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Abstract
This thesis provides a critical analysis of the work of Jiirgen Habermas and
explores ways in which his theories can be used to inform an analysis of education.
The study examines key elements of his Critical Theory and his Critical Social
Theory. It is suggested that there are significant weaknesses with these. The nature
of the testing of his theories is outlined. This entails a study of his contribution to
the sociology of school knowledge and ideology critique within that field. Following
this a series of outline prescriptions is made for the development of emancipatory
curricula. A 'severe' test of his theories is then undertaken in a case study of the
National Curriculum of England and Wales. Finally it is argued, as a result of the
general analysis of education and the specific case study, that Habermas's work,
though it contains several flaws and weaknesses, has some limited heuristic value
in an analysis of education but that his contribution to the development of an
emancipated society and of the degree to which his work stimulates education to
empower students is largely an empirical matter.
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Chapter I
THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
1.1 Introduction
Several socio-political analyses of education draw on the tradition of ideology
critique whose roots can be traced to Marx and his predecessors and to recent
variants of Marxism.' In this enterprise recent critiques of education have begun to
turn to the work of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory 2 to provide a theoretical
basis for their discourse.3
The emergence of ideological, socio-culturai, socio-political and philosophical
analyses of education leads to the coupling of the sociology of education and the
philosophy of education. The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory constitutes a
body of thought which synthesizes these several strands and which crystaffizes the
rationales for these types of analysis.
There is a developing educational literature which uses some of Habermas's
work (Ewert, 1991). However the educational texts which refer to his work over-
whelmningly use his early and midd1e period' works. These works deal with four
main concerns: (a) a critique of society which is overtaken by instrumentalism,
1 Eg the works of Aithusser, 1972; Grainsci, 1971; Bowles and Gintis, 1976: Willis, 1977; Corrigait,
1977: Gironx. 1983: Gibson, 1984; Whitty, 1985; Morrison, 1987; Smyth, 1987.
2 The eapitalisation of Critical Theory throughout this thesis indicates reference to the Frankfurt
School of Critical Theory and to those fields of sociology, philosophy and politics which draw from
the key writers iu this school.
For example Giroux. 1983, 1989; Aronowits and Giroux, 1985; Carr and Kemmis, 1986; Grundy,
1987: Morrison. 1989a.
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scientism and technicism; (b) ideology critique; (c) crises in modern society; (d)
knowledge-constitutive interests. In particular, since the field of the curriculum is
concerned with knowledge, authors have used Habermas's theories of knowledge-
constitutive interests to gain some purchase on problematical aspects of the cur-
riculum.4 However in his later writings Habermas has turned his back on his theory
of knowledge-constitutive interests. There is, then, a time lag between the work
of Haberinas and its treatment by educationists. Further, there is only limited
educational literature which takes up the later work of Habermas, ie that which
Habermas has been developing in the field of communicative action (eg Young,
1992).
There are very many specific aspects of Habermas's work from the perspectives
of sociology and philosophy which have not been synthesized in any up-to-date
texts5 nor are they addressed fully by educationists. A comprehensive and up-to-
date critique and application of his work needs to be undertaken.
1.2 The Purpose of the Study
There are four main features which need to be examined in the work of Haber-
mas. Firstly there is a need to use the full range of his work in the field of education;
secondly there is a need to bring together the several existing critiques of his work
and to add to these; thirdly there is a need to examine the contribution which the
work of Habermas can make to an analysis of education; fourthly there is a need
to verify and evaluate the nature, status and value of Habermas's theories.
Firstly the thesis will undertake a critical examination of the work of Jürgen
' For exalul)1e Carr and Kemniis, 1986; Grundy, 1987; Hargreaves, 1989; Morrison, 1987, 1989a,
1989b: Siiiytli. 1989a.
McCart1iys (1978) excellent critique is dated, Held's (1980) summary is slight and dated.
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Habermas. The senses in which his views constitute 'theory' will be clarified and
it will be suggested that his theories stand in need of proof and testing; the nature
of the proof and testing of Habermas's theories wifi be clarified.
Secondly it will be suggested that testing his theories can be undertaken by
demonstrating how his work can be used in a substantive area - in this instance
the field of education. This will be done in two ways: firstly by seeing how his
work can inform an analysis of the school curriculum generall secondly by taking
a particular case study within the field of the curriculum. In the case study -
the introduction of the National Curriculum of England and Wales and, more
particularly, the cross-curricular themes within it - it will be argued that this
permits the application of several of the themes contained in the work of Habermas
and hence will provide fertile ground for examining whether Habermas's theories
will stand scrutiny and whether they have any contribution to make to an analysis
of the curriculum; it constitutes the equivalent of a Popperian 'severe test' of his
theory. The thesis will offer an evaluation of Habermas's theories through a case
study. This will serve the purpose of establishing whether Habermas's theories are
applicable when subjected to analysis in a substantive field.
The thesis proposed is that the work of Habermas, though it contains very
many flaws and cannot be tested in the style of the natural sciences, has heuristic
value both per se and can be tested in the field of the curriculum. The nature of
that heuristic value, however, is limited.
1.3 The Significance of the Thesis
The work of Habermas has received acclaim and critique. The critiques have
been developed disparately and piecemeal, often in tandem with the appearance
16
of new works from Habermas. No single work yet brings together and analyses the
criticisms and critiques which have accumulated of Haberrnas's work. This thesis
attempts that task.
This thesis provides an overview of the nature and configuration of curriculum
analysis which is informed by Habermasian principles and provides a specific case
study of how these principles can be addressed.
Though commentaries, interpretations and guidelines for practice are available
on each cross-curricular theme, skill or dimension little attention has been given to
date to a comprehensive critique of the guidance booklets issued by the National
Curriculum Council for the cross-curricular issues with reference to the work of
Habermas. This thesis addresses this task. The National Curriculum of England
and Wales has not been analysed in light of Habermasian principles. This thesis
both establishes how this might be approached and undertakes such an analysis.
The testing of Habermas's theories has not been addressed in any extended
form. This thesis addresses that task in two ways, firstly by indicating the types of
testing that are possible and indicating how the nature of a 'severe test' of Haber-
mas's theories can derive from his analysis of knowledge-constitutive interests,
communicative action and the ideal speech situation, and secondly by undertaking
one aspect of that testing (through non-empirical analysis).
1.4 The Parameters of the Study
There are six deliberate parameters to this thesis: (i) the selective reading
of Haberinas; (ii) the use of Habermas in translation rather than in the original
German; (iii) the lack of empirical study in the thesis; (iv) the outline form of the
17
discussion of the curriculum in Habermasian terms; (v) the choice of the case study
and the documents used in it; (vi) the use of the broader aspects of Habermas's
social theory in those sections of the thesis which discuss education.
The work of Haberma.s is voluminous. It can be read in a host of different ways
and for a variety of purposes. 6 Given the breadth of his work one would struggle
in vain to arrive at a synoptic view of his theories; any reading of Habermas will
be not only selective but wifi reflect the interests and purposes of the reader: 'In
every philosophy there is a point at which the philosopher's 'conviction' appears
on the scene' (Nietzsche, 1973, p. 20).
This thesis will focus on the outcomes of Habermas's analysis as they con-
tribute to his own developing theories rather than to the background discussions
which lead to those outcomes (except where they are necessary as part of the cri-
tique of his works). In particular this thesis will focus on: his ideology critique,
his analysis of scientism, technicism and positivism, his knowledge-constitutive in-
terests, his view of a reconstructive science, his Theory of Communicative Action
and its sub-elements, his views on strategic and communicative action, his attempt
to rework Weber's analysis of the bureaucratisation of society, his social theory,
his appeal to a rational consensus. The selection of these themes is justified on
the grounds that they develop a cumulative argument and permit a critique of
Habermas to be undertaken; his early themes (eg ideology critique, knowledge-
constitutive interests, critique of instrumentalism) are either used in his later work
or else are replaced by Habermas (eg his work on knowledge-constitutive interests,
his work On The Logic of the Social Sciences).
0 This thl('si5 will abide by the following convention: where reference is made to Habermas's two-
voIiuiu work The Theory of Communicative Action the start of these words will be
capitalisv(l: where reference to a theory of communicative action generally, not necessarily in his
two-voluiite work. then capital letters will not be used.
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The key texts of Habermas which are used in this thesis are all books:
(i) Towards a Rational Society (1971a);
(ii) Knowledge and Human Interests (1972);
(iii) Theory and Practice (1974);
(iv) Legitimation Crisis (1976a);
(v) Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979a);
(vi) The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume One - Reason and the
Rationalization of Society (1984);
(vii) The Theory of Communicative Action: Volume Two - Lifeworid and
System (1987a);
(viii) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990a).
These key texts represent his main attempts to develop a social theory and
a Critical Theory of society. Habermas's books The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity (1987) and On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1988) are used only
as they contribute to Habermas's developing argument in this thesis. These two
books contain much additional material which takes the reader into areas which
are tangential to the developing argument of the thesis, eg post-modernism and
methodology respectively. Though the reading of Habermas will be selective it is
not intended to distort the messages and themes of Habermas which are explored
in this thesis. This will be demonstrated in the chapters which address Habermas's
work. The selection is a fair representation of these themes in Habermas's work.
Habermas's major works have all been translated into English and this thesis
19
uses the English translations. There is an inevitable risk of the loss of nuance and
meaning in translation; translators have addressed the problem consistently in their
work in three ways: (a) by including the original German in parentheses after any
problematical translations, (b) by providing commentary notes on translations,
(c) by adhering to the translations of words and phrases of previous translations.
Exceptions to this are the work of Masschelein (1991) who replaces 'knowledge-
constitutive interests' with 'knowledge-guiding interests' and Kunneman (1990)
who replaces 'the colonization of the lifeworid' with 'the colonialization of the
lifeworid'. In both these cases the works are themselves translations. What marks
the translations is the consistency of the shared vocabulary. In some cases (see
bibliography) this is because a single translator has translated more than one of
Habermas's texts; in others it is because existing translations of words and phrases
are adopted in later works.
The work of Habermas has attracted several criticisms, the synthesis of which
is one of the purposes of this thesis. The thesis will argue for the need to subject
Habermas's work to empirical test. This thesis clarifies the contribution which
Habermas's work can make to the curriculum in principle before an empirical test
of that contribution can be undertaken. This, in itself, is a large enterprise as it
has not been done in any comprehensive way in the field of the curriculum.
It will be argued that one of the tests of Habermas's theories will be the extent
to which their adoption might bring about emancipation and empowerment. This
thesis approaches the task in two ways: (i) by mapping out the curricular territory
in which empowerment and emancipation might be addressed in broad terms,
(ii) by providing a specific example of how this might occur within the field of
the curriculum (the case study of the introduction of the National Curriculum of
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England and Wales). It will be demonstrated that emancipation and empowerment
are possible even within a 'bureaucratised' curriculum.
1.5 The Structure of the Thesis
From a critique of Habermas will be derived a set of criteria which can be
used to test and evaluate his theories. These wifi be established and used in a
substantive field - the curriculum. The sections of the thesis which deal with the
curriculum provide a new area for study which can be used to inform an evaluation
of the potential and significance of the work of Habermas. Here the style of critique
is analysis and argument.
Though the argument through the thesis is largely linear and cumulative the
thesis falls into three main sections: section one (chapters 2 - 8) deals exclusively
with Habernms's work; section two (chapters 9 - 12) moves to a discussion of the
curriculum; section 3 (chapter 13) evaluates Habermas's theories in the light of the
worked examples in the field of the curriculum and the case study of the National
Curriculum and offers a set of prescriptions for introducing Habermas's work into
the curriculum.
Within the three sections there are thirteen chapters. Chapters 2 - 8 present,
analyse and critique the work of Habermas. The topics under discussion follow a
chronology of their appearance in the work of Habermas. Each of these chapters
follows a common format - a presentation of the issue, a critique of the issue and
an analysis of the contribution of that critique to a developing, cumulative critique
of the work of Habermas. Chapter 2 sets the scene for the work of Habermas, pro-
viding a brief context of the Frankfurt School and the nature of Critical Theory,
indicating its Marxist roots. Chapter 3 then clarifies Habermas's critique of 'or-
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thodox' Marxism and his attempt to rework a Marxist science of society. Chapter
4 takes forward this project in an analysis of Habermas's ideology critique and his
theory of knowledge-constitutive interests.
Chapters 2 - 5 set out some elements of Habermas's developing social theory. In
chapters 6 and 7, the strands traced in the preceding chapters are drawn together
into a social theory as a theory of communicative action. Chapter 6 indicates the
communicative turn in his theory and the sub-elements of it whilst chapter 7 sets
out his two-volume work on The Theory of Communicative Action. This theory is
seen to draw together the strands of the developing argument to date in the thesis.
Chapter 8 provides a global critique of his theories qua theory. The nature,
status and testing of theory are discussed; this chapter concludes that his views may
have heuristic potential. The heuristic value of Habermas's theories is indicated in
chapters 9 - 12, where his principles are used in an analysis of the sociology of school
knowledge (chapter 10) and of emancipatory curricula (chapter 11). Chapter 12
takes a case study - the introduction of the National Curriculum of England and
Wales - and undertakes a Habermasian critique of this, in particular focussing on
the cross-curricular issues of the National Curriculum as it is in these, it is argued,
that emancipatory potential lies in terms of content and pedagogy.
Chapter 13 then considers the contribution which Habermas's work can make
to social theory, methodology of social enquiry and the curriculum and whether
this contribution can be considered to meet the criteria of testing and value of his
theory which was set out in chapter 8. The chapter also summarises the criteria
for undertaking a 'severe test' of Habermas's theories which derive from a fusion
of the case study, his own principles for rational reflection, communicative action,
22
and the ideal speech situation, and suggests areas for future empirical research.
1.6 The Argument in the Thesis
The argument is advanced that the elements of Habermas's work at every
stage are flawed, both singly and severally. His critique of technicism, scientism
and positivism misrepresent their purposes and nature. His theory of knowledge-
constitutive interests not only is a vain attempt to root social theory in epis-
temology but makes several untenable assumptions about the premises, struc-
ture and purposes of knowledge and knowledge-constitutive interests which are
self-referentially incoherent and which conceal the ideological nature of his own
tenets. The appeal to Freudian psychology as a methodology for the operation
of knowledge-constitutive interests and as a methodology for the emancipation of
societies is fundamentally misconceived.
That Habermas jettisons his theory of knowledge-constitutive interests and
replaces it with a theory of communicative action as a paradigm for understand-
ing social developments is not necessarily an improvement, for each element of his
theory of communicative action is flawed. His notion of a special - separate -
category of reconstructive science does not stand scrutiny and commits the natural-
istic fallacy; his use of speech act theory misrepresents his sources and unjustiflably
privileges communicative action over strategic action; his use of strategic and com-
municative action is little more than a reworking of his technical and emancipatory
knowledge-constitutive interests - which themselves are problematical; his appeal
to the ideal speech situation offers little practical assistance in serving the principles
of a critical theory and collective empowerment; his use of Piaget and Kohlberg
as a model for social evolution is Eurocentric; his accounts of the lifeworid and its
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colonization are internally inconsistent and further misrepresent his sources; his
views are given the status of argument when in fact they are axioms.
Not only are the elements of his theory misconceived but the status of his views
as a 'grand theory' is questionable as the charge of relativism has not been refuted
and as the charge of positivism (which Habermas proscribed in others' views) can
be levelled; even if relativism were refuted it is questionable whether the status
of his theory as a 'critical theory' can be upheld; a post-modern critique of his
theory would criticise it at root for its totalising intent and hermetically sealed
framework. The nature of proof of his theory is confused because his theory is
flawed and it does not know its own nature - as empirical theory, grand theory,
critical theory, axioms, slogan, polemic, explanation, argument, heuristic; however,
as his reconstructive science differs little from an empirical science his theory can
be tested empirically and in a 'severe test' in the field of education. His theories
are as instrumental as those he proscribed in his early critiques of instrumentalism.
The criteria to judge and test his theories will require: (i) internal consistency;
(ii) fruitfulness and fertility; (iii) informing and extending understandings in new
contexts; (iv) an identification of the types of 'evidence' required; (v) successful
testing in new contexts; (vi) testing in a 'severe test'.
In respect of (i) it is argued that, because his theories contain so many flaws
they survive as heuristics rather than substantively whole explanations; criteria
(ii) and (iii) are met by indicating how his work contributes to an understanding
of the sociology of school knowledge, curriculum design and research and a study
of the National Curriculum; criterion (iv) is addressed in the statement of need for
empirical verification, eg the requirement that his work brings about emancipation
24
in practice; criterion (v) is addressed in the study of the curriculum, setting the
framework for what will be an empirical verification of his theories; criterion (vi)
is undertaken in a case study of the National Curriculum.
The criteria for rendering the case study a 'severe test' are: (a) it is a context
which is different from Habermas's original; (b) the potential for emancipatory
action is limited; (c) it is a bureaucratized curriculum; (d) it is a 'hegemonic aca-
demic curriculum' marked by strong classification and framing; (e) it is socially
reproductive; (1) it is heavily prescriptive; (g) it reinforces the 'cultural capital
thesis'; (h) it suppresses generalizable interests, emanating from the agenda of
the New Right and sectional political interests; (i) it is ideologically loaded and
perlocutionary (strategic), eg with Hayekian market models, a market mentality
(competitiveness, consumerism, individualism, acquisitiveness, choice and diver-
sity, information, privatisation, quality control, freedom from constraint); j) it
serves the technical and hermeneutic rather than the emancipatory interest; (k) it
was introduced by the 'steering media' of law and power. It is argued that, whilst
the major elements of the National Curriculum offer limited scope for emanci-
pation, nevertheless the cross-curricular themes contain the scope for significant
emancipation in respect of their aims, content and pedagogy.
It is argued that, though flawed, Habermas's views do meet the six criteria
for successful verification. As such they do have S a contribution to make to an
understanding of the curriculum. However, the significance of that contribution is
limited. It is argued that several of the outcomes of a Habermasian analysis in fact
do not require Haberrnas's views for their educational justifications or foundations.
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Chapter II
THE BACKGROUND TO HABERMAS'S WORK
2.1 Introduction
The chapter briefly sets the work of Habermas in the context of the Frankfurt
School of Critical Theorists and indicates how critical theorists viewed the differ-
ences between traditional theory and critical theory. It suggests how Habermas
offers a 'humanistic' interpretation of Western Marxism (Jessop, 1985) (as opposed
to, for example a political or economic interpretation). This section also signals a
concern which is fully addressed in chapter eight but which is a leitmotiv of many
chapters - the meaning of the term theory, the criteria for - and processes of -
confirming or refuting a theory, and the status of a theory.
2.2 Background of the Frankfurt School
The Frankfurt School of Critical Theorists was formed in 1923 as the Institute
of Social Research, nominally attached to the University of Frankfurt. Its early
membership contained Horkheimer, Benjamin and Marcuse who were united in
their conmion background of Marxism but who were anxious to develop an inter-
pretation of Marxism which was 'humanistic', less concerned with economic and
political forms of Marxism and more concerned with the social-psychological im-
plications of Marxism in its emerging forms in western societies. It recognized that
some of the principal elements of classical Marxism (eg the power of the proletariat,
the significance of labour and production, the two-class analysis of society) stood
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in need of revision and reworking to give them contemporary significance. Whilst
they accepted the notion of critique from Marx, they attempted to rework that
critique and indicate its operation in Western Europe (Held, 1980).
For the first decade the Frankfurt School's output comprised diverse research
projects which, though informed by Marxism, covered a wide field of study, 7 eg
authoritarianism, mass culture, ideology critique, humanist Marxism, aesthetics.
In 1933 the Nazis secured power in Germany. At that time the School included a
strong Jewish membership, had a clear affinity with Marxism, and was generally
advocating a critical stance to dominatory and inegalitarian forms of authority.
This being critical of Nazism the School moved from Frankfurt to Geneva (1933)
and then to New York (1935) and California (1941 - 1957), under the directorship
of Max Horkheimer (from 1930 - 1958). The impact of Nazism on the School is
significant, it is no accident perhaps that the School had an abiding interest in
authoritarianism in its social-psychological context. 8 Another major and enduring
focus of early critical theory was Freud.9 These promoted an enquiry into propa-
ganda and the use of media.'° Indeed the Marxist context of critical theory, with
its notions of ideology critique, freedom, emancipation and justice, stood in direct
contrast to the authoritarianism of Nazism.
In its move to New York and then to California the members of the School
were faced with a materialistic 'popular culture S which trivialised, glamourised,
anaesthetised and mythologised both its products and its mass consumers' (Gibson,
1986). Again it is no accident that this challenge to its existing values of culture
' Eg Grossiiiaii. 1929; Pollock, 1929; Wittfogel, 1931.
8 Eg Adurito. 1950; Horkheimer, 1936, 1949, 1973; Marcuse, 1934; Neumann. 1964.
Eg Fromiji. 1932. 1971; Horkheimer, 1940; Marcuse, 1951, 1955; Habermas, 1970a, 1971; Adorno
and Horklieiiitcr. 1946, 1972.
10 Adorno. 1946: Bettellicim and Janowitz, 1970; Horkheimer, 1939.
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and a tradition of rationalist intellectual and philosophical debate should spawn
a wealth of literature from the School on aesthetics and the arts, principally from
the musician Adorno but also from the other members of the School."
The move to North America also brought the School face to face with the
positivist tradition in the social sciences. The School subjected the positivism
which it encountered in North America to a series of critiques which spanned
several decades, well beyond its sojourn there.12
Taken together the effect of these critiques was to reaffirm a rationalist, human-
istic view of social theory. The School's commitments to a broad and 'humanist'
Marxist philosophy (Bernstein, 1983) complements the Marxisms of other schools
of thought (Jessop, 1985) (eg the economic Marxism of Capital, the state hege-
monic system of Gramsci's Prison Notebooks (1971), the structuralism of French
Marxism (eg Aithusser, 1972)). This reflected one concern of the Institute's direc-
tor, Max Horklieimer, to accord significance to the philosophical underpinning of
social science, which has remained an important concern since then.'3
2.3 The Nature of Critical Theory
The concept of critical as opposed to traditional social theory is an essential
tenet of the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer, 1972a). Critical Theory is deliberately
prescriptively normative (Horkheimer, 1972a), entailing a view of what behaviour
" Adoruo. 1936. 1939. 1941. 1945. 1952, 1954, 1964, 1970, 1971, 1973, 1975. 1976; Benjamin, 1929,
1973: Habcriiias. 1987a, 1987b; Horkheimer, 1941; Lowenthal, 1967: Marcuse, 1937a, 1978.
12 Adoriio. 1959. 1969, 1973, 1976; Horkheimer, 1972a - first published 1937. 1952, 1974; Marcuse,
1937b. 1964: Habermas 1971, 1972, 1974a, 1988.
13 Cf Adorui. 1977 first published in 1931, 1972 - first published in 1947. 1973 - first published
in 1966. 1969: Horkheimer. 1972a - separate articles for the translated volume first published in
1933 aiid 1937. 1939. 1972 - first published in 1947; Marcuse, 1928, 1932, 1937b. 1941. 1964, 1973;
Habriiia.s. 1972. 1974a, 1976a. 1979a, 1984, 1987a, 1987b.
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in a social democracy should entail. Its intention is not merely to give an account
of social formations and systems, it purposely goes beyond that to include a desire
to bring about a society based on equality and the emancipation of all sectors of
society where ideological distortion of 'real interests' has been eliminated (Geuss,
1981). It describes society not only as it is but as it ought to be (Bernstein, 1976,
p. 173). Critical Theory attempts to expose ideology and its operations, it seeks to
replace acceptance of given interpretations of society with normative prescriptions:
its purpose is not merely to understand society but to change it:
the theory never aims simply at increase in knowledge as such. Its goal is man's
ernan(:ipatiou from slavery, (Horkheimer, 1972a, p. 246).
This includes a transformative element whereby members emerge from oppres-
sion to emal1cipatiOfl and existential self-realization in a society in which justice
and 'generalizable interests' rather than the power of an elite hold sway (Haber-
mas, 1976a). McLaren (1989) argues that 'critical theorists are united in their
objectives: to empower the powerless and transform existing social inequalities
and injustices' (p. 160). Alexander (1991) agrees that 'Critical Theory...is ex-
plicitly political' (p. 40). Habermas (1991) acknowledges this where he writes:
'the theory of communicative action is not a completely unpolitical project', (p.
251). It supports critique as a necessary condition for emancipation and social
transformation. It is critical of the ideological functions of 'instrumental reason'
which are seen to perpetuate a 'technicist', 'scientistic' understanding of the world
dominated by positivism. Fay (1987), albeit post-dating many of the Frankfurt
School, provides a clear fourfold schema which differentiates critical theory from
traditional theory. This can be used as an entrée into Habermasian theory - or
indeed the Frankfurt School in general. Fay asserts that a critical social theory
will comprise:
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1. A theory of false consciousness which
(i) (lellloustrates the ways in which the self-understandings of a group of people
arc false (in the sense of failing to account for the life experiences of the members of the
group). or incoherent (because internally contradictory), or both; This is sometimes
called •i(leology-critique';
(ii) explains how the members of this group came to have these self-misunderstandings,
and how they are maintained;
(iii) contrasts them with an alternative self-understanding, showing how this
alternative is superior.
2. A theory of crisis which
(iv) spells out what a social crisis is;
(v) indicates how a particular society is in such a crisis. This would require
examining the felt dissatisfactions of a group of people and showing both that they
threaten social cohesion and that they can not be alleviated given the basic organi-
zation of the society and the self-understandings of its members;
(vi) provides an historical account of the development of this crisis partly in
terms of the false consciousness of the members of the group and partly in terms of
the structural bases of the society.
3. A theory of education which
(vii) offers an account of the conditions necessary and sufficient for the sort of
enlighteumueiit envisioned by the theory;
(viii) shows that given the current social situation these conditions are satisfied.
4. A theory of transformative action which
(ix) isolates those aspects of a society which must be altered if the social crisis
is to be resolved and the dissatisfactions of its members lessened;
(x) details a plan of action indicating the people who are to be the 'carriers'
of the amiticipated social transformation and at least some general idea of how they
might (10 this.
(Pay. 1987. pp. 31 - 2).
It will be argued, however, (chapters 4.4 and 8) that, working within these
criteria and fulfilling these criteria (as Habermas does), Critical Theory differs
from traditional theory less than its proponents would maintain; whereas Critical
Theory is overtly normative traditional theory is covertly normative. Habermas's
Critical Theory will be evaluated throughout the thesis as appropriate.
30
Chapter III
THE EARLY WORK OF HABERMAS
3.1 Introduction
•This chapter provides an overview of Habermas's attempt to rework a Marxian
analysis of society (3.2). It presents Habermas's critique of a traditional Marxian
analysis of society and then outlines his own reformulation. A critique of Haber-
mas's reinterpretation of Marxian social analysis is then presented (3.3). Arising
from the discussion will be the need to address the tension between agency and de-
terminism in social theory (3.4); this leads into Habermas's critique of technicism,
positivism and scientism (3.5). Finally a critique of Habermas's views of tech-
nicism, positivism and scientism is undertaken which indicates that his analysis,
though useful, is not without its weaknesses (3.6).
3.2 Habermas's Science of Society
3.2.1 Natural and Social Science
Habermas (1974a) was concerned to analyse the state of society in advanced
capitalism and to bring together the key social theories of Marx and Weber to
explain the development of twentieth century society - eg the rise of monopoly
capitalism, the bureaucratisation of society, the operation of power differentials in
society, the interrelationships between economic and political analyses of society,
the scientization of society, and to suggest that social theory was more appropri-
ately based on a paradigm of communication (cf. Roderick, 1986, pp. 44 and
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142). Habermas (1974b, p. 51) argues that there are inadequacies in classical
Marxian social theory, principally that it has become an inadequate analysis of
late capitalism, and therefore needs to be reformulated. These inadequacies are:
(a) the problems of base / superstructure theory and an economy driven view
of society ie a 'paradigm of production';
(b) the supposition that social class is the principle structural element of
society and that the class struggle is confined to the labour process;
(c) the reductionist and determinist view of social and individual agency;
(d) the functionalist basis of social science;
(e) the primacy of the economic aspect of life as the motor of social life -
the overemphasis on social change in the mode of production as the key to social
change generally;
(f) the rise in general standards of living which do not spring solely from an
economic cause;
(g) the dissolution of the proletariat; in advanced capitalist societies the pro-
letariat was not revolutionary but had been successfully integrated intcrthe system;
(li) the decline of Marxism in socialist countries;
(i) the fact that socialist revolutions occurred not in developed capitalist so-
cieties but in developing societies;
(j) the fact that class divisions still existed in socialist countries (ie that these
societies were not emancipated).
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Whilst Haberrnas accepts the importance of economic factors in determining
social evolution he is concerned about the significance attached to the economic
domain as the motor of society in traditional Marxism: 'it was wrong of orthodox
Marxists to privilege the mode of production as the single motor of history' (Jay,
1984, p. 487).' Habermas contends that superstructural - 'lifeworld' - elements
of society - religion, the law, politics, education for example - exert a major de-
termining influence on the economic base of society.' 5 In saying this he echoes
the work of the Italian Marxist Gramsci (1971) who suggests that the state ex-
erts hegemonic influence in enforcing the economic base of society, and the French
Marxist Aithusser (1972) who suggests that powerful ideological state apparatuses,
not just economic apparatuses, reproduce inequality. Aithusser (ibid.) argues that
it is only 'in the last instance' that economic issues will drive social circumstances.
Habermas regards as inherently flawed and outmoded the base / superstructure
theory of society. Given the complexity of social forces in modern society, the
rise of bureaucratization, the fragmenting of the class structure along more than
economic lines (Habermas, 1984, 1987a), the failure of the social relations of pro-
duction wholly to determine interpersonal relations outside production, and the
recognition that it is not simply the proletariat who bring about revolutionary
change, Habermas (ibid.) clearly identifies major elements of classical Marxism
which are in need of revision.
Habermas (1971a, 1974b, 1988) argues that there is a reciprocal or dialectical
informing of the base and superstructures of society - it is not a one-way, bottom-
up process (cf Eagleton, 1991, pp. 81 -2). Orthodox Marxism, then, is seen to
14 Haheruias's later work seeks to replace a paradigm of production' with a 'paradigm of communi-
catiou in revitahsrng Marxism.
Haberujas. 1972. p. 1O1 1974b, p. 51: 1987a, p. 168.
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be out of date in late capitalism (Habermas, 1974b, p. 50; 1988, P. 20). The
increasing role of state intervention into the economic base of society confounds
the simplicity of the base / superstructure theory:
Tlit' sphere of commodity exchange and social labour requires so much cen-
tralizc(l organization and administration that bourgeois society, once left to private
initiative operating according to the rules of the free market, is forced to resort to
political mediation of its commerce for many of its branches. However, if it is no
longer autonomously constituted as that sphere which serves as presupposition and
ba.sis for the state, then state and society no longer stand in the classical relationship
of superstructure and base (Habermas, 1974a, p. 195).
Classical Marxism is inadequate for a contemporary analysis of the relation-
ships between state and society, state and the economy:
the process of accumulation can indeed be switched over from economic to po-
litical mechanisms to the degree to which, in any case, state intervention is forced to
regulate amid stabilize the total economic cycle. Under these conditions the depen-
dence of political actions on economic interests, as this is presupposed by Mandsm,
becomes problematic (Habermas, 1974a, p. 235).
Habermas continues:
Due to the introduction of elements of the superstructure into the base itself,
the classhal dependency relationship of politics to the economy was disrupted (ibid.
p. 237).
Politics is 'no longer only a phenomenon of the superstructure' (Habermas,
1971a, p. 101). The state is not - nor ever was - ideologically neutral (Gramsci,
1971; Aithusser, 1972), nor indeed does it have an insignificant role to play in
the perpetuation of inequality, it serves the interests of the 'private • proprietors'
rather than society as a whole, thus remaining an instrument of domination, of
repression (Habermas, 1971a p. 111). It is a regulator of capital and a regulator
of ideology (cf. Habermas, 1972, Pp. 102- 7). The state 'has the task of sustaining
the accumulation process [whilst maintaining] a certain level of 'mass loyalty'
(Held, 1982, p. 184). It is that agent which perpetuates the private appropriation
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of socially produced surplus value (cf. Haberma.s, 1976a, chapter 4).16
Habermas argues that 'Marxian orthodoxy has a hard time explaining govern-
ment interventionism, mass democracy, and the welfare state' (Habermas, 1987a,
p. 343), it neglects the significance or power of these factors. Habermas suggests
that 'between capitalism and democracy there is an indissoluble tension' (ibid., p.
345), as advanced capitalism is premissed on state regulated exploitation. Haber-
mas echoes Gramsci (1971) in arguing that the welfare state 'renders the class
antagonism still built into the economic system innocuous' (Habermas, 1987a, p,
350) whilst at the same time perpetuating a capitalist system.
Habermas's 'humanistic' form of Marxism recognizes that 'the emancipation
of society caii 110 longer be articulated directly in economic terms' (ibid. p. 195):
'the economistic approach breaks down in the face of the pacification of class con-
flict and the long-term success of reformism in European countries since World
War II' (ibid., p. 343). The Marxism of The Communist Manifesto and Capi-
tal casts society in a class conflict model. This has the attraction of simplicity
and polemics. By isolating the root causes of inequality in capitalism Marx was
able to construct a polemical and easily visible attack on structural inequalities
in capitalist society. Habermas extends this in his Legitimation Crisis (1976a),
where he sees crises of legitimation, motivation .and economic growth arising in
the politico-administrative, sociocultural and economic domains respectively.17
Marx's analysis has several drawbacks which render it an inappropriate model
16 Habermas comments that: when I examine and consider all the flourishing republics in the world
today. believe me. nothing comes to mind except the conspiracy of the rich, who seek their own
advantage tuider the name and title of the republic (Habermas, 1974a, p. 53).
17 Hahermas (1979b) adds to this 'five developmental problems of the modern state: problems of
identity. penetration, legitimation, participation and redistribution (Habermas, 1979b, p. 19), sol-
uble by uat.iou building, modernizing administration, institutionalizing basic rights in law, political
denioc racy. and e.stablisliment of a system of social security respectively (ibid., p. 19).
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of late twentieth century society. Dahrendorf (1959) argues that Marxian analysis
fails to account for the emergent 'middle classes'. He argues that Marx's two great
social classes have been splintered into a variety of social groups whose number
depends on the authors one reads. The point is not only that there is a proliferation
of classes, but that the economic criterion used to delineate a social class is no
longer the sole factor in considering the structure of those groups in society.'8
Whilst orthodox Marxism may have value in addressing the class position of
those at the extremes of the social structure, for others it is simply irrelevant: 'the
unequal distribution of social rewards reflects a structure of privilege that can no
longer be traced back to class positions in any unqualified way' (Habermas, 1987a,
pp. 348 - 9). Whether this is because class has become so deeply embedded in the
structure of society as to become unnoticed - though nevertheless present (ie it
has become submerged as society has become saturated with its ideology, it has
become 'latent') - it remains an anachronism. Habermas accepts the worth of a
class analysis (he writes 'in the final analysis.. .class structure is the source of the
legitimation deficit' (Habermas, 1976a, p. 73)), he nevertheless breaks with this
Marxian axiom when he argues that 'what separates us from Marx are evident
historical truths, for example that in the developed capitalist societies there is
no identifiable class' (Habermas, 1982, p. 221). Habermas (1974a) suggests that
'any class consciousness, especially a revolutionary class consciousness, is not to be
found in the main strata of the working class today' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 196):
in the face of a class antagonism pacified by means of welfare-state nieasures.
however. aiid ilL the face of the growing anonymity of class structures the theory of
class eolLselollsIle.SS loses its empirical reference (ibid., p. 352).
Habermas is breaking with orthodox Marxism, which saw emancipation as
18 Cf Wd,'rs (1972) suggestion that power and status are significant variables in social grouping.
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only happening via the proletariat, to a position where everyone may be the in-
strument of emancipation.'9
Weber's account of the importance of the role of power and its rationalization
into bureaucracy makes a significant addition to Marxian social theory. 'For Weber,
bureaucratization is a key to understanding modern societies' (Habermas, 1988,
p. 306). By introducing these two components of social interaction Weber is
able to offer an analysis of society which respects its complexity. For Weber the
characteristic of advanced capitalism is its 'iron cage' of bureaucracy, wherein
spheres or zones of power, authority and legitimately are comprehensively worked
out - rationalized - and carefully delineated, becoming strictures on individual
powers and freedoms as well as structures of society.
The recognition in Weber that a Marxian two-class view of society can be
replaced by an analysis which allows for an infinite number of groupings, where
differentials of power - be they determined by income, status, or membership of
institutions - caii follow from a variety of criteria (Weber, 1972) is an important
factor which Habermas uses in discussing notions that the realization that empow-
erment of individuals and social groups is a multifaceted phenonemon which takes
place in a variety of spheres (cf Keat, 1981, p. 50). Social class might be one of
those spheres but it is only one out of many.
The analysis of Weber is a major preoccupation of Habermas's mature writ-
ing on social theory (Habermas, 1984, 1987a - discussed in chapter 7 of this
thesis), indeed Habermas devotes much of his two-volume outline of The Theory
19 Tn this rsj mct Habermas echoes the view of other critical theorists. Horkheimcr (1972a), deliber-
ately snhilularizilIg his own and Adorno's views, writes: 'It is possible for the consciousness of every
social stratum today to be limited and corrupted by ideology, however much, for its circumstances,
it may I)( lnnt on truth (Horklieirner, 1972a, p. 242).
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of Communicative Action to an analysis of the contribution of Weber and to a sug-
gested way of breaking free of Weber's 'iron cage' of bureaucracy through ideology
critique and through the development of communicative action (1987a, 1987b).
Whilst Weber sees no alternative to the 'iron cage' of bureaucracy Habermas is
more sanguine in his prognostications, developing, for example, the significance
of cultural, communicative and affective forms of rationality as an alternative to
technicism and instrumentalism.
Having suggested briefly that Habermas attempts to break free of the eco-
nomic determinism and simplistic class analysis of classical Marxism .this section
moves to a discussion of the methodology of the social sciences. This provides not
only a critique of classical Marxist methodology but an introduction to the nature
and purpose of Habermas's critique of positivism, scientism and instrumentalism.
It draws particularly on the early works of Habermas 2° though it does lay the
ground for his Theory of Communicative Action (1984; 1987a).
3.2.2 Marxist Positivistic Social Science
Marx's conception of a science of society bears strong similarities to the nat-
ural sciences, with their striving for the generation of norms, laws (Habermas,
1974a, p. 168), the isolation and controffing of: variables, and the espousal of
positivism.21 Hahermas retains the position of the Frankfurt School outlined in
the introduction to this thesis - a deep-seated suspicion of positivist social sci-
ences (Habermas, 1972, chapters 2 and 3). He 22 takes issue with Marx's comments
that natural science will eventually subsume the social sciences to become a sin-
20 Haberixta.s. 1971a: 1972; 1974a; 1974b.
21 Alt.hough lie liiutself established the science of man in the form of critique and not as a natural
science, lie cont.iiiiially tended to classify it with the natural sciences' (Habermas, 1972, p. 45).
22 HaberlilaM. 1974a. 1984, 1987a.
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gle science. For Habermas the conflation of the natural and the social sciences is
problematic (Haberinas, 1972, P. 162).
He is concerned about the status and future of sociology itself, fearing that it
will become merely 'an applied science in the service of administration' (ibid. p.
208), where 'the power of technical control remains wholly indifferent with respect
to the possible value systems, in the service of which it is to be exercised' (ibid. p.
269). The concern about the putative amorality of applied social theory sets the
scene for a Habermasian reinterpretation of social processes and for a later analysis
of the role of schools in this scenario. 23 A Marxian analysis (though not exclusively
so) - and indeed neo-Marxian analysis from Aithusser - suggests that we have to
accept that in the overwhelming number of cases individuals' actual and projected
life styles, social development and freedoms are determined or 'overdetermined' by
the constraints which are external to them (Aithusser, 1972; Giddens, 1979).
Habermas rejects a deterministic and functionalist view (Habermas, 1974a, p.
206), echoing the early Frankfurt School (chapter 2) whose work was set against
the backdrop of emerging Nazism and Fascism and its domination of the individual
(Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972). Individuals make society as well as society mak-
ing individuals, however conscious or not this may be (Habermas, 1972, p. 244),
a truism which nevertheless rejects the economic determinism of Marx and the
bureaucratic determinism of Weber. Aithusser and Marx, whilst acknowledging
this, place less emphasis on it in the agency / structure dialectic (Layder, 1994).
23 Habrmis recognizes that 'in the social sciences we have a peculiar combination of hermeneutic
and euIl)irical analytical methods' (Habermas, 1974b, p. 48). ie an interpretive rather than solely
a positivist.0 element.
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3.3 A Critique of Habermas's Reinterpretation of Marx
Habermas's attempt to rework Marxism can be criticised for the elevation of
theory, for his neglect of Marxism, for his remoteness from the working class and
for lack of clarity over the audiences of his views. These issues are commented
upon here and are features which are returned to in a much fuller way in chapters
7 and 8.
Lazarsfeld (1984) criticizes Habermas for abstract theory: 'the sociologist
attracted by the atmosphere of Critical Theory could not learn how to proceed if he
wanted to study a specific topic' (Lazarsfeld, 1984, P. 232). Similarly Heydebrand
and Burns (1984) argue that, in separating theory and praxis so sharply, Habermas
has in effect relegated praxis and partialized its power (Heydebrand and Burns,
1984, p. 411). Together they suggest that the effect of Habermas's preoccupation
with theory is a political and practical paralysis.
To the view that he gives too much weight to superstructural elements Haber-
ma.s (1972, 1974b, 1987a) argues that that there is a need for the base / super-
structure theory to be reworked, which moves from an economic interpretation to
a theory of communicative action. Also there are superstructural elements to be
found in the base, and there are new modes of production that need to be brought
into the base. That lie neglects the class component dimension in his analysis has
been suggested by Woodiwiss (1977).
The third concern is that, in contrast to the Marx of The Gommunist Man-
ifesto, Habermas has in effect evolved a proletarian theory which is not for the
proletariat. Hahermas's view is problematic. He suggests that 'involvement' can
take a variety of forms - from the formation of theory, through the implementation
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of the theory to the mobilisation of political practice. The process of enlightenment
from involvement thus operates at three levels:
Level 1. 'the formation and extension of critical theorems, which can stand
up to scientific discourse' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 32);
Level 2. 'the organization of the processes of enlightenment' (ibid. p. 32);
Level 3. 'the selection of appropriate strategies, the solution of tactical ques-
tions, and the conduct of the political struggle' (ibid. p. 32).
Haberma.s is operating substantially at level one. One has to question here
whether this theory above will ever have the potential to drive praxis - a feature
that Habermas accepts:
the prognostic capacity of social theories was and is very limited - that could
hardly be otherwise, given the high level of abstraction at which these statements
concerning complex states of affairs are formulated (Habermas, 1985a, p. 89).
With reference to the fourth concern - that Habermas is unclear on the
targets of his Critical Theory - Heller (1982) articulates the problem:
If all reflective theories offer an interpretation of the latent interests of one
group. then either the theories have to be particularised (different interests, different
theories), or else we must accept that all groups share the same interest. In the first
case a theory could not claim universality; in the second case it could not claim to be
interpreting interests at all (Heller, 1982, p. 30).
These assertions suggest that there is a logical and pragmatic inconsistency in
Habermas's theory. Habermas's early response, that 'in a process of enlightenment
there can only be participants' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 40),24 whilst it reinforces
the concepts of engagement and involvement, offers little practical solution to the
problem posed by Heller.
24 Cf also Yoniigs (1989) comment that the addressee of Critical Theory is clearly universal' (Young,
l989.p. 169).
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3.4 The Dialectic of Agency and Determinism
That there is a tension between agency (voluntarism) and determinism has
long been seen as both one one of the conceptual nightmares for sociølogists and,
more positively, a source of purchase on the explanation of the evolution of society
(Giddens, 1984, Habermas, 1984, P. 343; Layder, 1994). Habermas writes 'my
point of departure then, is that the problem for theory construction of how to
combine the basic concepts of systems and action theory is a genuine one' (Haber-
mas, 1987a, p. 201). In classical Marxian analysis, indeed in an Althusserian
interpretation of Marxism, human agency is negated, circumscribed or relegated
in importance; human behaviour is determined. Only with difficulty can one break
out of the system which is determining behaviour. In taking little account of the
agency of individuals - or even of disempowered social groups - this theory
fails to give a developed account of how society manages to evolve through the
mould-breaking actions of individuals, ie it is an inherently conservative model
(eg. Grarnsci, 1971; Althusser, 1972; Eagleton, 1991).
Habermasian theory, on the other hand, whilst it can be seen to be cast in
the mould of 'grand' macro sociological theory (cf. Giddens, 1985b), attempts to
accord more importance to individuals and agency in social theory - it attempts to
link macro and micro sociological theory whilst stifi preserving the essential conflict
and critical model which was generated by Marx. To do this Habermas alludes
to a central principle of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, arguing that it is social
processes and institutions which cause repression in the individual psyche and
produce neuroses (Habermas, 1972, p. 233). Habermas (1970a, 1972, 1974a) sets
great store by the implications of Freudianism for social theory which will be taken
up in detail in chapter five. Habermas is clearly unhappy about a structuralist
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theory in which little account is taken of the way in which individuals make or
shape society (Haberrnas, 1976b, p. 133). He comments:
we have to combine in a systematic manner the 'systems' approach with an
approach which has so far been explicated, rather in the pheuomeuological tradition
(Haberina.s. 1974b. p. 44).
Habermas attempts to do this in his Theory of Communicative Action. The
insidious effects of the 'technical control' mentality (ibid., p. 44) of the scientific
method, and the instrumentalist overtones of positivism render individuals more
passive players than agents of their own future roles. 25 This echoes Tar's (1984)
appreciation of the early Frankfurt School's concern with humanism, legitimation
crisis and aesthetics (Tar, 1984, pp. 12-13). Whilst Marx was clearly aware of
the idiographic as well as the nomothetic dimensions of social theory - indeed he
analysed the 'lived experiences' of reification - he nevertheless took a structuralist
stance on the interpretation of social formations, seeing reification, for example,
as a categorial issue in social theory.
Habermas (1984, 1987a), in avoiding the determinism of Marxism, is according
significance to the 'relative autonomy' of individuals to realize their existential
futures; he is breaking the mould of the traditional base / superstructure view of
social theory and is replacing it with a far more dialectical interpretation in which
agency itself has a determining influence on social formations.
3.5 Technicism, Positivism and Scientism
Habermas's own developing methodology for a science of society contains
several features:
• a rejection of scientism and positivism;
25 Sec also Hi,rkhcmier. 1972a, p. 229.
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• a consideration of the ambivalent position of technicism and natural science,
as they can be both emancipatory and constraining;
• the dangers of technicism and technicist mentalities.
These views derive from his early work 26 and his later, updated version of an
earlier work on the logic of the social sciences (1988).
Habermas contends that in striving to generate laws of human social be-
haviour and social evolution social science has become infected with the pos-
itivism which is characteristic of Western culture and society in general, what
Horkheinier (1972a) termed the 'mathematication of nature'. Positivism empha-
sises systematisation, empirical evidence, the importance of the 'scientific method'
and of adopting it in systematic investigation, the desire for precision inherent in
law-like hypotheses (Habermas, 1972, p. 75).
For Hahermas the desire to measure and then to control human agency, to
enter the hypothetico-deductive paradigm, to systematize, 'prove' and construct
data capable of replication (the methodology of the natural sciences) is both an in-
dication of the strength of the positivistic rationality and the power of science and
technology to provide twentieth century society with what it perceives to be the so-
lutions to the problems of social organization and integration. Whilst the increase
of technology might be appropriate for developing societies Habermas proscribes
the far reaching scientistic effects that the technicizing of culture exerts on devel-
oped western societies (Habermas, 1970a). He suggests that a state ideological -
hegemonic - intent is present, for when one considers the huge injection of state
intervention in promoting science and technology, where 'industrial research has
26 Haberiiia. 1971a. 1972, 1974a. 1974b.
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been linked up with research under government control' (Habermas, 1972, P. 104)
then technological innovation can be the instrument of further state hegemony, it
becomes another weapon in the armoury of state control (Habermas, 1974a p. 5).
Whilst science and technology join with labour power to become one of the
forces of production (and in classical Marxism therefore a pathway to societal
emancipation) this is problematical. Habermas realizes that technical progress
is a precondition and not necessarily a realization of emancipation (Habermas,
cited in Ottmann, 1982, p. 88). Science and technology can be emancipating and
they can be constraining - 'there are two kinds of mastery: a repressive and a
liberating one' (Habermas, 1972, pp. 86 - 7). The difference between Marx and
Habermas is clear here: 'science and technology - for Marx an unambiguously
emancipatory potential - themselves become the medium of social repression' for
Habermas (Habermas, 1984, p. 144) .27 Habermas however is operating from an
undifferentiated view of technology and science, assuming that it is 'dangerous or
negative' for everyone, where in reality it would be very positive and emancipatory
for some societies and people.
There is an unacknowledged feature in scientific rationality, that the desire to
control variables, environments and organisms (however defined) is inappropriate
when applied to human societies (cf Ottmann, 1982, p. 92), let alone to nature -
'the technical interest in mastery over nature encounters a nature taking revenge
upon the boundlessness of the will-to-control' (Ottmann, 1982, p. 89).28 Though
Habermas (1974a, p. 268) acknowledges that positivism might have the advan-
tage of exposing dogma it nevertheless risks fostering a mentality of control by
27 See also Haberivas. 1984, pp. 367 - 8; 1987b, p. 66.28 For exaitiple Ilie rabid use of fossil fuels to provide electricity rebounds back in the production of
ozow-(1e)lotiIIg gases and acid rain production.
ultimately restricting individual choice to a given set of alternatives - itself an
ideological process:
if the division of power and responsibility between experts and leaders is carried
out accor(lillg to the decisionistic pattern, then the politically functioning public realm
of the citwenry can serve only to legitimate the ruling group (Habermas, 1971, p. 67).
This is the spectre of 'decisionism' alluded to by Habermas. 2° Questions of
value are reduced to questions of expediency amongst a selection of 'given values,
means and boundary conditions' (Habermas, 1984, p. 170), ie pragmatism and
eclecticism. For Habermas the alleged objectivity of positivism in fact conceals its
own value positions and axioms, it is as much value based as Critical Theory, it
is as much an ideology as the ideologies it yurports to better (Habermas, 1972,
1974a). Technology assumes probability about 'given facts'; the pursuit of such
probability in constructing accounts of human behaviour misses a central element
of human behaviour, that it is uncertain, open to interpretation, open to debate,
mutable:
Today discussion centers on 'what we want in order to live' and not on 'how
we would like to live'. Technical questions are solved, practical goals are assumed as
given. Technology becomes a technocratic ideology (Landmann, 1984, p. 130).
Popper (1969), Kuhn (1970) and Chambers (1982) suggest that scientific
knowledge is not value-neutral but theory-saturated and that it is the espoused
theory which determines how one generates laws of science and which informs how
one begins to classify observational data as relevant or irrelevant. 30
 What one sees,
is informed by a set of theoretical preconceptions, as Popper (1969) says: 'the be-
lief that we can start with pure observation alone, without anything in the nature
29 For exauiile Habermas, 1971a, p. 82; 1972, p. 316; 1974a, p. 266.
30 Kulius (1970) and Chambers' (1982) accounts of the philosophy of science indicate the prevalence
of parathgmatzc views of science; the galactic structure in pre-Copernican times placed the earth
at the reut,re of the universe, the Copernican revolut{on adopted a heliocentric model. For scientists
before Galileo the downward movement of a weight attached to a piece of thread was interpreted
as its fall to earth interrupted by an attached thread; for Galileo it was a pendulum.
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of a theory, is absurd....Observation is always selective' (Popper, 1969, pp. 46-7).
The implication of the move which is clearly seen in the espousal of a technicist,
objectivist mentality away from discussion and debate towards the establishing of
immutable facts has the effect of separating fact from value (Horkheimer, 1972a;
Habermás, 1972, P. 339), aims from processes, purposes from predictable out-
comes, worth from assumed or unquestioned, unexamined worth:
they [technicism, scientism] can furnish technical recommendations for effective
instruiiieutalitics, but can no longer normatively give any orientation with respect to
goah th(1uselves. . .about the selection of aims, the priority of goals, the application of
noriiis (Haberiiias, 1974a, p. 114).
The effects of this separation of fact from value are huge, 3 ' for it indicates a
society dispossessed of moral judgements, disabled from cultural or moral advance,
playing out ascribed behaviours (Habermas, 1974a, p. 180), incapable of debating
values, reproducing the status quo, advancing a division of labour whose justice or
legitimacy remains unquestioned. It is a society without conscience.
'Scientism' is neatly defined by Habermas (1972) thus: ' 'Scientism' means
science's belief in itself: that is, the conviction that we can no longer understand
science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge
with science' (Habermas, 1972, p. 4), 'knowledge becomes identical with scien-
tific knowledge' (ibid., p. 80), other forms of knowledge - eg hermeneutic, aes-
thetic, critical - are accorded an inferior status whilst scientific knowledge reigns
supreme. Habermas (1972, p. 67) questions the desirability of this exclusiveness.32
Habermas is arguing that though individuals can exert their agency this itself will
31 Habernias argues that 'the positivistically cleansed demarcation set between knowing and evaluat-
mg...rprcscuts less a result thaii a problem' (Habermas, 1974a p. 265).
32 An alteriiative to positivism was seen by the Frankfurt School to be provided in the aesthetic
dhjjensjoiis
 tf life. Adorno laments the loss of the aesthetic dimension to life, Marcuse both
celebrates the role of Eros' as a foil to the dehumanization of life and sees the progress towards
science as the supreme mode of understanding as bringing about a One Dimensional Man
who is starved of feeling and barred from engaging necessary moral debate (cf. Jay, 1973).
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be conditioned by technicism and scientism. He argues that natural science is
an inappropriate model to use for social science, the claimed neutrality of social
science as natural science is seen to be ideology, diverting attention from its own
inability to expose interests and power differentials or to foster moral debate, thus
allowing social inequality to be reproduced (cf Keat, 1981, p. 2).
Positivism is unable to answer any of 'the really interesting problems' of life
(Habermas, 1972, p. 3OO). Habermas places a marvelously double-edged -
though unsupported - comment at the end of his examination of the episte-
mological bases of social theory where he writes '[t]he glory of the sciences is
their unswerving application of their methods without reflecting on knowledge-
constitutive interests' (Habermas, 1972, p. 315). Epistemology is reduced to
methodology (Habermas, 1972, p.68) - a technical interest in which the signifi-
cance of the knower and the subject of the known is lost - 'the knowing subject
is no longer the system of reference' (Habermas, 1972, p. 68), value is sacrificed
to ideology. Again this process is ideological in that it masks fundamental social
injustices that might be reproduced by such a rationality, and it diverts attention
away from such a debate.34
The elevation of the scientific mentality into the religion of 'scientism' is
viewed by Habermas as one of the great mistakes of the twentieth century. This
is a bold assertion; one has to question his evidence both of the existence of a
scientistic mentality and the extent of its influence in late capitalism. Whilst his
This erliues clearly the early writing of Wittgenstein (1974) when he comments that 'even when all
possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched'
(p. 73). See also Habermas, 1982, p. 259, and Jay's (1973) analysis of the early Frankfurt School.
Haberuias. it must be said, does pull back from an extreme view of such a separation, arguing that
thc separation between subject and object which science brings about methodologically.., is never
wholly sus1)eudcd (Habernias. 1974a, p. 209), that 'even if we place ourselves (fictitiously) outside
the social iiit.errelationships of life in order to confront them, we still remain part of them, even in
the act of insight., as subject and object are one' (ibid. p. 210).
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claim of the universality of scientism certainly has polemical power he brings little
empirical evidence to light to support his case.
3.6 Critiquing Habermas's Critique
This section argues that Habermas
• constructs too crude an interpretation of scientism and positivism;
• misrepresents the nature of natural science;
• provides little evidence for his assertions about technicism;
• misrepresents the effects of positivism as implying the end of moral debate.
The argument concludes that Habermas's critique is as ideological as the
positivism it proscribes.35
Keat (1981) suggests that the Habermasian conception of scientism is too
crude and that it confuses scientism with positivism, when in fact they 'do not
entail each other' (p. 19). It is possible to adopt a positivist view of science
without believing that science is the only form of knowledge. Keat further argues
that critical theorists have confused empiricism with scientism, scientism with
value freedom, and empiricism with positivism (pp. 22-23), that in dealing with
such terms their concepts are abstract and undifferentiated (p. 23). Bernstein
(1983), too, argues that Habermas has mistaken the nature of the natural sciences,
assuming that they abide by a unitary set of methodological principles (and which
are separate from the social sciences). In doing so Habermas neglects the work
of Kuhn (1970), Popper (1968; 1972) and Feyerabend (1975). Feyerabend (1975)
This draws oil key works of Popper (1968), Jay (1973), Keat (1981), Bernstein (1983), papers in
Thompson aud Held (1982), Chambers (1982), Afford (1985) and Rasmussen (1990).
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argues that empirical sciences are characterized by a multiplicity of theories; these
theories in turn determine their own domains - what counts as relevant facts either
to support or falsify them. One theory may not necessarily disprove another, it is
simply that their domains of relevant facts differ, that they are incommensurable
with each other.3° This moves empirical sciences away from the unitary view
espoused by Habermas. Indeed Bernstein (1983) cites the work of Hesse to show
the similarity between natural and social sciences in their use of hermeneutic,
interpretive and theory-driven investigations. Alford (1985) argues that Habermas
(lefilLes ordinary science in a more restrictive fashion than need be. This re-
stricted (lefliution of science itself helps to create the need for reconstructive sciences,
(Alford. 1985, p. 322).
Reconstructive science is discussed more fully in chapter 6.2 and 6.3. Alford
suggests that Habermas is obliged to define science narrowly in order to avoid the
charge that his own 'reconstructive science' is scientistic.
Habermas's contention that society has given up the moral debate does not
follow from his suggestion (a) that positivism has infected society, and (b) that
positivism purports to be value free. His views imply an exclusive causal relation-
ship between positivism and moral behaviour - for which he provides no empirical
evidence and which rational and logical analysis cannot sustain. Indeed it could
be argued that the rise of positivism has pronioted rather than impeded moral
debate; society has the capability to destroy itself several times over, it has the
knowledge to promote or to extinguish life. The moral debate over such issues -
in the minds of scientists and positivists - has grown rather than shrunk, fact
and value have come together in science.
36 This. of course, is contentious, for what is being argued is the case for relativism which, as will be
seen in chapter eight. is untenable.
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3.7 Summary
This chapter has outlined Habermas's views on:
• the anxieties about positivism and scientism and the loss of other forms of
rationality;
• the deleterious effects of a control mentality;
• the nature of a social science;
• the need to take from Marx his notion of ideology critique and to reformulate
orthodox Marxism for contemporary sociological analysis;
• the need to recognize that agency and structure exist dialectically;
• the double-edged nature of science and technology, being both a liberating and
yet constraining force on society;
• the need to develop an epistemologically sound theory of society and social
evolution;
• the nature of the operation and structure of societies in late capitalism.
Whilst these themes reflect the terms of Habermas's developing -analysis this
section has cast doubt on its adequacy. It has been shown that Habermas provides
insufficient support - in evidence or argument - for his assertions about the
extent of scientism and the deleterious effects of positivism. He misrepresents the
role of science when he argues that science takes place in a moral vacuum and
that scientists are either merely technologists or amoral operatives. He wrongly
attributes a putative decline in moral debate to the rise of positivism, he does
not provide empirical evidence for his views and does not suggest criteria for the
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verification or refutation of his views.
Habermas offers little on the kinds of evidence which would render his theory
tenable or untenable. His disdain of empiricism implies that his theory need have
no predictive, inductive role to play. Its value would appear to be that which is
accorded to it hermeneutically by its recipients. Not only does this slip into a
rationalistic, individualistic philosophy of consciousness 37 but it also becomes a
heuristic device for sensitizing readers to the possible dangers of an all-embracing
positivism and scientism; his theory has instrumental value in this respect. Haber-
mas, thereby, is guilty of the very instrumentalism which he is proscribing in the
marauding army of technicists, positivists and those of a scientistic disposition.
His appeal to 'generalizable interests' (1976a) (my italics), whilst it is the
appeal to the principle of universalizability in moral debate which can be seen in
Kantian moral philosophy, is - by definition - guilty of the generation of law-like
accounts in the positivism which he proscribes in others. It is difficult to see what
- in principle rather than in substance - separates Haberrnas from those whom
he targets, for in moving towards a normative theory himself he is simply replacing
one set of values - positivism and scientism - with another. Hence we are asked
to accept a series of axioms rather than demonstrations; these axiomsmight have
heuristic value in clarifying Habermas's sympathies and starting position.
Though Habermas frequently engages criticisms of his work (eg Habermas,
1982, 1985, 1990b, 1991) he nevertheless does not subject his own views to the
substantial reformulation or critique that he recommends in other writers (Alford,
1985). Indeed, it will be shown in chapters 4 - 8 that, when severe criticisms are
Haberinas (1984). however, argues that it is necessary to give up a philosophy of consciousness in
favour of eoiiuuuuicative rationality (p. 390).
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made of his theory, he moves on to another point or reworks the finer elements of
his theory rather than radically restructures it.
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Chapter IV
IDEOLOGY, KNOWLEDGE AND INTERESTS
4.1 Introduction
The preceding argument suggested that an important area of concern for
Habermas was to expose the operation of ideology in society. It was suggested
that ideology entered both the substance and methodology of social science. This
chapter provides an overview of ideology critique (4.2) and then indicates how ide-
ology critique links to epistemology in Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive
interests (4.3). Finally a critique is provided of Habermas's three knowledge-
constitutive interests (4.4).
4.2 Habermas and Ideology Critique
This section draws on the early writings of Habermas (1972, 1974a, 1974b,
1976a) and locates them in the tradition of ideology critique of the Frankfurt School
which states that 'there is no theory of society.. .that does not contain political mo-
tivation' (Horkheimer, 1972a, p. 222). Habermas's view, in line with the Marxism
that informs his work, is premised on fundamental principles of social justice, the
promotion of social equality, the creation and nurture of 'generalizable interests'
(Habermas, 1976a), and the commitment to the emancipation of society.
Habermas defines his notion of ideology as the suppression of generalizable
interests (Habermas, 1976a, p. 113, cf also 1984, p. 10) in the day-to-day lives of
participants, where systems and / or groups possessing power operate in rationally
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indefensible ways because their power relies on the disempowering of other groups
- ie that their principles of behaviour are not universalizable. His view builds on
the Marxian doctrine of ideology as false consciousness:38
for ideology to be present, then two conditions which Marx laid down should
be satisfied: the objective concealment of contradictions, and the interests of the
dominant class. Ideology is not a simple error. It is a particular kind of distortion,
depeiideiit upon real contradictions, which demand their solution iii practice before
it can 1w overcome (Larrain, 1979, p. 272).
Eagleton (1991), however, takes issue with the notion of false consciousness,
arguing that
the belief that a minority of theorists monopolize a scientifically grounded
knowledge of how society is, while the rest of us blunder around in some fog of
false consciousness, does not particularly endear itself to the democratic sensibility
(Eagletoit. 1991, p. 11).
He argues that it underestimates humans to assert that they are unaware
of their manipulation and are gullible. Rather, he suggests, they are unable to
upset the order which renders them powerless. 39 Habermas avoids the traps of
false consciousness by replacing the adjective false consciousness with fragmented
consciousness (Habermas, 1984, p. 522),° and recognizes that interests coupled
with power can cause the social order to distort systematically people's powers and
abilities to move to equality in a socialist democracy (Habermas, 1984, 1987a).
Habermas (1976a) suggests that capitalism is premissed on inequality - ex-
ploitation - and that it maintains its hegemony by averting crises of motivation
(an inadequacy of action-motivating meaning), legitimacy (an inadequacy of gener-
38 Cf Finn and Grant. 1981, p. 28.
' Further. Eagleton cites the work of Slotcrdijk to indicate, using the term enlightened false con-
sciotisliess (ibid.. pp. 39 - 40), that people in power know clearly that what they are doing is guilty
of bad faith and the suppression of generalizable interests, but that that does not prevent
tlteiit froiii continuing in this way.
40 Haberiiias (1984. 1987a) argues that such fragmentation has beeii brought about by rationalization
and t.ln rise of expert subcultures (cf Layder, 1994. p. 197).
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alized or generalizable motivations), identity (an inadequacy of social integration),
politics (an inadequacy of perceived rational decisions), and economics (an inade-
quacy of consumable items to create surplus value) (Habermas, 1976a). Ideology
critique identifies the spheres in which the suppression of generalizable interests
might operate. Habermas alludes to this where he comments that his theory is
'critical of ideology, it asks what lies behind the consensus, presented as fact, that
supports the dominant tradition of the time' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 12). The state
has a part in this process as it secures 'the loyalty of one class whilst systematically
acting to the advantage of another' (Held, 1982, p. 184).
At heart Habermas's critique of ideology is tied to a concern for equality
(1972, 1974a). Herein lies both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness,
for whilst it demonstrates the political will necessary for a 'critical' theory (see
Fay, 1987) it also confuses ideology critique with social theory; it brings together
contingently rather than analytically related concepts.
Ideology critique exposes the operation of ideology in niany spheres of daily
life, the working out in public of vested interests under the mantle of the general
good. The task of ideology critique is to uncover the vested interests at work in
society which may be occurring consciously or subliminally, revealing to partici-
pants how they may be acting to perpetuate a system which keeps them either
empowered or disempowered (Geuss, 1981), ie which suppresses a generalizable
interest, wittingly or not, of their own volition or against their own volition.
Ideology critique will have to identify the means or channels which are used to
perpetuate ideology, which could be used to resist ideology, and to understand the
reasons for use or non-use of these channels. 41 This will entail an examination of
41 Cf FLyS outliiic of Critical Theory (earlier) which argues that it should identify pathways to
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the notioii of 'interests', the epistemological bases of 'interests', and then to show
how these interests relate to the operation of ideology.
4.3 Habermas's Knowledge-Constitutive Interests
Habermas (1971a, 1972, 1974a) contends that action is not neutral, it serves
interests; a critique of ideology will expose the non-generalizable or non-universalizable
interests that perpetuate societal inequalities. By recognizing the significance of
the nexus between interests, ideology and action for a theory of social formations,
Habermas is attempting to root his social theory in epistemology; this is a funda-
mental part of his enterprise at this stage of his writing.
This section draws on the earlier writings of Haber,mas (1972, 1974a, 1974b),
in particular his Knowledge and Human Interests (1972) and his updated study
On the Logic of the Social Sciences (1988), whilst the critique of his theory at this
point derives in part from Bernstein (1976, 1983) and Keat (1981). This section
proceeds by:
• setting a context for a discussion of knowledge-constitutive interests (4.3.1);
• outlining the technical interest, its purposes and elements of its constitution
(4.3.2);
• outlining the hermeneutic interest, its purposes and elements of its constitution
(4.3.3);
• outlining the emancipatory interest, its purposes and elements of its constitu-
tion, and its relationship to the previous two interests (4.3.4).
eIualwipat 1(111.
57
• developing a critique of the technical, hermeneutic and ernancipatory interests
(4.4).
4.3.1 The Context of Knowledge-Constitutive Interests
The foundations of the three knowledge-constitutive interests appeared in the
appendix to Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests in 1972. Habermas, like
Marx and Mannheirn before him, argues that we act out of interests (Habermas,
1974b, p. 45). Epistemological enquiry is fuelled by interests; epistemological
purity is overlaid by the interests of the enquirer. Certain types of knowledge will
predetermine their possible applications:
you can use, for instance, nomological knowledge only in the way of technical
application. whereas you can make use of, let's say, historical knowledge, only in the
way of affecting the self-understanding of acting and interacting and speaking people,
(Haberiiias. 1974b, p. 45).
Habermas argues that each knowledge-constitutive interest has its own method-
ology, value systems, epistemology and substantive concepts.42
Habermas defines his key concept of 'interests' carefully to bring together
agency and determinism:
[litterests are] the basic orientations rooted in specific fundamental conditions
of the possible reproduction and self-constitution of the human species (Habermas,
1972. p. 196).
Interests are 'knowledge-constitutive' because they shape and determine43
what counts as the objects and types of knowledge (Habermas, 1972). 'Interests'
have an ideological function, for example a 'technical interest' (discussed later)
42 As an attempt to establish a theory of cognitive interests Knowledge and Human Interests
(1972) is neyclopacdic and has been seen as an excursion through the idealistic (Kant, Hegel) and
the iiiaterialistic (Marx) theory of knowledge, through the prehistory of positivism (Comte, Mach),
pragniatisni (Peirce). historicism (Dilthey), psychoanalysis (Freud) and perspectivism (Nietzsche)
(Ottiiianit. 1982. p. 79).
Masseheleiii (1991) refers to these as knowledge-guiding interests' (p. 97).
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can have the effect of keeping the empowered in their empowered position and the
disempowered in their disempowerement - ie reinforcing and perpetuating the
status quo. An 'emancipatory interest' (discussed later) threatens the status quo
for all parties and groups.
Knowledge is not neutral (cf Mannheim, 1936). What counts as worthwhile
and important knowledge is seen to be determined by the social and positional
power of the advocates of that knowledge. The link here between objects of
study and communities of scholars echoes Kuhn's (1970) notions of paradigms
and paradigm shifts, where the field of knowledge or paradigm is seen to be only
as good as the evidence and the respect in which it is held by 'authorities'. Knowl-
edge and definitions of worthwhile knowledge reflect the interests of the community
of scholars who operate in particular paradigms.44
Habermas constructs the definition of worthwhile knowledge and modes of
understanding and participating in social life around three cognitive interests:
(i) prediction and control;
(ii) understanding and interpretation;
(iii) emancipation and freedom.
Ie names these the 'technical', 'practical' and 'emancipatory' interests re-
spectively.
4.3.2 The Technical Interest
Grundy (1987) neatly summarizes Habermas's lengthy analysis of the techni-
This is takeii up fully in chapter 10.
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cal interest where she writes that 'the 'technical' interest characterises the empirical-
analytic science and has a fundamental interest in controlling the environment
through rule-following action based upon empirically grounded laws' (Grundy,
1987, p. 12). It is rooted in positivism and the empirical-analytical natural sci-
ences (Pusey, 1987), seeking laws of nature which will help us to predict and control
nature (defined widely). The commitment to behaviourism in this interest is clear,
for positivism rests on the observable (cf Ayer, 1936, pp. 179-180).
Habermas cautions against a critical social theory which is cast in behaviourist
terms: 'confronted with the objectivism of strictly behavioral sciences, critical soci-
ology guards itself against a reduction of intentional action to behavior' (Habermas,
1974a, p. 10), the same caution as obtained in his critique of positivism. Haber-
mas argues that the fundamental purpose of techne - control - which drives
this interest applies to environments, however defined, for example, interpersonal
and intra-personal (Habermas, 1972, P. 56): 'knowledge that makes possible the
control of natural processes turns into knowledge that makes possible the control
of the social life process' (ibid. p. 47).45 Instrumental control in the technical
interest, with its emphasis on predictability, passivity, controllability of humans,
is attractive to the dominant ideology as it perpetuates its hegemony:
Tediiiical questions are posed with a view .to the rationally goal-directed or-
gamsation of means and the rational selection of instrumental alternatives, once the
goals (values and maxims) are given (Habermas, 1974a. p. 3).
There is a clear sympathy with instrumentalism here. In its emphasis on
control of nature this interest underplays the role of nature-for-itself - natura
naturans - that we are are equal partners with nature, not its dominators.46
Cf Hork1niiticrs critique that doniination of nature involves domination of man' (Horkheimcr,
1974k p. 93).
Cf. MCarLhy. 1982, p. 86; Habermas, 1972; Keat, 1981, p. 9.
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Bowers (1991) argues that a Critical Theory must adopt an ecological not simply
an anthropocentric view of the environment - human and natural.
However Habermas's interpretation of technical control is questionable. Held
(1980) argues that Habermas confuses an interest in prediction with an interest in
control (p. 393). Further, Keat (1981) argues that Habermas confuses prediction
with explanation in his interpretation of this knowledge form (p. 69).
This interest echoes the functionalist view of society which sees individuals as
having to conform to the norms of society (Parsons, 1959). As such it is an essen-
tially conservative interest, yet one which, in an age which has seen the apotheosis
of science and technology, is seen to be all-pervasive (Habermas, 1971a). The
instrumentalism of this approach has close ties with the commodification of mate-
rials and workers (Braverman, 1974, Habermas, 1974a, p. 221) whose effects range
from Durkhejm's (1951) notions of anomie to Marx's notions of alienated labour
and domination in the relations of production.
4.3.3 The Hermeneutic Interest
The 'historical-hermeneutic science' is an attenuation of the positivism of the
empirical-analytical science (see Habermas, 1972, pp. 50 - 51), exemplified in the
technical interest. Hermeneutic sciences seek to clarify, 'understand' and 'interpret'
the communications of 'speaking and acting subjects' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 8). In
contrast to the 'technical sphere' whose field of study lies in work - 'instrumen-
tal action' - hermeneutics takes as its sphere of action interaction and language.
The hermeneutic interest - essentially a 'practical' interest (Habermas, 1972, p.
308) is summarized more neatly than Habermas himself was able to do 47 as 'a
Cf Haberivas. 1984. p. 135.
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fundamental interest in understanding the environment through interaction based
upon a consensual interpretation of meaning' (Grundy, 1987, p. 14). Hermeneutic
interests generate intersubjective accounts of events, they seek the Verstehen -
understanding - of Weberian analysis. Cultural sciences have a goal of under-
standing individuals' and groups' social construction of reality. This involves not
simply a re-experiencing for oneself the events of others - itself a practical and
logical impossibility for which Habermas (1972, pp. 145 - 9) criticises Dilthey -
but recapturing the meaning of the interacting other, recovering and reconstructing
the intentions of the other actors in the situation. Such an enterprise involves the
analysis of meaning in a social context (Held, 1980). In interpersonal situations
participants engage in action oriented to mutual understanding (Habermas, 1972,
p. 310) (developed later), they strive for mutual understanding (ibid. p. 92), a
consensus of meaning.
Habermas (1988) argues that the technical interest is either ahistorical or
transhistorical - where history is irrelevant in the search for immutable laws.
Hermeneutics, however, cannot operate outside an historical referent (Habermas,
1972, p. 181). Habermas (1988) indicates this in his reference to Weber's assertion
that 'sociology must both understand social facts in their cultural significance
and explain them as culturally determined' (Ijabermas, 1988, p. 12). People
bring their own histories, biographies, autobiographies, views, and expectations
to a situation - their own horizons of understanding and possibility: 'each of
the partners between whom communication must be established.. .lives within a
horizon' (Hahermas, 1988, p. 151). Habermas argues clearly that
h( rIn eiieutic knowledge is always mediated through this pre-uuderstauding,
which is cltrivc(l from the interpreter's initial situation.. ..He comprehends time substan-
tive coiitt'nt of t,ra(IitiOn by applying tradition to himself and his situation (Habermas,
1972. pp. 309 - 310).
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The knowing subject is part of a cultural web (Habermas, 1988, p. 149) and is
involved in self-reflection on that cultural context (ibid, p.154). Habermas (1974a)
acknowledges the value of Gadamer's terminology in clarifying hermeneutics, where
Gadamer (1975, p. 273) argues that hermeneutic understanding involves the 'fu-
sion of horizons' between participants: 'understanding, rather, is always the fu-
sion of horizons we imagine to exist by themselves' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 273).
Hence in the hermeneutic science there is a deliberate dialogue between partici-
pants (Habermas, 1974a, pp. 10 - 11). Habermas, however, criticises Gadamer's
views (Habermas, 1970d, pp. 123-133), arguing that he overplays the role of his-
tory, of tradition, he is too accepting of tradition (cf. Habermas, 1988, p. 172),
neglecting the view that history may be little more than the playing out of dis-
torted meanings and values - ie that it is ideological - or that history may be a
distorted, selective account of practices. Gadamer's response to Habermas's crit-
icisms argues that understanding will necessarily involve seeing all points of view
and that these will have their own historical and ideological referents, and that
Habermas is overstating the role of critique as the sole arbiter of truth. 'What is
clear is Habermas's ambivalence to hermeneutics, for though he criticizes Gadamer
he nevertheless gives careful and repeated coverage to, and use of, hermeneutics in
his own works over twenty years.
Habermas is laying a series of epistemological building blocks in his theory
of knowledge-constitutive interests; over the first foundation of the technical inter-
est he has laid the second stone of the practical interest of hermeneutics. The
hermeneutic level exceeds, but requires, the empirical level. As methodology
hermeneutic 'interpretive sociology bursts the bounds of a general methodology
of the empirical sciences' (Habermas, 1988, p. 108). The 'interest intentions' of
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the two differ; whereas the technical cognitive interest aims at comprehension of
objectified reality, the practical interest of hermeneutics is to maintain intersub-
jectivity of mutual understanding. Habermas suggests that
(111pirical-analytic knowledge can assume the form of causal expla.uations or
Co11(lit.iollal predictions, which also refer to the observed phenomena; hermeneutic
knowlidgc as a rule has the form of interpretations of traditional complexes of meaning
(HaberluiLs. 1974a, p. 8).
Meanings rather than phenomena become the subject of understanding in
hermeneutics. For the technical interest the knower stands in a relation of subject
to object, whereas in the hermeneutic interest the relationship is more of equal
partners in communication (ibid., pp. 11 and 181). For the former the aim is to
generate 'technically exploitable knowledge' (p. 191) whilst for the latter it is to
produce 'practically effective knowledge' - hence its 'practical' interest. Social
science has to draw on both elements.
4.3.4 The Emancipatory Interest
Habermas's third knowledge-constitutive interest - an emancipatory inter-
est, which is a central feature of Fay's earlier discussion of elements of a Critical
Theory - subsumes the previous two; it requires them but goes beyond them.48
The emancipatory interest - a 'critical' interest born of critical knowledge - rec-
ognizes that history and sociology exist dialectically as they chart the playing out
of repression and domination. It is an interest in 'emancipation and empowerment
to engage in autonomous action arising out of authentic, critical insights into the
social construction of human society' (Grundy, 1987, p. 19).° It is concerned for
48 Habernias writes: the emancipatory interest itself is dependent on the interests in possible inter-
subjective action orientation and in possible technical control' (Haberma.s, 1972, p. 211).
Massclielein (1991) defines emancipation as 'increasing self-determination and individual auton-
omy within a just society' (Masschelein, 1991. p. 97).
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praxis - 'action informed by reflection with an emancipatory intent' (Kincheloe,
1991, p. 177). It works on these previous interests rather than accepts them:
A (Titical social science, however, will not remain satisfied with this [hermeneu-
tics]. It is concerned with going beyond this goal to determine when theoretical
stateiiwiits grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they ex-
press ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed
(Haberinas. 1974a, p. 310).
The twin intentions of this interest are to expose the operation of power and to
bring about social justice. In marked contrast to empirical-analytic interests which
attempt to separate knowledge from its socio-historical context, this view accepts
as a premiss that 'critique becomes conscious of its own peculiar invohrernent in the
object of its criticism' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 214). The epistemological significance
of this interest in Habermas's scheme is set out by Habermas himself:
It is only in the emancipatory interest that knowledge and interest are fully
integrated. it is in accomplishing self-reflection that reason grasps itself as interested
(Habermas. 1972, p. 212).
To avoid scientism the emancipatory interest requires scientists to become
more aware of 'the political content of their work' (ibid. p. 47). Habermas is
suggesting that scientists can no longer claim neutrality and ideological or political
innocence. This requires a review of the position of science in society and the power
of the scientist.5°
Habermas (1974a) argues that the emancipatory interest is premissed on the
assumption that domination and repression act to prevent the full existential real-
ization of individual and social freedoms: 'the ideology-critical treatment of ideas
also retains its reference to situations of interests' (Habermas, 1979b, p. 14). It
accepts that there are structural inequalities in society which need to be eradicated
Haberuias (1990a. p. 211 argues that there are major issues in need of debate in communicative
action	 aiiirnal rights, torture, the arms race, hunger, poverty, unemployment, wealth.
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if social justice and generalizable interests are to be attained:
This interest can only develop to the degree to which repressive force, in the
form of the normative exercise of power, presents itself permanently in structures of
distorted communication - that is, to the extent that domination is institutionalized
(Habcrnia.s. 1974a, p. 22).
He is concerned to show that capitalism is premissed on inequality - the
empowering of one sector of society at the expense of another - and that social
justice will therefore necessitate a move to equality. This is a familiar theme
and reveals Habermas's debt to Marx, even though he has broadened the base of
classical Marxist social analysis. Inequalities are systemic in the social order - ie
are structural elements - and are likely to be deeply ingrained in the psyche of
individuals and social groups - so deep that these participants may be unaware
of them (Habermas, 1974b, p. 48).' In summary, the task of this knowledge-
constitutive interest, indeed of Critical Theory itself, is to restore to consciousness
those suppressed, repressed and submerged determinants of our social behaviour
with a view to their dissolution (Habermas, 1984, pp. 194 - 5).
4.4 Critiques of Habermas's Knowledge-Constitutive Interests
There are several criticisms of this aspect of Habermas's work:52
• there is an artificial separation of the technical and hermeneutic interest;
• his views replicate the mind / body dualism of Western philosophy which ar-
tificially separates work and interaction;
• he reduces his analysis to only three cognitive interests and they are unneces-
51 An iiitr'stiiig riposte to Eagleton's earlier dismissal of false consciousness.
52 These criticisuis focus on Habernias's works of 1972, 1974a and 1974b, with critiques stemming
from, in part. Bernstein (1978b, 1983. 1985), Kolakowski (1978), Heyderbraud and Burns (1984),
Jay (1984) and Afford (1985).
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sarily discrete;
• the link between ideology critique and emancipation is neither clear, nor proven,
nor a logical necessity;
• the criteria to evaluate the three elements of his theory of knowledge-constitutive
interests are inconsistent;
• he is unclear on the universalism or relativism of his theory and the criteria for
its verification;
• he is unclear on the status of his theory, rendering its verificationunclear;
• the reduction of social theory to a foundational epistemological theory is Un-
tenable;
. the emancipatory and empowering potential of his theory is not demonstrated.
Habermas argues that social science is different from the natural sciences
because, since it is dealing with an already interpreted world - a social world
- it has a 'doubly hermeneutic' task (Habermas, 1984, pp. 109 - 110). How-
ever, the distinctions between hermeneutic and empirical understanding may be
drawn too sharply (Hesse, 1982; Bernstein, 1983, p. 33). For exaniple one has
to bring hermeneutic understanding to bear on empirical-analytic knowledge to
inform hernieneutics - they need each other in order to make meaning of them-
selves (Bernstein, 1983). Indeed Bernstein, in an earlier work (1976) argues for the
necessity of a hermeneutic understanding of sciences, without which they would
not be able to judge themselves or their own status.53
See also Kat (1981) p. 79.
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Habermas confines 'work' to the sphere of the empirical-analytic sciences and
'interaction' to the sphere of hermeneutic sciences; this, for Giddens (1982), Hesse
(1982) and Layder (1994), is an untenable and narrowing separation. Aronowitz
(1988, p. 164) suggests that the separation. of work and interaction is a covert
replication of the mind / body dualism which has characterized Western philosophy
and social practice since the Greeks. Habermas presents us with theoretical rather
than empirical evidence to support what should be at heart an empirical question.
Whilst the categorization provided by Habermas has the attractions of discreteness
and heuristic utility it is not unproblematic both in theory and in practice.
A justification is required of the particular power of Critical Theory as defined
epistemologically to fulfil the task of emancipation more successfully than other
types of activity. In this instance critical theorists 54 argue that ideology critique is
essential to emancipation. Whether their case is proven is debatable, for, logically,
there is no necessary or exclusive relationship between ideology critique and eman-
cipation. The assumption that a person or society can become emancipated only
by exercising or including ideology critique is an empirical matter and not a logical
necessity. One can become emancipated by means other than ideology critique;
emancipated societies do not necessarily demonstrate or require an awareness of
ideology critique. Indeed it could be argued that the rationalistic appeal of ideology
critique actually obstructs action designed to bring about emancipation. Haber-
mas (1972) does not expand his view of emancipation in terms of how to reach it,
how to recognize when it has been reached, or how to judge conflicting indications
that might be offered for the achievement of emancipation. 55
 There is no vantage
point outside the social context from which to judge emancipation, emancipation
Horkheiuier. 1972a; Habermas, 1972; 1974a; Giroux, 1983; Fay, 1987; Rasmussen, 1990.
He do's provide this later in his discussion of the ideal speech situation. 	 -
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is an axiom in Habermas's theory rather than a demonstrated feature. Roderick
(1986) asks:
How cait we be certain that the emancipatory interest is imot just a particular
socially and historically relative interest? How can we be certain that it is not itself
subjc'ct. to the same distortions critial theory locates in other modes ofthought?
(Roderick. 1086, p. 65).
Roderick mounts a critique of ideology critique which hints at relativism in
Habermas, asking 'Why is the critique of ideology critique itself not ideological?'
(ibid., p. 71). Habermas's response to this type of criticism lies in his notion
of reconstructive science (chapter 6.2), indicating that communicative rationality
provides the norm for justifying his own views (discussed in chapters 6 a?d 7).
One can detect an inconsistency in Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive
interests, for whilst his empirical-analytical and hermeneutic forms of knowledge
are presented non-normatively the emancipatory interest includes a normative di-
mension (Alexander, 1991), arguing that society ought to be emancipated - it
introduces a different standard against which to judge his knowledge-constitutive
interests. Habermas (1972, 1974a) judges the first two knowledge-constitutive in-
terests to be incomplete because they fail to meet the normative standard which
only his third interest possesses.
Further, Habermas's (1972) interests theory suffer from the weakness of 'con-
ceptual pigeonlioling', it assumes that only emancipatory interest can bring about
emancipation; the fact that a technical interest or a hermeneutic interest might
also be emancipatory in practice is not mentioned. Just as the criticisms about
the artificial separation of the first two interests was pointed out earlier, the prob-
lem is compounded here, for the emancipatory interest is neither conceptually nor
empirically separate from the other interests. Whilst separation niay make for
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theoretical tidiness this is problematical, one needs hermeneutic understanding
to become emancipated, and, at a definitional level, one needs to take control of
one's life - an existential technical interest - if one is to become emancipated.
Habermas's three interests are certainly not as discrete as they are presented.
Whilst the claim to there being three forms of knowledge has the epistemo-
logical attraction of simplicity, one has to question the whole notion of Habermas's
knowledge-constitutive interests (cf Keat, 1981, p. 67). The inconsistency between
'ontological plurality' and the reduction of interests to merely three is untenable
- 'the theory would then require the identification of a multitude. of different
interests, one for each object-domain' (ibid. p. 91.)56 Habermas recognizes the
difficulty of this position (Habermas, 1985a, pp. 95 - 96), indeed his later work
(1988) jettisons the theory.
At an epistemological level Bernstein (1985, p. 13) contends that Habermas
is confusing a priori and a posteriori claims in his theory - transcendental and
empirical claims respectively - in that he is seeking to discover transcendental
aspects of theory from empirical analyses. Though Habermas accords his interests
'quasi-transcendental' status (1972) this is unhelpful in assisting the reader in de-
ciding where Habermas stands in the debate about the objectivism, subjectivism
or relativism in his work. Without this clarification we are unable to decide the
grounds of supporting or refuting his theory, we are unclear on grounds of verifi-
cation, refutation or usefulness. Moreover, in his linking of knowledge and society
in his notion of 'interests' there is a clear allusion to the view that knowledge
is socially constructed and socially motivated, a feature which implies relativism
(which is addressed and critiqued in chapter 10 in connection with the sociology
56 Cf. Bvriisteiii (1978. pp. 220 - 1) and Heydebrand and Burns (1984, p. 411).
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of knowledge). Bernstein (1985) argues that the three interests of Knowledge and
Human Interests are inherently rooted in a philosophy of consciousness and, as
such, one is unable to utilise them to grasp the intersubjectivity of communicative
action (Bernstein, 1985, p. 14) (italics mine).
The status of Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests, then,
is uncertain; it is unclear whether Habermas is dealing with a conceptual model,
a political analysis, an empirically grounded theory, a set of generalities, a set
of transhistorical principles, a set of temporally-specific observations, or a set of
loosely defined slogans whose strengths lie in their surface clarity rather than their
underlying coherence. Indeed, Kolakowski (1978) argues that Habermas's theory
thrives only by dint of its ambiguity, and that if its internal incoherence were
exposed the theory would fall. (Whether, of course, this criticism matters, is
another question; if one of the criteria of a critical theory is its ability to effect or
affect practice then the strength of Critical Theory might lie in its effects rather
than in its conceptual or theoretical coherence. In this respect the theory may
have more heuristic than substantive value).
Given the logical, epistemological and empirical problems which have been
outlined in the theory, given the generalized nature of the epistemological analysis
which Hahermas undertakes, and given the uncertainty of the scope or status of the
theory, there are significant weaknesses and shortcomings in Habermas's attempt
to develop a social theory based on epistemology. Indeed Habermas (1988) clearly
took account of these and eventually turned his back on the epistemological basis
of social theory. The theory has the attraction of a heuristic device rather than of
closely argued logic.
71
If Hahermas's Critical Theory is to be shown to effect emancipation, then
the means to that emancipation need to be clarified, the nature of the research
programme into the power of Critical Theory to effect emancipation needs to be
clarified (Lakatos, 1970). This also means that Critical Theory, like traditional
theory, will have to be empirically verified, even though this may not be under
the strict, controlled conditions of experimentation as in the natural sciences. The
separate nature of Critical Theory as opposed to traditional theory thereby is called
into question. It also remains a question open to empirical investigation whether
Critical Theory is any more or less likely to provoke emancipatory behaviour than
any other theories or actions. As part of this programme an analysis is required of
the methodology of Critical Theory as espoused in Habermas's early work discussed
so far. This is the substance of the next chapter.
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Chapter V
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SELF-REFLECTION
5.1 Introduction
It was stated in chapter 3 that Critical Theorists engaged psychoanalysis as
part of their focus of study. The previous chapter indicated that the nature of
methodology of Critical Theory beyond ideology critique needed to be addressed.
This chapter sets out the role of psychoanalysis as a model of methodology for
Habermas. It examines and evaluates his use of Freudianism. It outlines the value
of reflection as a precursor to the self-knowledge needed if social repression is to be
dissolved. In this respect this section deals with the substance and methodology
for social emancipation. The sequence proceeds thus (5.2):
• Habermas's use of Freudian psychoanalysis and depth hermeneutics;
• the use of the psychoanalytic analogy for social theory;
• the notions of rational reconstruction and emancipation;
• the attractions of the analogy: its ascription of responsibility to participants;
its sympathy to sstematically distorted communication; its exhortatory appeal.
The analysis here draws on Habermas's work of 1972, 1974a, 1974b. In section
5.3 his views are critiqued at two main levels:
• the employment and interpretation of Freudian psychoanalysis;
73
• the use of a psychoanalytical model as a model for social emancipation.
In the critique Habermas is seen to confuse emancipation and evolution and to
be guilty of the very positivism which he proscribes in his early works. As criticisms
mount of this aspect of his theory Habermas moves away from psychoanalysis and
towards the speech act elements of his Theory of Communicative Action - the
substance of subsequent chapters.
5.2 Habermas and Freudian Psychoanalysis
How can individuals and groups become aware of the vested interests which
act to prevent the realization of their 'real' interests of equality (Geuss, 1981)?
How can they become emancipated? Habermas, in typical fashion, goes to an
external and arguably unrelated source to strengthen his argument. He draws into
his argument some key principles from Freudian psychoanalysis (Habermas, 1974a,
pp. 25 - 32) as an analogy for the development of societal health, in particular
the value lie accords to the power of self-reflection as a tool of emancipation -
'depth hermeneutics' (Habermas, 1972, p. 218), knowledge of oneself which has
become inaccessible to oneself through repression (ibid., p. 217). Habermas's use
of Freudian psychoanalysis suggests that a patient will engage in self-reflection and
that such reflection has emancipatory power (Habermas, 1972, p. 197) .as it exposes
the repressive forces which have induced false consciousness and hence the neurosis
(ibid., p. 208). Habermas sets great store by reflection; for him 'self-reflection is
at once intuition and emancipation, comprehension and liberation from dogmatic
dependence' (ibid., p. 208).
Haberiva (1974a) accords considerable power to self-reflection as a tool of critique as it can provide
emancipatioii from unrecognized dependencies - that is, knowledge cohicides with the fulfilment
of the interest iu liberation through kiiowledge' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 9). See also Appendix G for
a coinparisoli and evaluation of Dcwcys and Habermas's views of reflective practice.
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In tile process of self-reflection the neurotic is facilitated by tile analyst to
perceive tile latent, repressed experiences which have given rise to the present
neurotic condition, just as a social group suffering from ideological distortion will
have to see through the sources of that distortion. The analyst is cast in a ther-
apeutic mode - a 'reflective participant' (Habermas, 1988, p. 93). This might
be perfectly acceptable in psychoanalytic theory but it creates many problems in
macro-sociological theory - eg the notion that society can be changed by a process
akin to psychoanalysis writ large (discussed later). Patients, through self-reflection,
will be involved in identifying the factors which have distorted their psyche and
hence their functioning as fully-fledged individuals in control of their own lives.
This involves:
(a) a herrneneutic element - where the patient comes to reconstruct (Haber-
mas, 1972, p. 230), understand and interpret previous experiences;
(b) a positivistic element - where the analyst helps the patient to comprehend
the significance of experiences by making nomothetic constructions of them;
(c) a critical element - where tile patient reflects on the factors which have
led to tile distortion and repression (ibid. p. 231) in the psyche and which are
subject to critical scrutiny in an attempt to dissolve their capacity to distort.
This process of reflexive analysis with the assistance of the analyst brings
about self-awareness in patients, an understanding of the constraining elements on
their lives, and tile disempowering of those factors to exert any further pressure
to distort (cf Haberma.s, 1962). The progress, then, is from neuroses to emanci-
pation. The self-aware individual, having clarified the causes of the oppression or
repression, bringing them back to consciousness and reflecting on them, achieves
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the state of being able to break free of her / his oppressive ties:
through ... psychoanalysis, as interpreted in terms of communication theory,
the two l)roce(lures of reconstruction and of self-critique can.. .be brought together
witliiii the framework of one and the same theory, (Habermas, 1987b, p. 300).
This is the process of rational reconstruction - the partner to elf-refiection
(cf Habermas, 1987b, p. 300). Habermas asserts that there is a symbiosis of
self-understanding and liberation, the movement is from unfreedom to freedom.
The strengths of this analysis are twofold. Firstly it accords responsibility
for the condition and its solution to the patient - it 'demands moral responsibility
for the content of the ifiness' (Habermas, 1972 p. 235) - a fitting model for an
analogy of society premised on participatory democracy (see also Lukes, 1982, p.
137), however illusory this may be in reality. Indeed Habermas writes that 'truth
must converge with authenticity - in other words, the patient himself is the final
authority' (Haberrnas, 1974a, p. 29). This, however, might generate difficulties if
the patient rejects a construction that may be objectively true (Keat, 1981, pp.
145 and 148). Keat suggests that
then' are serious problems about the validation of psychoanalytic interpreta-
tions. which basically hinge upon the extent to which patients may be said to have
some ultimate epistemic 'authority' about the nature of their own unconscious states
(ibid. i. 140).
The nature of this criticism is important, for one has to ask why Habermas
chose to go to Freud in particular, neglecting other schools of psychoanalysis. For
example a Jungian perspective, with its reference to the 'collective unconscious'
might have yielded just as much insight, as indeed would Fromm's 'fear of freedom'.
One conjectures that using Freud happened to suit Habermas's purposes, a feature
which he employs frequently (discussed in chapters 6, 7, and 8).
Secondly Habermas (1974a) (and Freud) acknowledge that it is society, in-
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stitutions and pressures which can cause the repression in the individual's psyche
(ibid. 1974, p. 29). The role of psychoanalysis in Habermas, though largely of
value as an analogy of society (critiqued later in this chapter), also identifies for
us the significance of systematically distorted communication (Habermas, 1970a,
discussed later), where external structural - system wide - societal constraints
and repressions reach right into the individual psyche.
As an analogy for the projected progress of societies from ideological oppres-
sion to self-control the importation of Freudian analysis has considerable exhor-
tatory and symbolic significance. Just as ideology distorts the realization of the
'real' interests (Geuss, 1981) of social groups, bringing to society's awareness the
power of ideological oppression, so rational reconstruction sets the scene for the
restoration of the health of that society which, in Habermas's terms, is founded on
the principles of social justice - democracy, equality, and the generalizability of
interests. In Habermas's view the progress towards societal emancipation involves
self-understanding writ large.
5.3 A Critique of Habermas's Use of Psychoanalytic Theory
The importation of psychoanalytic theory is not unproblematic, however -
a factor which Habermas accepts in the first chapter of his Theory and Practice
(1974a). He is aware that 'critical sociology must guard against overburdening the
concepts of the philosophy of reflection' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 13), and that
Marx too did not always make clear that the attributes ascribed to social
classes... did not represent a simple transference from the level of individual conscious-
ness to that of a collective (ibid. p. 13).
Criticisms of Habermas's use of the psychoanalytical model can be placed at
two levels: (i) at the level of psychoanalysis and the individual, and (ii) at the level
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of psychoanalysis for social theory.
5.3.1 Habermas's Use of Individualistic Psychoanalysis
Firstly, Habermas misinterprets Freud's conception of the id in:. way which
has significant ramifications for the credibility of his work. For Haberrnas the id
equals 'alienated ego' (cf Keat, 1981, chapter 4), whereas for Freud the id was both
the home of the instincts and alienated ego. Hence for Habermas the id is simply a
distortion, a negative, pathological entity, for Freud it is a prime mover, it has its
own dynamic, it is positive and non-pathological (ibid. p. 105). For Habermas the
aim is to abolish the id, for Freud it is to harness it - Freud does not share the
worries about technical control that haunt Habermas. Further, Kolakowski (1978)
argues that Habermas actually misinterprets Freud:
[Habernias] has in mind that in psychoanalysis auscultation is also therapy -
the patieiit' understanding of his own situation is at the same time a cure for it. This
is not correct. however, if it suggests that the act of understanding is the whole cure,
for according to Freud the essence of the therapeutic process consists in transference
(Kolakowski. 1978, p. 392).
Secondly, one has to be certain whether it is the psychoanalytic technique
which is producing the effect - the cure - or whether it is due to some other
variable (cf Keat, 1981, p. 151). This exposes the danger of spurious correlation
between psychoanalysis and a 'cure', and it takes no cognizance of the Hawthorne
effect on patients.
Thirdly, Habermas has failed 'to show through his account of psychoanalysis
how the rèlationship of theory to practice differs from that of the empirical-analytic
or hermeneutic sciences' (ibid. p. 152), ie he has failed to demonstrate the special
nature of an emancipatory interest or science.
Fourthly, the requirement that the distinctive character of a Critical Theory -
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that it brings about empowerment through critique - is a contingent rather than
logical necessity (ibid., pp. 154 - 159), a feature which is hinted at by Habermas
himself (19 74a, p. 32). As such there is a suppressed prelniss of optimism in
Critical Theory; Critical Theory might have to accept the reality of pessimism.
Fifthly, psychoanalysis is iii constant danger of committing the self-fulfilling
prophecy (Keat, op cit, pp. 152 - 159), ie that its empirical findings are only true
if one accepts the premises as 'given'; Habermas is silent on this crucial issue.
Sixthly, Habermas's 'picture of self-reflection is extremely rationalistic and
non-experiential by comparison with ...alternative[s]' (ibid. p. 171). Many patients
do not free themselves from repression solely by a process of rationalization.
Seventhly, by treating patients necessarily as 'objects', psychoanalysis con-
firms the asynunetry of relations which Critical Theory seeks to destroy (cf. Keat,
op cit, pp. 172 - 175). This resonates with McCarthy's (1978) criticism that the
physician / patient model is elitist, the analyst often controls the patient. 58 As
a model for social evolution it is inappropriate, for a social group cannot be so
controlled by critical theorists.
Eighthly, there is a concern that, because 'the transactions between analyst
and analysand are inherently confidential' (Habermas, 1985a, p. 87), the principle
is not extendable to others - a charge which Habermas accepts (ibid, p. 87).
Ninthiy, the question has to be raised of the extent to which reflection and
rational reconstruction are a sufficient condition for emancipation, for raising a
person's awareness of constraints may engender feelings of real powerlessness be-
58 This expo.s'.s the criticism that Critical Theory, by its language and concepts. attracts, in effect.
an
 hit.ist coterie of readers rather than the wide spectrum of the populace to whom it is directed.
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cause solutions are out of the person's control (Geuss, 1981; Nielsen, 1992).°
Tenthly, in 'psychologizing' social currents via the demand for authenticity it
is difficult to see how Habermas's use of Freud differs from existentialism; when
this is taken to the need to change society it is possible to argue that one can
makes one's own life authentic whilst leaving social inequality untouched - the
very antithesis of Critical Theory.
Eleventhly, Habermas's early work inveighs against reification, however his
use of Freud reifies subjectivity into certain forms of behaviour only. The analogy
of the intrinsic antisocial nature of people whose instincts have to be repressed or
sublimated need not be a fair picture of society.
Hence at the first level, of the use of Freudian psychology, there are major
problems with his theory.
5.3.2 Habermas's Use of Psychoanalysis for Social Theory
At the second level - of social theory - there are several concerns about the
use of a psychoanalytic theory, principally:
• the confusion between psychoanalysis and psychotherapy;
• the use of psychoanalytic theory as a social theory (Young, 1989, p. 16) - it is
impossible to translate the psychoanalytical model to social and political action
- social relations are not like a therapist / patient relation, and a methodology
from one sphere does not comfortably map onto another sphere;
Ingrain (1987) argues that there is a 'serious problem is Habermas's conflation of philosophical and
ennutcipatory reflection' (p. 15). Young (1989) comments on Habermas's use of psychoanalytic
theory: whii this dimension of power is added, we may take leave to doubt whether menibers of
elite groups in society (the ruling class) are capable of responding to 'analysis' ' (p. 38).
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its implicit view that social change is possible through 'therapy' (ibid. p. 16);
• that it is 'misleading as a model for discussion between politically organized
groups' (ibid. p. 25);
• that it is unclear how self-reflection can become 'fully practical in the form of
political struggle' (ibid. p. 27);
• that it conflates reflection and practical engagement;
• that it is unclear what is the political or social equivalent of personal emanci-
pation through psychoanalysis; whereas in psychoanalysis the therapy restores
former issues which have been repressed to the unconscious, in Critical Theory
'to free oneself from ideology is not to recover a lost element of one's past'
(Keat, op cit, p. 79)60 - it never existed in the first place;
• that the willing submission of the patient to therapy may not find its equiva-
lent in social theory (Larrain, 1994, p. 127), where groups will resist (a fact
which Habermas acknowledges) - 'the revolutionary struggle is by no means a
psychoanalytic treatment on a large scale' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 30). It is not
psychoanalysis writ large. 61 The therapist / patient relationship is cooperative
whereas 'at the social level classes stand in a relationship of domination and
possibly conflict' (Larrain, 1994, p. 126). If psychoanalysis is voluntary the
uneven distribution of resources is not; how does one manage to bring a class
to voluntary self-analysis - to submit itself to analysis?
• that the ruling class will enter a dialogue only inasfar as it serves to strengthen
° Cf also Eagleton. 1991. p. 136.61 Held. 1980. asks how can a relationship which is essentially voluntary become the methodological
model for uiidcrstaiiding and changing social situations characterized by unequal distribution of
scarce resources, discrepancies in material interests and power relations?' (p. 394).
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domination (Habermas, 1974a, p. 30);
• that 'the strategic confrontation between classes and the interaction between
doctor and patient are not the same thing' (ibid., p. 30);
- . that it is unclear who are the societal or political equivalents of patient and
therapist (ibid., p. 30);
• that understanding social repression will not cause it to disappear (ibid., p.
39), ie that it confuses aetiology with future-oriented action. Indeed the pro-
cess might exacerbate feelings of powerlessness when groups become aware of
overwhelming constraints which are out of their control (cf Keat, op cit, pp.
131 - 132);
• the 'individual plane of neurosis' does not translate to the 'social plane of class
power and domination' (Larrain, 1994, p. 126);
• it lacks reference to 'material interests and class antagonisms' (ibid., p. 127);
• that the casting of society in a pathological model is only one view of soci-
ety and that this may be miscasting other, more positive, aspects of society -
'Habernias puts institutions on a level with neurotic behaviour and the repeti-
tious compulsion of an individual' (Ottmann, 1982, p. 92);
• with respect to Habermas's (and indeed Horkheimer's and Adorno's) concern
with authority, that it adopts an inconsistent position on authority;62
• that it confuses reflection and self-reflection (Bernstein, 1985, p. 12);
62 [T11iose aspects of consciousness where...resistance might be located - critical reason, individu-
ation. iiitegrit..y - are tied to the process of internalizing authority. As a result. the rejection of
authority ran only take place through its acceptance....If reason, reflection and individuation are
historically tied to the process of internalizing authority, is not the result that authority is in some
sense s(('1i as necessary or even vindicated?' (Whitebrook, 1985, p. 147).
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• that to believe that structural change can be effected by an ernancipatory
critical social theory is naive (ibid. p. 178).
The whole notion of the employment of a psychoanalytic model, then, has to
be questioned. Habermas's notion of generalizable interests is similar to utilitar-
ianism as the greatest good for the greatest number (Moore, 1971). Habermas's
view thus becomes open to the criticisms which Moore raised (eg the tautological
justification of 'good' and the commission of the naturalistic fallacy). Moreover,
there is in the notion of 'generalizability' a sympathy to the law-like positivism
which he had rejected earlier. This is a major problem for Habermasian theory,
for if he is proscribing laws, generalities and universals (ci the discussion of pos-
itivism earlier), then his own argument is undermined for he too is propounding
laws, generalities and universals.63
In the Freudian analogy one has to ask who is the therapist, who the patient?
Habermas is unclear on this, his suggestions of the transformative power of prac-
titioners of Critical Theory accords them the status of Plato's 'men of gold' or
Mannheim's 'socially unattached intelligentsia' where the possibility of elitism is
high. Indeed Habermas's view that 'in a process of enlightenment there can only
be participants' (Haberrnas, 1974a, p. 40) makes unquestioned assumptions about
levels of domination, submission, power and equality amongst the participants.
There are, then, several weaknesses in Habermas's use of a psychoanalytic
model as a model of social transformation. It appears that Habermas's theory has
largely only metaphorical power or utility as an introduction to a more developed
theory of society or social formations. As an entrée into a theory of communicative
03 This is akin to the trap which relativists (discussed later) lay for themselves - that their views
must 1w treated relativistically.
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competence or to systematically distorted communication it has some introductory
value; however either as a fully worked out analogy or as a method for social
analysis it is too flawed in its finer grain to stand scrutiny.
As with his knowledge-constitutive interests, so with his use of psychoanalysis
- when his theory becomes untenable he jettisons its major features. He rejected
the attempt to ground social science in epistemology (Habermas, 1988); now 64 he
moves away from Freudian psychoanalysis65 into speech act theory and the work
of Weber, Piaget, Kohlberg, Parsons, and Schlitz. This is the subject of the next
two chapters. One has to question exactly what he wants from the authors to
whom he turns - a fully-fledged, eclectically-derived theory or support and the
respectability of accepted authorities. This latter point remains true through his
developing theory, as will be shown in subsequent chapters.
64 Haberivas (1979. 1984, 1987a).
65 Docicuiaii (1990) argues for the retention of a psychoanalytic perspective in Habermas's later works.
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Chapter VI
THE BEGINNINGS OF HABERMAS'S THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
6.1 Introduction
It has been argued that Habermas's attempts to found a social theory on
epistemology and psychoanalytic methodology contain several flaws. It has been
demonstrated that Habermas was aware of this (Habermas, 1974a, 1982, 1988;
Outhwaite, 1987). Whilst still retaining his concern for emancipation and equal-
ity his attempts at social theory shift their ground from an endeavour to found
social theory on epistemology and psychoanalytic methodology to a theory of com-
municative action. This is a major paradigm shift. Habermas is arguing that in
communication are the central features of an egalitarian society and emancipation
for individuals and social groups. The elements of his new paradigm are explained
throughout this chapter. The development of Habermas's thoughts in this chapter
principally draws on his 'early' and 'middle .period' writings. 00 This account of
Habermas's developing communicative social theory includes:
• an analysis of a theory of communicative action as a reconstructive science
(6.2);
• a critique of the notion of reconstructive science (6.3);
° Hab'rnias (l970a. 1970b, 1970c, 1970d, 1974a, 1976a, 1976b, 1979a) and the criticisms of this work
coutaiiiil in Bvriistein (1976). Thompson and Held (1982), Hohendahl (1986) and Fay (1987).
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• an analysis of systematically distorted communication and its sympathies to
Freudian concerns (6.4);
• an analysis of communication as possessing dialogue constitutive universals
(6.5);
• an analysis of the speech act theory of Austin and Searle (as used by Habermas)
and an analysis of the validity claims of speech acts (6.6);
• a critique of Habermas's use of speech act theory, particularly for its commission
of the naturalistic fallacy and its understatement of the political dimension (eg
power and interests) of speech acts (6.7).
. An analysis of Habermas's view of the ideal speech situation (6.8);
• a critique of the ideal speech situation (6.9);
• a consideration of strategic and communicative action (6.10);
• a critique of Haberrnas's concepts of strategic and communicative action (6.11);
Habermas's attempts to bring the work of Piaget and Kohlberg to a theory of
social formations (6.12);
• a critique of Habermas's use of Piaget an Kohlberg (6.13).
Habermas attempts to draw together his work on ideology critique, knowledge-
constitutive interests and psychoanalysis by fusing them into a theory of society
and social evolution which is essentially a theory of communication - 'societies
can be viewed as networks of communicative actions' (Habermas, 1979a, p. 96).°
67 Haberijias. 1982. P. 233, see also Habernias, 1984, P. xxxix; 1987a. This major step forward in his
thinking had beeu developing for over a decade in his work, traceable back to two seminal articles
in 1970 (HaIernias. 1970a, 1970b) and through his books (1972; 1979; 1984; 1987a; 1987b; 1990).
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The attempt to recast social theory as a theory of communicatiori necessitates
a massive reconceptual exercise, taking the substantive concepts of social theory
and setting them in a new context of communicative action. To carry out this
enterprise Habermas eclectically draws on sources as varied as Freud,.Wunderlich,
Chornsky, Austin, Schütz, Searle, Piaget and Kohlberg.
6.2 Reconstructive Science
Habermas's attempts to develop a theory of communicative action fundamen-
tally rely on his notion of a reconstructive science which is introduced thus:
llccoiistructive science is to be distinguished from ordinary science by its pecu-
liar combmation of empirical understanding with philosophic generalization or uni-
versalizatioii (Habermas, 1972, P. 310).
Habermas claims that one can observe in language and communication uni-
versal social principles and structures of rationality. He writes: 'we cannot avoid
making certain universal presuppositions when using language in order to reach
understanding' (Habermas, 1991, pp. 228 - 9) as they inhere inescapably in corn-
munication. Be they violated or implemented these principles nevertheless exist
(ie they have to exist if they are to be violated) and are evidenced in the validity
claims of rightness, truth, sincerity, legitimacy and consensus. Held (1980) argues
that 'the end point of this argument [for reconstructive science] is that the struc-
ture of speech is held to involve the anticipation of a form of life in which truth,
freedom and justice are possible' (Held, 1980, p. 345). Habermas suggests that
there are
universal and necessary communicative presuppositions of argumentative speech
aiid who kitows what it means to justify a norm of action implicitly presupposes as
valid tl principle of universalization (Habermas, 1990a, p. 86).
Communicative action and the ideal speech situation are self-evident forms of
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rationality because their existence is proven contrafactually (see 6.8).
In communicative action reside unavoidable universal principles of rational-
ity, democracy, equality and freedom; from this he suggests that, because these
universal principles are observed and observable (if contrafactually, see 6.7), ra-
tionality itself is a specific feature of humanity and abides by the moral principle
of universalizability. If one is looking for a justification of universalization then
it is found in the very structure of language itself (Roderick, 1986, p. 88). A
reconstructive science thus is a hybrid of empiricism and 'grand' theory. To make
human behaviour more 'human' one needs to further the principles of rationality
evident in language and discourse, thereby taking emancipatory action, 68 ie the
advocacy of rationality derives from the properties of communication. Habermas
is saying that in involving oneself in communication one is thereby unavoidably
committing onself to the principle of rationality:89
Thc argument is not that communicative forms ought to be primary, the argu-
ment is that. they are primary. Reason does not need to be regenerated, it is by nature
regenerative in the same sense that reason as communicative reason is embedded in
language (Rasmussen, 1990, P. 28).
Rasmussen argues for the elegance of Habermas's theory where he writes:
If it could be said that every great philosophy is based on a single simple (though
not simplistic) idea, this [ie the notion that communication per se is emancipatory]
WOUl(l be it (ibid., p. 22).
Habermas argues that it is possible to tease out of speech act theory a 'sci-
entific reconstruction' which is at the same time emancipatory (ibid. p. 22). He
then applies this to an analysis of social development. Using the work of Piaget
68 Haherinas is suggesting that one can derive an 'ought' from an 'is' (even though he indicates his
awareness of this problem where he writes that in the relationship between rational reconstruction
and euipirieal analysis there is a danger of the naturalistic fallacy' (Habermas, 1990a, P. 34)).69 This is what Habermas means when he undertakes his theory of universal pragmatics, eg
Haberitias. 1976h.
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and Kohlberg (6.12 and 6.13) he asserts that human development follows broadly
similar paths. The intention, at heart is to show that 'Western rationality is eman-
cipatory' (Rasmussen, 1990, p. 18). By indicating that societal development has
been marked by an inexorable progress towards decentring, demythologizing and
an openness to rational debate Habermas is arguing that this demonstrates that
rationality inheres in human behaviour.
•By an appeal to empirically and logically demonstrated universals in language
Habermas is able to override the charge of relativism; dialogue-constitutive univer-
sals exist not merely because Habermas believes that they do. A reconstructive
science is a blend of empirics and ethics:
fl.:oiistructive science is an ambitious attempt to create a special category of
science that combines immunity from falsification by ordinary science with special
access to the empirical foundations of morality (Alford, 1985, p. 321).
As such the creation of the special category of reconstructive science, if such
a category were tenable, could offer his views a priviiged status, avoiding the
weaknesses of empiricism and yet indicating that his view of the inherent tendency
towards rationality is both empirically observable and at the same time theoreti-
cally justifiable. It renders his theories immune from criticism.
The notion of a reconstructive science is one which Habermas never leaves. In
his 1991 paper he reasserts the central significance of being able to derive universal
principles from empirical observations, with these universal principles transcending
empirical situations and thereby not requiring empirical investigation, ie he claims
to have justified the normative basis of his social theory. These are rooted in
communicative action and communicative rationality. Habernias (1990) cites the
work of Peters (1974) on transcendental reason to provide support for his view
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(Peters, 1974, pp. 153 - 156).°
6.3 A Critique of Reconstructive Science
The notion of a reconstructive science, however, is not immune from criticism.
It was suggested in (6.2) that Habermas uses the notion of a reconstructive science
to generate ethical norms from empirical observations. The acceptability of this
view, has to be questioned, for it is built on the naturalistic fallacy. 7 ' Simply
observing principles of rationaiity in communicative action gives no prescriptions
for the desirability of observed behaviours. Hohendahl (1986) extends this criticism
into a major attack on the suppressed normative basis of Habermas's theory where
he writes:
The weak spot in Habermas's argument is the dual function of language. By
pointing to the actual operation of linguistic and social communication Habermas
coiiceab that these empirical conditions are ultimately turned into a normative Un-
derstandiiig of language.. ..By insisting that linguistic communication.. .provides the
basis for the new paradigm, Haberinas distances himself from a transcendental argu-
mont. But this move has a price: the rigid equation of facts and norms (Hohendahi,
1980. p. 63).
Habermas has made a category mistake in his derivation of an 'ought' from
an 'is'. Roderick (1986) accuses Haberma.s of misappropriating empirical evidence
in pursuit of his reconstructive theory:
How can an empirical-reconstructive approach be used to prove the very as-
suiuptioim on which it is based without circularity? (Roderick, 1980, p. 160).
This is a significant charge, for it alludes to the way in which Habermas
constructs a hermetically sealed theory by inventing his own rules, axioms and
Peters writes that the transcendental argument 'attempts to make explicit what a person is corn-
initted to who makes use of his reason in attempting to answer the question "What ought I to
do?". If anyone asks this question seriously.. .he must assume that there are general principles of
sonie sort. that make reasons relevant' (Peters, 1974, p. 153).
71 Cf Alfurd. 1985. p. 329.
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truth tests (discussed later).72
Habermas (1972, 1984) suggests that reconstructive sciences differ signifi-
cantly from 'ordinary' science. This has to be questioned on epistemological and
methodological grounds. White (1988, PP. 129 - 131) suggests that Habermas,
by his appeal to a reconstructive science, succeeds in breaking free from foun-
dationalist philosophy in epistemology but that in so doing he is committed to
having to provide the same empirical evidence for his theory as that required in
non-reconstructive sciences.
The essentialism, which, in my view, attaches to reconstructions of pretheoret-
ical knowledge of competently knowing, speaking and acting subjects is not meant
to deny that we are dealing here with fallible hypotheses, just as in the objectivating
scielices (Habermas, 1982; p. 277).
He confirms this where he writes: 'all rational reconstructions, like other types
of knowledge, have only hypothetical status' (Habermas, 1990, P. 32). Alford
(1985, p. 334) argues that, in accepting that reconstructions are fallible hypothe-
ses as in the empirical sciences, Habermas is abandoning the episternological and
methodological distinction between the two. Indeed Alford argues that the only
difference between the two lies in their focus:
what makes reconstructive science special is actually not its unique epistemo-
logical status, but simply what it is about: rational processes, understood as learned
cogiutive skills (Alford, 1985, p. 332).
Reconstructive sciences are not solely a special category or variant of empirical
science but are, for Alford, a weakened version of empirical sciences because the
criteria for their falsifiability are unclear.
72 Cf. Laiidaii's (1990) comment that 'theories are generally not tested by those phenomena which
they were expressly invented to explain' (Laudan, 1990, p. 24).
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6.4 Systematically Distorted Communication
Habermas uses Freudian psychoanalysis in his developing theory of system-
atically distorted communication (Habermas, 1970a, p. 215). In this account he
shows how Freud dealt with the occurrence of systematically deformed commu-
nication' in neurotic patients (ibid., p. 206), where the therapist restores to the
consciousness of the patient (through the patient's reconstructions) the situations,
experiences and constraints which have caused the systematically distorted commu-
nication and which render patients unable to integrate aspects of their biography
into an existential whole - a 'theory of deviant socialization which includes the
connection between patterns of interaction in early childhood and the formation
of personality structures' (ibid. pp. 209-210, see also Habermas, 1974b, p. 48).
The treatment of systematically distorted communication is effected through
scenic understanding - a hermeneutic understanding of the context and contours
of actions and repression:
Sceiiic understanding makes it possible to 'translate' the meaning of the patho-
logically frozen communication pattern which had been hitherto unconscious and
inaccessil)le to public communication (Habermas, 1970a, p. 208).
Habermas asserts the importance of understanding the context of repression:
thc reconstruction of the original scene leads to an understanding of the meaning
of a deforiiied language-game and simultaneously explains the origin of the deforma-
tioii itsclf (Habermas, 1970a, p. 217).
Habermas (1972; 1974a) argues that this has analogical value as a theory
of society in which the pursuit of equality is frustrated by the operation of ide-
ology which is systemic, structural, ie built into the differentials of social power
and asymmetrical relations of power. Systems distort communication (Habermas,
1974b, p. 48; 1984, p. 105) - maybe even unwittingly to participants. Habermas
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argues that the processes of social integration and socialisation 'can take place only
through the medium of action orientated to reaching understanding' (Habermas,
1982, p. 227) - a theory of society as a theory of communication which stems
from the sociology of Mead (1934), Searle (1969) and Austin (1962):Here Haber-
mas is borrowing ideas and concepts from others to support his developing thesis
- a repetition of the practice observed in chapter 5 where he used Freud.
Heller (1982) questions whether a theory of communication or systematically
distorted communication can embrace fully the class struggle or whether the 'class
struggle as action can be replaced by rational argumentation' (Heller ri982, p. 27)
as it underemphasizes the strength of practical and active struggle and engagement.
In this respect one can question the adequacy of a definition of class oppression as
systematically distorted communication; even though it offers an alternative to the
economic view of class oppression found in Marx it neglects the practical problems
of class struggle and social emancipation.73
6.5 Dialogue Constitutive Universals
Reinforcing the notion of a reconstructive science Habermas argues that speech
possesses dialogue-constitutive universals (a phrase which he borrows from Wun-
derlich (1974) to describe a feature already observed in language by Austin, Searle
and Chomsky) - rules which 'establish the conditions of potential communica-
tion' (Habermas, 1970b, p. 363), and cultural universals - 'invariant features of
contingent scopes of experience which...are common to all cultures' (ibid. p. 363),
a priori and a posteriori universals respectively (ibid. pp. 363 - 4). Universal
Hcld (1980) argues that Habermas might have to assume that at some stages in history certain
foriiis of distorted communication and hence certain levels of social repression, [arci unavoidable'
(HehI. 1980. p. 317). If this is true then it could weaken Habermass case. 	 -
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pragmatics and dialogue-constitutive universals begin to bring together a theory of
communication and a social theory.
6.6 Speech Acts
In discussing 'speech situations' Habermas, echoing Austin (1962) and Searle
(1969), is recognizing that speech operates in an interpersonal context. He accepts
that 'utterances are never simply sentences' (Habermas, 1970b. p. 368) disem-
bodied from context, rather their meaning derives from the fact that they are set in
intersubjective contexts - 'all speech exists in a context of actions and intentions'
(ibid. p. 371). A speech situation 'both forms a context and furnishes resources
for the processes of mutual understanding' (Habermas, 1987b, p. 298). Contained
in any speech situation is a 'double structure' (Habermas, 1976b, 1979a, p. 42),
whereby it is not oniy the propositional content which has meaning - the 'locu-
tionary' aspect (Habermas, 1970b, p. 367) - but also the 'performatory' content
of the speech - the 'ilocutionary' aspect (ibid. p. 367, Habermas, 1979a, pp. 34
- 36). Habermas outlines this double structure which he defines as' 'doing things
in saying something' - this is what Austin saw as the illocutionary force of speech
acts' (Habermas, 1976b, p. 156).
It is the illocutionary component which attracts Habermas, for it respects
both the intersubjectivity of speech - hence casting it in a sociological frame -
and the 'action-orientation' of speech situations. Habermas comments that the
uncoupling of propositional and illocutionary aspects of speech acts 'is a necessary
condition for the separation of the two levels of communication: (a) the level
of intersubjectivity. . . and (b) the level of objects in the world, or states of affairs'
Sec also Habcriiias. 1979a, p. 26.
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(Habermas, 1976b, p. 157). He indicates clearly the potential of speech to integrate
micro and macro levels of social analysis where he asserts that in a speech act there
is constant reference to 'four domains - external nature, society, internal nature,
and speech itself' (Habermas, 1979a, pp. 66-7), he argues that 'every process of
reaching understanding takes place against the background of a culturally ingrained
pre-understandmg' (1984, p. 100), ie speech acts are an inescapable element of a
sociocultural lifeworid (ibid., p. 108). Here, then, we can detect the elementary
form of a social theory which not only embraces micro- and macro-sociological
issues but necessarily links them. He writes that
the concept of society has to be linked to a concept of the lifeworid that is
compleiiiiitary to the concept of communicative action. Then communicative action
beconu's interesting primarily as a principle of sociation (Habermas, 1984, p. 337).
Haberinas introduces a third feature of a speech situation - the 'expressive'
aspect of the communication, wherein are manifested the speakers' intentions,
wishes, feelings (Habermas, 1979a, p. 49). These three aspects of speech acts have
their own criteria of validity; the locutionary aspects are premissed on 'truth', the
illocutionary aspects are premissed on rightness or legitimacy, and the expressive
aspects are premissed on authenticity or sincerity (Habermas, 1970b, pp. 158-9;
1979a, p. 28). Habermas (1979a; 1982; 1984, pp. 58, 99, 308-310; 1987b, p. 313)
argues that there are three 'worlds' in which we find ourselves - the objective, the
social and the subjective, and that the criteria of validity of utterances in these
worlds are truth, rightness (legitimacy) and sincerity respectively. He argues that
there are four validity claims for communicative action inherent in speech acts:
truth for a proposition;...thien legitimacy with respect to the norms and values
which justify a performatively generated interpersonal relationship in a given context;
further, veracity with respect to the self-presentation of the speaker's intentions; and,
finally. coiiiprehensibility with resect to the semantic content of the sentences used
in an utterance (Habermas, 1970b, pp. 159 - 160).
Sec also ibid. p. 335 and 1987b, pp. 298 and 350.
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In a later publication70 he writes that there are
three validity claims (truth, rightness, truthfulness [sincerity]) that speakers
raise with their utterances, three worlds (objective, social, subjective) to which speak-
ers relate in their utterances, three basic attitudes (objectivating, norm-conformative,
expressive) which they thereby adopt and among which they can establish continuous
traiisitions in a performative attitude, and three classes of speech-acts (constantive,
regulative, representative) that include three pure modes of language-use (cognitive,
interactive, expressive) (Habermas, 1982, p. 271).
Habermas constantly returns to these aspects in his developing theory of so-
ciety; the truth, sincerity, comprehensibility and legitimacy claims found in speech
acts (1987a, p. 26) are fundamental to rational society (cf. Habermas, 1984, pp.
15 - 16 and p. 99; Habermas, 1990, pp. 31 and 58). Habermas is not only laying
out the axioms of a theory of communicative action but is reasserting the value of
rationality and of the questioning of legitimacy which he outlined in his Legitima-
tion Crisis (1976a). The features of Habermas's treatment of speech acts can be
summarized in tabular form thus (Figure 6.1):
The figure proceeds (from top to bottom) on a continuum from establish-
ing the domains of the speech acts to their validity claims and requirements and
their characteristics, themes and functions. Rational discourse is found in com-
municative action; communicative action embodies equality and the exercise of
generalizable interests, essential to an egalitarian society.
Speech act theory is a fundamental building block in his attempt to recast
social theory as a theory of communicative action. Habermas is attempting to
construct a set of universal pragmatics (Habermas, 1979a), an awareness that
Ewert (1991. P. 360) notes that the later Habermas did not include comprehensibility as a validity
claim. Ingram (1987, pp. 196, 201) argues that the later Habermas views comprehensibility as a
precoitilition rather than a criticizable claim about objective, social and subjective worlds.
This rtniflates the tables from Habermas, 1979a, Pp. 58 and 68, Held, 1980. p. 338 and Pusey,
1987. p. 79. Hahermas himself frequently conflates tables from his own earlier sources, using one
table to build on previous tables.
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Figure 6.1 - Modes of Communication in Speech Acts
MODES OF COMMUNICATION _________
__________________ Cognitive
	 Interactive	 Expressive
________________ (Locutionary) (Illocutionary) ____________
Domains of
	
'the' world of
	
'our' world of	 'my' world of
reality	 external nature	 society	 internal nature
Basic attitude	 objectivating norm-conforming	 Expressive
Implied validity	 truth	 rightness	 sincerity
claim	 appropriacy	 truthfulness
_____________________ ________________	 legitimacy	 authenticity
Speech-act	 Grounds	 Justifications	 Confirmations
immanent
obligations
to_provide	 _____________ ______________ ____________
Types of speech	 Constantives	 Regulatives	 Avowals
action	 (eg assertions,	 (eg commands,	 (eg admission,
descriptions,	 advice,	 revelation
__________________ explanations) recommendations) 	 deception)
Theme	 propositional	 intersubjectivity 	 speaker's
content	 intersubjectivity	 intentions,
wishes and
________________________ __________________ _____________________ 	 feelings
General functions Representation	 Establishment	 Disclosure
of speech	 of facts	 of legitimate	 of speaker's
interpersonal	 subjectivity
relations
language is both contextualized and yet abides by decontextualized rules (a notion
hardly notable for its originality or profundity).
6.7 A Critique of Habermas's Use of Speech Act Theory
Habermas (1979a) uses ideas from the speech act theory of Austin, Searle
and Hynies.?S Participants in speech acts, operating within the parameters of
78 A1cxaiulii (1985) argues that Haberma.s misrepresents Austin's work (Alexauder. 1985, p. 416),
oversiiiiphfyiitg it and making di8crete sonic elements which Austin saw as overlapping.
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'dialogue-constitutive universals', are striving to reach an 'intersubjectively held
consensus'; speech 'is the medium of communication which already presupposes a
tacit consensus about what it means to communicate' (Habermas, 1970b, p. 370).°
Held (1980) summarizes this in his comment that 'behind all smoothly functioning
communication is a background consensus based on the mutual recognition by all
interlocutors of validity claims' (Held, 1980, p. 339).
However Heller (1982) refutes the strength of Habermas's assertion - 'the
assumption that consensus can be achieved in a process of enlightenment is in fact
no answer; the will to achieve consensus is the problem in question' (p. 25) (cf
Phillips, 1986, pp. 84-5). This is a significant point, for Habermas is assuming
that argument alone will, or should, achieve consensus, thereby ignoring the role of
interests (discussed earlier) and the question of the political will and power which
motivates moves either towards or away from consensus. Fay (1987) criticizes
Habermas's use of speech act theory and its putative orientation to consensus,
suggesting that 'the mistake in Habermas's argument is the unstated assumption
that to understand a speech act is to agrewith it' (Fay, 1987, p. 188).80 This
is echoed by White (1988) where he notes: '[t]he key question here is the exact
source of the motivation to agree' (White, 1988, p. 42).
Within Habermas's use of speech acts there are further weaknesses. Roderick
(1986) argues that Habermas overlooks the complexities of speech act theory as
set out by Austin and Searle, which were problematic for them. This echoes the
criticism earlier of his use of Freud - that he uses Freud (indeed psychoanalysis
generally) very selectively to advance his own theory. Subtlety of treatment is lost
See alsu Hahrina.s (1979a) p. 63.80	 Uuch'rsta1Ldi11g does iiot presuppose agrcemeiit' ' (Roderick, 1986, p. 159).
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to the all-encompassing thrust of his argument. If Habermas were really to take
the notion of speech acts for what they are rather than for what he wants them to
show for his argument then he would have to establish a far more developed speech
act context, drawing on discourse analysis and linguistic theory. He does not do
this in any detail, and thus is exposed to the charge, once again, that he takes
decontextualized aphorisms which happen to suit his argument. Thompson (1982;
1984), Ingrain (1987) and Kruger (1991) regard Habermas's attention solely to
'standard speech acts' as rendering his analysis incomplete and hence inadequate.
Thompson (1982) makes a forceful attack on Habermas's whole notion of universal
pragmatics, for, he argues, if Habermas confines his analysis solely to standard
speech acts how can their claim to be 'universal' be substantiated (Thompson,
1982, p. 193)? Held (1982) reinforces this criticism of how 'universal' the universal
pragrnatics really are when he suggests that Habermas has ignored the importance
of the dimension of internationalism, confining himself to nation states (Held, 1982,
p. 193). In the absence of an international dimension we simply do not have the
evidence to call universal pragmatics universal. They are ethnocentric (see the
comments on Piaget and Kohlbeig later). Habermas, in turn, admits that there
are 'other forms of linguistic realization of speech acts' (Habermas, 1984, p. 330)
but argues for using standard forms as these most clearly demonstrate his principle
of sincerity rather than strategic speech acts.
6.8 The Ideal Speech Situation
Habermas argues that in dialogue-constitutive universals there is a theoretical
presumption of symmetrical relations of equality between the interlocutors, even
though they may be absent in practice, suggesting that in principle participants
have power to enter into and influence the content of a speech situation:
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no matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding may be deformed,
the design of the ideal speech situation is necessarily implied in the structure of
potential speech, since all speech, even of intentional deception, is oriented towards
the idea of truth... .On the strength of communicative competence alone, however,
and indepeiideiit of the empirical structures of the social system to which we belong,
we are quite unable to realize the ideal speech situation; we can only anticipate it
(Haberuia.s. 1970b. p. 372).
This is what he takes to be the contrafactual evidence of the rightness of his
theory - if we can observe an instance where certain principles are violated then
this points to the existence of the principles themselves. Habermas is arguing that
to be able to understand - or indeed to employ - deception we need to know
that deception is a violation of sincerity, and that sincerity is one of the hallmarks
of communication. To be able to deceive or to appear to be sincere, we need to
know the rules of linguistic interaction. Habermas writes that 'in the execution of
speech-acts.. .we contrafactuallij proceed as if the ideal speech situation.. .were not
merely fictive but real' (Habermas, 1982, p. 124) (italics mine).8'
Habermas's conception of the ideal speech situation developed over a period
of nearly fifteen years.82 The concept of the ideal speech situation builds on his
theory of communicative competence and the value he accords to rational action.
In its concern for the 'engagement' of participants the ideal speech situation also
signals a later concern of Habermas - the sigiiificance of participatory democracy.
He argues that 'the speaker must engage himself, that is, indicate that in certain
situations he will draw certain consequences for action' (Habermas, 1979a, p. 61).
Haberivas suggests that 'in order to participate in normal discourse the speaker
must have at his disposal ... communicative competence... [ie] the mastery of the
81 Cf. Haberma.s 1984. p. 14.82 This is (Ilawn from his works of 1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1970d, 1976a, 197Gb. 1979a and 1984.
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ideal speech situation' (Habermas, 1970b, p. 367):83
that. foriti of communication which is free from the constraints of the very pro-
cesses of action and experience, and which allows for an exchange of arguments on
hypothetical validity claims (whereby truth and legitimacy may count as discursively
redeemable validity claims) (ilabermas, 197Gb, p. 164).	 -.
The ideal speech situation is discursively redeemed in speech acts (Habermas,
1979a, p. 2; 1984, P. 10), in principle speech is unavoidably oriented to consensus.
Habermas (1979a, pp. 63-4) writes that 'since every linguistic utterance receives
its actual meaning in the to and fro of dialogue, every sentence reaffirms the idea
of autonomous responsibility for all participants' (Habermas, 1979a, p. 48). This
is very questionable - as will be argued later in the critique (6.9) indeed the
critique will suggest that the ideal speech situation is little more than high-sounding
rhetoric. The ideal speech situation is characterised thus, Figure 6.2:84
One can observe that the characteristics of the ideal speech situation utilize
higher order thinking skills (cf Bloom, 1956) - 'check', 'evaluate', 'modify', 'reflect
on', 'assess', 'alter', 'select'. In its social dimension it operates dialogically
rather than mono logically - the ideal speech situation accords with Vygotsky's
(1978) view that all higher order cognitive functions are learned and communicated
socially. These significant features are discussed in chapters 11 and 12 of this thesis.
This figure contains key phrases which are used repeatedly in the later parts of
the thesis which analyse education from Habermasian perspectives. It is a very
important figure in this respect.
A rational consensus is one that approaches the conditions of the ideal speech
situation where 'only the unforced force of the better argument comes into play'
83 See aLso Habernias (1979a, p. 29).
84 Haberuias. 1970a: 1970b; 1972; 1976b; 1979a; 1984; 1987a; 1987b, 1990; McCarthy, 1978; Held,
1980: Pusey. 1987. 	 -
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Figure 6.2 - Elements of the Ideal Speech Situation
THE IDEAL SPEECH SITUATION
(i) Orientation to a 'common interest ascertained without decetion';
(ii) Freedom to enter a discourse;
(iii) Freedom to check questionable claims;
(iv) Freedom to evaluate explanations;
(v) Freedom to modify a given conceptual framework;
(vi) Freedom to reflect on the nature of knowledge;
(vii) Freedom to allow commands or prohibitions to enter discourse
when they can no longer be taken for granted; 	 -
(viii) Freedom to assess justifications;
(ix) Freedom to alter norms;
(x) Freedom to reflect on the nature of political will;
(xi) Mutual understanding between participants;
(xii) Equal opportunity to select and employ speech acts;
(xiii) Recognition of the legitimacy of each subject to participate
in the dialogue as an autonomous and equal partner;
(xiv) Equal opportunity for discussion;
(xv) Discussion to be free from domination and distorting or
deforming influences;
(xvi) The consensus resulting from discussion derives from the
force of the better argument alone, and not from the
positional or political power of the participants;
(xvii) All motives except the cooperative search for truth are excluded;
(xviii) The speech-act validity claims of truth, legitimacy,
sincerity amid coniprehensibility are all embodied;
(xix) Illocutions replace perlocutions.
(Habermas, 1987b, p. 130). In this respect 'this concept of communicative ratio-
nality carries with it connotations based on the central experience -oj the uncon-
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strained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech' (Habermas,
1984, p. 11O). Habermas has constructed a conceptual framework for a social
theory which operates from the asserted premiss that participants are actively 'en-
gaged' (Habermas, 1979a, p. 61) in intersubjective communications which leads
to their emancipation, even though he outlines only skeletally the practicalities of
that engagement and how it may happen (ci Bernstein's (1976, p. 224)). Haber-
mas argues that in the structure and operation of language are the principles on
which a just society are based:
The commitment to consider all individuals as potential participants in dis-
course presupposes a universalistic commitment to the potential equality, .autonomy,
and rationality of individuals (Habermas, 1982, p. 252).
The cl1aracteristics of the ideal speech situation here are no more than the
characteristics of the just and free society which, according to Habernias, human
activity should strive to achieve. 86 The disclosure of the central tenets of universal
pragmatics is no more than the disclosure of norms on which society is based;
the notion of systematically distorted communication serves to identify the gulf
between the ideal and actual socio-cultural and socio-political worlds; the search
for a rational consensus marks out the evolution of society towards universally
acceptable norms and justice:
Rationalization means overcoming such systematically distorted communication
in which the action-supporting consensus concerning the reciprocally raised validity
clainn...can be sustained (Habermas, 1979a, p. 120).
In this sense Habermas marks a break from Weber who saw the rationalization
85 Haheritias (1984) defines rationality as that which makes action defensible against criticism.
86 Haberitias writes that 'ethical universalism does indeed have a utopian content' (Habermas, 1972,
j. 251). fl.oderick (1986) indicates that Habermas subsequently moves from a view in which
the ideal speech situation indicates an end-state of society to a view of the ideal speech
situation as a conceptual tool oniy. Young (1989) argues that in Knowledge and Human
Interests Hahermas regards the ideal speech situation as a tool to think with (Young, 1989,
p. 76).	 -
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of society into the 'iron cage' of bureaucracy as profoundly irrational - a society
wherein Wertrationalitàt has been overtaken by Zweckrationalität. Habermas's
views of communicative action attempt to break the bonds of Weber's scenario of
an over-administered, emancipation-deadening bureaucracy.
Habermas sees the potential of the notion for research into the structural,
ideological deformations and repressions of the ideal speech situation as being of
major sociological import (Habermas, 1979a, p. 374). This would have to chart the
repressive forces and the factors which were frustrating the realization of the ideal
speech situation, a harking back to the ideology critique of his earlieLwritings. He
comments that the ideal speech situation is 'a critical standard against which every
actually realized consensus can be called into question and tested' (Habermas,
1982, p. 258). Emancipation is wrought through the attaining of communication
free from domination.
6.9 A Critique of the Ideal Speech Situation
Criticisms of the notion of the ideal speech situation 87 are cast at many levels:
• the gulf between ideal and actual speech situations;
• the problems of a consensus theory of truth;
• its utopian and unrealistic purity;
• the presumption of resolution of ideological conflict;
• the relegation of the overtly political dimensions of social life in favour of the
pursuit of rational action;
87 Beriist'in. 1976: Keat 1981: Thompson and Held, 1982; Dallmayr, 1984; Giddens, 1985; Fay, 1987;
l3ouhni. 1989.
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• the assumption of the appeal of the pursuit of rationality or agreement on its
constitution;
. the inability to link macro and micro social theory;
. the linguistic turn of social theory;
• the utility of the theory in effecting equality and democracy;
• the power of rationality or of theory to stimulate action.
Thompson and Held (1982) comment that 	 -
The gulf which exists between ideal discourse and actual speech cannot ... be
closed by recourse to transcendental reflection .... in attempting to ground practical
critique through a quasi-Kantian reflection on language, Habermas succumbs...to the
most intricate self-deception [by conflating unfairly empirics and theory] (Thompson
and Held. 1982, p. 12)
This view is echoed by Keat (1981) who wonders how adequate the notion
of the ideal speech situation is for resolving the 'kinds of normative issues that
typically arise in moral and political decisions' (Keat, 1981, p. 181). One has to
ask how far a rational consensus is realistic or how possible it is to separate the
force of the argument from the power or force of the protagonists.
Thompson (1982) contends that 'the recourse to the conditions of ideal speech
may be neither necessary nor sufficient for the attainment of a 'rational consensus'
(p. 130); Lukes (1982) comments that the ideal speech situation could occur but
leave economic and political processes a 'rationalist illusion' (p. 141). Larraiii
(1994) argues that 'the reconstruction of a hypothetical state of perfect rationality
seems totally disconnected from historical practice' (Larrain, 1994, p. 125). More-
over, Hesse (1982) argues that even if a rational consensus were achie.ed this does
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not avoid the charge of relativism. 88 Further, Thompson (1984) comments on the
lack of clarity in the view that all participants in an ideal speech situation have
equal chances to select and employ speech acts (p. 272). These are major criti-
cisms of Habermas, indicating that he is caught up in the utopian purity of speech
act theory which, in reality, is and has to be touched by the reality of everyday
life. 89 Boudon (1989) comments on this:
the l)erfect-communication model seems to be literally impossible to conceptu-
alize: firstly. because it assumes that everybody is equally competent in all areas;
secon(hly. because it assumes that there is no time-lag at all in acquiring and circu-
latizig information: thirdly, because it assumes that within the communication group
there is ito question of manipulation, coalition or strategy; fourthly, because it as-
suities that everybody has clear and discernable opinions and wishes on all- matters;
fifthly. because it blithely ignores the classic problem of how individual preferences
and opinions are transformed into collective preferences and opinions; and finally,
because it obscures the distinction, even though it has been a classic one ever since
Aristotle. between topics of debate which stem from opinions and those which are
raised by proof or experiment (Boudon, 1989, p. 82).
The model assumes a shared consensus on rules for communication which
may operate in a small group situation but more possibly not in a large group
situation, ie it asserts that which it needs to demonstrate. It assumes a consensus
on the nature of the 'good life', debarring alternative conceptions (Dailmayr, 1984).
Indeed Dalimayr goes on to suggest that 'the study oscillates precariously between
a mode of action predicated on a prior, presubjective consensus and another view
treating consensus as the outcome of divergent .individual designs' (Dailmayr, 1984,
p. 237). We are unsure whether consensus is achieved or pre-ordinate, or whether
linguistic communication is the means to, or goal which is, consensus (ibid., p. 238)
- a premise, a medium or an outcome (ibid. p. 239). Habermas's view of the
ideal speech situation offers little solace to those struggling for power, recognition,
88 Cf Strain (1984): Tlie major charge against any consensus theory of truth is that it leaves truth
as merely relative to a local culture (Strain, 1984, p. 108). See also Strain (1984). ch. 2.
89 Nielsen (1992) argues that Habermas's work is 'radically incomplete' because lie gives us no account
of how this transformation of society is to be achieved' (p. 283).
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rights and freedoms. Boudon (1989) comments on this where he writes that
Haberiitass theory of pure and perfect communication is a model which is in-
terestiug. congenial and inspired by the sincerest of motives; but it always reminds
me of the story of the expert in operational research who, when asked the best way
to get an elephant on to a boat, started from the assumption that the weight of the
elephant was negligible (Boudon, 1989, p. 194).	 1
Giddens(1985), in his turn, doubts the implications and applications of the
concept of the ideal speech situation:
SOur first sentence' you once wrote, 'expresses unequivocally the intention of
univcrsal and unconstrained consensus'. Why not say that our first gesture of recog-
nition of another person promises a universal solidarity of human beings (Giddens,
1985. PP 116 - 7).
Giddens is arguing that Habermas is placing too much emphasis on a linguistic
turn of theory (cf Hohendahl's (1986) criticisms earlier) and is, in fact, simplistic.
Domination is not equivalent to distorted communication, there are economic and
material conditions of oppression to be addressed (Giddens, 1977, p. 152). This
is reinforced by Roderick (1986) who asks 'Why is a genuine understanding /
agreement based only on the force of the better argument? Couldn't it also be
based on love, compassion, solidarity or sympathy?' (Roderick, 1986, p. 160).
Habermas is unclear whether a theory of communication takes sufficient account
of a range of phenomena - eg culture, the distribution of material resources.
It is possible - or indeed impossible - for individual participants to observe
the requirements of the ideal speech situation and yet to operate in a massively
unequal society. Habermas fails to show how the ideal speech situation can effect
these changes, assuming that the gulf between ideal discourse and actual speech
can be bridged solely or simply by recourse to reflection and domination-free corn-
municatioii (Bubner, 1982). In many situations the ideal speech situation might be
implied - or redeemed - contrafactually but have absolutely no effect-in bringing
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overall equality, emancipation or empowerment, it is simply an irrelevance. Indeed
it could be argued that the ideal speech situation might impede the move towards
equality; that moves to equality might be made more effectively by using force -
or action. Action oriented to mutual understanding need not be cmmunicative
action - a point which is neglected by Habermas in his desire to elevate the role
of communicative action. Further, the ideal speech situation assumes an unproven
commonality of interests between individuals; whilst this is questionable (cf Keat,
op cit, p. 195) it remains for Habermas to justify the assumption that common
interests are relevant in practical discourses (ibid. p. 195). Fay (1987) argues that
even though they understand one another perfectly, rational people may con-
tinue to be rational though they continue indefinitely to disagree; neither their mutual
understaiidiiig nor their rationality is sufficient to achieve that consensus which is a
necessary condition of collective autonomy... .the estence and the defensibility of
rational disagreements needs to be invoked (Fay, 1987, p. 190).
Again Habermas is assuming that which he should be demonstrating - that
rational argument will achieve consensus. 9° Moreover there are major substantive
questions to be raised against the ideal speech situation, for example to ask what
the indicators will be of the achievement of the ideal speech situation; will we know
it when it is reached (Phillips, 1986, p. 85), and who has such perfect knowledge
(Geuss, 1981); what kinds of knowledge would constitute the force of the better
argument (which inevitably would be value based as values determine the relevance
or worthwhuleness of the argument). The achievement of consensus on the force
of the better argument is temporally or spatially contextualized; Young (1989)
suggests that this a major dilemma for Critical Theorists where he writes:
How eaii we postulate transcendental conditions - conditions of our human
nature if that nature is subjectively constituted? How can we transcend ourselves?
°° Phillips (1986) suggests that 'if the notion of the ideal speech situation is taken as a necessary
requiruikient fur speculation and argumentation about questions of justice and morality, then it
PP(L$ Lu be a hindrance to articulating the demands of justice and to developing the social
crit.wisin that Habermas himself advocates' (Phillips, 1986, p. 88).
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(Young. 1989, p. 38).
The ideal speech situation assumes that consensus will be an adequate criterion
for the achievement of the better argument, neglecting the possibility of every
party being collectively mistaken, ie neglecting any moral absolutes (Callinicos,
1989, p. 111). Callinicos argues that a rational consensus is not a guarantee of
truth. Further, it is unclear how the force of the better argument will be judged
or disputes over it settled, and how one will adjudicate between equally sound but
ideologically different arguments (questioning the move towards consensus which
is implicit in Habermas's view of the ideal speech situation). Indeed Phillips (1986)
argues that a justification that a consensus itself is rational has to be established
(Phillips, 1986, p. 84).91 Who will be the adjudicators (with the risk that it will
promote the very elitism which it sought to deny)?
Habermas does not develop the practical implications of 'the unforced force
of the better argument' (Habermas, 1987b, p. 130). The problem here is that
an increasingly general, all-subsuming theory is too general to inform or stimulate
action, one has to ask how far a very general principle or theory will be a stimulus
to action. Larrain (1994) argues that 'this regulative model is too abstract to be
able to provide concrete criteria which can be used when passing judgement on
specified theories and political programmes' (Larrain, 1994, p. 125). One is faced
with the problem of how the concept of the ideal speech situation assists us in the
face of powerful ideological struggles and with competing systems - eg religious,
political - which all claim to be reasonable and rational (Lukes, 1977). Under
these circumstances does the ideal speech situation become simply decisionism (see
91 Haberinas is nuclear on his position here; in Legitimation Grisis (1976a) he argues that con-
flicts am! couiprouhise can be overcome, then in 1982 he argues that compromises might be necessary
(cf Keat. 1981).	 -
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chapter 3.5) which Habermas condemns in scientism and positivism? Habermas
denies the absolutes which inhere in positivism and yet he credits the force of the
better argument with 'absolute', ideal, status, thereby equating facts with norms
(the same feature for which lie criticised positivism and scientism).
There remains also the problem that the force of the better argument is pre-
missed on communicative action; this assumes its superiority over strategic action
discussed in chapter 6.10. The ideal speech situation seeks a liberal consensus which
many would find unpalatable. It does not question the acceptability of grounding
a critique of ideology in a theory of language.	 -
A communication theory, with its emphasis on the moves to rational argu-
ment, where the force of the argument alone holds sway, is perhaps too genteel
or too optimistic for the realities of oppression and suppression in society. There
will be occasions where force has to be used 'on behalf of argumentation' (Young,
1989). There will be some social forces which will simply not be dissolved by the
operation of reflection and reconstruction. The ideal speech situation neglects the
potential necessity of using practical force to bring about equality:
the .social system is one of domination, and the dominating party cannot be
brought to listen to an argument or accept any kind of reciprocity unless it is forced
to pay attention (Heller, 1982, p. 27).
The conditions of the ideal speech situation do not necessarily engage the
lived experiences of cultural traditions, uneven distribution of material resources
and power. The ideal speech situation is interesting but too utopian to be relevant
to daily praxis and its effects might be minimal. Van der Burg (1990) comments:
[cjveii if we assume that one can arrive at satisfactory and relatively clear solu-
tions iii an zdeal discourse situation, does it still not become impossible to reach good
results ilL corcrete. real situations, because of the fundamental contrafacticity of the
ideal situation... .Are we not therefore compelled to appeal to concrete morals' (Van
(her Burg. 1990. p, 109).
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One is reminded of Santayana's (1971) comment on idealisations of this kind:
'[n]othing will have been disproved, but everything will have been abandoned' (p.
44) and of Marx's and Engels' (1976) withering comments on German ideologists:
'they forget, however, that to these phrases they. are only opposing o'ther phrases,
and that they are in no way combating the real existing world' (Marx and Engels
1976, p. 30).
There is a sense in which Habermas's reworking of social evolution as the
progression towards communicative action and the ideal speech situation is as re-
ductionist as the Marxism which he criticised, for in moving towards-the austerity
of rational argument Heller accuses Habermas of losing the sensuous, tragic side of
human nature. People have feelings, needs, wants (Heller, 1982, p. 31).92 Human
activity is much less antiseptic than Habermas would have it, there is an expres-
sive rationality which needs recognition. Haberma.s overplays the rational at the
expense of the practical (discussed later).
Like his psychoanalytic model, Habermas's concept of the ideal speech sit-
uation contains an unrealistic suppressed premiss that consensual outcomes are
possible in practical discourse (ibid. p. 196); however people differ in their ra-
tional desires. This is a fundamental problem in Habermasian theory. Roderick
(1986) argues that there are severe logical problems with Habermas's position here:
If ull(lerstallding and agreement belong to the structure of language, if they are
conditions ... of speech. then misunderstandings and disagreements must also belong
to the structure of language and be conditions for the possibility of speech....Since
both umkrstaiiding misunderstanding, agreement and disagreement, belong to the
cou(:eptnal-tl-anscendental structure of language, no basis remains for privileging the
posit.ive terms over their 'negative' counterparts (Roderick, 1986, p. 159).
92 [C]oiiiinit.iiieiit to rational argument is not sufficient to secure the target group's readiness for en-
lighit.eniii'ut: such readiness depends on the involvement of the human being as a whole' (Thompson
aiid Held. 1982. p. 12).
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Negatives are no more simply derivatives of positives than positives are of
negatives. 93 Given that Habermas argues that communicative and strategic action
are both evident in laiiguage he needs to provide a justification for privileging com-
municative action over strategic action that is more than ideologicakpreference.94
The implication of Roderick's critique is to suggest that, even though Habermas
suggests that a normative justification for his 'theory with a practical intent' can
be found in communicative rationality this is, in fact, ideological because it un-
fairly selects those aspects of communicative theory which happen to support his
case. Thus as exhortation the ideal speech situation may be attractive whilst as
unbiased theory it is flawed - an issue which is taken up in chapter. eight in the
critique of Habermas's overall theory.
Hence whilst superficially the notion of the ideal speech situation might be
attractive, when one evaluates Habermas's arguments they are found to be flawed
on logical, epistemological, substantive, empirical and practical grounds. 95 As a
contributor to Habermas's developing theory of communicative action the flawed
ideal speech situation, then, undermines that theory.
6.10 Strategic and Communicative Action
From the principles outlined so far in this study chapter Haberrnas develops
his theory of communicative action as a theory of society. 96 The notion of commu-
Couseusu.s presupposes dissent and vice versa' (Van Reijen, 1990, p. 98).
Hall (1980) writes of the repressive conditions in which language as such is itself constituted' (Hall
et al. 1980. p. 161).
Youug (1989) uotes that 'the ideal speech situation as a critical device is liniited....It cannot be
used to criticise large-scale communication structures, but only face-to-face ones. Thus it cannot
be the sob' basis of a rational form of life. It is better adapted to generating critique in some areas
thaii others' (Young, 1989, P. 77).
96 He writes that. tlic concept of society has to be linked to a concept of communicative action',
(Haberinas. 1984. P. 337).	 -
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nicative action and strategic action are of fundamental importance in Habermas's
theory of communicative action as they not only underpin his notions of lifeworid
and system and not only underpin his analysis of society, but offer a way out of
the 'iron cag& of rationalization envisaged by Weber. His theory at heart suggests
that society is 'sustained at the level of language and governed by the rules of com-
municative action' (Thompson and Held, 1982, p. 10). Habermas (1982) indicates
the striving for consensus in society where he speaks of 'communicative actions' as
social interactions.. .coordinated not through the egocentric calculations of suc-
cess of evtry individual but through cooperative achievements of understanding among
participants (Habermas, 1982, p. 264).
The development of social forms belongs to the realm of language, clearly
signalled by Habermas where he writes that forms of social action are those
iii which the plans of action of different actors are coordinated through an
exchange of communicative acts, that is through a use of language ... orientated
towards reacinug understanding (Habermas, 1982, p. 234).
Habermas links his discussion of communicative and strategic action to his
earlier concepts of speech acts and their illocutionary and perlocutionary effects.
Communicative action is characterized by its illocutionary effects (doing something
whilst saying something), whilst strategic action is characterized by its perlocu-
tionary effects (achieving something - instrumentally - by saying something).
The former is built on cooperative consensus - 'action oriented to mutual under-
standing where a 'moment of unconditionality exists' (Habermas, 1987b, p. 322)
- whilst the latter is premised on realizing interests (Habermas, 1982, p. 237).
Communicative action uses the concept of the ideal speech situation - itself
a derivative of tile hermeneutic and emancipatory knowledge-constitutive interests
Habernias argues that ideologies dissolve when called into question, since they are maintained only
by rst.rutiug couiiiiumcative action (cf Holub 1991,. p. 123) -• 	 -
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discussed in. chapter four - whilst strategic action violates the ideal speech sit-
uation as it is concerned with controlling other people's behaviour, the technical
knowledge-constitutive interest outlined in chapter four. The difference between
strategic and communicative action can be illustrated diagrammatically by pre-
senting a conflation of several of Habermas's tables 98 (Figure 6.3):
Figure 6.3 - Communicative and Strategic Action
Social Interactions
Communicative Action
	
Strategic Action	 Strategic Action
(eiiiaiicipatory and
	
(the technical interest) (the technical interest)
hIrt1L('1LeUtiC interests)
Illocutionary effects
	
Perlocutionary effects	 Perlocutionary effects
__________________________	
Covertly strategic	 Overtly strategic
unconscious deception	 conscious deception
(systematically distorted)	 (manipulation)
This model also follows 'Austin's distinctions between illocutionary and per-
locutionary acts.. .for delimiting action oriented to reaching understanding from
action oriented to success' (Habermas, 1984, p. 279). Illocutionary acts concern
processes to an undecided end, perlocutionary acts already know the end which is
sought. In the former 'agreement rests on common convictions' (ibid:, p. 287); in
the latter consensus is imposed (p. 310), the desired is already known. The for-
mer is marked by symmetrical intersubjective relations: the latter by asymmetry
(cf. ibid., p. 294), iè by unequal power. Systematically distorted communica-
tion, in Habermas's view, is action oriented to success and control rather than to
understanding and eniancipation, it is perlocutionary rather than illocutionary.
98 Haberijias. 1982. p. 264. pp. 285 - 7, p. 333.
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6.11 A Critique of Strategic and Communicative Action
White (1988) argues that communicative and strategic action are not as sep-
arate as Habermas would have them be:
What disturbs one usually sympathetic critic is that apparently the more you
scratch the concept of communicative action, the more it begins to resemble strategic
action. The link between the two arises from the fact that both are ultimately tele-
ological or goal-oriented. In communicative action, there is simply a different goal
from that in strategic action (White, 1988, p. 46).
Indeed Doelernan (1990) suggests that 'Habermas has increasingly empha-
sized the place of teleology as fundamental to -all action, so much-so that the
distinction between communicative and purposive types of action is difficult to
maintain' (Doeleman, 1990, P. 113) - a view which Habermas (1990b) explicitly
refutes (pp. 130-1). Alexander (1985) argues that the aligning of iflocutionary and
perlocutionary speech acts with communicative and strategic action respectively
misrepresents Austin's work and overlooks Austin's own difficulties in articulating
the distinction between the two. Austin intended perlocutionary acts to include
understanding and illocutionary acts to include strategizing (cf Culler, 1985, p.
136). Habermas (1984) is aware of the difficulty and suggests that certain phases
of communicative action may have to use strategic elements (Habermas, 1984, p.
331; 1990b). Joas (1991) argues that the useS of two types of action--- commu-
nicative and strategic - does not 'do justice to the diversity of kinds of action
and accordingly [Habermasi has delivered only communication as such as the jam-
packed residual category of non-instrumental action' (Joas, 1991, p. 101). Berger
(1991) comments that:
just as communicative action contains teleological components, so, too, teleo-
logical action contains communicative elements....The two figures of action cannot be
(lisellt-allgle(l as easily as Habermas imagines. One can be interested in goal-oriented
activity iii order to increase the chances for communication (Berger, 1991.-p 172).
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If Habermas cannot demonstrate that communicative action is either prior
to or superior to strategic action then the primacy of the ideal speech situation
becomes merely a matter of preference (cf Culler, 1985, P. 137). Roderick (1986)
suggests that 'it is arguable that strategic action is more basic to cQmmunication
than 'communicative action oriented to reaching understanding' (Roderick, 1986,
p. 98). Habermas's theory, then, is open to the criticism that it is selective and is
ideologically rather than logically justified. Habermas argues that communication
is premissed, if contrafactually, on equality, freedom, democracy and justice. That
is a highly selective interpretation; it is also premissed on elements of strategic
action - power, persuasion, instrumentalism and strategizing. Speech acts are
premissed on communicative action and strategic action, they point to the prin-
ciples of strategic not simply of communicative action. To argue, as Habermas
does, that one should behave in accordance with the ideal speech situation is not
only to commit the naturalistic fallacy (discussed earlier) but is to misrepresent
the notion of speech which concerns strategic as much as communicative action.
Roderick (1986) argues that:
the ... point Habermas is attempting to make concerning equal access to corn-
municatilig roles and constraint-free communication suggests that his own account
might itHeif be construed as an example of strategic action (Roderick, 1986, p. 98).
This suggests that behind the appeal to communicative action as a means
to avoid the challenge of relativism is a very clear political ideology at work in
Habermas's Critical Theory. Critical Theory, as was argued in chapter two, has
its own clear political agenda.
6.12 Piaget and Kohlberg: Ontogenesis and Phylogenesis
Having set out Habermas's commencement of the developme of a social
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theory from communicative action this section outlines his attempt to link micro-
and macro-social theory, to provide an explanation of how societies develop over the
centuries. Essentially his early attempt uses the development of the individual as
a parallel for the development of societies - ontogenesis of the individual mapping
onto phylogenesis of societies. Habermas's analysis here moves away significantly
from his Marxist roots. Whereas Marx took an economic interpretation of the
development of societies Habermas, whilst still keeping high a concern for the
emancipation of societies, attempts to recast a theory of social evolution within
a framework of the development of his theory of communicative action. Here his
attempt99 draws on the work of Loevinger, Piaget and Kohlberg. This section sets
out his analysis and then provides a critique of his use of these sources and their
utility in his attempt to link micro and macro elements of sociological analysis for
a theory of social evolution. This critique draws on papers in Thompson and Held
(1982) and Giddens (1985).b00
Habermas makes considerable use of the writings of Loevinger, Piaget (1932)
and Kohlberg (Habermas, 1979a, chapters 2, 3, 4). From Loevinger he sets out the
developmental stages of the ego from presocia.l-symbiotic, through impulse ridden-
opportunistic to conformist stages, and on through conscientious and autonomous
stages to the integrated stage of development. He sets out the stage theory of
ontogenetic development from Piaget from the symbiotic, through the egocentric
and then the sociocentric-objectivistic stages onwards to the universalistic stages
of development, charting a movement from preconventional, through conventional,
to postconveutial stages of moral development (Habermas, 1979a, p. 100).
° Haherinas. 1979a. 1984, 1987a.
100 Thce critiques of Haberinas (1984) and (1987a) use the untranslated versions which appeared
before 1984.
117
ft
Habermas also sets out Piaget's theory of learning stages in a moral context
— from sensori-motor, through pre-operational, concrete operational thought to
formal, abstract operation thought, mapping out the relationship between these
and the stages of moral growth — a development to a decentred understanding of
the world, setting the ground for linking this to his notion of communicative action.
He also draws on Kohlberg's six stages of moral development (ibid. pp. 77-81):
stage one: punishment-obedience orientation — stage two: instrumental hedonism
—* stage three: 'good-boy / nice-girl' orientation —* stage four: law-and-order
orientation —' stage five: social-contractual legalism —+ stage six: ethical-principles
orientation (Lukes, 1982, pp. 300-1).
Habermas's intention is to use these as patterns of the evolution of societies
(Habermas, 1979a, p. 121). Just as individual, ontogenetic, development is realized
interactionally so it is with societies: 'communicative reason is expressed in a
decentred understanding of the world' (Habermas, 1987b, p. 315). Habermas
connects his analysis of Piaget's stages of cognitive development to his developing
theory of communicative action.
if we employ Piaget 's concept of decentration ... in order to clarify the internal
comiectioii between the structure of a woridview, the lifeworid as the context of
processes of understanding, and the possibilities of a rational conduct of life, we
again encounter the concept of communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984, p. 72).
The stages which Habermas sets out for individual moral development from
Loevinger, Piaget and Kohlberg are also stages of the development of the human
species and society (Habermas, 1979a, 1984, 1987a, 1990a). The move from pre-
conventional, through conventional, to postconventional stages of development —
a move from ego-centrism to decentration (Habermas, 1984, p. 69) — parallels, in
Habermas's analysis, the development of societies from mythical, mgica1, tradi-
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tional societies marked by ascription and mechanical solidarity to 'disenchanted"°1
rationalized societies marked by achievement and organic solidarity. Habermas
(1984) suggests four stages of social evolution - archaic, civilized, early modern
and modern. Dallinayr (1984) conflates the latter two and then maps them onto
Piagetian stages thus (cf Dailmayr, 1984, P. 154):
mythical archaic societies...........infant identity
early civilization..........................pre-adolescence
developed civilizations.......................mature ego-identity
One has to comment on the ease with which Habermas makes use-of Piagetian
theory to support his ideas; again Habermas appears to be employing or importing
a theory from a decontextualized source elsewhere to support his own developing
views just as he did earlier with Freud, Austin and Searle.
6.13 Critiques of Habermas on Ontogenesis and Phylogenesis
Much criticism has been levelled at Habermas's attempt to combine ontogen-
esis and phylogenesis through the application of the work of Piaget and Kohlberg
to a reconstructed theory of historical materialism and a theory of social evolution.
There are two foci of the criticisms:
• the validity of the enterprise as a whole;
• the use of Piaget and Kohlberg, even if the enterprise were valid.
Habernias's attempts to draw parallels between the development of the mdi-
vidual and the development of societies have been criticised both in principle and
101 Haherijias uses this term extensively in his Theory of Communicative Action. It is a terni
winch he takes from Weber who, in turn, had taken the phrase 'the disenchantment of the world'
from Seijiller (MacRae, 1974, p. 86).....
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iii practice - in principle because it need not (and perhaps should not) be done,
and in practice because Habermas has not done it sucessfully to date.
Schmid (1982) doubts the validity of Habermas's enterprise - the 'notion of
developmental logic rests.. .on questionable assumptions concerning the relations
between the ontogenesis of the individual and the development of world views'
(cited in Thompson and Held, 1982, p. 16). Schmid writes:
CULL we connect the fact that different problem-solving capacities are institu-
tio11ali.W(1 in structures of collective consciousness according to the organizational
principle and the learning level (which is what the ascription of a developmental logic
to learitiug levels amounts to) with the fact that the people of earlier social forma-
tiolLs did itot pass through all the stages of their possible ontogenetic development?...It
seems to tue much more sensible...to separate out strictly the processes oF learning
and niaturatioii which guide the ontogenesis of the individual from those processes
which underlie the development of world views (Schmid, 1982 p. 173).
Schmid is suggesting that nothing will be lost in the power of Habermas's
analysis if this element were to be jettisoned completely. McCarthy (1982, p.
72), whilst recognizing that the attempt to link individual and social evolution in
a developmental logic has heuristic value (a fact which Habermas acknowledges
(Habermas, 1979a, p. 205)), nevertheless castigates him for his uncritical importa-
tion of ontogenetic theories into social theory - exacerbated by the flawed nature
of the ontogenetic theories themselves (McCarthy, 1982, p. 69).b02 Heller (1982,
p. 38) shows not only how Habermas has to assume the priority of ontogenesis
over phylogenesis but questions the validity of this through cross-cultural argu-
ment. She finds the totalism of Habermas's theory both attractive in its attempt
at completeness but dangerous as a philosophy of history - 'there are no loose
threads' (ibid. p. 39). This is a significant criticism, for, again, it indicates that
Habermas is constructing a hermetically sealed theory to define the social world
in terfl1S which are axiomatic and immune to critique.
102 Sec also Kriioer (1991, p. 147) and Habermas's response to Kruger (Habermas, i.991. p. 261).
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The notion that Piagetian views of children's development can be parcelled
out into stages has been effectively disproved, 103 as has the notion of the restriction
of 'decentring' in the young child. Piaget's studies themselves were carried out
on small non-representative samples of urban, white middle-class Swiss children,
whilst the cross-cultural studies that there have been have shown that generalizable
notions of stages of development are untenable.'° 4 McCarthy (1982) suggests that
Habermas has to address more fully the charges of ethnocentrism, of scientistic and
rationalistic bias in the studies of Piaget and Kohlberg if his theory is to be able to
stand (McCarthy op cit, p. 69).b05 Habermas (1990a) however does indicate that
he is aware of this, providing evidence that Kohlberg had to modify his theory in
light of studies in Taiwan, Turkey and Israel (Habermas, 1990a, p. 172).
Habermas's adoption of the work of Piaget and Kohlberg attracts criticism
from McCarthy (1982) who accuses him of importing into his theory a view of the
'end-state' of development of an individual and thus of a society which is 'decidedly
Western in conception' (ibid. p. 70), thus bringing to his work a cultural relativism
which is used to redefine 'cultural difference' as 'cultural retardation' (ibid. p.
71). Heller (1982) echoes this when she writes: 'why 'the good life' and not 'good
lives'. ...Habermas reconstructs historical materialism around one universal value:
his own' (p. 41). Rasmussen (1990), too, criticizes Habermas for this
[H]as not Habermas indulged in the very procedure that he declared taboo for
others. iiainely. has he not selected a particular tradition from which to argue and
sustain his ethical point of view (Rasmussen, 1990, 74).
White (1988) argues that the universality of Kohlberg's forms are in fact
specific to Western culture and time, and are anti-feminist (White, 1988, pp. 65
103 For exaiiiple by Donaldson, 1978; White, 1988, p. 67.
104 For example Asliton, 1975; Buck-Morss, 1975; Dasen, 1977; Gibbs, 1977.
See also Giddens. 1985, p. 117; Gilligau, 1977. -
121
F
and 87). Bubner (1982, PP. 60 and 64) questions the acceptability of Habermas's
views here, asking whether Habermas captures 'universals' or is operating a 'thinly
disguised Eurocentrism' (p. 65) in his treatment of Piaget and Kohlberg (ci Held,
1982). He suggests that:
if ... the structures of communicative action and discourse that Habermas sin-
gles out are to be found...only in certain spheres of certain (Western) cultures at
certain (modern) times, how then is it possible to defend the view that these struc-
tures are universal-pragmatic features of communication as such? (Bubner, 1982, p.
65).
Habermas (1982; 1985a, P. 104) appears to accept some of these criticisms
when he responds 'to the extent that philosophy takes on the tasks .f a theory of
rationality, it will have to explain Occidental rationalism's decentred understanding
of the world which developed in modern Europe' (Habermas, 1982, p. 240).
In using the work of Piaget and Kohlberg Habermas commits the relativis-
tic and naturalistic fallacies in applying their conceptions to a theory of social
evolution. Thus whilst it is clear that Habermas is undertaking an enterprise of
grand proportion it also appears that much remains to be done in the formaliza-
tion, justification and application of the theory.'° 6
 Habermas again is importing
the writings of others to support his own views, replacing his own argument and
demonstration with the arguments of others. McCarthy (1982) writes:
HLberIllass appropriation of the concepts, assumptions and results of-develop-
mental studies has been noticeably less critical than one might have expected from
his tnatnieut of other research traditions (McCarthy, 1982, p. 68).
This has problems at the level of theory, for it follows the path of 'confir-
matory' theories and inductivism - 'proof' of a theory residing in the number of
times or authors in which it is held to be true. O'Hear (1980), commenting on
100 He has at.teinptd this in his two volumes (1984 and 1987a) of The Theory of Communica-
tive Action. He recognizes that an overall social theory is preferable to a theory of speech action
(Haberitias. 1984. p. xxiv).
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Popper's view that 'a good theory forbids, a better theory forbids more' (Popper,
1969, p. 36) dismisses inductivism for displaying the 'epistemological irrelevance
of confirming evidence' (O'Hear, 1980, p. 8). One must remark on the question-
able acceptability of importing - unchallenged and decontextualized - a set of
theories from other disciplines merely because they hold a surface similarity to
views expressed in a different context. Habermas accepts that his theory is in-
choate (Habermas, 1979a, pp. 116-7) and in need of refinement (ibid. p. 102).b07
Nevertheless he is resolute that 'homologies' can be found (ibid. p. 104) in:
• the similarity of ontogenetic sequences of basic concepts and logical structures
to the evolution of world views (ibid. p. 103);
. the concept of causality (things, events, motivations) (ibid. p. 103);
• the similarity between structures of ego and group identity (ibid. p. 106) where
'collective identity regulates the membership of individuals in the society' (ibid.
p. 111);
• the ways in which law and morality regulate the actions of individuals and
groups (ibid. p. 116);
• the ways in which rules of communicative action apply to individuals and groups
(ibid. p. 116);
• the construction of personal and collective identities which are a 'necessary
presupposition for taking on the general communicative roles' (ibid. p. 116).
Habermas finds such homologies to have sufficient power to draw a nexus
107 For vxaiuple he is aware of the dangers of confusing individual consciousness and cultural tradition,
Ic of tlic' I)r()bl(U of overgeneralization; of the inability of certain ontogenctic stages (the early stages
in particular) to mirror the development of structures of species history (Habermas,_1979a, p. 102).
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between ontogenetic development and the development of human societies (ibid.
pp. 157-8).'°
This section suggests, then, that, whilst one can detect Habermas's concern
to link micro and macro social theory, the enterprise is problematic, for it strives to
generate law-like accounts of the development of societies, which, it will be argued
in chapter 8, have to be subjected to empirical testing, a form of testing which he
castigates in his earlier works. Further, in generating such law-like accounts Haber-
mas risks the accusation of seeking a positivistic conception of society for his own
theory whilst proscribing the operation of positivism in others - a contradiction
in his work.
The move to communicative action marks a turn in Habermas's concern to
construct a grand social theory. In this he has broken free of social theory based
on epistemology and engages new constructs and sources of support for his social
theory. These new constructs discussed here all feed into a full social theory, which
is the subject of the next chapter. This chapter has noted, however, that each of
these elemenls contains flaws. As such his overall theory is necessarily flawed.
This is itot a iiovel idea, as Coser and Rosenberg (1969) remark: 'the crux of this idea, stated in
surprisingly siiiiilar terms by Comte and Piaget, was summed up by nineteenth century biologists
who said that. oiitogcny recapitulates phylogeny' (Coser and Rosenberg, 1969. p. 4). It is interest-
111g. if iroiiieal. to note the reference to Comte here, one of the founding figures of that positivist
sociology which Habernias. is at pains to replace. -
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Chapter VII
THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
7.1 Introduction
This section outlines Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action thus:
• his perceived improvement on a social theory founded on epistemology (7.2);
• his analyses of the rationalization of society and social evolution and critique
of Weber in order to suggest how his own Theory of Communicative Action can
improve on Weberian analysis (7.3);
• his appeals to interactionism and communicative action as sources of improve-
ment to Weber's account of the rationalization of society (7.4);
• his outline of the context of a theory of communicative action which embraces
action and systems theoretical perspectives which necessitates:
(a) an outline of interactionist and functionalist sociological perspectives;
(b) an analysis of the concepts of lifeworld and system;
(c) an indication, of how such perspectives and concepts offer an account of
rationalization which improves on the cul-de-sac of bureaucratization outlined by
Weber (7.4);
• a tracing of the colonization of the lifeworid by system imperatives, indicating
how 'steering. mechanisms' of money and power technicize the likworld ('un-
125
ft
couple' lifeworid and system) and reduce the potential of communicative action
necessary to recouple lifeworid and system (7.5);
. a critique of the Theory of Communicative Action (7.6);
• the development of a social theory which draws on but reworks Weberian and
Parsonian accounts in a new paradigm of communicative action (7.7);
• a theory of communicative action which attempts to re-integrate or recouple
lifeworid and system, interactionist and functionalist perspectives, social and
system imperatives, action theory and systems theory (7.7).
The analysis will establish issues to be addressed in the subsequent chapters
on education. The several elements of Habermas's work outlined so far are brought
together and developed in his two-volume work - The Theory of Communicative
Action (1984; 1987a). They constitute a fully worked out attempt to develop his
theory of society from a theory of communicative action (cf. Hohendahl, 1986, p.
62). The wor.ks have no single theme; they draw more on mainstream social theory
than his earlier volumes.
7.2 The Move away from Epistemology
One can detect a move away from the quasi-epistemological justification of
social theory seen in his Knowledge and Human Interests and towards a com-
municative justification: 'the communications-theoretical model of speaking and
acting subjects is better suited for laying the foundations of social theory than is
the episteinological model' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 254). He reinforces this in his
1985b article where he wrote 'I can no longer. believe in epistemology as the via
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regis' (Haberinas, 1985b, p. 78) . 109 He accepts that 'methodology and epistemol-
ogy are no royal road to social theory' (Habermas, 1988, pp. ix - x). Social theory,
he argues (1984, 1987a) should look to communicative action for its foundation.
Habermas preserves several elements from the themes already ed:
• his concern to rework and revitalise Marxism;
• his concern to cast a theory of society as a theory of communication;
• his concern to rework and revitalise Critical Theory;
• his concern to build on and advance the inheritance of 'grand' social theorists
to date;
• his concern to analyse modernity and post-modernity from a sociological stance;
. his concern to maintain a central role for rationalization and progress towards
rationality.
These are clearly addressed in his The Theory of Communicative Action (1984,
1987a) in the following sequence:
(i) a prolegomenon on rationality;
(ii) an apologia for the significance of argumentation;
(iii) an exposition. of the concepts of worlds of action and lifeworid;
(iv) a discursus on Weber's account of Occidental rationalization;
(v) an analysis of the importance of Mead and Durkheirn for a theory of
109 This wan iii response to the critiques laid out earlier in this thesis. Habermas (1985a) writes: 'my
analysis of 1969 cannot be simpiy extended today'. (Habermas, 1985a, p. 99).	 -_
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society as a theory of communicative action;
(vi) an account of societal rationalization as the uncoupling of lifeworid and
system;
(vii) an excursus into Parsonian systems theory;
(viii) a development of a Critical Theory of society.
7.3 The Rationalization of Society
Habermas begins his Theory of communicative Action by according signifi-
cance to the role of rationality - defined as 'a disposition of speaking and acting
subjects that is expressed in modes of behaviour for which there are good reasons
or grouiids' (Habermas, 1984, p. 22). He argues that social evolution is seen as a
move towards a more rational, consensual and rationalized world (discussed later)
in which centrality is given to the view that communicative action is the touchstone
of social theory:
we can say that actions regulated by norms, expressive self-preservations, and
also evaluative expressions, supplement constantive speech acts in constituting a com-
municative practice which, against the background of a lifeworid, is oriented to achiev-
ing. sustaining, and renewing consensus - and indeed a consensus that rests on the
mtersul)jective recognition of criticizable validity claims. The rationality inherent in
this practice is seen in the fact that a communicatively achieved agreement must be
based in the end on reasons (ibid., p. 17).
The thrust of the two volume enterprise is towards showing how communica-
tive action, as the integration - or reintegration - of the lifeworid and system
and as a form of rationality, breaks the 'iron cage' of Weber's instrumental ratio-
nality. What we are witness to in modernity' 10
 is the progressive rationalization of
110 Haberinas characterizes modernity as a bundle of processes: the formation of capital and the mo-
biizatiou of resources; the development of forces of production and the increase in the productivity
of labuiti: the centralizing of political power; the formation of national identities; increasing rights
to political participation; increasing urbanization; increasing rights to schooling; th secularization
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these three worlds, the objective, the social and the subjective, ie society, culture
and personality respectively. The process of rationalization is marked by the move
from mythical, enchanted worlds to 'deinystified' worlds (Habermas, 1984, P. 52),
the 'rationalization of religious woridviews' (ibid. p. 186) and the secularization
of culture (Habermas, 1987b, p. 1).hhl
Weber distinguishes four types of rationality - purposive-rational (Zweck-
rationalität), value rational ( WertrationalitIt), affectual and traditional (ibid., p.
281). A comparison of Habermas and Weber is presented in Figure 7.1:
Figure 7.1 - Weber and Habermas Compared
WEBER'S CONCERN	 HABERMAS'S CONCERN
Instrumental rational Means-end	 Teleological	 Strategic
Zweckrationalität 	 Wertrationalität
Value rational and Ultimate ends Norm-regulated 	 Social and
traditional action	 Ingrained	 cultural interaction
habituation
Affect ual rational	 Feelings and Dramaturgical 	 Representation
emotions	 .	 of self to
others
	
Communicative	 Oriented to
rational consensus
One can perceive that Habermas has an abiding interest in the problems of
instrumentalism which reaches back through the technical interest of his earlier
of valws (Haberuia.s. 1984. p. 2).
" McCarthy (1990) terms this t1ie disiutegration of sacred canopies (McCarthy. 1990. p. vii).
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knowledge-constitutive interests to the critique of technicism which typifies the
work of the founding figures of Critical Theory - Horkheimer, Adorno and Mar-
cuse. For Habermas, as for the Weberian analysis which he cites, the movement
towards purposive-instrumental rationality not only characterizes modern society
but is also its undoing. The move from mechanical to organic solidarity which
is effected through increasing rationalization necessitates increasingly differenti-
ated organizations. Following Weber's sociology Habermas suggests that this is
managed - administered, organized, effected, worked out - by an increasing bu-
reaucratization of society (Habermas, 1987a, p. 306), and an increasing separation
and autonomy of the elements of society - culture, law, morality (cf Habermas,
1984, pp. 162 and 243). Like Weber before him, he suggests that the movement to-
wards rationality and the rationalization of the lifeworid brings with it increasing
bureaucracy (Habermas, 1984, p. 429). For Habermas the problem of instru-
mental rationalization is its intrusion into the lifeworid, overriding communicative
rationality.112
Increasing the degree of bureaucratization reduces the capability of the indi-
vidual, indeed of the social group, to make meaning of or to control that bureau-
cracy. It takes on a life of its own, overriding agency with system imperatives.
Modern western society for Weber, whilst striving to improve freedoms and ratio-
nality, succeeds in achieving just the opposite - a loss of meaning (Sinnverlust)
and a loss of freedom (Freiheitsverlusi). Bureaucracy is as constraining as it is en-
abling (cf White, 1988, p. 144). The process of bureaucratization is as constricting
as it is inevitable (Habermas, 1984, p. 248). Habermas cites Weber's analysis to
' Sec Welliuers comment that the 'rationalization of the lifeworid was the precondition and the
starting point for a process of systemic rationalization and differentiation, which then has become
more and more autonomous viv-a-vis the normative constraints embedded in the lifeworid, until
1U tll(' end the systemic imperatives begin to instrumeutalize the lifeworid and threaten to destroy
it' (Weilimier. 1985. p. 56).	 -
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support his case:
The differentiation of the independent cultural value of spheres that is important
for the phase of capitalism's emergence, and the growing autonomy of subsystems
of I)urposivc-1ttional action that is characteristic of the development of capitalist
society since the late eighteenth century, are the two trends that Weber combines
into an existential-individualistic critique of of the present age. The first component
is represented in the thesis of a loss of meaning, the second in the thesis of a loss of
freedom (ibid. p. 244).
Weber argues that purposive-rational action is becoming institutionalized in
the economy and the state (ibid., p. 248). For Weber, value is seen to reside
in fidelity to procedures, means rather than ends, rationalization is marked by
the rupture of ethics and means (cf. ibid., p. 155). Indeed Habermas sees the
development of law as a 'steering medium' (discussed later) as prototypical of
legitimation through procedures (Habermas, 1987a, p. 365). Habermas recognizes
the fallacy here in the assumption that rationality about ends - moral principles
and goals - can be derived from an analysis of the rationality of means:
how can a legal domination whose legality is based on a law that is viewed
purely iii decisiomustic terms (that is, a law that devalues all grounding in principle)
be legit.iniaf.ed at ali? Weber's answer...runs as follows: through procedure .... It
renmailis luI(:Iear how the belief in legality is supposed to summon up the force of
legitimation if legality means only conformity with an actually existing order, and if
this order.., is not in turn open to practical-moral justification (ibid. p. 265).
Procedure, argues Habermas, can never legitimize itself (ibid. p. 266), hence
it only has a partial contribution to make to discussions of values. 113
 Habermas
rejects 'decisionism' (cf. 1988, p. 52) as being purely purposive-rational action.
The overwhelming power of purposive-rational action negates serious debate about
value rationality. We are in the grip of purposive rationality. The rationalization of
society enters all spheres of life - law, morality, art, culture, society and personal-
113 
'Reas(JlI which concerns procedures of rational argument still needs to be defended by procedures
of rational arguuient....once 'truth' has been made a procedural notion, a theory of truth no longer
copes with questions of how one generates evidence, what counts as evidence, and in what sense
propositions are testable' (Giddens, 1985a, pp. 114 - 6).
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ity (Habermas, 1987a, p. 138). He (1984, 1987a) spends much time in considering
Weber's analysis, if only to clear the ground for his critique of Weber.
Habermas contends that, in giving such weight to purposive-rational actions,
Weber concentrates too heavily on instrumental concepts of modernity (1987a,
p. 303) and that this neglects moral-practical, communicative and aesthetic-
expressive forms of rationality. 114
 Habermas suggests that Weber's 'iron cage'
arises because he gives too scant attention to the emancipatory potential of com-
municative, moral-practical and aesthetic-expressive forms of rationality (Haber-
mas, 1987a, p. 303)." Weber also fails to see that capitalist modernization is not
the result of societal rationalization generally, but is reached through the 'selec-
tive exploitation of culturally available cognitive potentials' (Habermas, 1987a, p.
303).
Weber is unable to account for the potential of society to change itself - it ap-
pears unidirectional and uniform (ci. Weilmer, 1985, p. 57). Weber, thus, displays
the 'one-sidedness' that he himself condemns in modern society (cf. Habermas,
1987a, p. 397.), the supremacy of the technical cognitive interest." 6 To make good
the perceived shortcomings of Weber's analysis Habermas turns to the work of
Mead (eg Mead, 1934) for his attention to symbolic' interactionism and then at-
tempts to incorporate this into a theory which is capable of engaging both action
and system - through Durkheim and Parsons (Habermas, 1984, p. 391). What
is being undertaken is' a move from purposive rationality to communicative ratio-
" Cf McCarthy. 1985. p. 85.
115 Giddeus (1985a) takes Habermas to task for his dismissal of Weber on this score: 'you criticise
Weber tor coiifiuiiug rationalization primarily to purposive rationality, but you are forced to argue
that this type of rationality does dominate modern culture' (Giddens, 1985a. p. 120).
116 Rasiuitsseu (1990) clarifies Habermas's argument, indicating that Weber was wrong in his analysis
of the evolution of Western rationalization because he conceived it instrumentally rather than
coiiiinuiiicativcly ( p. 25).	 -
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nality, from instrumental or strategic action to communicative action as a way of
breaking the 'iron cage' of bureaucratization.
The drive towards rationality as the dynamic of social evolution - an endur-
ing feature of his analysis - now occupies Habermas's discussions of the nature
of rationalization in Occidental society (ibid. p. 137). In terms of communicative
rationality Habermas declares Occidental society to be the most emancipated and
therefore to exemplify the developmental pattern of societies which have not yet
reached the advanced stage of the West. This, says Habermas (1979a; 1984, p.
132), is because the degree of decentration required for communicative rationality
is only to be found in societies at the postconventional level of development. This
restates the ontogenesis / phylogenesis issue discussed earlier."7
Social evolution is marked by the move from mechanical to organic solidarity,
ascription to achievement, fixity and acceptance to interrogation of norms and
behaviour. The rise of rationalism parallels the rise of decentration. Though
Habermas provides scant evidence for his assertions he nevertheless contends that
the move towrds increasingly rational intersubjective behaviour lies at the core of
western rationalization - of modernization. Such rationalization takes place in the
three 'worlds' mentioned earlier (6.6): the objective world of facts, the-social world
of interpersonal relations, and the subjective world of consciousness and mental
states (cf. ibid., pp. 52 and 76). Indeed one characteristic of societal evolution
is the increasing differentiation of systems, subsystems and 'worlds' of interaction
(see also chapter 6.6).h18
Giddeus (1985b) argues here that, according to Habermas, the West alone is marked by the pre-
eiiiiueiit:' cf postcouveutional cognitive domains. Postconventional forms of institutional order are
tllOSC whirl, have tiot only freed themselves from the dominance of traditional codes of conduct,
but liaw' beoiiie organized according to warranted principles (Giddens, 1985b, p. 133).
118 1-laberijiass tr'atiueut of the rise of Occidental Rationalism as being played out in the three worlds
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7.4 Mead and Interactionist Sociology
Habermas's attraction to the work of Mead, Schlitz and Husserl lies in the
'elective affinity' between them on the significance accorded to language and com-
munication. Mead developed a theory of socialization in which the identity is
formed by Ltaking the attitude of the other' (Mead, 1934) - a precursor to Pi-
agetian notions of decentration - and by interacting with 'significant' and 'gen -
eralised others' through language. 11 ° This clearly lays emphasis on the 'social
character of perception' (ibid., p. 29) which opens the possibility for breaking
free of a philosophy of consciousness which had trapped earlier interactionists and
phenornenologists like Schlitz and Luckmann. 12° Habermas brings the work of
these symbolic interactionists into his own theory of communicative action. The
development of moral awareness and rationality - essentially a social act (Haber-
mas, 1987a, p. 48) - comes through the recognition of the generalized, universal,
impersonal binding authority of norms. The process of rationalization develops
universal, demystified and binding norms in capitalist society:
the authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved
consensus. This means a freeing of communicative action from sacrahly protected
normative contexts (ibid., p. 77).
Habermas took up the concept of the lifeworid from Schlitz and Ilusserl, and
introduced it in his Legitimation Crisis of 1976. Put simply, the rationalization
of society is achieved by the 'rationalization of the lifeworid' (Habermas, 1987a,
p. 111) (discussed later). The lifeworld can be described as the 'taken-for-granted
universe of daily social activity which 'always remains in the background' (Haber-
of culture. society and personality, is an echo from Parsons (Habermas, 1984. p. 158).
119 Haberijias (1987a) writes: 'identity formation takes place through the medium of linguistic corn-
uiunicat.iuii (Haberutas, 1987a, p. 58).
120 Haberijias writes: in the frame of the philosophy of consciousness, the 'experiencing subjcct
remains the court of last appeal for analysis' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 130). See also ibid., p. 389 and
1988. p. xiii.
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mas, 1987a, p. 131). It is the saturation of communicative action by tradition and
established ways of doing things. The lifeworid is a pre-interpreted set of forms of
life within which everyday conduct unfolds' (Giddens, 1985a, p. 101). Habermas
(1987a) suggests that the lifeworid 'is made up from sedimentations of formerly
actually present experiences that are bound to situations. Inversely, every actually
present experience is inserted into the flow of lived experiences and into a biogra-
phy' (ibid., p. 128); the lifeworid is 'the intuitively present, in this sense, familiar
and transparent, and at the same time vast and incalculable web of presuppositions
that have to be satisfied if an actual utterance is to be at all meaningful' (ibid.,
p. 131). It is constituted of society, culture and personality (Habermas, 1987a, p.
138; 1987b, pp. 343-6) and the subsystems which are part of these. The lifeworld
is not oniy the repository of received wisdoms, it is also perpetually reconstituted
in the communicative actions of participants (cf Habermas, 1984, pp. 82 and 279).
Habermas (1990a) contends that:
The shared lifeworid offers a storehouse of unquestioned cultural givens from
which those participating in communication draw agreed-upon patterns of interpre-
tatioii for use in their interpretive efforts (Habermas, 1990a, p. 135).
Herein are clear references both to an action frame of reference and to the
principles of the structuration of society. 121 The concept of the lifeworid is taken
up with reference to the theory of communicative action and to Habermas's earlier
notion of the ideal speech situation, where he writes that the lifeworid is
the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they reciprocally
raise (hulls that their utterances for the world (objective, social or subjective) and
where they cnn critkize and confirm those validity claims (Habermas, 1987a, p. 126).
Communicative action has the potential to act as a medium of and expla-
121 Haberivas clearly points to the principles of structuration operating in the ilfeworid where he writes
that V iii drawing itpoii a cultural tradition they [communicating actors] also continue it (Habermas,
1987a. p. ]25).
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nation for social action,'22 it is 'the medium for the reproduction of lifeworids'
(Habermas, 1984, P. 337). It forms part of that lifeworid of which it is a medium
of reproduction and production (ibid., p. 335). This is a prime example of the
concept of structuration.
Habermas is able to bring to the theory of communicative action his ear-
lier theory of systematically distorted communication and use it for an analysis of
modernity: 'The communicative potential of reason has been simultaneously de-
veloped and distorted in the course of capitalist modernization' (Habermas, 1987b,
p. 315). Rationalization is a necessary element of emancipation as it moves to a
disenchanted world of achieved consensus through communication' 23 and yet it also
marks the move towards greater impersonal controls placed on spheres of human
action - rationalization of society risks rationalization of the lifeworid: 'the life-
world is gradually reduced to a satellite of the system' (Ingram, 1987, p. 127). This
process is begun through the 'structural differentiation of the lifeworid' (Haber-
mas, 1987a, pp. 145 - 6). Structural differentiation of the lifeworid is achieved
through the differentiation of society, personality and culture thus:
(i) with regard to society, through the uncoupling of institutional views from
world views (discussed later - the uncoupling of system and ilfeworid); 'principles
of legal order and of morality are established which are less and less tailored to
concrete forms of life' (ibid., p. 146);
(ii) with regard to personality, through the extension of 'the scope of contin-
gency for establishing interpersonal relationships' (ibid., p. 146); 'the objects in
122 Tlie (:ouc4pt of communicative action not only provides us with a point of reference for analyzing
the comitributious made by culture, society, and personality to the formation of action orientations;
this iiiodtl also enables us to get clear about how culture, society, and personality hang together
as compoiunts of a symbolically structured lifeworid' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 222).
123 The iiiigitistification of the sacred' (Habermas, 1987a, pp. 77 - 111).
136
connection with which formal competencies can be exercised become increasingly
variable' (ibid., p. 146).
(iii) with regard to culture, through its increasing dependence on individuals'
'readiness to criticize [traditions] and their ability to innovate' (ibid.; p. 146).
The increase in differentiation and opportunity for individualization occurs at
the cost of separating form and content, rationalization of choice uncouples prin-
ciples of procedure from content. 124 The process of rationalization of the lifeworid
which started out as the 'linguistification of the sacred' now turns back on itself as
it brings increasing depersonalization, alienation, anomie and unfreedom. This is
effected (a) by the operation of two 'steering mechanisms' outlined by Habermas
(and Parsons before him) - money and power (Habermas, 1984, p. 342), and (b)
by the 'uncoupling of system and lifeworid' (Habermas, 1987a, pp. 153 - 197). The
task of communicative action is to reduce the intrusion of steering media into the
lifeworid and to recouple lifeworid and system (Habermas, 1987a)..
7.5 The Colonization of the Lifeworid
The steering mechanisms of money and power in rationalized societies override
the role of language as the 'mechanism for coorcjinating action' (Habermas, 1984, p.
342), the effect of which is to 'technicize the lifeworid' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 263)
and to sacrifice consensus formation to purposive-rational instrumentalism. Any
attempt to recouple lifeworid and system will involve an increase in communicative
124 Hab'riiias argues that this is evidenced in: (i) increasing specialization and professionalization of
child-rearing practices, cultural transmission and social integration; (ii) increasing systematization,
profe.ssioiializat.ion and specialisation of the cultural organization of science, law and art. This
echoes Whit&s (1988) view that 'leisure, family life, sexual relationships and even one's sense of
self and (lPv('1ol)lueut as a human being, increasingly become targets of commodification' (White,
1988. i. 115).
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action rather than the strategic action of the technical interest.125
Habermas suggests that the role of money as 'a special exchange mechanism'
(Habermas, 1987a, p. 171) is to separate the operation of society from the nor-
mative base of that society, an echo of the separation of fact and value which so
concerned his early work. Power, in its turn, could well determine normative goals
and individual responses, guaranteeing a 'certain automatic quality to the contin-
uatión of interactions' (ibid., p. 268). Both money and power are 'normatively
anchored in the lifeworid' (ibid. p. 270), the former in the sphere of the orga-
nization of law such as property and contract - the hierarchical organization of
public office - and the latter in the sphere of public-legal organization of offices -
legitimation (ibid., p. 270). As such they could have the potential to exert greater
force on society - be it in systems or lifeworids - than the role of communica-
tive action. 126 The recovery of the power of participants to appropriate their own
existential futures, collectively realized, is thus a function of the relative power of
commumcative action over the alienation and reification brought about by money
and power.'21
Habermas argues that the evolution of society also is marked by the uncou-
pling of the system and the lifeworid and the overcoming of communicative action
in the lifeworld by steering mechanisms and strategic action in a system which
125 Habcrivas suggests that steering mechanisms have fous elements - structural features, qualitative
properties. structures of claim and redemption, and system-building effects (Habermas, 1987a, pp.
264 - 266. al!(l Habermas, 1979b, pp. 38-9) which, by dint of their comprehensiveness, accord them
massive power in directing - steering - social evolution and social formations.
126 Ratioima1izatioii of the life-world makes it possible to convert societal integration over to language-
independent, steering media and thus to separate off formally organized domains of action. As
objeetilied realities, the latter can then work back upon contexts of communicative action and set
their own imimperatives against the marginalized life world' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 318).127 Haberimmas also defines law as a steering medium though, as Van der Burg (1990) points out,
Haberijmas adopts an ambivalent position on the law - in the first volume of Theory of Com-
municative Action he is very positive about it; in the second volume he is much more negative
(Van cbr Burg. 1990, p. 108).	 -
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is becoming increasingly bureaucratized. This can be put into an eight-stage Se-
quence which derives from Habermas (1987a, pp. 153 - 197). This has strong
sympathies with Weberian analysis, where the process of bureaucratization
develops the more perfectly, the more dehumanized, the more completely it
suCCee(b in eliminating from official business, love, hatred, and all personal, irrational
and emotional elements which escape calculation (Weber, 1968, p. 975).
The eight stage sequence can be stated thus:
Stage One: The lifeworid is relegated to a subsystem which takes its place
alongside other subsystems (eg behaviour), all of which are subordinated to the
system-integrating imperatives of bureaucratization - rationalization: 'the more
complex social systems become, the more provincial lifeworlds become' (Habermas,
1987a, p. 177).
Stage Two: The operation of system imperatives render hermeneutic under-
standing of the system unmanageable as the system becomes too 'hypercomplex'
an environment to comprehend or control totally (ibid., p. 225); hermeneutic un-
derstanding is replaced by differentiated technical understanding - values and
norms are replaced by the norms of the organization, system or subsystem.
Stage Three: Increasing differentiation is seen through increasing complexity
of the system and increasing rationalization of the lifeworld; there is a detachment
of system mechanisms and system integration from social structures and social
integration - they become uncoupled.128
Stage Four: The system becomes depersonalized through the rise of objec-
128 Haheriiia.s writes that '[to] the extent, then, that the structures of the lifeworid get differentiated,
the ujechainsius of systemic and social integration [coordination of action orientations] also get
separated from each other' (ibid., p. 164). 'Action oriented to mutual understanding gains more
and more independence from normative contexts' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 155).	 -
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tive 'steering media' - money, power, law, decentred morality - and the loss of
communicative rationality.120
Stage Five: The lifeworid, in its movement towards rationalization, becomes
institutionalized, subject to systematization and bureaucratization.
Stage Six: Language becomes overloaded and loses its ability to create free-
dorns (ie its potential for communicative action) and takes on the form of a 'delin
-
guistified' medium, ie falls into the service of an objective steering medium.
Stage Seven: Steering mechanisms which are strong in the system take over
the operation of the lifeworid - money, power, strategic communication, law,
decentred morality - rendering the operation of the lifeworid subject to the same
objectifying processes as the system (characterised by value-free technicism).13°
Stage Eight: The lifeworid becomes a subsystem of purposive-rational action.
The lifeworid becomes technicized and subordinated to the system.131
Habermas sets the scene of rationalization well, painting a picture of an over-
administered world that, in turn, becomes driven by the imperatives of that over-
administration. Habermas argues that in the agency / structure tension of social
theory (cf Layder, 1994) the power of structural elements reduces the communica-
tive potential of agents. The significance of the sequence is great, for Habermas
129 Habernias writes that. 'modern societies attain a level of system differentiation at which increasingly
autonomous organizations are connected with one another via delinguistified media of communica-
tion: tliesc' systemic mechanisms - for example, money - steer a social intercourse that has been
largely disroumiected from norms and values' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 154).130 Hahernmas writes: tlie 'colonization' of the Iifeworld takes place as steering mechanisms from the
system colomnse the lifeworld' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 173).131 Habernias coiiuiiieiits that 'the transfer of action over to steering media appears from the lifeworid
perspert.ive both as reducing the costs and risks of communication and as conditioning decisions in
cxpande(l spheres of contingency - and thus, in this sense, as a technzczzing of the lifeworid'
(ibid.. p. 183).	 -
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argues that each stage of the process can be reversed or ameliorated by commu-
nicative action.
7.6 A Critique of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action
The Theory of Communicative Action as set out above is open to serious
criticism:
• its use of the concepts of the lifeworid and system;
• its retreat into rationalism and intellectualism;
• Habermas's assumption of his own rectitude;
• the shift from a paradigm of production to a paradigm of communication.
These points are discussed below.
7.6.1 A Critique of Habermas's Lifeworid and System
Dallmayr (1984) raises questions against Habermas's interpretation and usage
of the concept of the 'lifeworid' outlined earlier, suggesting that there are problems
with the status of the lifeworld. He wonders whether the lifeworid is subjectivity
writ large - the 'first person plural' (Dallmyr, 1984, p. 243) - in which case
it fails to embrace macro-structural societal factors and becomes a reassertion
of interactionism. Habermas's case for considering the lifeworld is undermined
further because lie is unclear on whether the lifeworld pre-exists (ie is a background
context) or whether it is perpetually constructed and reconstructed in interaction.
Habernias argues that the lifeworid is not susceptible to sociological enquiry,132
T1u lii('wurlcI cainiot be subjected to empirical analysis' (Habermas, 1991, p. 245).
141
F
it is 'at 110 one's disposal' (Haberma.s, 1984, pp 337 and 449). However, Habermas
theii proceeds to objectify the lifeworld - into the domains of culture, society and
personality. These three categories become susceptible to sociological enquiry;
culture becomes investigated from the perspectives of the sociology of knowledge,
society from tile perspectives of institutional analysis, and personality from the
perspectives of social psychology.' 33 The problem with such an objectification
of the lifeworld is that it is difficult to see how it differs from the 'systems' and
'worlds' to which it had been contrasted. It is no longer a pole in the system versus
lifeworld polarity.134
Baxter also argues that Haberrnas's separation of system and lifeworid, wherein
strategic action is the province of the system and communicative action is the
province of tile lifeworid, is unclear and untenable:
In Haberu,as's account of formal organizations [systems] there is a fundamental
tension: on one hand, he must acknowledge that such organizations cannot func-
tion without communicative action; on the other hand, he wants both to define the
lifeworhi a.s the realm of communicative action and to distinguish sharply between
system and lifeworid (Baxter, 1987, p. 64).
This hfeaks down because lifeworid and system inform each other:
nor caii au organization be indifferent to the personal qualifications and skills
that its melul)ers bring with them. To say that organizations are 'uncoupled' from
• persoiialit.y structures', überhaupt. then, seems mistaken (ibid., p. 70).
Baxter is suggesting that system and lifeworld are necessarily coupled because
both show concern for 'norms, values and personal motivation' (ibid., p. 72); if
tile concept of the lifeworld, as Baxter suggests, is tied to an action-theoretical
perspective then the spheres of that action will have to include formal organiza-
' Sec Dallntayr (1984. pp. 244 -5) and Haberinas (1987a).
Baxter (1987) argues that 'the distinction between system and lifeworid leads to a misconception
of the nature of the economic and political! administrative systems and...ultimately the distinction
(1c1)dn(1S tnt equivocation in the concept of the lifeworid' (Baxter, 1987, p. 40). -
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tions (ibid., p. 74).135 Further, Berger (1991) comments that Habermas's Critical
Theory
analyses lifeworid-system interferences only in one direction and does not take
note of the equally significant expansion of lifeworid principles into subsystems of
purposive-rational action (Berger, 1991, p. 178).
McCarthy (1991) adds to this the view that 'organizations...can be viewed
in action-theoretic terms as well as in system-theoretic terms' (p. 130), a feature
which Habermas acknowledges (1991):
It is obvious that commercial enterprises and government offices, indeed eco-
noillic and political contexts as a whole make use of communicative action that is
embed(led in a normative framework (Habermas, 1991, p. 257).
Such an acknowledgement undermines his own case for the separation of life-
world and system. Schnãdelbach (1991) argues that Habermas's concept of the
lifeworld rests on uncertain grounds:136
I (10 not see how it is supposed to be possible to reinterpret in a formal-pragmatic
sense this philosophically-loaded term which originated in phenomenology, and then
to insert it into social theory in such a manner as to enable me to speak of the
coloiiization of the hifeworid'.... in the thought of Husserl and Schlitz 'lifeworld'
is a concept taken from epistemology developed in the context of a transcendental
philosophy or )henomenology (Schnädelbach, 1991, p. 17).
Not only is Habermas taking a concept from epistemology - on which he had
turned his back for use in social theory - but he is taking the term out of one
context and putting it into another - a repeat of the practice observed earlier in
relation to Freud, Piaget, Kohlberg and Austin.
Rasmussen (1990) adds to this concern the view that in fact Habermas sub-
ordinates the lifeworld to the system (p. 49), thereby adopting the very func-
tionalism for which he critiques systems-theoretical social theory. Roderick (1986)
135 See also Seel. 1991. p. 38.
136 Cf A1exaiid'rs (1991) comments that Habermas's 'definition of the lifeworid is distressingly vague'
(p. 59).
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argues that Habermas adopts too harmonious and consensual a view of system,
underrating the degree of internal struggles which take place between participants
in the system (p. 165).
The validity of Habermas's use of the concept of the lifeworid in an advocacy
of rationalization as reasoned enquiry when he has stated that this concept is itself
not susceptible to enquiry is open to enquiry. If the lifeworid is not susceptible to
enquiry'37
 then this violates Habermas's views of the value of criticizable validity
claims as a major principle of communicative action. Either it must subject itself
to rational enquiry or it must cease to be part of a theory of rational enquiry. If
indeed the lifeworid does succumb to rational enquiry and the objectification to
which Habermas in fact subjects it then 'the colonization of the lifeworid is not
simply a deplorable but avoidable hazard, but a necessary consequence of his own
premises and concept of rationalization' (Dailmayr, 1994, p. 248).138
If mythical, archaic societies do not separate system from lifeworid (as Haber-
mas himself agrees) then, Dailmayr asserts, how can we justify the conceptual
separation of lifeworid and system as part of a social theory which embraces the
mythical world, it is palpably untenable (Dailmayr, 1984, p. 246).
Further, Alexander (1985) questions whether Habermas is correct to confine
the 'oppressive and dangerous parts of modern society... [to] rationalized, material
systems whereas the "good parts" are associated with the personal intimacy of
137 Haberujas (1984) argues that the lifeworld has a 'certainty, background character, [impossible] of
being gone behind (Habermas, 1984. p. 71), and that 'it is the unquestioned ground of everything
given in my experience and the unquestionable frame in which all the problems I have to deal with
are located (Haberivas. 1987a, p. 131).138 
•Oiice inocleriuzation is seen as progressive rationalization of background assumptions through
discursive tlieinat.ization, the lifeworid is bound to be not only weakened but steadily eclipsed
and finally absorbed by world concepts. Consistently pursued, this process would render nugatory
a central pillar of the entire study, thus depriving communicative action of its social moorings,'
(Dalliiiayr. 1984. p. 245). 	 -
144
moral life' (Alexander, 1985, P. 412). He argues that the problems of modern
society have arisen 'as much from the lifeworids of intimate relations - from the
authoritarian family, religious sect and peer groups - as they have from adminis-
trative and economic systems' (ibid., Pp. 412 - 3).
In summary, if the concept of the lifeworld is not available for rational enquiry
then it call he criticized, and if it is available for rational enquiry then it can be
criticized for being ultimately unnecessary. The use of the concept of the lifeworid
is confused and replete with internal contradictions.
7.6.2 Habermas's Assumption of the Rectitude of His Own Theory
Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action is presented as the only theory
of communicative action. This, of course, can be seen positively as the first theory
of its kind, thereby lacking any rivals. Habermas judges his own social theory
to be superior to those specific theories of Weber, Parsons and Mead by dint of
including a communicative element, which they either did not attempt to address
(eg in the cases of Weber and Parsons) or which they did not link to macro-social
theory (in the case of Mead). To critique other theories for something that they
did not attempt to do in the first place is perhaps unfair, 139 even though it may
have the effect of rendering his theory an impi'ovement on theirs and thereby may
avoid the trap of relativism.
One has to comment on the uncharacteristic self-assurance of Haberrnas'4°
139 [W]hat we expect a progressive theory change to do is to produce a successor theory which (a)
retains all the uondiscredited, lawlike statements associated with the earlier theory, (b) drops
out. thos pseudo-laws which have already been refuted, and (c) introduces some new law-like
regularities not previously encompassed within the predecessor theory' (Laudan, 1990, p. 7)
even though there is no iron-clad guarantee of the truth of the new theory, ie that it is still corrigible.
140 Habernias has always been willing to rework his views in light of criticism (eg Haberinas, 1982;
1985b: 1990a: 1990b: 1991).	 -
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in titling his work The Theory of Communicative Action. 14' We are not given
any grounds for supposing that his theory of communicative action is any better
or worse than any one else's because no other theories of communicative action
are developed or presented in his work. Habermas is arguing that the elegance
of Critical Theory is that there is no privileged access to truth (eg Habermas,
1.974a, p. 40), however he then goes on to suggest that communicative action has
a privileged position.
Moreover, one has to question the need to base a critical theory, ie a theory
concerning equality, freedom and social justice, on communication theory at all. It
might be equally profitable to base a critical theory on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Habermas's theory displays not only foundationalism but commits
the genetic fallacy of assuming that the origins or foundations of a theory will suffice
to bring about empowerment and emancipation - a political, practical enterprise.
That is an empirical, not a theoretical, matter.
Heller (1982) questions the adequacy of a theory of society recast as a theory
of communicative action. She argues that there are more ways to reconstruct
historical materialism than in the mould of domination-free communication, eg
through Marxist or Weberian analysis, a view echoed by Roderick (1986). Heller
(1982) is both concerned at the form and the audience of Habermas's theory.
She echoes the comment made earlier that Habermas has moved away from his
Marxist roots, that the shift from the paradigm of production to the paradigm of
communication implies the replacement of the theory's addressee (p. 33), ie from
the proletariat to the whole of society. This creates new problems, indeed in the
141 T1ier Lre real problems of translation here, for Habermas's original work is entitled Theorie des
Koramunikativen Handels - ie the definite article is omitted.
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same volume of essays Held asks 'to whom is critical theory addressed? How, in any
concrete situation, can critical theory be applied?' (Held, 1982, P. 295). In moving
away from a classical Marxian position wherein critique emancipates, and is the
property of the working class, Habermas has estranged his theory from its possible
target group. He has lost the sharp edge of social and ideology critique which
characterised his earlier work'42
 and has directed attention away from economic
concerns to sociocultural spheres.' 43
 Habermas reaffirms the need for theory to
expose dogma and he argues that classical Marxism needs to be reworked to give
it relevance to the present day - that it should adopt a broader base. Habermas
rejects the charge of deserting Marxism:
the paradigm-shift from purposive activity to communicative action does not
mean, however, that I am wishing or bound to abandon the material reproduction of
the life-world as the privileged point of reference for analysis (Habermas, 1985a, p.
96).
Though Habermas adheres to his own theory, nevertheless it can be seen that
there are significant problems with his theory.
7.7 Summary of the Previous Chapters
This section summarises implications of Habermasian critical social theory
at the levels of (a) social theory construction (7.7.1), (b) methodology of the social
sciences (7.7.2), (c) social praxis and substantive areas of interest and focus (7.7.3).
It draws together the strands of argument developed through the study so far.
142 This parallels Kuuiieivan's (1990) concern that Habermas's early critique of science and technology
has been lost in his later works and that 'the incorporation of science and technology in the dynamics
of capit.ahisui' (Kunnernan, 1990, P. 117) needs greater attention, a feature which Habermas accepts
withoit. reservation (Habermas, 1990b, p. 132).
143 As au a(:(:ouut of the workings of advanced capitalism Held (1982) criticises Habermas for his
neglect. of international capitalism - increasingly important in an age in which, ironically perhaps
for couiitii uuiication theory, communication networks have increased.	 -
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7.7.1 Social Theory Construction
At level (a)	 of social theory - this thesis has suggested that a critical
social theory recognizes that:
• a theory of modernity uses but transforms Weberian, Meadean, Marxian and
Parsonian perspectives (eg Habermas, 1984, 1987a);
• it must draw on the dialectic between action and systems approaches - life-
world and system (Habermas, 1987a);
• Weberian, Durkheimian and Meadean perspectives can yield accounts of 'patholo-
gies of modernity' (ibid., p. 378);
• simple notions of base and superstructure have to be broadened for an analysis
of contemporary society (Habermas, 1985a, p. 96);
• functionalism and action theory have to combine to explain complex and hy-
percomplex social systems (Habermas, 1987a);
• steering mechanisms from the system enter the lifeworld (Habermas, 1987a);
• rationalization and bueaucratization are inevitable processes of the movement
towards modernity (Habermas, 1984);
• the move towards disenchantment is accompanied by increased bureaucratiza-
tion aiid rationalization (Habermas, 1984, 1987a);
• communicative action can replace strategic action in indicating a way out of
the negative effects of bureaucratization and the recoupling of lifeworid and
system (Habermas, 1984, 1987a);
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• ideology critique will have to operate on a wide variety of fronts simultaneously
(Habermas, 1970a, 1972, 1974a, 1976a);
• advanced capitalism is subject to various forms of crisis, eg, legitimation, mo-
tivation, rationality (Habermas, 1976a);
• social theory is best cast as a theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984,
1987a).
7.7.2 Methodology of the Social Sciences
At level (b) - of methodology of the social sciences - a Habermasian critical
methodology of the social sciences argues for methodological pluralism (Haberrna.s,
1988; Strain, 1984) and recognizes that:
• social theory is deformed by recourse solely to epistemology or to methodology,
the 'logic of social enquiry can fruitfully be pursued only in connection with
substantive questions' (Habermas, 1985a, p. 78; 1988, p. x);
• no single .methodology can be preordained, hence there are roles for normative-
analytic, empirical-analytic, phenomenological, linguistic, hermeneutic and crit-
ical approaches (Habermas, 1984, 1987a, 1988);
• hermeneutic approaches fit well with a theory of communicative action (Ver-
stehen methodologies) (Haberma.s, 1987a);
• value is accorded to biographical and autobiographical methodologies (1987a,
1987b, 1988);
• there is value in reconstructive methodologies and reconstructed accounts (Haber-
mas, 1974a, 1979a, 1984);
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• human and natural sciences are conceptually distinct and this must be recog-
nised in working in these sciences (Habermas, 1988);
• positivism might contaminate sociological enquiry (Habermas, 1972, 1974a,
1988);
• whilst ethnomethodological and interactionist accounts serve a theory of corn-
municative action they must be supplemented by recognition of macro-structural
processes of society (Habermas, 1984, 1987a);
• reflexive accounts should take stock of their own potential to be criticized for
relativism (Habermas, 1987a);
• interpretations of social evolution must identify the validity claims which they
raise (Habermas, 1979a, 1984, 1987a).
7.7.3 Social Praxis
At level (c) - of substantive social praxis - a critical social praxis must:
• preserve an ideology critique which exposes the operation of the suppression of
generalizable interests and questions justice and legitimacy (Habermas, 1976a,
1984, 1987a);
• expose situations in which communicative action is blocked by systemic steering
mechanisms eg power, money, bureaucracy and mass media (Habermas, 1970a,
1970b, 1970c, 1970d, 1984, 1987a);
• identify the operation of rationalization as the colonization of the lifeworid in
which communicative, aesthetic-expressive, moral-practical and affective ratio-
nality should play their part (Habermas, 1987a);
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• take full account of the emancipatory potential of communicative action on-
ented to mutual understanding (Habermas, 1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1970d, 1979a,
1984, 1987a);
• move towards the re-integration of system and lifeworid in participating sub-
jects (Habermas, 1987a);
• operate a participatory democracy (cf. Habermas, 1987a, p. 292);
• accept the importance of engagement (Habermas, 1971a, 1987a, 1987b);
• undertake empirical analysis of phenomena to ascertain how they are freedom
guaranteeing or freedom constraining (Habermas, 1987a, p. 364);
• accept that conflicts are no longer confined to the sphere of material reproduc-
tion (cf. ibid., p. 392), but occur in domains of culture, socialization and social
integration, they 'have to do with the quality of life, equal rights, individual
self-realization, participation, and human rights' (ibid., p. 392);
• identify the mechanisms which reduce emancipation (Habermas, 1984);
• expose scientistic explanations of accounts (Habermas, 1971a, 1972, 1974a);
• identify factors - both systemic and intrsubjective - which frustrate corn-
municative action (Habermas, 1979a, 1984, 1987a);
• identify and judge the validity claims raised or redeemed in communicative
action (Habermas, 1979a, 1984);
• identify factors - both systemic and intersubjective - which frustrate rational
consensus and emancipation, where truth is separated from and replaced by
power (Habermas, 1976a, 1979a, 1984);
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• identify mechanisms which promote alienation, anomie, repression and senses
of losses of freedom and meaning (Habermas, 1984);
• identify instances where judgements of value are replaced by decisionism (Haber-
mas, 1984, 1987a);
• identify and critique the legitimation claims and crises which operate in inter-
subjective actions (Habermas, 1976a);
• identify and judge the extent of instrumentalism operating in situations -
strategic versus communicative actions, perlocutions versus ilocutions (Haber-
mas, 1971a, 1979b, 1982, 1987a);
• yield an account of the interests which are operating in a given situation (Haber-
mas, 1971a, 1972, 1974a);
• expose hegernonic forces and movements which systematically distort commu-
nication (Haberma.s, 1976a, 1984);
• map out the territory of postconventional moralities in capitalist and non-
capitalist societies (1987a, 198Th);
• identify factors which prevent the emergence of societal emancipation through
postconventional moralities (Habermas, 1 987a);
• delineate modes of behaviour which promote or subvert the development of
communicative competence in individuals and groups (Habermas, 1970a, 1970b,
1970c, 1970d, 1979b, 1984, 1987a);
• suggest ways in which communication is systematically distorted (Habermas,
1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1970d, 1979b, 1987a);
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• disclose the emancipatory potential of situations at various tiers - inter-
national, national, regional, local, institutional, interpersonal, intrapersonal
(Habermas, 1987a).
Clearly the issues in levels (a), (b) and (c) above have been set out at a
high level of generality; this is indicative of fidelity to the level of analysis that
Habermas offers. The tasks of later chapters are to contextualize these factors
and to draw them to a more precise level of specificity. In some spheres Habermas
addresses substantive issues raised in (c) above and he has given some more slightly
detailed references to specifics. For example he sees conflicts of interests no longer
confined to more traditional domains of forces and relations of production but
played out in a wide range of 'movements' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 393) - eg anti-
nuclear, environmental, peace, youth and alternative life styles, recognition for
minority groups, school protests, women's movements and resistance to neo-fascism
in Germany (Habermas, 1993), seeing movements and conflicts as an attempt to
resist the colonization of the lifeworid. He gives examples of this in the 'Green'
movement, the movement against military potentials, nuclear plants, atomic waste
and genetic engineering (Habermas, 1987a, pp. 392 - 395). Thus he offers a Critical
Theory of society which bursts through the confines of Marxian analysis but which,
he claims (Habermas, 1984, 1987a), is no less critical; it is more encompassing in
its conceptual apparatus.
One can detect through the chronology of Habermas's work a progressive
'clearing of the ground' to allow a reconstructed social theory to be developed. An
outline of this takes the following approximate sequence (a) - ( i):'44
144 Clearly his ideas do not emerge as clearly as this sequence indicates, as is evidenced from the
chronology of his articles, nor is this outline anything but a paring to essentials a highly complex
and recursive development. 	 -
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(a) he clarifies his methodological position through an analysis of the logic of
the social sciences (1988 - though the original manuscript was published in 1967),
social theory cannot be approached through methodology alone;
(b) he opens the substantive debate on the grip of society by scientism and
ideology (1971a) - echoing the early writers of the Frankfurt School;
(c) lie attempts to root social theory in epistemology (1972), an approach
which he later discards;
(d) lie develops his links between social theory and praxis through psycho-
analysis and rational reconstruction (1972; 1974a);
(e) lie undertakes an analysis of advanced capitalism which is experiencing a
plethora of crises (1976a);
(f) he articulates the means of reconstructing social theory as a theory of
communication (1979a);
(g) he reconstructs social theory and analysis of advanced capitalism as a
theory of communicative action (1984; 1987a);
(h) he restores his interest in Critical Theory, now reworked (1987a);
(i) lie outlines his analysis of modernity and post-modernity (1987b).
Though some of the earlier material is jettisoned as his work develops, what
is striking is that key elements of his earlier work are incorporated significantly
into his later work. Throughout this movement this thesis has shown that he is
guided by several leitmotivs - eg ideology critique, emancipation, engagement,
reflection, rational reconstruction, the move to grand theory, and communication
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as an underpinning of social theory. Having completed an overview of his Theory -
of Communicative Action, chapter eight provides a critique of this theory and then
provides an overall, global critique of his work.
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Chapter VIII
A CRITIQUE OF HABERMAS'S THEORY
8.1 Introduction
The analysis so far has demonstrated that there are significant weaknesses at
every stage of Habermas's argument, and that therefore the status of his views
is questionable. The question to be posed, then, is whether Habermas's overall
theories are greater than the sum of their flawed parts, (a requirement indicated
by Durkheim, 1938, p. 102) whether synergy can survive a substantial attack on
component elements of a theory.'45
The argument in this chapter addresses this, suggesting:
• that Haberinas's theory of communicative action belongs to 'grand theory' in
sociology but that this diminishes its potential to be a Critical Theory (8.2);
• that Habermas's theory attempts to avoid the charge of relativism but that,
nevertheless, this is only partially successful, and his work is undermined by
the charge of relativism (8.3);
• that, despite its flawed nature, Habermas's theory might have heuristic value
and that it is possible to establish criteria to test his theory (8.4).
' Key e1iti(irns of Haberinas are found in Heller (1982), Held (1980; 1982), Geuss (1981), Keat
(1981). Ottniami (1982), Thompson (1982), Lukes (1982), Giddens (1982), White (1983), Popper
(1984). Lazarsfeld (1984), Heydebrand and Burns (1984), Rodenick (1986), Houneth and Joas
(1991). Hab'rinas addresses some of these criticisms in his works of 1982, 1984, 1985a, 1985b,
1987a. 1988. 1990a. 1990b 1991-..
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It will be argued here that, in many respects, Habermas's work contains
some significant weaknesses at the level of fulfiffing the requirements of a theory in
general. This requires an explication of the nature and purpose of theory. We need
to know in what sense(s) Habermas's writings constitute a theory The problems
with his views include:
(a) questions about the detail of his importation and use of a diversity of
sources for his own purposes - which are often different from their initiators' and
their original contexts;146
(b) questions about his own theory, its construction, formulation, style, audi-
ence, purpose and effects.
What marks out The Theory of Communicative Action is Habermas's lack of
reflexivity, he does not subject his theory to the critical scrutiny that he advo-
cates - and indeed undertakes - for other social theorists.' 47
 It will be argued
that to evaluate Habermas's theory will require empirical illumination, testing or
investigation of rival theories of communicative action. Communicative action, es-
sentially a practical activity, requires an empirical perspective. Habermas is silent
on the nature, methodologies or elements of other rival theories.
8.2 Three Types of Theory
Different types of theory define different types of 'proof'. The following sec-
tions characterize three distinct types of theory - empirical theory (including
146 For exauiple psychoanalysis, speech act theory, ontogenesis and phylogenesis.
147 Heller (1982) contends that 'if we accept the plurality of ways of life, we have to accept the plurality
of theories as well' (Heller, 1982, p. 31). Holub (1991) indicates Habermas's openness to debate
and discussion on several areas of hi8 work, eg systems theory, hermeneutics, the student move-
ment. post-modernity, the public sphere, and with many writers, eg Popper, Gadamer, Luhmann,
- Lyotard. though less so on communicative action.
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reconstructive theory - see chapter 6.2 and 6.3), 'grand' theory and Critical The-
ory. An empirical theory seeks empirical 'proof', a 'grand' theory requires logical
coherence and explanation as 'proof' (Layder, 1994, p. 44), a Critical Theory -
as described in chapter 2 - can bejudgedby the. extent to. whichit- promotes
enlightenment, equality, freedom, democracy and emancipation. It will be argued
that Habermas's work requires verification as an empirical theory, even though it
falls into the category of 'grand' theory, and that several forms of verification are
required if Habermas's views are to meet the criteria for a Critical Theory.
8.2.1 Empirical Theory
An empirical theory, the clear sphere of the natural sciences, 'gathers together
all the isolated pieces of empirical data into a coherent conceptual framework of
wider applicability' (Cohen and Manion, 1985, p. 15), it is a set of interrelated
constructs, definitions and propositions that presents a systematic view of phe-
nomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining
and predicting phenomena (Kerlinger, 1970). To this Mouly (1978), Siegel (1987),
Rasmussen (1990) and Laudan (1990) suggest that there are several characteristics
of a 'sound' empirical theory:
• it should permit deductions and generate laws that can be tested empirically;
• it should have great explanatory, predictive and generalizable potential;
• it should be able to respond to observed anomolies;
• it should be parsimonious.
Lakatos (1970) adds to this the notion that a theory should spawn a research
enterprise, echoing Siegel's (1987) comment that one of the characteristics of an	 -, -
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effective theory is its fertility (p. 110), a fact which Habermas acknowledges.148
Merton (1967) outlines several elements of a sociological theory, suggesting (p.
140) that it should possess methodology, general sociological orientations, analysis
of sociological concepts, post factum-. sociological. interpretations and empirical.
generalizations. Clearly Habermas can be seen to be fulfilling all of these criteria
(his empirical generalizations derive from his view of reconstructive science). One
can add to this Ryan's (1970) view of a theory in the social sciences as having to
be empirically demonstrable and Popper's (1968) view of a scientific theory which
takes 'the form of a universal law applying to a particular type of phenomenon'
(O'Hear, 1980, p. 23). Such a law should demonstrate precision and universality,
it should set the critera for its own falsification (Popper, 1968, p. 92) and possess
explanatory and predictive power:
by the best' theory I mean the one of the competing and surviving theories
which has the greatest explanatory power, content and simplicity and is the least ad
hoc. It will also be the best testable theory (Popper, 1968, p. 419).
The notions of 'testability' and predictiveness are taken from the hypothetico-
deductive paradigm of natural science and the empirical basis of truth of the logical
positivists. If one accepts an alternative paradigm which is more hermeneutic and
interpretive, then the notion of testability in 'severe tests' (Popper, 1969) need
not stand; data are collected and evaluated rather than hypotheses confirmed or
refuted. Nonetheless this does not negate the need for a theory to set the empirical
criteria for its own meaning, verification or refutation or indeed to identify the types
of evidence which would enable it to be considered tenable. A sound empirical
theory, then, will:
(i) be operationalizable precisely;
'	 Haberiwu (1987a, chapter 1;.1987b, p. ii). See also White (1988, pp. 4 - 5).-.
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(ii) state the grounds for its own empirical verification or falsification;
(iii) clarify its methodologies (eg hypothetico-deductive, inductive, hermeneu-
tic);
(iv) clarify the precise terms in which it seeks to explain, predict and generalize
about empirical phenomena;
(v) clarify the conceptual framework and the paradigm in which it works;
(vi) demonstrate internal coherence;
(vii) be a spur to empirical research.
Points (iii), (iv) (v) and (vi) are not the exclusive preserve of empirical the-
ory, they call fit equally well into non-empirical theory. Habermas provides little
guidance on elements (i) and (ii), his methodology in (iii) - self-reflection - has
been shown to be flawed, whilst (iv) - (vii) are contained in his hermetically sealed
theory of communicative action, wherein he sets out his theory and then selects
the evidence for his theory; the explanandum of his theory is part of a watertight
whole, embodying a circularity of argument:'49
[I]f someone challenges our hypothesis and asks us to put it to the test, she
will not be impressed if we rehearse the very information which served as the initial
base for generating the hypothesis to begin with....for a test, it must be drawn from
samples different from those used to devise the hypothesis (Laudan, 1990 p. 62).
Laudan is arguing for the need to test Habermas's theory in contexts which
were different from those which gave rise to the theory, ie to move beyond cor-
roboration and induction. Habermas's theory, then, does not fit completely into
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'Theories are generally not tested by those phenomena which they were expressly invented to
expIain (Laudau, 1990, p. 24). There is an interesting irony in that Habermas was aware of the
dangers of cicularity in positivism (Holub, 1991, p. 42) - arguing that positivism relies on criteria
for experimentation yet criteria for experimentation derive from experimentation themselves - yet
appears to fall into the trap ofcircularity . himself..-
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the mould of empirical theory but, with its commitment to practical outcomes,
requires empirical testing.
8.2.2 Grand Theory
Theories can be formal, conceptual, speculative and non-empirical - the
'grand' theory - defining areas of study, clarifying and refining their conceptual
frameworks and creatively enlarging the way we consider, in the terms of this
study, human and group behaviour and organization (cf Layder, 1994, pp. 28-30,
43-5). Such a theory
coiisists of elaborating basic ontological and epistemological postulates which
serve, one way or another, to define an area of study or domain of enquiry... .Empirical
material is often used for illustration rather than systematically grounding the theory
in any detailed work (Hughes, 1976, pp. 43-4).
Clearly Habermas's theory is of this type. His appeal to the empirical work
of Piaget and Kohlberg exemplifies Hughes's (1976) view of the use of empirical
data in grand theory. Theories of this nature are often free from empirical refer-
ence, echoing Horkheimer's (1972a) view that 'constructive thinking, then, plays a
more important role than empirical verification in this [critical] theory as a whole'
(Horkheimer, 1972a, p. 221). Grand theories have been criticized for their arid-
ity and inability to stand empirical scrutiry (Merton, 1949; Wright Mills, 1959;
Cohen, 1968; Layder, 1994). Cohen (1968) argues that 'they predicate something
too vague to allow for any rigour in testing' (ibid., p. 7). This charge, however,
might appear unfair - attempting to judge a theory by criteria which it did not
strive to meet. There remains the problem that too easily grand theory can be-
come empty rationalization. 15° In this respect Wright Mills (1959) argued that
Cf Hughcs comment that 'to the positivist this form of theorizing is just so much over-elaboration
of concepts almost to the wilful exclusion of any empirical import' (Hughes, op cit, p. 45)
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'grand theory [involves] seemingly arbitrary and certainly endless elaboration of
distinctions which neither enlarge our understandings nor make our experience
more sensible' (Wright Mills, 1959, p. 33), echoing Merton's (1949) view a decade
previously:
To concentrate entirely on the master conceptual scheme for deriving all sub-
sidiary theories is to run the risk of producing twentieth-century equivalents of large
philosophical systems of the past, with all their varied suggestiveness, all their archi-
tectonic splendor and all their scientific sterility (Merton, 1949, p. 68).
Coser and Rosenberg (1969) comment that
The speculative mind concerned only with theory in the large is likely to leave
behind a system of Byzantine style, a large architectonic scheme, admirable perhaps
for its logical consistency but otherwise of no relevance to the workaday development
of a growing science (Coser and Rosenberg, 1969, p. 14).
The criticisms developed in the preceding chapters illustrate very well the
problem voiced by Merton, Wright Mills, Coser and Rosenberg. Accepting that
Habermas's theory is of this type also entails accepting the problems cited here
in this type of theory. Doll (1993) adds a post-modern critique of 'grand' theory,
arguing (pp. 19 - 22, 58 - 60) that such 'totalising' (sic) attempts at theory
construction are marked by closure, and fixity, whereas post-modern society is
characterized by openness, fluidity, heterogeneity and fragmentation. Put simply,
Doll's critiques of 'grand' theories are that they are out of date and out of touch
with modern society. 15' Reference has already been made to the way in which
Habermas's theory is 'hermetically sealed' (8.2.1); Doll's critique not only seems
applicable here but powerfully undermines Habermas's views.'52
Habermas (1987b, 1990b) clearly identifies himself as being a modernist rather than a post-
modernist.
152 A similar critique of Habermas directly. is made by Larrain (1994, p. 105). -
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8.2.3 Critical Theory
The discussion of a Critical Theory in chapter 2 indicated that it possesses
normative and substantive criteria. It comprises a theory of false consciousness,
ideology critique, a theory of crisis, a theory of education and a theory of transfor-
mative action. These provide several criteria against which to evaluate the success
of Habermas's theory. It should, therefore:
(i) be clear in its methodology;
(ii) set criteria for its verification and falsification (empirical and non-empirical)
and should denote the type(s) of evidence which would substantiate the theory;
(iii) possess substantive concepts which are internally coherent and logically
tenable;
(iv) fuse 'grand' and empirical theory;
(v) demonstrate an appropriate measure of precision and universality;
(vi) possess appropriate explanatory power and predictive validity;
(vii) have greater validity claims than rival theories;
(viii) possess the potential for practical empowerment, freedom, equality, so-
cial justice, democracy and emancipation.
Earlier chapters showed that Habermas's theory meets criteria (i), (ui), (iv),
(v) and (vi). He has neglected criterion (ii). His putative improvement on orthodox
Marxism and on Weberian analysis indicate his attempt to meet criterion (vii);
however, as has been argued earlier, it is by no means clear that he has been
successful-here. The absence of any analysis ofany. rival theories of communicative 	 . -
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action also render problematical his achievement of criterion (vii).
At the level of verification Habermas often accepts the veracity of his sources
and, until recently, sets his face against empirical verification of his theory. He
offers little guidance on the type of evidence which would support or refute his
theories or which would count as appropriate evidence. This conflicts with Fay's
(1987) requirement of a Critical Theory - that it should address the practicalities
of transformative action. Though Habermas suggests a variety of forms of ratio-
nality (eg communicative, aesthetic, affective) which would break the 'iron cage'
of bureaucracy which fettered Weber, he ignores the potential of affective and aes-
thetic rationality to emancipate, indeed he neglects to consider even the potential
of non-rational or creative actions to bring empowerment. Habermas sets out what
will not constitute verification - eg empirical testing and its sympathy to posi-
tivism - but hesitates to suggest, other than in what have been demonstrated to
be flawed terrns,' 3 what devices might be used to verify his views.
Habermas's Critical Theory argues against dogmatism but neglects empirical
verification; it exists, as was noted earlier in Kolakowski's (1978) remark, by dint of
its own ambiguity (p. 356). Indeed Kolakowsi (ibid.) argues that Critical Theory
is unclear in which senses it claims to be true: 'because it describes reality as it is,
or because it serves the interests of the liberation of humanity' (p. 355).
We do not know in practice how to judge the accuracy of self-understanding,
the achievement of emancipation, the success of a theory of communicative action
in empowering or emancipating its participants, the use of bureaucracy to emanci-
pate rather than to disempower. Habermas's retreat to reason as verification offers
little more perhaps than invective, 'grand' - but empty - theory or slogan. If a
153 See 3.4: 4.4: 4.5; 5.3; 6.3; 6.7; 6.9; 6.11; 6.13;	 -
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normative theory is inescapably embedded in a practical context, being moral in
intention, it appears perverse that Habermas should turn his back on the practical
implications of his theory (ci Nielsen, 1992).154
• Habermas is resigned, in practice, to having individuals or groups decide if
they are emancipated or empowered. Such a move echoes the words of Thomas
(1928) that if men (sic) define their situations as real then they are real in their
consequences.' 55
 Habermas's refusal to address verification and falsification open
the door to relativism (though he seeks to avoid this in his appeal to reconstructive
science as a way of breaking free from relativism).
With regard to criterion (vii) - that his theory should have greater validity
claims than rival theories - his theory is cast in a discourse which is forbidding
to a wide readership in its language, style and argument. Whilst it is intended to
be a spur to emancipatory action - theory with a practical intent - it is unclear
how this type of writing could relieve societal inertia as the ideal speech situation is
essentially utopian.' 56 It has been shown throughout that Habermas takes a range
of authors out of context and uses them to support an argument which either does
not fundamentally require them to advance his own thought or which betrays the
complexity of his sources and the criticisms which those sources have attracted.
The encyclopaedic range of his sources for which Habermas has been praised (eg
Pusey, 1987) is at the same time a source of danger. His argument is able to be
iM One can detect in Habermas's very recent work (1989, 1993) a willingness to engage practical
substantive issues and less 'grand' theory.
155 This also risks the charge of relativism, discussed in (8.3).
156 Phiffipson (1972) comments appropriately here that 'the linguistic architects of sociology have
constructed vast edifices which bear unknown relationships to the social world .... Certainly these
constructions provide shelter for verbose sociologists but from the point of view of men engaged
in practical activities in the world, they are more likely to appear as esoteric retreats whose doors
are barred except to the converted' (Phillipson, 1972, p. 77)..
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condensed into far less space than Habermas in fact takes. Complexity of language
conceals simplicity of concept. As has been argued throughout, this demonstrates
the least acceptable interpretation of the attractions of the 'simplicity' of a theory
Popper (1968), being often little more than advocacy5!
It is difficult to imagine the predictive nature of Habermas's theory for it is
decontextualized and disembodied. It is a striking irony that Habermas should
draw on speech act theory which emphasizes the huge significance of context, and
then discuss it in a decontextualized way. His ideal speech situation is antiseptic,
pure advocacy of principle uncontaminated by a world peopled by real, sentient
humans. In this respect his own putatively universalizable theory differs little from
the law-like accounts which he so dislikes in positivism;' 58 his theories replace one
set of laws and generalities with his own; he is touched by the very structuralism
that he proscribes.
We have, then, not so much a theory as a statement of the value of theory, an
uncritical acceptance of the supremacy of rationality (Kolakowski, 1978, p. 379),
a peculiarly Western preoccupation, thereby negating the universalism Habermas
claims for it (White, 1988, p. 21). Whilst Habermas claims that his theory over-
comes the cul-de-sacs of Weberian and Parsonian analysis (of bureaucracy and
macro-social functionalism respectively) through the development of the alterna-
tive rationality of communicative action, and hence in that respect it is arguably
an improvement on these two theoreticians, he does not provide guidelines or cri-
teria to evaluate theories which might rival his own. We are left having to accept
157 Popper (1984) describes Habermas's views as 'trivialities in high sounding language' (Popper, 1984,
p. 161).
158 Van der Burg (1990) argues that Habermas has 'a too positivistic and too system-functionalistic
imageoflaw(p. 107).
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his views in the absence of presented alternatives.
The oniy evidence offered of how rationality wifi lead to action is through
the notion of communicative action. We are told that intellectual activity will de-
liver emancipation in communicative action. Taking this further, it is paradoxical
that his obscurantist and opaque language, undifferentiated for a target audience
other than of like-minded sympathisers, will ever reach the mass audience who
might benefit from his insights.' 59
 As an exercise in communication his theory of
communicative action singularly fails to communicate to a wide audience.'6°
Thus whilst Habermas's theory does fulfil some of the criteria of a theory -
espousing a mixture of methodologies, possessing substantive concepts, possessing
explanatory potential, laying the ground for a practical Critical Theory of society,
it is nevertheless incomplete. It is an amalgam of empirical, grand and critical
theory. It is an admixture of axioms and slogans, an account, an explanation, an
argument, a heuristic, a combination of these.'6 ' Indeed his work can be seen as a
disguised or subtle form of ideology,'62 being both normative in its desire for social
justice as equality and instrumental in its goal oriented design - the realization
of communicative action free from domination. Whilst this might be an inevitable
characteristic of any theories - that they 'are essentially instrumental in that
they are good means for linking together statements about observations to other
159 One has to note, however, that his Theorie des Kommunikativen Handels sold ten thou-
sand copies in Germany within the first month of publication (Alexander, 1985, p. 400) and Holub
(1991) indicates that his Theore der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie: Was Leis-
tet the Systemforschung (1971b) sold more than 35,000 copies (Holub, 1991, p. 107).
160 Berger (1991) writes about '[tihose who have fought their way through Habermas's Theory of
Communicative Action' (p. 165).
161 If one accepts Popper's dictum that one criterion for defining an area of study as a science is the
ability for its theories to be falsified then one could deny whether Habermas's views constitute a
social science at all.
162 Discussed earlier in 6.1, see also Alexander, (1985) comments on the ideological intent of commu-
nicative action.
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statements about observations' (Ryan, 1970, p. 92) - Dallmayr (1984) is less kind
about Habermas's instrumentajism:
Despite the stress on interaction, Habermas's arguments at various junctures
still carry the overtone of instrumentalism . .. .it seems to me, primary preoccupation
with rational action and goal-oriented human designs cannot entirely avoid instru-
mentalist effects; even when endorsed by a consensus of participants, such designs
are lialle to reduce the environment - and potentially other human beings - to the
level of means (Dallmayr, op cit. p. 190).
Habermas's theories are as instrumental - teleological - as those he pro-
scribed in his early works. This is perhaps inherent in any normative theory.
Habermas's Critical Theory may have putative heuristic value (demonstrated in
chapters 10-12 of this thesis) (cf White, 1988, p. 125), indeed his theory (a) may
be disproved if the ideal speech situation and social structures working with com-
municative action in fact fail to break down bureaucratization or to emancipate
societies, (b) may become redundant when the perfect state of the ideal speech
situation is reached. Habermas is caught in a cleft stick: either his theory is guilty
of instrumentalism or it is in principle redundant. One has to question whether
his retreat from practice into system building will in fact be able to achieve the
goals of a Critical Theory. In his thirst for system building he demonstrates the
very aspects of the 'system' mentality for which he criticizes bureaucratization and
rationalization as the colonization of the lifeworid. His neglect of engagement with
the lived experiences of humans renders him as guilty of those technocracies and
coarse-grained macro-sociological analyses which attract his criticisms throughout
his work.
His theory is untouched by human factors and yet it seeks the betterment of
humanity. His is a theory which, though it demonstrates strong internal consis-
tency of its elenients-,.. is too.. watertight - it sets its own ground rules and then-
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proceeds to discuss their implications as if they were true or acceptable; this gives it
spurious legitimacy. One can suggest, then, that as a set of linked heuristics it has
instrumental value - itself a realization of the dangers of Habermas's dismissal of
instrumenta1ism— but this valuewill have to be. realizedempirically..What we
have here, then, is a need for Habermas's theory to be tested empirically, to see
if it overrides the criticisms levelled against it as a grand theory and as a critical
theory.
8.3 The Relativism of Habermas's Theories
Mention has been made throughout this study of the questionable status of
Habermas's theories and the possible relativism of his views. If his views are found
to be true only relativistically then, coupled with the neglect of empirical evidence,
the criticism can be sustained that Habermas's views are in essence little more than
ideology. This section addresses the question of Habermas's relativism, outlining:
• the dangers and weaknesses of relativism (8.3.1);
• the relativism of Habermas's theories (8.3.2);
• Haberinas's attempts to avoid relativism and an evaluation of these attempts
(8.3.3);
8.3.1 The Dangers and Weaknesses of Relativism
Siegel (1987) argues that relativism is self-referentially inconsistent and inco-
herent in two principal ways.
Firstly there are concerns about the denial of the existence of any external
criteria higher than the individual 'by which claims to truth and knowledge can be
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adjudicated' (Siegel, 1987, P. 4). If this view is held then there is no opportunity for
any thesis to fail a test of rightness or adequacy, or for rival theories to be claimed
superior or inferior. Siegel demonstrates the logical inconsistency in relativism:
'relativism, is incoherent because, if it. is right, the.very notion-.of. rightness-4s
undermined, in which case relativism cannot be right' (Siegel, 1987, p. 4) (see
also Bernstein, 1983, p. 9). Rightness is 'inteffigible only when understood non-
relativistically' (ibid., p. 8).
Secondly Siegel argues that if all opinions are true and right for those who
hold them this means that no sincerely held opinion can be considered to be false.
However 'if opinions conifict then the ... relativist must acknowledge the truth
that that doctrine is false. Thus, if it is true, then (as long as there is one who
holds that it is false) it is false' (Siegel, 1987, p. 5). This is self-defeating and
incoherent:
relativism is incoherent because it holds that all beliefs and opinions are true,
yet, given conflicting beliefs, some beliefs must necessarily be false - in which case
relativism cannot be true (Siegel, 1987, p. 6).
Siegel and Bernstein argue that if relativism is to be rationally justified then
it can only do so by adopting non-relativistic criteria, in which case it undermines
itself. 163 Clark (1981) contends that if relativism is accepted then disputes about
validity may be decided by power rather than truth, which is Habermas's point
in his repeated references to the need for the force of the argument alone to hold
sway.'64 Clark argues that the outcome of relativism may be totalitarianism, ie an
163 Siegel argues that 'i]f relativism is only relatively true, then by its own light it is no better than its
alternatives .... The very notion of rational defense is given up by the relativist, for the relativist
has rejected the possibility of non-relative criteria by which rival claims or hypotheses can be
evaluated (p. 19).
164 White (1983) argues that 'every type of relativist is ultimately driven to define truth in terms
of majority opinion: for given that propositions have no absolute status, he has no other way of
accounting for the differences betweenthose which-are true and . those which are false. However,
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unwarranted consensus based on strategic action (Clark, 1981, p. 152). Clark's
point indicates that to accept relativism is to violate the ideal speech situation.
Pring (1975) challenges the relativists and argues for external, universal crite-
na of validity, that the wa we 'know' facts in not solely due to our own constructs,
is not solely relative to our own psyche, but has something to do with the facts
themselves. That objects are different is not an individual construct but due to the
properties of the objects themselves regardless of how we construe them. White
(1982) argues that commonsense alone demolishes relativism:
to the question of how he [the relativist] is to decide which propositions are true
and which are false, the answer is that he must decide in the same way as everybody
else. That is, lie must look to the evidence of his senses, to the evidence of the
past. to the community's best established beliefs and theories, to its basic epistemic
principles. In a word, like the non-relativist he must behave rationally (White, 1982,
p. 10).
If proven, then, the relativistic nature of Habermas's work seriously under-
mines its value.
8.3.2 The Relativism of Habermas's Theories
Habermas's early theory of knowledge-constitutive interests and his later the-
ory of communicative action can be challenged on the grounds of relativism. The
social construction of knowledge and the social motivation of knowledge (in the
notion of 'interests') risks relativism. By appealing to the social rather than purely
the epistemic basis of knowledge his theory of knowledge-constitutive interests ac-
such a definition quickly leads to absurd consequences. Confronted with a proposition concerning
which there is as yet no majority opinion, each individual will be forced to wait and see what
the majority will believe; but the majority will not be able to form a belief until the individuals
constituting it have first made up their minds. Inevitably there will be a deadlock' (White, 1983,
p. 10). Phillips (1986) argues that Habermas falls into this trap in his consensus theory of truth:
ay selection of the principles of justice must wait on the consensus of all 'those concerned'....
This appears to place a severe restriction on attempts by individuals to work out on their own the
principles that would govern the just society' (Phillips,. 1986, p. 87). -.
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cords with the relativistic views of Kuhn (1970) who argues that knowledge is that
which is stipulated by a community of scholars. Further, the ideal speech situation
devolves to participants alone the definition of agendas and rationality - there
are no absolutes - thereby risking relativism.By.seeking.to generate, a- hermet--.--
ically sealed theory of communicative action whose justification is based on the
coherence of its internal elements rather than its application in practice Habermas
has opened himself to the same charge of relativism as could be levelled against
any personal opinion. This is exacerbated by the totalising nature of his theory
a self-contained world of theoretical self- and mutually-supporting constructs
without external referents in which rationality and language reign supreme.
Habermas writes that 'from the beginning, critical theory labored over the
problem of giving an account of its own normative foundations' (Habermas, 1984,
p. 374). Thompson (1982) asks 'what assurances have we that the interpreta-
tions offered by critical theory are any less ideological than the ideologies which
they claim to expose?' (Thompson, 1982, p. 117).165 Ottmann (1982) proposes
that 'the interest shown by a critical theory in doing away with concrete power
structures could itself be a child of the times and thereby merely reflect the in-
terest of a particular period and not a theory of knowledge in general' (Ottmann,
1982, p. 80). It has already been suggested that Habermas's theory celebrates
Western rationality. There are, then, several ways in which Habermas's work risks
relativism.
8.3.3 Habermas's Attempts to Avoid Relativism
Though the danger of relativism has been specifically addressed by Habermas
165 See also Thompson, 1984, p. .257.-.
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(if infrequently) this does not preclude the possibility of demonstrating that he
fails to avoid it. There are several ways in which his work attempts to avoid the
charge of relativism:
(a) his appeal to a middle ground between absolutism and relativism;
(b) his appeal to reconstructive science as an attempt to discern universal
properties of communication from empirical evidence;
(c) his appeal to an epistemological bases of social science;'66
(d) his appeal to commensurability;
(e) the coherence of his theory.
These five means, however, will be shown to be either faulty or unproven, and
therefore relativism can be seen in Habermas's work.
Habermas argues that there is a vast middle ground between absolutism and
total relativism:
when they [philosophical questions] are sharpened into the opposition between
relativism and absolutism, an unmediated confrontation emerges between pure his-
toricisiu and pure transcendentalism. At that point the failures of both positions
becomes clear: the one side carries the burden of self-referential, pragmatic contra-
dictions and paradoxes that violate our need for consistency; the other side is bur-
dened with a foundationalism that conflicts with our consciousness of the fallibility
of human knowledge (Habermas, 1985b, p. 193).
It is to this middle ground that critical social theory belongs, arguing first that
'what is accepted as truth at any given time is a matter of convention (Habermas,
1984, p. 126) and later that
eVen basic concepts that are starkly universalist have a temporal core.. ..with
the aid of these [formal-pragmatic] operations one succeeds in steering between the
166 Siegel (1987) provides a cogent argument to suggest that epistemological coherence and absolutism
are fundamental to any theory which wishes to avoid the charge of relativism.
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Scylla of absolutism and the Charybdis of relativism (Habermas, 1987b, p. 300).
Between absolutism and total relativism is the view that putative truths may
be subjected to public scrutiny and publicly verifiable tests, may be rational, and
may possess truth content which is greater than rival contenders (ie that they
constitute the best explanation of truths that exist). This middle ground avoids
relativism by making its criteria of judgement available to evaluate publicly rival
claims - a feature which is absent in relativism. Habermas's ideal speech situation
is an appeal for arguments to be made public and the elements he observes in a
reconstructive science are publicly demonstrable. However he does not provide
clear criteria to evaluate his theories in verifiable tests nor to claim that his theory
is superior to rival theories of communicative action. Furthermore he couches
much of the discussion of his own theory in non-fallibilist terms. Habermas's
theory of communicative action demonstrates strong internal coherence between
its constituent elements. Reference has been made earlier to the way in which his
theory is 'hermetically sealed', 'immune to criticism', rendering it highly resilient
to refutation. However this resilience risks relativism:
epistemic relativists like Kuhn all suppose that a society.. .evolves a set of prac-
tices and beliefs which come to be highly integrated and interdependent... .they make
the beliefs and practices of a given community so tightly integrated that there could
never be ally compelling grounds for modifying those beliefs (Laudan, 1990, p. 115).
It is impossible, therefore, to demonstrate with any certainty that he has
managed to keep to the 'middle ground' between absolutism and relativism. It
remains an open question.
Habermas has attempted to avoid the charge of relativism in his appeal to
reconstructive science: 'without reconstructive sciences, Habermas would have to
argue either on a purely transcendental basis.. .or he would. have, to accede to the ..
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contextualist' (Rasmussen, 1990, P. 97).
There is in communication theory a 'context-independent standard for the
rationality of woridviews' (ibid., p. 62). This is a crucial claim; Habermas is ar-
guing that inherent in communication is a universal principle of rationality, and
that communicative rationality counters relativism (ci Rasmussen, 1990, p. 37).
This constitutes a justification of its normative foundations. Habermas is claim-
ing that rationality and emancipation are inescapable features of communication.
Rasmussen (1990) goes to the heart of the issue, suggesting that 'the question
is whether communication, in principle, is emancipatory' (p. 4). However, Ras-
mussen argues that movements to emancipation belong to the sphere of politics
rather that to science - reconstructive or ordinary (ibid. P. 36). He accuses
Habermas of an illegitimate practice of transforming 'what was originally a po-
litical assumption into a transcendental or reconstructive a priori' (ibid., p. 42).
This constitutes a powerful questioning of Habermas's attempt to avoid relativism.
Further, simply observing universal features of communication does not establish
the case for using a communicative theory as an all-embracing social theory in the
first place, that still remains a matter of preference.
In order to avoid relativism Habermas has to demonstrate that his view of
communicative action is an improvement on Marx and Weber (ie he has to demon-
strate that which would lead to a denial of relativism - the notion of commensura-
bility and hence progress in social science (Siegel, 1987; Laudan, 1990)). Habermas
argues that his theory is an improvement on Marx and Weber. With regard to
Marx he argues that a paradigm of communicative action captures the complexity
of modern society more fully than a 'paradigm of production'. Roderick contests
this claim (Roderick, 1986, pp. 169 - 173), arguing that Habermas's theory of corn-
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municative action is best regarded as a 'supplement to the paradigm of production,
and not as a replacement for it' (Roderick, 1986, p. 167) . b67 Further, Marx provides
a clearer agenda for 'radical practical activity' (ibid., p. 170) than does Habermas
- without recourse to transcendental or quasi-transcendental-language) 8 Marx- ' -.
replaces Habermas's 'etherealization of human practice' (Keat, 1981, p. 130) with
the day-to-day lived experience of suffering, injustice and material deprivation.
Theory and practice are more closely linked in Marx than in Habermas; Roderick
argues that Habermas lacks the 'theoretical, critical or political power of Marx's
original' (ibid., p. 171). As such Habermas's theory, though not necessarily an
improvement on Marx, addresses commensurability and thereby avoids relativism.
With regard to Weber, Habermas argues that his paradigm of communicative
action provides a fuller and more appropriate account of rationalization of society
into bureaucracies than does Weber. The point to be made here is that Haber-
mas, in acknowledging that there are neutral grounds for evaluating rival theories,
attempts to avoid relativism which contends that in relativism:
competing paradigms ... cannot be measured against a neutral standard -
because each paradigm possesses a built-in non-neutral standard of its own.... N]eutral
debate between the two paradigms is impossible (Siegel, 1987, p. 52).
However, with reference to Weber, the commensurability is unclear becase
Habermas is providing not only an account of society as it is but as it ought to
be (Rasmussen, 1990, p. 54), ie he is prescribing lines of action (ie the move to
communicative action as a way of breaking Weber's 'iron cage' of bureaucratiza-
tion) - a feature absent in Weber.'° 9 Indeed Habermas (1990a) argues that 'two
167 He argues that Habermas underestimates Marx's concern with language within the paradigm of
production.
168 See also Larrain (1994).
169 This echoes Laudan's (1990) view that earlier theories generally solve problems not solved by their
successors. -
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competing empirical theories cannot be evaluated independently of the paradigms
furnishing their basic concepts' (Habermas, 1990a, p. 118). There is doubt, there-
fore, whether Habermas has avoided relativism in his discussions of Weber. Laudan
(1990) adds to this the view that, for relativists:
testing a theory does no more than bring one set of theories...to bear against
another set of theories - those utilized to generate the evidence in the first place... .the
subsequent judgement that the ' 'evidence' supports the 'theory' just reflects the
logical compatability between the theories' (Laudan, 1990, P. 38).
This is an almost tailor-made description of the way in which Habermas
has used the work of Freud, Austin, Searle, Mead, Piaget, Husserl, Schütz and
Kohlberg. In acknowledging this there is considerable power in the view that
Habermas has not escaped fully the charge of relativism. One of the purposes of
chapters 10, 11 and 12 is deliberately to apply Habermas's work in a new context
(education), thereby to offer some 'external evidence' for his theory.
Habermas's neglect of indicating the nature of the verification of his theory
until very recently (other than by an appeal to the logic of reconstructive science)
and by an appeal to a reader's penchant for the values and axioms which he does not
demonstrate empirically, sees agreement rather than demonstration as a criterion
for verification. This is verification interpreted as a matter of taste or opinion;
taste and opinion are relative. His Critical Theory of society, by definition (see
chapter 2), seeks to change society; it requires practice and changes to practice;
it is inescapably, inherently practical - empirical - and thus requires practical,
empirical evidence.
In summary, then, it is an open question whether Habermas has overcome
relativism in his appeal to a middle ground between absolutism and relativism
in his appeal to reconstructive, science. He is-. more affirmatively relativist in his
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theory of knowledge-constitutive interests. When he abandoned this in favour
of a theory of communicative action he only partially overcame the relativism
of incommensurability and did not. overcome relativism by establishing internally
consistent, sealed, watertight, totalising and unchai.lengeable social theory because- - -
the effect of creating a world marked by such closure was to render as a matter
of preference the acceptability of his axioms. Moreover, the charge of occidental
ethnocentrism in his use of Piaget and Kohlberg and the absence of an international
dimension in his discussions of capitalism contribute to his relativism. Relativism,
therefore, has not been refuted in Habermas's work.
Failing to refute relativism entirely in Habermas's work suggests that there
are problems with the status of his theories. Given that there are also substan-
tive problems in Habermas's theories their status is reduced from explanation to
heuristic devices for enquiry.
8.4 Testing Habermas's theories
Whilst it would be out of keeping, perhaps, to seek the type of empirical
verification in the 'severe tests' in science (Popper, 1968, 1969; O'Hear, 1980)
that Habermas criticizes in positivism it would not be inappropriate to expect an
outcome of his theory in practice,'7° given that his is a theory with a practical intent
and given that Habermas borrows from theorists (eg Freud) who are positivistic
and falsiflable (Bernstein, 1976). Indeed a test of his theory of communicative
action would be to chart the extent to which it is emancipatory or empowering,
and the contexts in which its success lie.
Layder (1994) argues that Habermas's theory of the colonization of the lifeworid 'has an irreducibly
empirical dimension to it' (p. 203), for example, to identify 'which areas of the lifeworid are more
susceptible to colonization and which are more resistant' (ibid., p. 203).
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Though Habermas suggests the need for a research enterprise (1988) he pro-
vides little comment on the grounds for testing of his theory. One can infer some
criteria for falsification, however, eg if his views do not stand by his own principles
of comprehensibility, truthfulness, sincerity. and legitimacy,. or. if they lack internaL....
logic and coherence, or if they fail to bring about emancipation in practice. In a
departure from his previous work Habermas (1990a) does make it clear that his
theory needs empirical verification: 'the validity of the normative theory is cast
into doubt if the philosophical reconstructions prove to be unusable in the context
of application within the empirical theory' (Habermas, 1990a, p. 39).
Indeed in this volume Habermas suggests that his work and all its sub-
elements needs empirical verification and testing (p. 117). He indicates the need
to find 'counter examples' (p. 6) and for 'critical testing' (p. 7), bringing his theory
closer in line with the empirical theories which he dismissed so readily in his early
work. He argues that 'all rational reconstructions, like other types of knowledge,
have only hypothetical status' (ibid., p. 32), and that 'the assertion that there is
no alternative to a given presupposition.. .has the status of an assumption. Like a
lawlike hypothesis, it must be checked against individual cases' (ibid., p. 9).
From the preceding discussion it is possible to establish some general prin-
ciples to enable an evaluation of Habermas's theory to be undertaken (as one of
Merton's criteria for a social theory), eg the extent to which equality, freedom,
democracy, emancipation and empowerment have been addressed and achieved by
dint of his theory, the extent to which transformative practices have been addressed
or occurred as a result of the theory, the extent to which the theory of communica-
tive action and the ideal speech situation have enabled proponents to identify ways
to break down the 'iron cage' of bureaucracy and to reassert their agency and the
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extent to which these have occurred in practice, the extent to which an appeal to
rationality defined in terms other than means-end instrumentalism might achieve
or has achieved a more egalitarian participatory democracy.
Further, if circularity is to be avoided (as argued previously) then Habermas's
theories will need to be tested in circumstances which are different from those which
gave rise to the theories in the first place, ie his theories will have to be applied to
new data. From this analysis one can summarise criteria for testing Habermas's
theories; they must:
(i) demonstrate internal consistency;
(ii) identify the type of evidence (empirical or otherwise) which is required to
confirm or refute the theories, in total or in part;
(iii) demonstrate the extent to which they are empirically verifiable (eg their
power to empower and emancipate in practice);
(iv) be tested in new contexts and with new data, informing and extending
an understanding of those new contexts;
(v) demonstrate their fertility in spawning a research enterprise.17'
Habermas's work has been undermined by the earlier critiques. However it
may have utility value as a tool to think with, to examine an area of study, to assist
its users to discover new insights, to shed new light on issues, ie it may have value
heuristically. If indeed, in doing so, it does become empowering and emancipating
then it can be seen to have been demonstrated. It is this enterprise which will be
171 Cf Rodericks (1986) view that '[t]he ultimate test of Habermas's communicative rationality is its
empirical, theoretical and critical fruitfulness for social theory and research' (Roderick, 1986, p.
112).
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undertaken in the subsequent chapters dealing with education.
Habermas's views can be verified in a form of 'severe test'. For example if it
were possible to demonstrate that Habermas's work indicates that emancipatory
potential and the potential for empowerment exist in circumstances which seem
very hostile to the development of such empowerment and emancipation and if
it were possible to demonstrate that this emancipatory potential were realizable
and 'realized in practice then Habermasian theory might have value even though
it contains flaws. Subsequent chapters identify whether this is the case.
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Chapter IX
HABERMAS ON EDUCATION
9.1 An Introduction to Habermas and Education
This brief chapter sets the ground for applying Habermas's theories in a new
field from those which gave rise to them, thereby avoiding circularity. Habermas
touches on the situation of schools, suggesting that they are (a) becoming increas-
ingly marked by 'jurudification' (Habermas, 1987a, p. 368), subject to increasing
administrative regulation and formalization (ibid., p. 369) and bureaucratization
(p. 371) even though this might be done to protect pupils' and parents' rights,
(b) tied to the reproduction of capital and employment (p. 371), (c) restrictive of
teachers' rights and professional freedoms, (d) subject to depersonaiising curric-
ula, inhibiting innovation and commodifying children's and teachers' experiences,
(e) bureaucratising the socialization process, (f) achieving competition through
grading systems, (g) operating sanctions and threats in order to achieve norma-
tive consensus on behaviour, and (h) subordinating the communicative action of
schools to purposive-rational action (ibid., pp. 368 - 373). Habermas recognizes
the paradox at work here, as has been articulated throughout the discussion so
far, that in order to foster social integration through values, norms and consensus
formation (ibid., p. 372), in order to prevent them from being 'incorporated' by
economic imperatives, in order to prevent them from being overtaken by adminis-
trative subsystems (ibid., pp. 372 - 3) schools are having to enter the juridification
process. What one. sees. in 'steering media' (eg law, money, power,_ mass media,
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the rationalization of complex societies into bureaucracies) is their potential for
emancipation. These mechanisms might be emancipatory; equally they might be
constraining. A major task, then, is to identify the mechanisms whereby emanci-
patory potentials are deformed into constraint.
Habermas has initiated the analysis of the relationship between his social
theory and the curriculum, the task of the following sections of this study is to
extend that analysis. Chapters 10 and 11 set out a range of issues deriving from
the work of Habermas which can be taken forward to inform an analysis of the
relationship between the curriculum and society (ie chapter 10) and the range of
curriculum elements in particular (ie 'within-school' factors - chapter 11). It was
suggested in the preceding discussion that Habermas's work was problematical
in its several elements but that it might have instrumental, heuristic value in
establishing a set of principles with which to interrogate the curriculum. It is
therefore for its utility value that it is judged as well as for its substantive elements
and merits. If it is able to generate and inform new insights into the curriculum
and to indicate how these could be used to further the principles of communicative
action, the recoupling of lifeworid and system, equality and collective, democratic
freedoms (the normative basis of his theory) then its usefulness as a theoretical tool
will have been established. This would lay the ground for empirical verification, ie
the ability of Habermas's work to effect empowerment in practice.
Chapters 10 and 11 demonstrate the 'fruitfulness' of Habermas's theory for
an understanding of curricula - as they articulate with the wider society (chapter
10) and as they operate in schools (chapter 11) - and chapter 12 provides a 'severe
test' of Habermas's theories in a case study. It will be argued in chapter 10 that
Habermas's theory informs an analysis of the sociology of the curriculum, ie the
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relationship between the curriculum and the wider society. Chapter 11 provides an
outline of how Habermasian principles inform an understanding of school curricula,
whilst the 'severe test' of Habermas's theories is a case study of the introduction
of the National Curriculum of England and Wales, undertaken in chapter 12.
The preceding chapters indicated Habermas's enduring concern for the evo-
lution of social justice. It is not insignificant that the closing pages of his Theory
of Communicative Action (1984, 1987a) should signal a return, after an excursion
into social theory, not only to a fully fledged Critical Theory and his analysis of
'critical' movements in society, but that in these pages he should give considerable
room to an analysis of schooling and the politics of control (discussed later). Anal-
yses of curricula in the subsequent three chapters will identify their potential for
developing communicative action. By taking his theories to a new field it will be
shown how Habermas's work can inform several aspects of education and how his
theories can be tested. Finally chapter 13 undertakes an evaluation of the work
of Habermas in the light of his utility in the field of education and suggests an
agenda for the further testing of his theories.
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Chapter X
HABERMAS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLED GE
10.1 Introduction
Habernias's early work on knowledge-constitutive interests revealed that he
is concerned to show that interests and the ideological processes at work in so-
ciety should be subject to ideology critique. Habermas's theory of knowledge-
constitutive interests echoes Mannheim (1936, p. 230) in suggesting that knowl-
edge is socially constructed and that it articulates with the reproduction and trans-
formation of society. This chapter relates discussions of schools and curricula to
the wider society. It will be demonstrated that Haberrna.s's notion of 'interests'
inform an analysis of content selection and pedagogy in schools. It will be argued
that, whilst Haberinas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests and analysis of
bureaucracies are useful, the value of using his theory of communicative action to
redress the inequalities exposed by a sociology of knowledge is unproven.
Habernias argues that knowledge should be subject to the critical rational
interrogation of the truth claims of his ideal speech situation - truth, legitimacy,
sincerity, comprehensibility - and its part in a macro theory of communicative
action. His views suggest the need to expose the interests, purposes and agendas
in and through the curriculum. This echoes Bernstein's (1971) view that
110W a society selects, classifies, distributes, transmits and evaluates the educa-
t.ioiial knowledge it considers to be public, reflects both the distribution of power and
the principles of social control. (Bernstein, 1971, p. 47). 	 -
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Bernstein argues that the power elites in society define what is to count as
worthwhile school knowledge. The ideological function of such decisions is mas-
sive. School knowledge is used to perpetuate power elites. It will be argued that
Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests suggests that school knowl-
edge - the 'hegemonic academic curriculum' (Hargreaves, 1989) - serves the
technical and hermeneutic interest rather than the emancipatory interest and that
this contributes to the reproduction of the societal status quo - an inegalitarian
society - rather than the egalitarian and openly democratic society which he sees
as being the contrafactual goal of the ideal speech situation.
The reproduction of power elites in society through school knowledge is a
clear example of strategic rather than communicative action, ie action which fulfils
sectoral interests to the disadvantage of others, the suppression of generalizable
interests. The question to be addressed is how those in power succeed in perpet-
uating their power through school knowledge, ie how the suppression of gener-
alizable interests and the operation of strategic action occur in school curricula.
Habermas's work suggests the need to subject to rational scrutiny the processes
of the perpetuation of power and power groups in order to discover and evaluate
their legitimacy. The defensibility of these processes and reproduction of power
elites will be judged according to the extent to which generalizable interests and
emancipation are promoted, realized through the appeal to the ideal speech situa-
tion. Implicit throughout this is the leitmotiv of control, social control is effected
through, amongst other things, control of curricular knowledge. Habermas's call
to expose, question and critique the interests which operate in the control of the
curriculum suggests that the speech act validity claims of truth, sincerity, legit-
imacy and comprehensibility of decision making have to be scrutinised in school
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knowledge, ie that conformity and decision making have to be 'warranted' (Brown,
1985) and agreed on the basis of generalizable interests.
10.1.1 Perpetuating Power through School Knowledge
Young (1971), Esland (1971) and Apple (1993) suggest that those in positions
of power succeed in having their definitions of worthwhile knowledge given high
status, and the definitions of others' knowledge given low status:
huldren do not simply learn maths, English, history and so on; they learn what
ruling iiiterest take as maths, English, history; and they accept as correct and worth
knowing what those same interests count as correct and worth knowing (Harris, 1979,
p. 74).
For example Anyon's (1981) study found that working class children were not
taught their own histories - their histories were disconfirmed (Morrison, 1989a) -
that middle class children were not taught the history of dissent but were taught
the value of individual success in competition, and that children in the affluent
professional class were given a fully fledged account of history - in particular of
their own history as a success story which gave them legitimate rights to power
- so that they could maintain their dominance. This reinforced her earlier study
(1980) of social studies texts where she found that (a) they glossed over or ignored
dissent and conflict in society, (b) they sanctioned consensus and the status quo
of unequal power to non-whites and to women, (c) they confined the democratic
process to political institutions, (d) they did not challenge capitalism, (e) they
trivialised unemployment and poverty, (f) they paid little attention to undemo-
cratic decision making in the economic sphere, (g) they de-legitimised alternatives
to the political and economic status quo.
Young (1971) argues that knowledge becomes high status whelLit is:
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I.
• formally assessed - bureaucratized;
• taught to the ablest children;
• taught in homogenous ability groups of children;
• academic.
By 'academic' he means literary as opposed to orally presented, individual
as opposed to group oriented, abstract (over which the learner has little control)
as opposed to concrete (over which the learner has substantial control) and un-
related to everyday life (non-vocational) as opposed to practical, commonsense,
vocational knowledge which is related to non-school life. In this respect schools
are the guardians of tradition (Giroux, 1989, pp. 42-4); school knowledge serves
Habermas's technical interest of control by those in power. In Habermasian terms
this indicates the violation of the principles of the ideal speech situation set out
in figure 6.2: 'equal opportunity to select and employ speech acts'; 'orientation
to a common interest ascertained without deception'; 'freedom to reflect on the
nature of knowledge'; 'freedom to modify a given conceptual framework' and 'the
consensus resulting from discussion derives from the force of the better argument
alone, and not from the positional or political power of the participants'. Positional
power alone is used to take decisions on curriculum content.
A Habermasian analysis of curricula can draw on Bernstein's typologies of
educational codes in relation to academic curricula, defined with reference to 'clas-
sification' and 'framing' - the 'degree of boundary maintenance between contents'
(Bernstein, 1971, p. 49) and 'the degree of control teacher and pupil possess over
the selection, organization and pacing of the knowledge transmitted and received
in the pedagogical relationship' (ibid., p. 50) respectively. Collection codes and
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integrated codes, Bernstein argues, can be defined with relation not oniy to clas-
sification and framing but to questions of power and control in the wider society
such that academic curricula, characterized by collection codes with strong classi-
fication and strong framing, reproduce existing power structures (ibid.). They can
be presented thus, Figure 10.1:
Bernstein's collection codes embody Habermas's technical and hermeneutic
interests whereas integrated codes, with weak classification and framing, are much
more open and negotiable, enabling participants to abide by some of the principles
of the ideal speech situation set out in figure 6.2, viz.: 'freedom to modify a given
conceptual framework'; 'freedom to reflect on the nature of knowledge'; 'equal op-
portunity to select and employ speech acts'; 'equal opportunity for discussion'; 'the
consensus resulting from discussion derives from the force of the better argument
alone, and not from the positional or political power of the participants'. Collection
codes are perlocutionary, demonstrating strategic action; integrated codes are illo-
cutionary, demonstrating communicative action. That this 'hegemonic academic
curriculum' (Hargreaves, 1989) persists can be seen in the elevation of traditional
subjects and the subordination of personal and social education in the National
Curriculum of England and Wales. It will be argued in chapter 12 that the eleva-
tion of personal and social education would constitute a significant move towards
reducing inequality and enabling active participation in society.
The move from collection codes to integrated codes displays an ideological
shift; Bernstein argues that it represents a disturbance in the structure and distri-
bution of power and control as control is no longer bureaucratized and the property
of power elites. 172 In Habermasian terms the move from collection codes to jute-
172 Chapter 12 treats the issue of Habermas's analysis of the bureaucratization of shool curricula.
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Figure 10.1 - Characteristics of Collection and Integrated Codes
COLLECTION CODES INTEGRATED CODES
Strong classification	 Weak classification
	
Hierarchical	 Democratic
Subject loyalty	 Integrated and interdisciplinary
Strong social control	 Weaker social control
	
anddiscipline	 ___________________________
Traditional subjects -
	 Traditional subjects -
	
high status	 low status
Received curricula	 Reflexive curricula
Core principles of subject - Core principles of subject -
mysteries - revealed late 	 mysteries - revealed where
in life	 relevant
Secrecy of knowledge - 	 Content openness
(content closure)
	
Theoretical	 Practical
Revealed truths to select	 Knowledge available to all
few who have been
'successfully' socialized
Limited pupil choice	 Extended pupil choice
	
Instruction	 Enquiry
Rigid timetabling	 Flexible tirnetabling
Hoinogenous ability groups 	 Heteregenous pupil groups
Discipline through	 Discipline through
hierarchical control	 interpersonal relations
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grated codes permits the movement from technical and hermeneutic interests to
the emancipatory interest. Habermas's tenets suggest the need to identify the
power elites, the decision makers, to question their legitimacy (Habermas, 1976a),
and to examine how the differential status accorded to subjects can be rationally
defended. The operation of the ideal speech situation requires weak classification
and framing if the pursuit of rational interrogation of interests in and effects of
the school curriculum is to occur. Habermas's views of the ideal speech situation
require educationists to interrogate the degree to which a 'warranted consensus'
(Brown, 1985) on the content, status and pedagogy of curricula can be identified.
One has to ask how far the Habermasian speech act validity claims of truth, sin-
cerity, comprehensibility and legitimacy are respected or violated in the ascription
- by decision makers - of differential status to subjects.
10.1.2 Differential Access to High Status Knowledge
Having defined high and low status knowledge those in power then give differ-
ential access to high status knowledge, arguing that it should only be the preserve
of the few who have accepted the discipline of the school and the subject - those
who adhere to the status quo - thereby condemning the majority to a second class,
low status education. 173 According differential access to high status knowledge vi-
olates Habermas's principles of the ideal speech situation set out in figure 6.2, viz.:
'freedom to enter a discourse'; 'freedom to modify a given conceptual framework';
'freedom to reflect on the nature of knowledge'; 'freedom to alter norms'; 'mu-
tual understanding between participants'; 'equal opportunity to select and employ
speech acts'; 'recognition of the legitimacy of each subject to participate in the
173 Cf. Daith,eks (1975) discussion of hi8 fo&' curriculum and Midwinter's (1975) 'community edu-
catioii prograuhlues of the early seventies.
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dialogue as an autonomous and equal partner'; 'equal opportunity for discussion';
'the consensus resulting from discussion derives from the force of the better ar-
gument alone, and not from the positional or political power of the participants'.
The effect of this violation is to circumscribe the possibilities of children to break
out of ascribed futures, ie it reasserts a technical interest in control. This control
operates for those who are denied access to high status knowledge and, paradox-
ically, for those who are are given access to high status knowledge as Bernstein
(1971) suggests that this latter group is schooled to 'the existing order' (p. 57).
Pupils who assert their agency, who reject the school's definition of worthwhile
knowledge, who present problems of control and discipline, are given low status
knowledge (to 'try to keep them happy' (Giroux, 1989, p. 127) or maybe genuinely
to reflect socially situated differences). This is also evident in the options available
to children in different tracks of school, where 'the knowledge-power relation.. .flnds
expression in the active production and distribution of knowledge itself' (Aronowitz
and Giroux, 1986, p. 84).' In this respect the National Curriculum of England
and Wales, premissed de jure on 'entitlement' to access by all students to all
subjects of the curriculum (DES, 1988a) could be a way of breaking out of this
cycle of disadvantage.
However, in perpetuating the 'hegemonic academic curriculum', equalizing
access to a curriculum which is not ideologically innocent, the National Curricu-
lum itself is ideological, Habermas's generalizable interests are suppressed. Hence,
though the 'entitlement' to a National Curriculum might be illocutionary in pur-
pose, such entitlement is perlocutionary in its effects. It is itself an ideological
process. This is demonstrated in the 'cultural capital' thesis (Bourdieu, 1976;
174 See also Hargrcaves, 1967, 1982; Lacey, 1970; Peak and Morrison, 1988.
	 -
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Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977) wherein an academic curriculum, though in princi-
pie open to all equally, in fact is taken up differentially by social groups, thereby
contributing to social reproduction (see Appendix A).
Habermas's technical interest in control by the power elite is strengthening
in the contexts of examinations and assessments in the National Curriculum of
England and Wales. This can be seen occurring in five main ways (Burke, 1990): (i)
by the reduction in the number of syllabi available to be examined by examination
boards, (ii) by the need for examination boards to act responsively rather than
proactively to government directives if they are to survive (ibid.) - no longer do
they have the sway which they had prior to the National Curriculum and GCSE;
(iii) by the rise of control of vocational qualifications (NVQs) and their levels of
qualification; (iv) by the increasing 'surveillance' of pupils occasioned by the rise
of instruments of assessment and the overall increase in assessment and Records
of Achievement (ROAs) (Foucault, 1977; Gibson, 1986),' (v) by the reproductive
effects of assessment (Hextall, 1976) whereby the asymmetries of power in the
teacher / pupil relationship are reproduced through the teacher's control of the
assessment situation - its form, content and outcomes.
What is very clear in the control of assessment is the operation of Habermas's
technical interest, conception of assessment eg its forms, purposes, contents,
methods and reporting - is separated from its execution. This violates Habermas's
principles for the operation of the ideal speech situation set out in figure 6.2, viz.:
'freedom to modify a given conceptual framework'; 'freedom to alter norms'; 'equal
Hargrav's (1989) supports this view in his suggestion that ROAs are a sophisticated means of
controlling (lisaflected pupils. He argues that ROAs were a response to a 'motivation crisis' (cf
Ha1wriiia.. 1976a) in society; they were a means of motivating pupils who otherwise would have
left school with no credentials. Hargreaves, however, indicates that ROAs might be hijacked to
be simply ui instrument for job selection rather than pupil motivation. indeed the link between
1I1o(lu1Lr rourses. unit accreditation and ROAs has already begun this process. -
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opportunity to select and employ speech acts'; 'recognition of the legitimacy of each
subject to participate iii the dialogue as an autonomous and equal partner'; 'the
consensus resulting from discussion derives from the force of the better argument
alone, and not from the positional or political power of the participants'.
10.1.3 The Bureaucratization of Schooling
Habermas (1984, 1987a) has a clear contribution to make to an analysis of
schools and curricula in the area of the bureaucratization of schooling, discussed
fully in the case study in chapter 12. It was argued earlier that advanced capitalism
- and indeed socialism (if we accept Weber's analysis) - is characterised by
increasing bureaucratization. Given that power is hierarchically distributed in
bureaucracies, if people are to gain power then they must possess the credentials
that will enable them to ascend the rungs of power. The credentials that schools
provide can be said to buttress the economic and social organization of advanced
capitalism by being the main means of ascending hierarchies. Those without the
necessary credentials do not begin to ascend the bureaucratic ladder and hence
have little power to control their own futures.176
Schools are becoming bureaucratized, power is administered hierarchically
with heavy reliance being placed on written forms of communication (witness the
plethora of curriculum documentation given to and received from the DES / DFE).
In Habermasian terms these written documents demonstrate perlocutionary rather
than illocutionary purposes; their intention is to communicate strategically - to
fulfil DES and DFE agendas - rather than to engage participants communica-
176 Wihiss (1977) study illumiiiates this clearly, showing 'how working class kids get working class
jobs through their rejection - amongst other items - of credentials and that this eventually
underuiiiu's the potential which the iads' had to upset the status quo - ie how they were
ulcorporat( C1 by eapital.	 -
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tively in an open discussion. Britzman (1986) supports the view of the bureau-
cratization of schools, writing of three important features of schools - that social
control (Habermas's technical interest) is a significant dynamic of classroom life,
that the curriculum is compartmentally organized (cf the National Curriculum
subject documentation), and that schools are hierarchically organized (p. 444) -
all features of an advanced bureaucracy.' 77 Harris (1988) argues that questions
of bureaucratic management sacrifice interpersonal aspects to issues of structures
of the organization, thereby impeding discourse (p. 206) on their impact on peo-
ple, personalities and the interpersonal aspects of schools - central features of
communicative action.
In Habermasian terms it can be argued that bureaucracies and schools, when
viewed as bureaucracies, cannot aspire to the achievement of the ideal speech situa-
tion set out in figure 6.2 as they are imbued with constraints on power and freedom
to enter discourse; different types of discourse are open to different role bearers in
the hierarchy and thus the unforced force of the argument in situations in which
all stakeholders have the freedom to participate is impossible. Communication is
written, strategic and one-way (a 'top-down' model). Haberrnas's technical inter-
est reigns supreme. Hierarchies preclude open discussion, they separate conception
from execution (Apple, 1983), and this thereby negates the possibility of the oper-
ation of tl1e ideal speech situation. There is limited room for challenge. Hierarchies
of power, epitomized in bureaucracies, thus cannot help but systematically distort
It is iut.'r .st.iiig in this context to see how much of the literature on school organization and man-
ageilielit of the 1970s - at a time when the sociology of knowledge was appearing in educational
discours e is heavy with the nornothetic language of role, role strain, role conflict, role distance
etc (cf Grace. 1972 Hargreaves 1973) rather than on the interpersonal, personal, idiographic di-
ineusious of mauagcmeut (Hoyle, 1976, for example is aware of these two dimensions - nomothetic
and idiograpliic. but tends to focus attention on the former). This constitutes an overemphasis on
bureaucratic aspects of school life.
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communication and violate communicative action.178
Schools embody the form, content and process of the movement towards the
uncoupling of system and lifeworid and the Colonization of the lifeworid charted in
chapter 7.5. For example we are witness now to Habermas's technical interest and
to the rise of Habermas's steering media in the Reform Act of 1988, where: (i) de
jure innovations are being made in organizing the financing and administration of
the finances of schools - the steering medium of money; (ii) schools are becoming
increasingly subject to legislation and juridification - the steering medium of law;
(iii) schools are becoming increasingly organized along power criteria the steer-
ing medium of power; (iv) schools are subject to increasingly formalized channels
of communication - language becomes a steering medium where communicative
action is lost to unquestioned strategic action; (v) action oriented to mutual un-
derstanding becomes subordinated to the technicist playing out of decisionism (cf
chapter 3.5) in ascribed - and differentiated - zones of power and authority,
(vi) bureaucracies thrive - the steering medium of bureaucracy. 179 The status
quo remains relatively undisturbed in the asymmetrical relations of power between
managers, teachers and pupils. Existing power relations become reified rather
than made dialectical: 'bureaucracy rests on assumptions of scientific rationality,
the generalized other which is apolitical an4 ideologically invisible' (Blackmore,
1989, p. 119).
In contrast to this Foster (1989) argues for a 'critical', non-bureaucratic style
of leadership in which there are four major tasks (pp. 50 - 55). Leaders must be
m78 l3lackiuore (1989) sees the paradox inherent here: 'The irony remains that the expansion of bu-
reaucrades which increasingly regulate all aspects of social life has been accompanied by modern
political theory centring on individual freedom and democracy' (Blackniore, 1989, p. 110).
179 Cf Webcrs (1968) characteristics of bureaucracy set out in chapter 6.5. 	 -
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(a) critical - rather than accepting of situations, (b) transformative - of social
conditions and individual and social consciousnesses, (c) educative - possessing
both vision and skills of analysis of situations, and (d) ethical - both personally
and for the community of participants. In this respect leadership is Separate from
management as traditionally defined - indeed leadership should be shared and
reflexive, embodying action and reflection (Codd, 1989). These views embody the
language and purpose of Habermas's emancipatory interest and the operation of
the ideal speech situation in its equalization of power amongst all participants and
its recognition that education is a matter of participatory debate.18°
10.1.4 Summary
Through three ways then - (i) according differential status to school knowl-
edge; (ii) operating differential access to school knowledge and ensuring differential
outcomes through the operation of the cultural capital thesis; (iii) bureaucratizing
schooling - schools perpetuate power structures and reproduce the societal status
quo. It has been suggested here not only that school curricula violate Habermasian
principles, depending on the operation of their bureaucracy, but that, because they
are part of a larger, societal and cultural process of bureaucratization, this process
is difficult to resist. When the steering media of law, money, communication and
bureaucracies combine and intrude overtly info education, driven by political will,
then empowerment of teachers, schools and pupils is under threat. Strategic action
serving Haberinas's technical interest replaces communicative action.
180 Suiytli (1989h) develops this view of 'critical leadership' where he sees it as enabling through
uuderstaiidiiig and transformation of consciousness and circumstances. Leadership, titus defined,
replaces leadership-as-domination with leadership as facilitating self-transformation. This involves
the rejection of the social constructs of leaders and followers with a construct of many leaders and
participants. a democratized and participatory bureaucracy (Smyth, 1989b, p. 11).
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10.2 The Sociology of School Knowledge Reconsidered
There are three criticisms which can be levelled at this analysis, the first
two deal with the relationship of school and society (10.2.1 and 10.2.2), the third
(10.2.3) concerns the charge of relativism in the sociology of knowledge (the criti-
cisms of which were directed in (8.6) to Habermas's own theories).
10.2.1 Schools Do Not Alter the Power Elites in Society
There is an assumption in the above that school knowledge perpetuates the
interests of the powerful, ie that it performs an ideological function and that so-
cial change and reduction of inequality result from change in educational knowl-
edge, thereby overlooking the notion of overdetermined behaviour; changing school
knowledge, however, may not redistribute power in society. Haes (1980a) criticises
Young's preluiss here:
Young makes the false and simplistic assumption that a redistribution of the
present organization of knowledge would somehow lead to a parallel redistribution
of property. power and prestige. ...such relatively minor superstructural educational
modifications alone cannot, in Marxian terms, be presumed to lead to structural
alterations in the relations of production... .Young's excursus into epistemological is-
sues.. .kads hut to the curious view that the reorganization of knowledge constitutes
a sufficient condition for the redistribution of power, he thus misses the simple and
obvious point that if previously neglected educational areas become significant, this
merely changes certain educational assumptions (Haes, 1980a, pp. 723-4).
Indeed Haes questions education's role in the reproduction of the societal
status quo through access to bureaucracies:
being inititiated into Young's 'high status knowledge' is not the best route to
follow for a position of power in capitalist society; such knowledge is actually 'a
passport to the vast army of proletarianized clerical and minor adminstrative workers
or a job as a schoolteacher'. The key to membership of the ruling class is not a.
curri(:lllIuu whicli culminates in certificates in literature, abstract and non-applied
knowledge. but. the process of gentrification', which involves... 'a drift towards claret
and horses and away from beer and motor bikes'. This curriculum is centred not on
huigh status knowledge' but on blood sports and Scouting for Boys; it is disseminated
through those professions which have refused to become 'professionahized', such as
the aruiy. the church, public schools and universities (Haes, 1980a, pp. 724-5).
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Haes (1980b, p. 28) suggests that Young's analysis overlooks the argument
that schools have a measure of 'relative autonomy', they are not passively socially,
culturally and economically reproductive (Giroux, 1983, 1984); some are sites of
contestation, struggle and resistance (Willis, 1977; Giroux, 1983; Bowe et al, 1992)
and relative autonomy (Giroux, 1984) from economic, cultural and social repro-
duction. Schools may be actively engaged in breaking out of cycles of reproduction
through developing student voice (Giroux, 1989) and 'positive critical knowledge'
(ibid., pp. 121-2) which interrogates, resists and mediates the determining pres-
sures of economic, social and cultural hegemonies.' 8 ' One cannot assume too tight
or mechanistic a fit between school and society, even though, for example, repre-
sentatives from the local community and industry sit on governing bodies.182
Further, one sees attempts by government now, yet again, to elevate non-
academic knowledge through certification of vocational education (NVQs), perhaps
reducing the significance of Young's high status being accorded solely to academic
knowledge. Moreover, the weak classification and framing of flexible learning sys-
tems that have been introduced for academic knowledge with the rise of information
technology perhaps reduce the significance of Bernstein's link between high status
knowledge and collection codes marked by strong classification and framing.
If agency is to be restored, in Habermasian terms if lifeworld and system are
181 hi this perspective schools are 'relatively autonomous institutions that not only provide spaces for
oppositional behaviour and teaching but also represent a source of contradictions that sometimes
makes tlieiii dysfunctional to the material and ideological interests of the dominant society.... For
instance, schools sometimes support a notion of liberal education that is in sharp contradiction
to the loinnjaiit. society's demand for forms of education that are specialized, instrumental, and
geared to the logic of the marketplace' (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986, p. 72).
182 This forimis the basis of Aronowitz's and Giroux's condemnation of theories of economic, social
and cultural reproduction (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986, chapter 5 and Tunnel's (1978, p. 338)
and Gitoux's (1983) criticism of the Bowles and Gintis correspondence principle. Aronowitz and
Giroux (1986) comment on Althusser's and Bowles's and Gintis's neglect of the role of contestation,
resistance and struggle that takes place in, and over, schools ( pp. 75 . 79).	 -
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to be recoupled, then such a determinist position has to be resisted. This recog-
nizes that education is not simply the unproblematic transmission and mechanistic
reproduction of the dominant ideology but that the field of schooling, like labour
itself, is a contested terrain.' 83 Rather, Habermas's principles of ideal speech sug-
gest the need to regard schools as mediating institutions which can accept, resist,
interrogate, modify or reject strategic action from external agents, and to regard
teachers and pupils as involved in mediating behaviours, addressing the conditions
of ideal speech and communicative action (cf Fernandes, (1988); Bowe et al (1992)).
Application of Habermas's argument suggests that schools and teachers should
resist the strategic - perlocutionary - actions of others if they are not 'warranted'
and that communicative action will interrogate the purposes and effects of curricu-
lar proposals taken by decision makers. In effect this is arguing that schools might
have to act strategically, weakening Habermas's advocacy of communicative ac-
tion. The operation of the ideal speech situation will also reject positivist accounts
of determined or over-determined behaviour (Habermas, 1971a, 1972), a feature
discussed in the case study of chapter 12.3 (see also Ball, 1990).
Resistance theories are not without their theoretical problems however, for
example Aronowitz and Giroux (op cit., pp. 99 - 109) suggest that resistance
theories to date take insufficient account of 'the historical development of the con-
ditions that promote and reinforce contradictory modes of resistance and struggle'
(p. 99),184 that they fail to take seriously the notions of race and gender (p. 101),
that they tend to focus on overt acts of resistance only (p. 102), that such theories
183 Eg Braveriitau. 1974: Willis, 1977; Corrigan, 1977; MacFtobbie, 1978; Apple, 1983; Bowe et al,
1992: Apple. 1993.
184 A uotabh ('xce1)tiou to this is provided by Grace (1985) in his discussions of the history of con-
testat.ioit in teacher evaluation. This is significant in pointing to the value of using Habernias's
theories to interrogate lived experience rather than to construct a social theory. -
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'have not given enough attention to the issue of how domination reaches into the
structure of personality itself' (p. 103), that they assume cultural and social soli-
darity within and between oppressed groups. Giroux (1989) provides an example
of this where he shows that students' values are composed of multiple and often
contradictory sets of discourses (pp. 67 - 8). What is clear is that resistance theo-
ries, taking fuller account of Habermasian principles and his insistence on the need
to capture the complexity of variables in a situation, wifi need to recognize that
lived experiences are interpenetrated by contradictions as well as consistencies. In
Habermasian terms theories of resistance, contestation and struggle (eg Aronowitz
and Giroux, 1986; Giroux, 1989) have to be complemented by an analysis of eman-
cipatory and empowering curricula.
10.2.2 The Epistemological Rather than Social Basis of Knowledge
The insistence in the sociology of knowledge that knowledge is an individual or
coincidental social construct neglects the fact that there are broad areas of shared
experience and concepts which can be used as a basis for communicative action.
Indeed two of the characteristics of the ideal speech situation outlined in figure 6.2
are that it should embody a 'cooperative search for truth' and there should be an
'orientation to a common interest'. There is a limit to the number of ways in which
experience is organized and construed, and such organization does not require the
edict of those in power to determine what those ways shall be, ie knowledge is
an epistemological rather than political construct. The ideal speech situation is
premissed on a recognition of shared assumptions about the methodology - the
procedures - of discourse and debate.
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10.2.3 The Problem of Relativism
Young et al (1971) commit themselves to a relativist position in acknowledg-
ing the social construction of knowledge, by acknowledging the social origins of
knowledge and by indicating that criteria for verification of knowledge are deter-
mined by society rather than epistemologicaily. White (1982) signals the dangers
of this, arguing that in principle it could lead to an 'anything goes' policy (White,
1982, p. 8) where majority will directs educational policy, regardless of whether
that majority will is correct, informed, ignorant or partisan (ie regardless of how
fully Habermas's speech act validity claims of truth, comprehensibility, sincerity
and appropriacy are addressed). Indeed Warnock (1977) suggests that adoption
of the totalist relativists' views would mark the end of teaching as nobody would
have any right over anybody else to set herself up as an expert in any field. In
these circumstances two major features of Habermas's theory come to the fore:
the need to interrogate (a) the dialogue claims of the proponents - their truth,
sincerity, legitimacy and comprehensibility - and (b) the nature of the process of
bureaucratization where limited authority of expertise is not necessarily a barrier
to the exercise of substantive decision making.'85
The first instance (a) is problematical, for it would be possible to be perceived
as being sincere, comprehensible, legitimate and true (depending on the meaning
of this latter term), and yet still to be wrong or ideological - a practice which
obtains in everyday life. This suggests an important weakness in Habermasian
theory - that his criteria for the ideal speech situation are either inadequate or
only spatio-temporally referenced.
185 For cxaiiiple the way in which senior politicians under the regulations of the 1988 Reform Act can
zixake stibstaittive decisions on the content of school curricula without having expctise in the field.
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The second instance (b) is typically the case in parliamentary democracy
organized into bureaucracies. In these circumstances Haberrnas's suggestion that
rational critique and justification ought to be the case - even if it is not currently
the case - serves as a reminder of the need to recognize the distinction between
expertise and political power.
10.3 Reviewing the Sociology of School Knowledge
This chapter has indicated that, whilst traditional curricula and their orga-
nization risk the technical and hermeneutic interest and thereby become socially
reproductive, there are several ways in which communicative action and the eman-
cipatory interest can be served through ideology critique and communicative ac-
tion, ie that Habermas's views can be useful in illuminating an analysis of curricula
and their relationship to the wider society. However, there are limitations to the
utility of Habermas's views here. The work of Young and Bernstein (10.1.1) does
not rely on Habernias's comments on strategic action and the technical interest to
make its point; the comments on according differential access to high status cur-
ricula (10.1.2) do not rely on Habermas's views to give them meaning; Bourdieu's
cultural capital thesis does not rely on Habermas's views to give it meaning, nor
does the discussion of examinations and credentials (10.1.2) or collegiality (10.1.3).
The discussion of the bureaucratization of curricula here (10.1.3) owes more per-
haps to Weber's (1972) analysis of bureaucracy, Durkheim's analysis of 'social
facts' (1938) and 'anomie' (1951), and Marx's (1963) concept of alienation than
it does to Habermas. The notion of overdetermined behaviour (10.2.1) does not
rely on Habermas's views to give it meaning, indeed the work of Aithusser (1972)
might be more applicable here. Further, resistance theories (10.2.1) do not rely on
Habermas's work to give them meaning, indeed one could argue that the signif-
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icance of resistance theories is their celebration of the success of strategic rather
than communicative action. The discussion of areas of shared experience (10.2.2)
does not rely on Habermas's views to be given meaning. Habermas's work might
be seen as consonant with or an interesting adjunct to, rather than central feature
of, the analysis of the sociology of knowledge. What, then is the particular power
of Habermas's views?
Habermas's principles suggest ways in which the issues in the summary above
can. be addressed, viz:
• by exposing technicism and strategic action in schools and curricula and mdi-
cating how these can be transformed into communicative action;
• by exposing the knowledge-constitutive interests at work in curricula;
• by exposing decision making on curricula to ideology critique;
• by exposing perlocutionary purposes and effects in decision making and by
indicating how these can be transformed into illocutionary purposes and ci-
fects through critique, communicative action and the search for a 'warranted
consensus' and rational consensus on issues;
• by exposing the operation of technical and hermeneutic interests in decision
making in schools and curricula and indicating how they can be transformed
into emancipatory interests;
• by identifying areas of curricula where the suppression of generalizable interests
and systematically distorted communication occur and indicating how these can
be addressed through the principles and validity claims of ideal speech;
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• by indicating how the principles and validity claims of the ideal speech situation
can bear on decision-making about schools and curricula;
• by scrutinising the legitimacy claims of decision makers on curricula;
• by indicating how freedoms can be developed through communicative action;
• by indicating how the colonization of the lifeworid by the steering media of
power, law, bureaucratization in schools and curricula and the uncoupling of
lifeworid and system can be avoided by involvement in communicative action
for decision making;
• by indicating how the rationalization of schools and curricula can develop en-
abling rather than constraining bureaucracies through communicative action;
• by indicating where losses of freedom and losses of meaning occur in schools
and curricula and ways of overcoming these;
• by binding together conception and execution;
• by adopting collegiai models of management and leadership.'8°
A further series of implications from Habermasian principles lies in the de-
velopment of the emancipatory interest within bureaucratic settings. The analysis
of schools as bureaucratic settings outlined earlier suggests that the movement to-
wards bureaucratization, whilst being a movement towards 'disenchantment' and
180 Sutytli (1985) echoes this in his list of issues which educationists can address (cf Smyth, l985p.
119): what comits as knowledge; how is such knowledge produced and distributed; what concerns do
different foriiis of knowledge production address; whose interests are in opposition to the dominant
ideology: what knowledge would not be consistent with the dominant ideology; do certain forms
of engaging knowledge help to legitimate one set of interests over and above others; how niight
knowledge he engaged so that alternate forms of knowledge and knowledge production might be
cousidere(l: wlicre ultimately will the teacher and the student stand regarding the interests which
underlie the pursuit of knowledge; given this pursuit of knowledge. what is to bo. done?
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hence towards freedom also risks the loss of democracy through the hierarchically
controlled exercise of power which, Lakomski (1987) argues, is only soluble through
the application of the emancipatory interest.
Using Habermas's principles in this chapter has suggested that schools have
to be examined to expose their freedom-guaranteeing and freedom-constraining
potentials, to outline the channels whereby emancipation can too easily be trans-
formed - or deformed - into constraint, to examine the possible reasons for this
potential deformation, to outline patterns of deformation and patterns of libera-
tion, to examine the practices and principles which appear to be mosLconstraining
on emancipation to see how they can be transformed into empowerment, in short
to map out the terrain of emancipation in situations which might threaten it. This
addresses the aims, content, pedagogy, resourcing, assessment, evaluation, man-
agement, change, development, research into and the planning of the curriculum
- significant features of which will be addressed in the next chapter. It involves
questions of control, strategic and communicative action for collective interests,
debates about values and their protection, freedoms and their practice.
Emancipation and constraint operate at a variety of levels - day-to-day cop-
ing in classrooms (ie interpersonal levels), departmental and school level planning
(ie institutional levels), beyond schools 1evls (eg local, regional, sociocultural,
national). This recognizes that:
school life is not conceptualized as a unitary, monolithic, and iron-clad system
of rules and regulations, but as a cultural terrain characterized by the production of
experiences and subjectivities amid varying degrees of accommodation, contestation,
and resistance. As a form of cultural politics, literacy both illuminates and interro-
gates school life as a place characterized by a plurality of conflicting languages and
struggles, a site where dominant and subordinate cultures collide and where teachers,
students. 1)tre11ts. and school administrators often differ as to how school experiences
and iractices arc to be defined and understood (Giroux, 1989, p. 162). -;
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Habermas suggests that contestation and the formulation of administrative
communication and powers have to be subjected to analysis of the validity claims
which inhere in them - rightness, truthfulness, legitimacy and sincerity. Devel-
oping the emancipatory. interest in the face of structural - bureaucratic - denial
of this involves differentiating between bureaucratic organization and administra-
tive organization - which need not be bureaucratic. In the face of the former
organization theii 'chinks in the armour' of bureaucracy (Giroux, 1983) have to
be exposed187 to enable the emancipatory interest to be exposed and acted upon
communicatively. It is no mere accident of metaphor that this can be described
as a 'freeing-up' process. In the face of the latter then there is a recognition
that non-hierarchical organizations, eg collegial organizations (Bush, 1986), might
be more freedom guaranteeing and democratic but that this will be bought at
a price of increased communication commitment (which could all too easily tip
over into bureaucratization). The emancipatory interest and communicative ac-
tion are served but bounded in bureaucracies, the administrative regularities and
practices of organizations have to be vigilantly interrogated for their emancipatory
and empowering potentials.
The peculiar power of communicative rather than strategic action to effect
empowerment and emancipation is one of Hbermas's. central claims. However,
whilst this chapter has argued where and how this might take place, whether com-
municative action is to take precedence over strategic action is a moot point, for
this chapter has demonstrated the power of strategic rather than communicative
action in using school knowledge to perpetuate the societal status quo. In the
face of such powerful forces and structures in society communicative action seems
187 Cf Girunxs (1983) analysis of the battle against hegemony. 	 - -
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ineffectual; rather it might become more appropriate to use strategic action to
meet strategic action. In this case the communicative turn of Habermas's theo-
ries offers little; rather it is the political and strategic turn that might be more
decisive in bringing emancipation and empowerment through school knowledge.
The same criticisms which were levelled against the utopian optimism of the ideal
speech situation in 6.9 surface here also. Communicative action is ineffectual in
meeting powerful strategic action. In this respect, whilst Habermas's views on
technicism, ideology critique, strategic action, the suppression of generalizable in-
terests, legitimacy claims, bureaucracies and losses of freedom are useful, the power
of communicative action as the prophylactic or panacea remains unproven. Indeed
it might be argued that over-reliance on the power of communicative action in the
ideal speech situation in fact might be disempowering (cf Phillips, 1986, p. 88).
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Chapter XI
HABERMAS AND EMANCIPATORY CURRICULA
11.1 Introduction
Chapter 10 identified how Habermasian principles can inform an understand-
ing of the relationships between curricula and society. This chapter examines how
Habermas's work can inform an understanding of the internal rather than external
aspects of the curriculum. The chapter follows the components of a curriculum
model outlined by Skilbeck (1976a) (see Appendix B):'88
. curriculum design (Skilbeck's 'situational analysis' and 'goal formation') (11.2);
curriculum aims (Skilbeck's 'goal formation') (11.3);
• developing a critical curriculum content (Skilbeck's 'programme building') (11.4);
• developing a critical pedagogy (Skilbeck's 'interpretation and implementation')
(11.5);
. evaluation in emancipatory curricula (Skilteck's 'monitoring, feedback, assess-
mnent') (11.6);
. research and curriculum development (Skilbeck's 'reconstruction') (11.7);
These are used as section headings for this chapter. Habermas's views argue
8 Skilherks iucnlel has been used here as it breaks free from linear, objectives driven models of
currirulitut design (Morrison and R,idley, 1988, PP. 39 - 40), ie strategic forms of communication,
the techuial interest. Skilbeck argues thaL his components do not necessarily have to follow a
given Se(jI('1tCC.
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for a re-invigoration of the curriculum debate, ie as an exercise of communicative
rationality, which not only renders problematic the curriculum but which subjects
it to rational interrogation and indicates its potential for the development of several
forms of rationality (Habermas, 1987a, 1987b) (cf Morrison 1989b).!9
11.2 Curriculum Design
At the level of curriculum design one can observe a rise in interest in Haber-
mas's views by curriculum theorists which has been reflected both in the scope
and frequency with which Habermas's early theory of knowledge-constitutive in-
terests has been used. 19° Grundy (1987) argues that Habermas's three knowledge-
constitutive interests inform three styles of curriculum design:
(a) a rationalist / behaviourist 'curriculum as product' view of the curriculum
revealing the 'technical' knowledge-constitutive interest (eg Tyler, 1949);
(b) a humanistic, interpretive, pragmatic 'curriculum as practice' view of
the curriculum which is identified with Stenhouse's (1975) 'process' approach
to the curriculum and with his Humanities Curriculum Project, embodying the
hermeneutic knowledge-constitutive interest;
(c) an existential, empowering and ideology-critical view of the 'curriculum
as praxis' which can be seen in the work of Freire (1972), Stenhouse (1975; 1983)
and Apple (1979; 1993) and which embodies the emancipatory interest.
These styles provide a neat typology of educational goals and design models
which enable systems of knowledge to be constructed; on the other hand they are
9 T1iis e(11o(s St,eiihouse's (1975) definition of the curriculum as a proposal which is subject to
debate.
190 For 'xaiiii1e Carr and Kemmis, 1986; Grundy, 1987; Young, 1989 . 	 -
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perhaps too conceptually neat, they fail to see the necessary interconnections and
overlaps between what appear to be discrete ideal types.'9'
11.2.1 The Technical Model of the Curriculum
Habermas's technical interest can be seen in the objectives (often behavioural)
model of planning which features in literature from Tyler (1949), Taba (1962)
and. Wheeler (1967). In this model the evidence for learning is demonstrated
in the behaviour of students, evaluation of learning thus becomes assessment of
end behaviour. The curriculum is cast in an instrumentalist view, focusing on
controlling the content and outcomes. In Habermasian terms the curriculum serves
strategic rather than communicative action through prespecification and strong
framing, arguing that the most rational way to plan a curriculum is to decide
first the objectives and then find the most suitable means of achieving those ends
- a means-end model which furthers the 'decisionism' noted in chapter 3.5 as an
example of a technicist mentality which leaves aims unquestioned. The tenets of the
ideal speech situation set out in figure 6.2 - 'freedom to modify a given conceptual
framework'; 'freedom to alter norms'; 'equal opportunity to select and employ
speech acts'; 'recognition of the legitimacy of each subject to participate in the
dialogue as an autonomous and equal partner' - are violated.' 92 Whilst the model
is useful for training purposes and the planning and assessment of behavioural
conpetencies (Pratt, 1994), from an ernancipatory stance it is undesirable as a
complete model of the design process in education for several reasons:
One aii add to this Barrows (1984) proscription of the whole enterprise of modelling the curriculum
at alL LS it reduces complex realities of lived experiences to crudely simplistic abstractions, perhaps
the problem with any theory (including that of Habermas), a view contested by Morrison (1993).
However. Grumidy (1987) is able to use Habermas's theory of kuowledge-constitutive interests to
suimmiarize a history of curriculum design.
192	 j perhaps ironical in Habermasian terms that this model has been termed rational curriculum
plaiimiimig (Sockett. 1976).
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• its bureaucratic stance - devoid of human agency (producing the alienating
effects of colonizing the lifeworid by system imperatives - the steering media of
power and bureaucracy, and negating the importance of motivation in learning),
ie failing to address possible motivational crises (Habermas, 1978a);
• its casting of students in a very passive mode, emphasizing control and un-
derstanding (Habermas's technical and hermeneutic interests) rather than em-
powerment (Habermas's emancipatory interest);
• its reduction of education to the observable (eg to training) (neglecting Haber-
mas's principles of ideal speech which stress open-endedness, reflecting on the
nature of knowledge (see fig. 6.2));
• its neglect of difficult areas to measure or assess, its trivializing of the curricu-
lurn to the easily measurable, ie addressing lower order behaviours and thinking
rather than the higher order thinking which, it was indicated in chapter 6.8,
characterise the ideal speech situation, and indicating a sympathy with the
scientism and positivism criticised by Habermas (1971a, 1972, 1974a);193
• its epistemological incoherence (assuming that learning and behaviour can be
described discretely and taxonomically in a way that separates process and
product), ie demonstrating a sympathy with the scientism and positivism which
Habermas criticised (1971a, 1972, 1974a);
• its neglect of processes of learning and of process epistemology (demonstrating
strategic rather than communicative action, perlocutionary rather than illocu -
tionary teaching, neglecting the need for discussions which figure 6.2 outlined as
193 This also sniacks of the efficiency, quality control model of the industrial metaphors of teaching
suggesw(l by Morrison, 1989b.
	 -
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the principles of the ideal speech situation, viz.: 'freedom to check questionable
claims'; 'freedom to evaluate explanations'; 'freedom to assess justifications';
'equal opportunity to select and employ speech acts'; 'recognition of the le-
gitimacy of each subject to particpate in the dialogue'; 'equal opportunity for
discussion'; 'the consensus resulting from the discussion');
• its uniformity and lack of individuality in prescribing programes (a confusion of
the logical and psychological approaches to learning (Hirst, 1967), addressing
strategic rather than communicative action and elevating rationality factors
over personality factors in education (cf Habermas, 1984));
• its inapplicability to aesthetics (Eisner, 1985), humanities and arts education
(where open-ended forms of experience (Habermas, 1984, 1987a) are essential
if the deleterious effects of rationalization, bureaucratization, scientism and
strategic action are to be avoided);
• its reduction of the complexity of the curriculum to simplistic statements (cf
Barrow, 1984) (echoing Habermas's (1984, 1987a) fear that loss of meaning
leads to loss of freedom and violating the principles of the ideal speech situation
set out in figure 6.2, viz.: 'freedom to evaluate explanations'; 'freedom to modify
a given conceptual framework'; 'equal opportunity for discussion');
• its silence oil values and justification (violating the principles of the ideal speech
situation set out in figure 6.2, viz.: 'freedom to check questionable claims'; 'free-
doin to evaluate explanations'; 'freedom to reflect on the nature of knowledge';
'freedom to assess justifications'; 'freedom to reflect on the nature of political
will'; 'all motives except the cooperative search for truth are excluded');
• its constraining potential on individual empowerment, emancipation and free-
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dom (emphasizing Habermas's technical rather than emancipatory interest and
violating the principle of the ideal speech situation set out in figure 6.2, viz.:
discussion to be free from domination);
It is thus the prototypical bureaucratized curriculum. Habermas's views of
communicative action suggest that the task for emancipatory curriculum planners
and teachers using this model would be to suggest how participatory democracy'94
could be developed in, and through, this style of curriculum design - by teachers,
planners and pupils.
11.2.2 The Hermeneutic Model of the Curriculum
Habermas's hermeneutic interest is exemplified by Stenhouse's (1975) process
curriculum, premissed on deriving processes from content, emphasizing the im-
portance of pedagogical processes and understanding over outcomes. Stenhouse's
example of the Humanities Curriculum Project shows how learning about con -
troversial issues eg war, poverty, race, is best achieved through the appropriate
teaching styles of discussion, debate and the neutral chairperson - ie to embody
the principle that if an issue is in principle debatable then it should be explored
through debate rather than through, for example, transmission teaching. A process
approach describes an 'encounter' which leaves open the outcomes of the encounter.
This is not to deny an objectives approach - indeed Skilbeck (1984a) sees in Sten-
house's model a veiled objectives model - it is to replace behavioural objectives
with process and expressive objectives (Eisner, 1985) in which understanding is
developed through involvement and through practice.
194 McCarthy (1991) questions the extent to which Habermas's views of a participatory democracy
are. iii fact, practicable in large scale adniinistration in advanced capitalism. A measure of repre-
seiitativc democracy, lie suggests, is unavoidable. 	 -
214
A process curriculum is based on Habermas's hermeneutic understanding and
abides by the principles of the ideal speech situation set out in figure 6.2. Be-
cause the outcomes are uncertain a process curriculum is illocutionary rather than
perlocutionary, it serves communicative rather than strategic action. Indeed the
example of Stenhouse's Humanities Curriculum Project specifically identifies the
need for discussion, thereby addressing Habermas's principles of the ideal speech
situation set out in figure 6.2, viz.: 'equal opportunity to select and employ speech
acts'; 'recognition of the legitimacy of each subject to participate in the dialogue as
an autonomous and equal partner'; 'equal opportunity for discussion'; 'discussion
to be free from domination and distorting or deforming influences'; 'the consen-
sus resulting from discussion derives from the force of the better argument alone,
and not from the positional or political power of the participants'. The move to
understanding - making meaning of situations - is a counter to the 'loss of mean-
ing' and thence to 'loss of freedom' which Habermas saw in the rationalization of
society into technicist bureaucracies (Habermas, 1984).
11.2.3 The Emancipatory Model of the Curriculum
Habermas's emancipatory interest is served by rendering the curriculum prob-
leinatical - for example through action research (discussed later), through taking
'type three objectives' (Eisner, 1985) - those objectives which deal with prob-
lems and problem-solving approaches - and through establishing emancipatory
issues in the curriculum (eg cultural literacy programmes as developed by Freire
(1972)) and social studies programmes (eg Anyon, 1981) and emancipatory peda-
gogies (discussed later). As in the hermeneutic interest social issues are explored
illocutionarily rather then perlocutionarily; further, these issues are subjected to
ideology critique to evaluate the legitimacy of the situations which_they describe
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and to establish an agenda for change for generalizable interests to be furthered.
This is exemplified in the case study in chapter 12.
Emancipatory curricula serve student empowerment both in content and pro-
cess, developing participatory democracies, engagement, student voice (Giroux and
McLaren, 1986) and the realization of individual and collective existential futures
in situations approaching an ideal speech situation as set out in figure 6.2, viz.: 'ori-
entation to a common interest ascertained without deception'; 'freedom to modify
a given conceptual framework'; 'freedom to reflect on the nature of knowledge';
'mutual understanding between participants'. Habermas's hermeneutic interest is
a necessary though not sufficient condition for a curriculum which serves the eman-
cipatory interest. Critique and practice combine to articulate a curriculum which
interrogates cultures, lived experiences of power, domination and oppression, ie
which subjects curriculum aims, contents and purposes to communicative enquiry
(eg Habermas's claims of truth, rightness, comprehensibility, sincerity, legitimacy)
and which sets an agenda to promote empowerment (cf Ashcroft, 1987, p. 150).
Hence curriculum planning must take account of agency and structure, life-
world and system. What is being argued for here is the need for curriculum
planning to be a collegial activity in which different interests, values, purposes,
contents are exposed and, true to the ideal speech situation, a 'warranted consen-
sus' reached which results from discussions in which the force of the better argu-
ment takes precedence over the positional or political power of the participants
and where discussion is free from domination (ci figure 6.2). Hence participants
will have the freedom to: 'enter a discourse'; 'check questionable claims'; 'evaluate
explanations'; 'reflect on the nature of knowledge'; 'assess justifications and alter
norms' (fig. 6.2).
However, how realistic or practicable is this suggested openness is an open
question. Habermas is advocating rather than demonstrating the use of commu-
nicative action. Whilst his views articulate with types of curriculum plan the
viability of his suggested method for planning -• through communicative action
- is unproven. The tenets of the ideal speech situation provide a useful set of
criteria for the methodology of reaching agreement on curriculum practices. Aims,
contents and pedagogy are all exposed to ideology critique and a consensus which
is morally defensible in terms of the promotion of generalizable interests is sought
on their outcomes in practice.
11.3 Curriculum Aims
The second element of Skilbeck's model is curriculum aims. Habermas's work
contains several implications for curriculum alms and objectives. His early critiques
of technicism (1971a) and of the technical and hermeneutic knowledge-constitutive
interests (1972, 1974a) argue for the development of the emancipatory interest and
freedoms - individual and collective - through education and the recognition of
the intrinsic rather than instrumental (technical) worth of education.
The proscription of a narrow instrumentalism is reinforced in Habermas's
later work (1979a, 1984, 1987a) where he argues for the elevation of communica-
tive, illocutionary action over strategic, perlocutionary action. Habermas sees in
the development of freedoms the need for education to maximise generalizable in-
terests and to serve the furtherance of equality in society. Figure 6.2 clarified the
nature of the freedoms which were rooted - contrafactually - in the ideal speech
situation - eg. freedom from domination, distorting influences, political will and
strategic action; freedom for the opportunity to enter a discourse, evaluate claims,
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The proscription of a narrow instrumentalism is reinforced in Habermas's
later work (1979a, 1984, 1987a) where he argues for the elevation of communica-
tive, illocutionary action over strategic, perlocutionary action. Habermas sees in
the development of freedoms the need for education to maximise generalizable in-
terests and to serve the furtherance of equality in society. Figure 6.2 clarified the
nature of the freedoms which were rooted - contrafactually - in the ideal speech
situaton - eg. freedom from domination, distorting influences, political will and
strategic action; freedom for the opportunity to enter a discourse, evaluate claims,
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justifications and explanations, reflect on the nature of knowledge, alter norms,
enter discussion, use speech acts. Chapters 6 and 7 outlined how, through the
notion of reconstructive science, Habermas was able to suggest that equality and
democracy should be central aims; these are central purposes of education. Indeed
figure 6.2 implies that education should develop in students the ability to become
part of a participatory democracy. The rejection of a narrowly instrumentalist
education coupled with the need for education to serve democracy, liberty and
equality reinforces the need for citizenship education.195
Habermas's tenets suggest that if freedoms and the emancipatory interest
(individual and collective), equality, democracy (participatory and representative)
and emancipation are to be served then education should aim to develop com-
municative competence in pupils, viz.: the ability to distinguish defensible and
indefensible arguments, to undertake ideology critique, 196 to assess validity claims,
to distinguish between strategic and communicative action, to distinguish between
perlocutions and illocutions, to develop the ability for rational discourse, to distin-
guish between rational and irrational claims and discourses, to clarify 'interests'
and subject these to the arguments of legitimacy, to expose the interests in plural-
ist societies and subject these to ideology critique, to participate in rational dis-
course and enquiry, to develop critical awareness, to develop informed autonomous
thought and action. At the level of aims an empowering curriculum has been seen
to be premised on a socially critical progressivism (Morrison, 1989a) which builds
on the work of Dewey and student-centredness but which additionally interrogates
the socio-cultural context in which it is set.
195 Educatious role in developing citizenship will be discussed more fully in the case study of cross-
curricular issues in the National Curriculum of England and Wales in chapter 12.
196 This is rhoed by Young (1990) in his comment that 'if children do not engage in critique as they
learn. they may not have the courage for critique later' (Young, 1990, p. 481). -
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Habermas's principles of ideal speech argue for a need to develop in pupils
not oniy a measure of autonomy' 97 but the ability to think and act flexibly and
creatively if the 'fusion of horizons' of Habermas's hermeneutic interest are to be
served and if the principle of ideal speech is to be addressed which mentions: 'recog-
nition of each subject to participate in the dialogue as an autonomous and equal
partner' (figure 6.2 sic).' 98 Indeed Habermas (1979a, 1984, 1.987a) regards this
ability to decentre as a significant feature of 'disenchanted' societies,' 99 evidenced
in his discussion of Piaget and Kohlberg. Developing the child's ability to accept
the force of the better argument alone, a characteristic of the ideal speech situation,
recognizes the need for the child both to be able to decentre and to separate the
argument from its proponents.
It was argued in chapter 4 that Habermas's hermeneutic interest was insuf-
ficient to guarantee emancipation - it concerned understanding and acceptance
rather than social and individual transformation. The implications of this for cur-
riculum aims are to suggest that pupils will need to think flexibly and to put this
to some emancipatory purpose, hence will have to develop the abilities to identify,
articulate, suggest solutions to problems and, where possible, put those solutions
into practice. Hence ideology critique sets an agenda for emancipation. 20° This
197 Young (1990) supports 'the self-directed exploratory freedoms Dewey enjoyed. ... The failure to
connect. with the child's schemata may be called "framework failure". When learning emerges from
the child's problematic, this form of failure is far less likely' (Young, 1990, p. 480).
198 
'Calling for openness to experience and pointing to the importance of personal choice and free
expression progressive education negatesJ the traditional emphasis on achieving inner control by
inhil,it.joii anti competence by adult modelling....The progressive educator Iviewsi the school as
a potentittor of creative thinking, self-awareness, and inner strength far in excess of what was
envisaged iii the past' (Zimiles, 1987, p. 204). Zimiles argues that 'classrooms in progressive schools
are seen inure as vehicles for supporting complex initiatives than as shops for the production of
particular outputs (p. 206).
199 This is eehoed by Cagan (1978) where he suggests that a decent and just social order, one allowing
each individual to achieve self-determination and self-actualization, can be built only if individu-
alistic modeLs of social relationships are replaced by more communal or collective ones, (Cagan,
1978. p. 228).
200 Smiiyt.lm (1989d) suggests that this• can be done through a four stage process - describe (what
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accords significance to the addressing of social issues in the curriculum - the de-
velopinent of the 'socially critical school' (Kemmis, 1982b; Morrison, 1989a). It
will involve a critical reading of immediate, local, regional, national, and inter-
national environments and related issues - their power structures, organizations,
dynamics and participant communities.20'
Habermas's views suggest the need to keep together an individually and so-
cially negotiated and socially focussed curriculum, the school and society have to
be kept together as Dewey suggests, although there needs to be a more sharply
critical reading of the society and the relationships of the school, pupils, teachers
and society than Dewey gave in his somewhat bland call for democracy.202
Morrison (1989 a) argues that these requisites provide only a necessary rather
than a sufficient set of emancipatory criteria as one could follow all of these prin-
ciples and still not have an emancipated curriculum or an emancipated child at
the end of it (see also Gleeson, 1978). What is needed is to address not only the
content but the pedagogical aspects of that content (ibid., p. 47), the child's rela-
tionship to that content (Morrison, 1989c), in Giroux's words (1983) to make the
political more pedagogical and the pedagogical more political. In Habermasian
terms there is a need to interrogate and demythologize curriculum content (Fitz-
clarence and Giroux, 1984),203 with teachers working with, and on, the experiences
do I do?): inform - (what does this mean?); confront - (how did I come to be like this?);
reconstruct - (how might I do things differently?) (pp. 5 - 6). These derive directly from
Haberiiiass (1972, PP. 230-1) use of psychoanalysis discussed in chapter 5.2 above - Habermas's
hermeiinntic. positivistic and critical elements (sic).
201 This resoiiatcs with Giroux's (1985) comment that the discourse of lived cultures needs to interro-
gate how people create stories, memories, and narratives that posit a sense of determination and
agency. which, itself, echoes Counts (1932, pp. 9-10).
202 Cf Grevii"s (1986) discussion of the 'small-town paradigm in Dewey's treatment of community'
(Greeu'. 1986. p. 434).
203 Thes' will be hlt,roduced in the case study of the National Curriculum in chapter 12.
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which children bring to school (Hall, 1983, P. 8).
Habermas (1984, 1987a) is concerned to expose the deleterious effects of bu-
reaucratization:
. its colonization of the lifeworid;
. its technicist view of rationality;
. its neglect of agency;
• its separation of conception from execution;
• its neglect of other forms of rationality (eg expressive, artistic, communicative).
This suggests that the curriculum should aim to develop in pupils an under-
standing and critique of steering media in society (eg power, law, money, bureau-
cratization - discussed in education for citizenship in chapter 12). Further, the
curriculum should enable teachers and children to negotiate learning, ie embody
the weak classification and framing (Bernstein, 1971, 1977a) which facilitated the
operation of the ideal speech situation. The development of other forms of ra-
tionality as a counter to the positivistic, technicist, instrumental rationalities for
which Habermas criticises society and bureaucracies can be addressed through
aesthetic-affective and communicative education (Habermas, 1971a, 1984, 1987a);
Habermas's principles argue for a wide core of curriculum 'basics', moving from
conformity and uniformity to a celebration of diversity (cf Greene, 1986, p. 440).
If we take from chapter 7 a main characteristic of bureaucracies being a reliance
on written forms of communication then, whilst this can be seen as a move to
demythologizing education - a 'linguistification of the sacred' (Habermas, 1987a)
it can also be seen as a constraining force in packaged, deskilling curricula (cf
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Carison, 1982; Apple, 1983) which separate conception from execution and which
reduce teachers to technicians and which further Habermas's technical interest.
A multiplicity of styles of education, curricula and pedagogy is required to
meet different children's needs, backgrounds and interests. For some a child-
centred approach is needed, for others a subject-centred, traditional approach is
more appropriate. This directs attention to an issue raised several times, that
the same curriculum (however construed and whatever its philosophy) can be em-
powering or it can be disempowering depending on its relationship to the lived
experiences of the pupils and the pedagogical relationships between teacher, pupil
and curricula. 204 Whichever approaches are chosen several curriculum aims can be
identified:
• the need to develop students' empowerment and freedoms;
• the need to avoid narrowly instrumental curricula;
• the need to develop communicative competence;
• the need to develop the ability for ideology-critique;
• the need for education to promote equality and democracy;
• the need to develop pupil autonomy and cultural power;
• the need for collaborative learning;
• the need to develop aesthetic education and non-instrumental forms of ratio-
nality;
204 This is analogous to the discussion of bureaucratization in chapter seven, where it was argued that
bureaurrarics could both empower and disempower their members. 	 -
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• the need to develop flexibility and problem-solving abilities in children;
• the critical interrogation of steering media and bureaucracies in society and the
proposals of agendas for change;
• the critical interrogation of cultural and environmental contexts in which per-
sonal and community cultural biographies are embedded;
• the need to develop negotiated learning;
• the need to address issues of equal opportunities;
. the development of the socially critical school;
• the need to develop citizenship in participatory democracies;
• the need for political education and the study of politically sensitive issues;
• the development of a wide view of the 'basics' in curricula.205
On the face of it, then, it appears that Habermas's views are fruitful in sug-
gesting curriculum aims. However, the same difficulties that were suggested to
exist with his contribution to a study of the sociology of knowledge apply in this
context also, viz, that the aims which Habermas's views support do not rely on
his views for their educational strength, they are free-standing. Indeed these aims
can be found in curriculum statements from agencies and political parties of all
hues and espousing a diversity of doctrines (eg the National Curriculum, discussed
in chapter 12, which issued from a conservative government with a narrowly in-
strumental agenda). Habermas's views advocate the development of open and
enquiring minds in egalitarian societies; that message is neither exclusively his
205 It will Ia' argued ilL chapter 12 that all of these are addressed in the cross-curricular themes of the
National Curriculum.	 -
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own nor one which is marked by novelty. The peculiar - distinct - contribution
of Habermas's views to a delineation of curriculum aims is not proven.
11.4 Developing Critical Curriculum Content
The third element of Skilbeck's model is curriculum content. This section
outlines the content which a Habermasian emancipatory curriculum might possess.
11.4.1 Areas of Critical Curriculum Content
From the preceding discussion of curriculum aims a range of substantive
themes emerge which can become the subject of ideology critique in curricula:
. media studies (communications and steering media);
• political education;
• citizenship education;
• equal opportunities;
• power and authority;
• education and the community;
• education for industrial and economic awareness (eg the relationship of educa-
tion and labour markets);
• personal and social education;
• aesthetic education.
Applying Habermasian principles (1971a, 1972, 1974a, 1976a) will involve an
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ideology critique of contents in these curriculum areas.2°
11.4.2 Literacy and Emancipation
Habermasian tenets of communicative action argue powerfully- for literacy.
Coupled with the observed higher order cognitive levels of the ideal speech situtation
(6.8) they argue for the need for higher order thinking in developing literacy for
emancipation and in developing communicative action. Habermas's ideal speech
situation, the attainment of which was seen in the preceding section to be an aim
of education, requires a high level of literacy and communication to be developed
in children. It is a central and major implication of his communication theory.
Schools are predicated on language and communication in a variety of media,
through talk, memoranda and documentation, notices, record systems, film, video
and cassette recording, information technology systems, reports and letters etc.207
We require children to spend a disproportionate amount of their time on writing
(but not speaking) - far more than most of them will ever experience beyond
school. In an age of accountability we accord high status to a written product as
'proof' of work. In Habermasian terms children who do not possess communica-
tive competence - ' functional literacy' (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986) - will have
their lifeworids heavily determined by the system, ie their agency will be reduced.
Habermas (1987a) suggests that, through the steering mechanism of communica-
tion, system and lifeworid can be recoupled to enable bureaucracies - of which
schools are one - to empower their members. Hence people who are dispossessed
206 1t will be argued in chap terl2 that these are addressed in the cross-curricular themes of the National
CurrisiLllLItL.
207 Indeed Sallis (1990) argues that communication between participants in education - parents,
teachers. elilldren - is necessary for the future development of schooling, recovering public knowl-
edge of the curriculum - mutual understanding made practical. 	 -
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of functional literacy will sever the connection between lifeworid and system and
thus will have little opportunity to realize their existential futures.208
Habermasian tenets suggest that an analysis of the combination of power and
language should be undertaken. This has a twofold aspect: the 'silencing' (Fine,
1987) and the 'naming' (ibid.) of experience. It refers to the 'structuration' (Gid-
dens, 1980) of assymetries of power which operates in silencing 209 and naming.
Fine (1987, pp. 146-7) argues that silence has to be seen both as the disconfirma-
tion of cultures in school and the unspoken operation of the dominant ideology; in
Habermasian terms silence is used perlocutionarily by the empowered.21°
An ideology critique of the issues of silencing and naming generates questions
such as: 'why are some values, issues, cultures, people silenced and others named
and used in schooling? Whose interests and powers are served or disserved by
silencing and naming (ie which knowledge-constitutive interests are served by si-
lencing and naming) (echoing the issues discussed in chapter 10 on the sociology
of knowledge)? Whom does silencing and naming protect (Fine, 1987, p. 157)?
Whose cultures are affirmed or disconfirmed in schooling (cf Giroux, 1986, p. 57)?
What are the causes and effects of silencing and naming - structurally and in-
terpersonally? What does the silence indicate, eg is it a form of domination or of
resistance (or neither of these)? Who decides on the silencing and naming? How
does silencing and naming serve strategic - perlocutionary - or communicative
illocutionary - purposes? How does schooling function to silence and to name?211
208 Even Willis.s (1977) 'lads' found this ultimately to be their life experience.
209 Arouowitz and Giroux (1986) discuss the 'structured silences that permeate all levels of school and
classroom relations (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986, P. 75).
210 Youiig (1990) writes that 'many classrooms are characterized by communicative relationships which
SUPtSS hffcrciices and exclude the lifeworld of resources of learners' (Young, 1990, p. 476).
211 Young (1990) suggests that '[mjany classrooms are characterized by communicative relationships
whi(:h suppress differences in ontological presuppositions and exclude the life world resources of
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If we deny Habermas's communicative action and ifiocutionary speech acts we de-
prive participants of the opportunity for action oriented to mutual understanding.
This reinforces cultural hegemony.
The obverse of silencing is the issue of naming. A Habermasian analysis
argues that an ideology critique of naming is just as important as of silencing if
empowerment is to be developed (cf Fine, 1987, p. 157): 'naming gives license to
critical conversation about social and economic arrangements, by which students
and their kin suffer disproportionately' (Fine, 1987, p. 160). It is not accidenfal,
perhaps, that a low ability child is named 'dumb'; it may be indicative of ideological
domination and silencing. If a participatory pedagogy is to be encouraged then
dialogue and dialogical relationships are vital. Habermas's ideal speech situation
(figure 6.2) makes clear reference to dialogue, discourse and discussion.
Habermas's views suggest that through an analysis of schools as commu-
nicative settings, silencing and naming, questions of cultural representation and
disconfirmation should be raised and subject to ideology critique. 212 If schools and
curricula are to promote a 'fusion of horizons' in Habermas's hermeneutic interest
then they must examine their silencing and naming practices for their potential
to empower or disempower communicative action (ie their perlocutionary effects)
and the cultural contexts in which such action is embedded (see also Giroux and
McLaren, 1989, p. 199). This will have to examine how power and meaning is
sustained, produced, reproduced and legitimated in classroom relations, and to
locate- the barriers to the transformative potential of language which operate in
leariicrs (Young. 1990, p. 476).
212 Young (1990) suggests that 'Habermas's position here is of obvious relevance for education in a
time of an unprecedented need for intercultural cooperation.... It may also be directly related to
teaching situations where cultural or subcultural differences exist between teachers and learners.
Not so obviously, this position is simply a restatement of the communication situations that should
obtain wherever critical teaching and learning take. plac& (Young, 1990. p. 478)..
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classrooms (even though their origins may lie outside classrooms, eg pupil / teacher
ratios, resource allocation etc). Discourses have to be interrogated and critiqued for
their ideological properties. This then becomes the substance of 'critical literacy'
(Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986, p. 133).213
Clarifying Habermas's view of critical literacy using the tenets of the ideal
speech situation in figure 6.2 (sic) will involve the interrogation of 'the cultural
capital of the oppressed in order to learn from it; [how] it functions to confirm
rather than disconfirm the presence and voices of the oppressed institutions that
are generally alienating and hostile to them' (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986, p. 133).
Language becomes a site of contestation 214 as content and medium of struggle for
meaning, representation and 'readings of the world' (Giroux, 1989, p. 131):
Language intersects with power in the way particular linguistic forms structure
and legitimate the ideologies of specific groups. Language is intimately related to
power. atid it constitutes the way in which teachers and students define, mediate,
and uiiderstaiid their relations to each other and the larger society (ibid., p. 135).
Hence, using Habermasian tenets suggests that curriculum content must ex-
amine the school voice(s), student voice(s) and teacher voice(s) to see their agree-
ments, commonalities of interest, histories and biographies, defences, contestations,
struggles for power, meaning and emancipatory potentials. The work of Freire in
developing a critical cultural literacy amongst oppressed Brazilian groups is a clear
example of this, for he sees emancipation as not only requiring 'functional literacy'
(Aronowitz, 1988) but utilizing that literacy to develop empowerment; critique and
emancipation, content and process go together as in the psychoanalytic analogy
213 As a ilarr,Lt.ive for agency and as a referent fQr critique, literacy provides an essential precondition
for orgL1iizing and understanding the socially constructed nature of subjectivity and experience and
for assessing how knowledge, power, and social practice can be collectively forged in the service of
making kcisions instrumental to a democratic society rather than merely consenting to the wishes
of the ridi aiid powerful' (Giroux, 1989, p. 155).
214 Taylor (1993). commenting on the work of Freire, argues that writing is fundamentally iconoclastic
(Taylor. 1993. p. 146).	 -
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outlined by Habermas. Indeed Freire's Método Paulo Freire (see Appendix C) ar-
ticulates with the terminology of Habermas's ideal speech situation in its frequent
references to dialogue (cf fig. 6.2).
A further example of Habermasian ideology critique in school curricula is in
textual analysis (cf Giroux, 1989, pp. 138 - 9). Here the ideological messages of
texts are deconstructed, both in looking at the structured silences and the nam-
ings in the text. Hence school texts are rendered problematical215 as non-neutral
constructions of meaning and value. Giroux (1987) argues that analysis of texts
and curriculum materials is important because it provides the basis for students
to analyze critically the forms of intelligibility, interests, and moral and political
considerations that different voices embody (Giroux, 1987, p. 179), echoing the
validity claims of comprehensibility, sincerity, truth and legitimacy respectively
required in Habermas's communicative speech acts.
The problematical aspects of school texts can be extended to Records of
Achievement (ROAs) as an exercise in communication. ROAs have emancipatory
potential in that they putatively accord power to students and student voice, ie
they have the potential to develop communicative action:
in f lie moves towards negotiated ROAs where power should pass evenly between
pupils and teachers, where ownership of the record and its release resides with pupils,
when' bottom-up innovation' is seen to begin with the child rather than the teacher,
aiid whre achievements other than in the academic sphere are recorded, the 'liege-
nionic acadeniic curriculum' cait be broken through the equahising or neutralizing of
power dilfrrentials (Morrison. 1990b, p. 199).
The references to the equalization of power relations articulates clearly with
those tenets of the ideal speech situation (fig. 6.2) which stress the need for: 'free-
dom to modify a given conceptual framework'; 'freedom to alter norms'; 'equal
21& Cf the texts which Anyon's (1980) study found to be in use in social studies curr4cula.
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opportunity to select and employ speech acts'; 'recognition of the legitimacy of
each subject to participate in the dialogue as an autonomous and equal partner';
'equal opportunity for discussion'; 'discussion to be free from domination' (sic).
The credibility of this claim is questionable (Pole, 1993), however, for Hargreaves'
(1989) belief in ROAs as 'freeing' the curriculum from its academic hegemony is
perhaps optimistic in an era of a nationally prescribed curriculum in England and
Wales. Rather, ROAs can become the instruments of 'panoptics' and 'constant
surveillance' - 'interrogation without end' (ibid., p. 137) - of increasing assess-
ment and measurement - the disciplinary procedures of society (Foucault, 1977;
Gibson, 1986), ie of covert strategic action. 216 Hence whilst an ROA has consider-
able emancipatory potential it can also be the bearer of yet more bureaucracy as
the written companion to teaching, ie it can be constraining rather than liberating,
it can be 'incorporated' and 'accommodated' by the dominant ideology (Shapiro,
1984) and become yet another form of ideological domination - the technical in-
terest and strategic action - rather than become an instrument of freedom - the
emancipatory interest and communicative action.
11.4.3 A Summary of Critical Curriculum Content
The position set out so far is that, far from being a merely technical exercise,
education has to be recast as an emancipator; activity in which active democratic
principles are utilized to develop an egalitarian society. The end point of this
argument is a redefinition of citizenship which sees it not as the reproduction of
ascribed roles in mechanical solidarity but as the ongoing dialectical debate be-
216 Hargravs it'glects the possibility or significance of resistance in his treatment of ROAs, giving
it, only rllrsory coverage where he discusses their potential to secure the conformity of potential
deviants hi a system which remains unchanged or unchallenged and as a way out of the legitimation
aiid iuutivatiou crises to which Habermas (1976a) alludes. 	 -
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tween agency and structure in which the voices of participants are heard, listened
to and acted upon by all groups in society (cf Giroux, 1989, P. 5). Citizenship
recognizes plurality with equal rights and freedoms for all which moves towards
the ideal speech situation. Citizenship then has a necessary creative rather than
reproductive dimension to it (cf Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986, p. 20). It becomes a
'voicing' rather than 'silencing' experience both in form and content (Fine, 1987).
Citizenship is a communicative enterprise which builds solidarity through dialogue
and discourse (cf Giroux, 1989, p. 6). Citizenship is developed through argu-
ment and critique - be it ideology critique, political critique, economic critique
or sociocultural critique. The citizenship-developing functions of education, then,
address systemic inequality with a view to replacing it with empowered pupils and
communities (cf Giroux, 1989, ch. 1).217
The achievement of a critical democracy engages a struggle for meaning, voice,
rights, freedoms and emancipation. This entails three factors (ci Giroux, 1989): (a)
the acceptance of the rights of all groups to participate in educational discourse,
redolent of Habermas's ideal speech situation, (b) the need to link pedagogical
practices in school to the wider society - eg encouraging democratic behaviours
in school as a preparation for democratic behaviour in the wider society, (c) the
need for educators to link to other progressive social groups outside school and in
the wider community in order to create affiances and solidarity for radical reform
and radical democracy (Giroux, 1989, pp. 109 - 110) . 218 Thus schools become sites
217 Giroux (1989. PP. 28 - 33) sets out four criteria for a reworked view of citizenship: a rejection of the
ahistoriea.l. transcendent notion of truth or authority - struggle is here and now; a politicization
of mterp'rsonal relations where appropriate to increase solidarity in a radical pluralism; a casting
of citiz'iiship in a language of critique and possibility; a redefinition of schools as public spheres
whcr' iigageiueiit. and democracy can be cultivated in a struggle for 'radical democratic society'
( p. 32). Ethics, democracy, politics and schooling conjoin to resist the view of citizenship held by
the N'w Iligirt.. See also Giroux, 1989, p. 177.
218 It will bt' sc''ii in chapter 12 how this is. approached in the cross-curricular theine-.of the National
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where democratic principles can be built (cf Giroux, 1989, p. 185), eg through the
analysis of validity claims, through the pursuit of the ideal speech situation, and
through the recoupling of lifeworld and system in a bureaucracy.
When one reviews the discussion of curriculum content the same issue that
was raised in the discussions of the sociology of knowledge and curriculum aims
earlier re-appears here, viz, that these items are free-standing, they do not rely on
Habermas's views to give them significance in discussions of curriculum content.
Indeed that it would be difficult to argue against the inclusion of these items is
attested by the attention given to them by parties across the political spectrum.
Habermas's views, however, do suggest that greater status should be given to
hitherto low status areas of the curriculum, eg citizenship education, personal and
social education, media studies, aesthetic education. In this latter respect it could
be argued that Habermas is advocating areas of content that, strategically rather
than communicatively, will serve freedoms, empowerment and equality, ie that
he is acting ideologically. As was observed in the discussion of the sociology of
knowledge, it appears that strategic action might, in fact, be more fruitful than
communicative action in achieving the normative agenda of Critical Theory set
out in chapter 2.3.
11.5 Critical Pedagogy
The fourth element of Skilbeck's model is pedagogy. The need to address the
contextualization of curriculum content points to the . role of pedagogy. Consid-
erable significance is accorded to pedagogy as this is both premissed on the im-
portance of interactionism (echoing Habermas's middle and later works (eg 1979
Currliitliuia of Eiiglaud. and Wales.
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onwards)) and on its role in the critical mediation of curriculum content (prescribed
or negotiated) with pupils. 219
 Pedagogy requires communication, it is inoperable
without it; that locates it firmly within Habermas's concerns for communicative
action. Pedagogy situates and contextualizes content. A critical pedagogy is that
which renders problematical and which develops an ideology critique of the se-
lection and decision making on curriculum aims, design, content, teaching style,
learning style, evaluation and development, with the intention of moving from
the suppression of generalizable interests and inequality to liberty, equality, social
justice and fraternity, in short to individual and collective emancipation through
communicative action. Clearly these features are not confined to Habermas (dis-
cussed later). Eight principles of pedagogy from a Habermasian perspective can
be outlined which flow from his views of knowledge-constitutive interests, the ideal
speech situation and his view that communicative action can recouple lifeworid and
system and break down the negative aspects of bureaucratization.
Principle 1: the need for cooperative and collaborative work, deriving from
the elements of the ideal speech situation which mention 'a common interest'; 'mu-
tual understanding between participants'; 'equal opportunity to select and employ
speech acts'; 'participation in the dialogue as equal partners' (fig. 6.2 q.v.). This
echoes the need identified in chapter 6.8 for the higher order requirements of the
ideal speech situation to be socially transmitted:
('v4'ry function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the
social lev(l. aiid later, on the individual level; first, between people (interpsychologi-
cal). and tlteii inside the child's logical memory, and to the formation of concepts. All
the higher order functions originate as actual relations between human individuals
(Vygotsky. 1978. p. 57).
The reach of cooperative work extends to teachers, children, mixed ability
219 Gore (1993 argues that it is in pedagogy primarily that emancipatory curricula and emancipatory
iuoiii(iits li(.	 -
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teaching, team teaching and flexible learning arrangements. Children learn about
democracy by engaging in democratic processes (Harwood, 1985; Palansky, 1987).
This has educational support from a line of educationists from Neill to Zimiles
(1987) who comments that
the ciihaiiced empowerment of children from progressive schools in the previ-
ous generatioli seemed to be derived from their greater sense of competence, from
their auoiiomous learning experiences and from the reassurance they gained from a
iiurtuiaiit. and supportive learning environment (Zimiles, 1987, p. 215).
In this context Zimiles shows how children brought up on progressive edu-
cation were able to engage far weightier moral issues - punishment, goodness,
wrongdoing - than children brought up in more traditional surroundings; they
appeared able to decentre (echoing Habermas's (1979a, 1984) appeal to the work
of Piaget and Kohlberg) and articulate their perceptions from a much earlier age
than their peers.
Principle 2: the need for discussion based work, which, again, enables the
higher order elements of the ideal speech situation to be experienced in a social con-
text, deriving from the elements of the ideal speech situation which mention: (i)
freedom to enter a discourse; freedom to check questionable claims, evaluate expla-
nations, modify a given conceptual framework, assess justifications, alter norms,
select and employ speech acts, participate in a dialogue and discussion; (II) the
need to establish a 'warranted consensus' (Brown, 1985) for truth claims, to ad-
dress the validity claims of truth, appropriacy, sincerity and comprehensibility;
to develop the ability for ideology critique; (iii) naming, reflection and action to
further the notion of ideal speech as action oriented to mutual understanding and
'the cooperative search for truth' (see fig. 6.2);
Principle 3: the need for autonomous,- experiential and flexibl& learning in
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order to be able to: (i) decentre and to abide by the 'force of the better argument
alone' in the 'cooperative search for truth' - principles of the ideal speech situation
(fig. 6.2 sic); (ii) develop hermeneutic understanding of others' views (the 'fusion of
horizons' in Habermas's hermeneutic interest); (iii) develop higher arder thinking
- required for the operation of the ideal speech situation; (iv) break free of Haber-
mas's technical interest; (v) develop communicative action rather than strategic
action (ie illocutionary rather than perlocutionary abilities); (vi) recognise com-
plex realities and the pupils' own interpretation of these; (vii) defend a 'warranted
consensus'; (viii) abide by the principles of weak 'classification' and 'framing' from
chapter 10; (ix) learn about democracies by behaving democratically (cf Dewey,
1916, 1943); (x) recognise the legitimacy of each subject to participate in the
dialogue as an autonomous and equal partner (fig. 6.2 q.v.);
Principle 4: the need for negotiated learning to facilitate the principles of the
ideal speech situation which indicate freedom to: enter a discourse; check claims;
evaluate explanations; modify frameworks; reflect on the nature of knowledge;
allow commands and prohibitions to enter discourse; assess justifications; alter
norms; select and employ speech acts (fig. 6.2 q.v.); learn democratic principles;
develop communicative competence; overcome the technical interest and strategic
action by communicative action; 22° overcome, possible motivational crises (Haber-
mas, 1976a) through cooperative planning; address the weak classification and
framing deemed important in chapter 10;
Principle 5: the need for community-related learning in order that children
° Young (1989) criticizes curricula which are based on the technical interest in his comment that the
const.jtiit.joii of the curriculum in this [technicist] way blocks the development of creative learning,
confining tin' classroom to a technocratically managed recapitulation of predecided content. It also
supports a iiiauipnlative pedagogy in which children are treated as educational objects rather than
subjects' (Youiig. 1989, p. 57).
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can understand and interrogate a range of environments (cf Dewey, 1916; Counts,
1932) so that the relationships of agency, lifeworid and system can be explored; to
render learning meaningful so that the loss of meaning leading to loss of freedom
(Habermas, 1984, 1987a) can be avoided; to examine critically the political, social
and cultural determinants of their own life situations (echoing Habermas's (1972,
1974a) argument in his psychoanalytic analogy that participants - patients -
need to understand their situations and the causes of their situations before they
can begin to alter and improve them):
a critical educator can demonstrate his / her moral courage through a content
that gives real meaning to ethical action while allowing students to read, debate, and
aligii themselves with moral discourses brought to bear on the issues that become a
legitimate object of discussion. Although a teacher cannot demand a student not to be
a racist. lie / she can certainly subject such a position to a critique that reveals it as an
act of political and moral irresponsibility related to wider social and historical social
practices. This can be done in the spirit of debate and analysis, one that provides
the pedagogical conditions for students to learn how to theorize, while affirming and
interrogatmg the voices through which students speak, learn, and struggle (Giroux,
1089. i>. 67).
This lengthy quotation show clear links between Habermasian principles and
critical pedagogy - the notions of ideology critique, legitimation, agency and
structure, reconstructed meanings as a grounding for emancipatory action, method-
ology as critique, and the politics of participation. This resonates with Simon's
(1987) view that pedagogy is about content, form, process, teaching and learning
style and 'the cultural politics such practices support' (Simon, 1987, p. 371) and
with Aronowitz's and Giroux's (1986) argument for relevance to 'students' lives by
curricula becoming more practical without succumbing to the anti-intellectualism
of vocational education' (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986, p. 58).
McLareii (1989) suggests the need to encourage students to 'to try to identify
those forms of power and control that operate in their own lives' (McLaren, (1989)
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p. 133) (see Appendix D for an example of Smyth's approach to this issue).22'
Simon (1987) argues that 'a pedagogy of empowerment' (p. 372) should be cast
in the language of possibility, equality, fairness, equal opportunity, differentiation
and transformation (pp. .372 - 4), several features of the ideal speechsituation (fig.
6.2 q.v.). To do this, he suggests, entails. (a) engaging the cultural resources of
students and developing beyond these, and (b) preserving a clear view of a just and
desired society (p. 375), again embracing the features of the ideal speech situation.
Principle 6: the need for problem-solving activities (if, as discussed in the
preceding section, the emancipatory interest - application of knowledge and set-
ting agendas for change - is to build on hermeneutic knowledge, if communicative
competence is to be developed (cf Habermas's (1972, 1974a) psychoanalytic anal-
ogy discussed in chapter 5), and if empowerment is to be developed) (cf Dewey,
1933). This develops the higher order elements of the ideal speech situation men-
tioned in figure 6.2. Giroux (1989) provides a lengthy but important definition of
empowerment as:
the process whereby students acquire the means to critically appropriate knowl-
edge exit.iiig outside their immediate experience in order to broaden their under-
standiiig of theniselves, the world, and the possibilities for transforming the taken-
for-granted assumptions about the way we live .... In this sense, empowerment is
gained from knowledge and social relations that dignify one's own history, language,
and cultural traditions. But empowerment means more than self-confirmation. It
also refers to the process by which students are able to interrogate and selectively
appropriate those aspects of the dominant culture that will provide them with the
basis for (lefluing and reinforcing, rather than merely serving, the wider social order
(Giroux. 1089. p. 189).
Principle 7: the need to increase pupils' rights to employ talk, not only
because the social aspects of communicative action enable the higher order thinking
221 Bowers (1991) criticizes McLaren here for his 'highly charged and ideologically laden language'
(Bowers. 1991. p. 242) which results in a 'messianic rhetorical style that lacks specificity and a
sensitivity to the limitations of the political process' (Bowers, 1991 p. 24). Context specificity, as
was argued at thc start of the chapter, is not only crucial for interrogating content but for engaging
critical pedagogy.	 -
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of the ideal speech situation to be developed (cf Vygotsky's view that all higher
order cognitive functions are socially transmitted (Vygotsky, 1978)) but because
this develops communicative competence and equality (Habermas, 1970b, 1979a).
Within classrooms issues of power are played out routinely. Edwards (1980)
shows that talk in classrooms reinforces asymmetries of power: '[t] he teacher tells
the child when to talk, what to talk about, when to stop talking, and how well
they have talked' (Edwards, 1980, P. 241). Classroom talk here is essentially a
closing rather than an opening, enquiring activity. Young (1989) reinforces this in
his comment that the question-answer-question-answer pattern of teaching is sub-
stantially perlocutionary rather than illocutionary - strategic and instrumental
rather than communicative:222
Only those speech acts which are illocutionary but not perlocutionary.. .can
characterize the form of action we would want to call 'educational' rather than 'in-
doctriiiatory (Young, 1989, p. 107).
Young (1992) also comments on the high incidence of closed and pseudo ques-
tions which teachers use to maintain their control of the classroom talk, and the
dearth of higher order questions, ie those questions which promote the higher order
capacities of the ideal speech situation, (fig. 6.2 q.v.). He indicates that teachers
not only build in student silences but, when silences occur, teachers answer their
own questions (Young, 1992, p. 113). Kincheloe (1991) suggests that teachers
'must avoid monopolization of classroom conversations in order to encourage stu-
dent talk - talk which reveals their idiom and their consciousness' (Kincheloe,
1991, p. 22). Critical pedagogy here, then, is the medium by which curriculum
222 See also Yomigs (1992) comments that 'what is at stake is the ownership of the direction of the
lcssoii (Young. 1992, p. 121). Young (1990), however, makes the point that indoctrination concerns
rnteutious. aiid that strategic action may not necessarily be unjustifiable 'in the overall process of
education of the young provided that views acquired in this way may eventually be subject to
rationni (uqniry (Young, 1990, p. 480). See also Young (1992, p. 59).
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content is contextualized and the means by which student voice can be developed;
Principle 8: the need for teachers to act as 'transformative intellectuals',
promoting ideology critique, addressing the need for the emancipatory interest to
transform constraint into empowerment, individual and collective (cf Habermas's
analogy of psychoanalysis (1972, 1974a) in chapter 5), to enable agency and the life-
world to be recoupled, to enable communicative action to override strategic action,
addressing the principles of the ideal speech situation which argue for freedom to:
modify frameworks; alter norms; select and employ speech acts; to enable validity
claims of truth, sincerity, appropriacy and comprehensibility to be addressed (fig.
6.2 q.v.). In this respect teachers are akin to the psychoanalysts of Habermas's
earlier writings (1972, 1974a).
The teacher has to transform the everyday experiences which pupils bring to
school into a dynamic critique of their life situations. Teachers act as 'transforma-
tive intellectuals' which Aronowitz and Giroux (1986) define as:
intellectuals who are part of a specific class and / or movement and who serve
to give it an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the
social and political fields (ibid., p. 135).
Teachers become both scholars and activists in the community (Aronowitz and
Giroux, 1986, p. 160) . 223 Transformative intellectuals work on the experiences that
children bring to school, interrogate them critically, interrogate curricula so that
223 Giroux (1989) gives his definition a contestual strain where he states that transformative intel-
lectuals are those who exercise 'forms of intellectual and pedagogical practice that attempt to
insert teacliiiig and learning directly into the political sphere by arguing that schooling represents
a struggle for meaning and a struggle over power relations...articulating emancipatory practices
and working towards their realization. Teachers who assume the role of transformative intellectu-
als treat students as critical agents, question how knowledge is produced and distributed, utilize
dialogue. and make knowledge meaningful, critical, and ultimately emancipatory' (Giroux, 1989,
p. 174 - 5). One cali see that transformative intellectuals, engaged in critique, are the antithesis
of Mauuljeiiits (1936) 'socially unattached inteffigentsia' in their involvement with struggle and in
the recognitioli that the intellectual life is not merely contemplative but political and dynamic, and
that there is no single elite of intellectuals; intellectuals exist in all walks of life...._
239
children's life experiences are transformed into critical awareness and empower-
ment, a parallel to Habermas's analogy of Freudian psychoanalysis. Teachers will
interrogate dominant cultures and engage pupils in developing forms of ideology
critique and participatory democracy. In this respect teachers are both bearers and
developers of the expressive phrase 'dangerous memory' (Giroux, 1989, p. 99).
The operation of the transformative intellectual dictates not only a content
but a pedagogical form and process which is reminiscent of the weak classification
and framing of Bernstein (1971). It represents the shifting of responsibility away
from solely the teacher-as-transmitter to a negotiated and interrogative curriculum
shared between teachers, pupils and community.
These eight features of a Habermasian critical pedagogy are utilised in the
case study in chapter 12. Pedagogy, as the means of working on critical curriculum
content, parallels the high order thinking set out in the ideal speech situation -
checking claims, evaluating explanations and legitimacy, reflecting on proposals
and powers, modifying frameworks, assessing justifications and altering norms.
These point to the need to develop critical faculties in children and for teachers to
cultivate these faculties whilst working on critical curriculum content. 224 The eight
pedagogical principles which are derived from Habermas's ideal speech .situation are
not exclusive to Habermas. As with the aim and content which one can derive
from his work, they do not rely on Habermas for .their educational support. Indeed,
as with the discussion of aims and content, nor are they exclusive to one political
faction but find general support.
It is becoming clear that Habermas's principles of communicative action,
224 Much of I1ie preceding discussion has drawn on the work of Giroux. A critique of Giroux's work
can be found in Appendix E.
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premised on the ideal speech situation, are becoming redundant in suggesting new
prescriptions for the curriculum. They are contributing nothing new. This echoes
the criticism levelled against the ideal speech situation in 6.9, that it is redundant in
bringing about emancipation, being too removed from everyday life io be of value
and, in reality, being platitudinous. It appears, then, that though Habermas's
work can support certain curriculum aims, content and pedagogical principles the
significance of his contribution is not great. It is interesting, if unremarkable for
its novelty or exclusive contribution.
11.6 Evaluation in Emancipatory Curricula
The fifth element of Skilbeck's model is evaluation. Habermas's work on
ideology critique (1971a, 1972, 1974a), speech act theory (1979a, 1984, 1987a)
and communicative action which embodies the ideal speech situation (1979a, 1984,
1987a) suggest five principles for evaluation methodology:
Principle 1: it should be a participatory and collective activity, serving those
principles of the ideal speech situation which mention: (i) 'a common interest'; (ii)
'freedom to: enter a discourse, check questionable claims, evaluate explanations,
assess justifications, select and employ speech acts'; (iii) 'recognise the legitimacy of
each subject to participate in the dialogue'; (i.v) 'equal opportunity for discussion';
(v) 'the cooperative search for truth' (fig. 6.2 q.v.);
Principle 2: it should be democratic, serving the principles of the ideal speech
situation which mention: (i) 'orientation to a common interest'; (ii) 'freedom to
enter a discourse, engage in discussion, reflect on the nature of political will, employ
speech acts' (iii) 'recognition of the legitimacy of each subject to participate in
the dialogue as an autonomous and equal partner'; (iv) discussion to.be free from
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domination; (v) 'the consensus resulting from discussion derives from the force of
the better argument alone, and not from the the positional or political power of
the participants' (fig. 6.2 q.v.); (vi) exposing interests and engaging in ideology
critique of legitimacy of interests;
Principle 3: it should be a debate rather than be closed, serving the principles
of the ideal speech situation which mention: (i) freedom to: evaluate explanations,
assess justifications, check questionable claims, enter a discourse; (ii) the motiva-
tion to the cooperative search for truth; (iii) the consensus resulting from discus-
sion derives from the force of the better argument alone (fig. 6.2 q.v.); (iv) validity
claims should be checked for their truth, sincerity, appropriacy, comprehensibility;
(v) a rational, warranted consensus should be sought; process is as important as
outcome (employing the principles of ideal speech);
Principle 4: it should be formative, serving the principles of the ideal speech
situation which mention: (i) freedom to: modify a given conceptual framework,
alter norms; (ii) the cooperative search for truth (fig. 6.2 q.v.);
Principle 5: ii should be emancipator'y and demonstrate communicative ac-
tion, enabling collective egalitarian interests to be served (Habermas's emancipa-
tory interest and arguments against instrumentalism (strategic action));
These five principles find voice in Kemmis's (1982a) definition of curriculum
evaluation as
the lroeess of marshalling information and arguments which enable interested
in(hvi(hIIa1 and groups to participate in the critical debate about a specific programme
(Kemniis. 1982a. p. 118).
His references to process, arguments, 'enable interested individuals and groups'
and participate echo the Habermasian principles outlined above. Hab.ermas's work
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suggests an approach to evaluation and meta-evaluation which bears several hall-
marks. Its declared concern for accepting the interpretive categories of participants
(cf Carr and Kemmis, 1986, p. 129) in communicative action suggests a case study
approach to evaluation which captures the idiography, reflexive biogiphy and au-
tobiography of schools and teachers. Such an approach will draw on qualitative
data, rejecting the 'positivist notions of rationality, objectivity and truth' (ibid.,
p. 129) which Habermas criticised in his work (1971a, 1972, 1974a, 1988) and
explore multiple perspectives and multiple ideologies, giving equal concern to all
participants in the enterprise. Principles (i) to (iv) above are methodological whilst
principle (v) is substantive and will be discussed separately (11.6.2).
11.6.1 Methodological issues
Habermasian principles 1 - 3 above suggest that evaluation has to be demo-
cratic (MacDonald, 1976). A stakeholder approach to evaluation enables Haber-
mas's communicative action to take place (ci Weiss, 1986, p. 284) , 225 as it argues
that those who make decisions about a program and all whose lives are affected
by the program and its evaluation should be party to that evaluation.
The elements of the stakeholder approach are clearly defined by Weiss (1986)
in terms of five criteria. Firstly there is a recognition that a program will affect
many groups who may have divergent and maybe incompatible concerns (echoing
the need to seek Habermas's rational consensus in communicative rather than
strategic action). The second feature suggests that an evaluation realizes, and
225 The stak1iolder approach is an attempt to counter the criticisms made of many evaluations for
beiug: iiarrow (focusing on what is easy to evaluate or measure rather than what may be edu-
catiottally sigiiificaut) (ibid., pp. 145-6); unrealistic (holding 'programs to standards of success
unpossible to attain') (House. 1986, P. 143); irrelevant (not meeting the needs of the people in-
volved in the program) (Weiss, 1986, pp. 146-7); unfair (wherein the powerless are held accountable
to the powerful) (House, 1986, p. 143); unused (that they rarely achieve any impact on the future
developinvitt or implementation of a program) (Weiss, 1986, p. 147).
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maybe legitimates, a diversity of interests at play in the program world (echoing
Habermas's principle of ideal speech which recognises the legitimacy of each subject
to participate in the dialogue as an autonomous and equal partner (cf fig. 6.2)).
The evaluation, thirdly, will thus have to recognize the multiple perspectives that
these interests bring to judgement and understanding, seeking a rational 'common
interest' and serving action oriented to mutual understanding (fig. 6.2 q.v.). The
fourth and fifth features are necessary implications of the preceding points - that
evaluations will have to be part of everyday life rather than being a remote and
largely useless activity, and that they will have to be context-specific. One major
implication of this is that power and control is no longer the monopoly of program
sponsors who can operate strategically. The stakeholder concept:
('lifrauchises a diverse array of groups, each of which is to have a voice in the
planning and conduct of studies. Local as well as national concerns are to be ad-
dressed. Issues specific to individual sites and generic issues common across sites
receive attention (Weiss, 1986, p. 154).
Moving to a stakeholder approach sets the ground for Habermas's notion
of ideology critique, it provides the platform on which critical evaluation can be
built. The equalizing of participation by stakeholders (in Habermas's terms, those
involved in a speech situation), serving the principles of the ideal speech situation,
however, can be problematical.22°
Democratic evaluation as described so far has been criticized for being po-
litically conservative. Lakomski (1983), for example, argues that in treating all
participants as equals democratic evaluation ignores differences of power in deci-
sion making about a program, and hence serves to reproduce rather than alter the
societal status quo. This violates the principles of the ideal speech situation which
220 Witness MacDonald's five year arguments with the sponsors of the National Development program
in Coiiipitt.er Assisted Learning, see Appendix F.	 -
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emphasize: the legitimacy of each subject to participate in the dialogue as an au-
tonomous and equal partner, discussion to be free from domination, the consensus
resulting from discussion derives from the force of the better argument alone and
not from the positional or political power of the participants (fig. 6.2 q.v.). Rather
the voices of the socially less advantaged or the disempowered must be presented
as it were unequally if power differentials are to be minimised (Lakomski, 1983).
This, involves addressing the question of what impact the distribution of power will
have on an evaluation (Simons, 1987). Indeed Simons cogently puts the case for
recasting democratic evaluation 'as a moral activity based on a critique of domina-
tion' (ibid., p. 83). The introduction of democratic evaluation into the service of
'critical evaluation' sharpens the political impact of democratic evaluation and its
commitment to equalizing power relations, echoing Habermas's ideal speech situ-
ation. Addressing Habermasian notions of ideology critique exposes the interests,
vested interests and conflicting interests of stakeholders, to ask 'whose interests is
this program serving?'227
With regard to principle 4 above - evaluation should be formative - Haber-
masian tenets suggest that an objectives-based, summative evaluation serves the
technical interest - strategic action - as participants have linfited or no powers to
control the agenda. Rather, a formative evaluation enables participants to have a
'voice' (see the preceding section on pedagogy) and to serve the participatory mod-
els of evaluation for which the ideal speech situation argues. Formative evaluation
enables communicative action to be addressed; the next stage of a program being
open to debate, rather than being pre-determined, demonstrates how a formative
evaluation is illocutionary rather than perlocutionary.
227 Weiss (1989) argues that evaluation is 'a means of unpacking latent commitments' (p. 128).
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The implications of Habermas's principles suggest additional roles for the
evaluator - to actually awaken issues (eg of legitimation, participation, strategic
action), to sow seeds in participants' minds which may not have been identified
automatically by those participants. This could be seen as running cunter to the
accepted role of evaluators as disinterested individuals (Kemmis, 1982a, p. 135)
who are impartially performing a service both to the sponsors and participants
neutrally; evaluators' own views and agendas should not enter the evaluation for
fear of introducing strategic action into the evaluation.
However, one can suggest that the call for neutrality in the evaluator is itself
ideologically saturated with laissez-faire values which allow the status quo to be
reproduced or altered. The call for neutraiity and disintereduess is just as value
laden as is a call for evaluators to intrude their own perspectives and to kindle
awareness in participants' minds of distortion, manipulation, oppression and frus-
tration which hitherto had been assigned to the unconscious or subconscious (cf
Habermas, 1974a). In practice this role of the evaluator as an awakener of issues
need not threaten traditional impartiality, for if the evaluator's is but one perspec-
tive in a field of multiple perspectives, if the intention of evaluation is to judge
value and to prescribe as well as to diagnose, assess and appraise, then perhaps
one of the tasks of the evaluator is to expose concerns which might otherwise go
unvoiced, just as the therapist helps to expose issues in Habermas's analogy of psy-
choanalysis (1974a). The rights of the evaluator to move beyond disinterestedness
are clearly contentious, raising the question of the legitimacy and the expertise of
the evaluator in the areas under discussion, requiring the evaluator to become a
critical connoisseur - a connoisseur (Eisner, 1985) who serves ideology critique.228
228	 this siise Eisnerian notions of connoisseurship support the hernieneutic interest whilst 'critical
coniioisseursliip can support emancipation. 	 -
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The safeguard for stakeholders against the intrusion of the agenda of the eval-
uator is that in the end the 'community of self interest' (Kemmis (1982a, p. 125)
may override the interpretation which that evaluation puts on a program. This
echoes Habermas's principles of the ideal speech situation which emphasize a 'com-
mon interest', 'the cooperative search for truth' and the rights of all stakeholders
to be treated as equal participants (fig. 6.2 sic.). This might become a nightmare
for critical evaluators who see a program operating against a community's self
interests, ie that the community is saturated with false consciousness:
it is the spectre of a society where social control is so total and so effective that
members can be prevented from even forming desires which cannot be easily satisfied,
a society of happy slaves, genuinely content with their chains (Geuss, 1981, p. 84).
11.6.2 Substantive issues
With reference to principle 5 above Habermas's views argue for the need
to reveal to participants in a program the constraints - ideological, managerial,
structural, institutional or psychological - which are operating on them, in the
belief that such enlightenment can become emancipatory (Habermas, 1972; Gib-
son, 1986). It seeks to reveal structures over which participants have limited or no
control and which can frustrate intentions - hence it places Habermas's steering
medium of power at its heart. This harks back to Habermas's use of the psychoan-
alytic analogy in chapter 5, where emancipation proceeds from an understanding of
the suppression of generalizable interests. Individuals who are aware of constraints
on' them are better able to exercise their own agency, to identify the means by
which to exercise agency.229
 However this has to be taken with Geuss's (1981)
229 Carr and Kemuiis (1986) allude to this clearly in their comment that evaluation 'is aimed at reveal-
iiig to individuals how their beliefs and attitudes may be ideological illusions that help to preserve
a social order which is alien to their collective experience and needs (pp. 138 - 9). This is also
the csseuc' of Adorno's (1973) 'negative dialectics', where evaluation reveals people's possibilities,
potentials. existential futures and the distance of these from present life situations. It also Un-
247
p
caution that simply seeing ideological processes at work will not necessarily lead
to their dissolution:
repl•es.sive social institutions will be kept in existence not merely by a kind of
social iiirtia but because they foster and promote the real and perceived interests of
some particular social group; that group will have every reason to resist theabolition
of the institution (Geuss, 1981, p. 73).
The effect of evaluation here then might be to promote frustration rather than
to reduce it.
Habermas's views suggest a considerable substantive agenda for evaluations:
• to evaluate both facts and values, ie to redress the shortcomings of scientism,
technicism and positivism which Habermas outlined in 1971a, 1972 and 1974a
(see chapter 3 of this thesis);
• to articulate power differentials in program selection and pedagogy, ie to ad-
dress Habermas's knowledge-constitutive interests at work in programs, to iden-
tify ways in which the ideal speech situation is being supported or violated in
programs, to identify the operation of the steering medium of power in programs
(and its furtherance of strategic action), to identify how bureaucratization (and
the separation of conception from execution) support or violate communicative
action and colonize the lifeworid of participants;
• to expose ideological distortion in individuals and groups over the aims, content,
pedagogy and evaluation of programs, ie to identify Habermas's suppression of
generalizable interests and the operation of systematically distorted communi-
cation, the violation of the principle of ideal speech which mentions 'orientation
to a common interest ascertained without deception' (fig. 6.2 q.v.) and the
denies Haberiiia.ss view that self-understanding and understanding of constraints and ideological
distortions of social life lead to their overcoming (Habermas, 1974a).	 -
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extent to which the validity claims of truth, sincerity, appropriacy and com-
prehensibility have been met in curriculum content;
• to expose areas of the planning process over which individuals and groups have
limited or 110 control, and to identify the nature and legitimacy of the control, to
identify strategic - perlocutionary - action which is serving the technical in-
terest, and to suggest how agency can be asserted and emancipation developed,
addressil1g the principles of the ideal speech situation which include freedom to:
enter a discourse, check questionable claims; modify a given conceptual frame-
work, alter norms, allow commands or prohibitions to enter discourse when
they can no longer be taken for granted, select and employ speech acts (fig. 6.2
q.v.);
• to expose inequalities in program planning, content and implementation, be
they of race, gender, class, age, size or other factors, ie to expose the suppression
of yer&eralizable interests;
• to chart the potential in programs for participants' development of autonomy,
responsibility, creativity, social and moral development, and interaction ori-
ented to mutual understanding, ie to identify how a program addresses the
ideal speech situation, aesthetic-expressive rationality (Habermas, 1984, 1987a,
1987b) and the agency of participants;
• to identify issues and areas of conflict, resistance, opposition over program con-
tent, organization, pedagogy and evaluation, ie to indicate areas where corn-
municative enquiry (and its implications for communicative competence) are
required, where a rational consensus has to be reached and where the partici-
patory aspects of the ideal speech situation need to be addressedj
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• to demonstrate in whose interests the program content and pedagogy is operat-
ing and how this links to society at large, ie to subject the program to ideology
critique and examination for the operation of the technical interest and the
suppression of generalizable interests;
• to examine the potential of the program to promote reflection, self-reflection
and critical thinking, ie to identify the potential for communicative action and
the espousal of the principle of ideal speech which mentions freedom to: reflect
on the nature of knowledge and political will, evaluate explanations and assess
justifications, search for truth cooperatively;
. to chart the potential of the program for participatory, experiential and active
learning, addressing the aspects of the ideal speech situation which emphasise
freedom to: enter a discourse, check and evaluate claims, justifications and
norms, reflect on the nature of knowledge, select and employ speech acts, par-
ticipate in dialogue (fig. 6.2 q.v.);
• to chart the extent to which teachers act as 'transformative intellectuals' and
the nature of that operation, addressing Habermas's emancipatory interest,
using his analogy (1972, 1974a) of the therapist psychoanalytically empower-
ing the patient to overcome suppressed possibilities and constraints, enabling
communicative action to take precedence over strategic action;
• to chart how teachers work on, as well as work with, the experiences that
children bring to their schools (Hall, 1983, p. 8).
The setting of substantive issues in critical evaluation does not preclude the
possibility for democratic evaluation and democratically derived issues and foci for
evaluation raised by participants as defined earlier, indeed it requiis it. It opens
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up possibilities for lines of evaluative enquiry rather than forecloses them. It has a
revealing rather than a limiting function. That evaluation should be a liberating,
emancipating exercise is a major claim which derives from Habermasian princi-
ples, empowering participants to articulate and move towards the zealization, in
practice, of their existential futures. Whether the notion of a critical evaluation
is acceptable to those who advocate objectivity and disinterestedness in an eval-
uation is a major point of contention. Whether evaluators should have their own
agendas lies at the heart of this issue. Habermas's work runs into difficulties in
setting a substantive agenda for, by so doing, this appears to support strategic
rather than communicative action. This repeats the concerns raised in the dis-
cussion earlier of the sociology of knowledge and of curriculum aims and content,
that, in fact, strategic action to bring about empowerment might be more effective
than communicative action.
It is in the substantive areas of recommendation that Habermas's views have
a novel contribution to make. However in the remainder of the issues suggested, or
supported, by Habermas's views - the stakeholder approach, democratic evalua-
tion, formative evaluations, the need to evaluate values, the need for debate, the
need to empower participants - a familiar picture is rehearsed wherein Haber-
mas's views support and give rise to important issues but these issues do not rely
on his work for their existence, they have an existence which is independent of
him. Hence the power of the ideal speech situation to effect emancipation is not
proven; emancipatory methodologies can look to Habermas's work for support but
not for sole justification. His contribution is unoriginal.
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11.7 Research and Curriculum Development
Implicit in the curriculum model (Skilbeck, 1976a) which has been used to
structure the analysis in this chapter is the view that curricula may have to change
if they are to become empowering and emancipatory. The argument has indicated
how this change might be effected. Habermasian tenets suggest five principles to
underpin research and curriculum change and development:
Principle 1: it should be cooperative and collaborative, deriving from the
principles of the ideal speech situation which include: 'orientation to a common in-
terest'; action oriented to mutual understanding; 'the cooperative search for truth';
'recognition of the legitimacy of each subject to participate in the dialogue as an
autonomous and equal partner'; 'equal opportunity to select and employ speech
acts' (fig. 6.2 q.v.);
Principle 2: it should adopt a problem-solving approach, addressing Haber-
mas's emancipatory interest which transforms hermeneutic understanding into
communicative action and building on Habermas's (1972, 1974a) psychoanalytic
analogy discussed in chapter 5, ie applying knowledge and setting agendas for ac-
tion; addressing the principle of the ideal speech situation which states that 'all
motives except the cooperative search for truth are excluded' (fig. 6.2 q.v.);
Principle 3: it should be non-bureaucratic, conception and execution should
be kept together, ie control should be in the hands of all stakeholders, it should
enable individual and group agency to be exercised, addressing the principles of
the ideal spcech situation which emphasize freedom to: enter a discourse, check
claims, evaluate explanations and justifications, alter norms, modify frameworks,
select and employ speech acts, cooperatively search for truth, not ..be swayed by
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the positional or political power of participants. It also enables the colonization
of the lifeworld to be avoided - where the steering medium of power intrudes
illegitimately into the lifeworid of participants - and enables agency, lifeworid
and system to be recoupled through communicative action rather than strategic
- perlocutionary, 'top-down' - action;
Principle 4: it should be emancipatory, empowering all the stakeholders to
participate in an egalitarian society, realising their own existential futures, serving
freedom from: unwarranted constraint or strategic action, the illegitimate exer-
cise of power, the suppression of generalizable interests, systematically distorted
communication; and freedom to: enter a discourse, modify frameworks, select and
employ speech acts, reach a 'common interest' through a warranted consensus,
which serve the ideal speech situation (fig. 6.2 q.v.), and serving ideology critique
(Habermas, 1972, 1974a);
Principle 5: ii should avoid exclusive reliance on positivist methodologies,
echoing Habermas's critique of scientism, positivism and technicism (1971a, 1972,
1974a) - see chapter 3230 - and arguing for action research as reflective and
transformative enquiry.
These five principles are all served in action research and reflective practice (cf
Kemmis, 1982b; Carr and Kemmis, 1986; Grundy, 1987; Kincheloe, 1991; Prawat,
1991) and the notion of the 'reflective practitioner'. Action research and reflec-
tive practice are participatory and democratic. They are rooted in the problems
identified by practitioners (Kemmis and McTaggart, 1983; Hopkins, 1985, 1989)
230 Cf Carrs aiid Kciiimis's (1986) comment that 'educational theory must reject positivist notions
of ratioiialit.y. objectivity and truth' (p. 129) and Kincheloe's (1991) argument against the ueo-
positivisiii of traditional research: 'Such a perspective has attempted to measure ambiguous edu-
catioiial proossc's by focussing only on quantified educational outcomes. The resulting ideological
nmocc,itc • supports the power relation of the status quo' (Kincheloe, 1991, p. 95)...
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and adopt a problem-solving, 'bottom-up' (ie non-hierarchical) model of change
(Havelock, 1973). Grundy argues that action research and reflective practice are
unavoidable features of a critical pedagogy because they (a) confront the real
problems of experience, (b) involve processes of conscientization, (c) confront ide-
ological distortion, and (d) incorporate action as part of knowing (Grundy, 1987,
pp. 156 - 7). They aim to improve practice, understanding of practice and the
situation in which practice occurs and to do this through involving participants at
all stages. Action research and reflective practice move beyond traditional indus-
trial research-and-development (Havelock, 1973) models of the curriculum change
and development process which, in Habermas's terms (1971a, 1972, 1974a) are
technicist.23'
By building in reflection and development based on reconstruction, action
research and reflective practice are analogous to the psychoanalytic emancipatory
process outlined by Habermas (1972, 1974a), and echoes his concern that research
in the social sciences should be interpretive and interactional (Habermas, 1988, p.
95) and that action research and reflective practice are legitimate forms of research
(1972; 1984; 1987a).
Habermas's knowledge-constitutive interests are parallelled in Gore's (1993)
typology of action research which she takes from Van Manan (1977): the technical,
the practical and the critical (Gore, 1993, p. 141). Kincheloe (1991), too, indicates
a three-level view of action research by the critically constructivist teacher: ievel 1,
puzzle-solving research; level 2, self-monitoring reflective research; level 3, critical
constructivist research' (Kincheloe, 1991, p. 122). He indicates that level 3 is
Cf Girouxs (1989) discussion of the separation of conception and execution in curriculum design
(pp. 180 . 1) and Apple's (1983) castigation of pre-packaged curricula. 	 -
254
the highest level.232 Kincheloe, echoing Habermas's views of ideology critique,
indicates that the critical, constructivist action researcher will identify oppression,
suppression, power relations, ideological forces and domination.233
One has to guard against overstating the case for action research and reflective
practice as political and emancipatory action as they tend to limit the analysis to
single teachers or small groups. Instead of interpreting 'political praxis' in a wider
sphere there is an optimism in action research and reflective practice that macro
political emancipation will follow from the micro political emancipation of teachers
(and perhajs children). Whether this reflects the reality of the limited powers of
teachers is an open question. One can be as emancipatory as one likes in classrooms
but this can leave the wider society untouched by emancipation; wider society,
characterized by a movement towards bureaucratization, is not easily affected by
small scale changes, it can incorporate them. Hence whilst action research and
reflective practice can inject meaning into situations which have moved towards
a loss of meaning ('Sinnverlust, through bureaucratization, a feature identified
by Habermas (1984, 1987a), and whilst they can be immensely motivating and
meaningful to participants, their potential to upset the total order is limited. That
is a matter of knowledge utilization and its links to the political agendas of decision
makers (Anderson and Biddle, 1991).
Similarly one has to guard against too optimistic a Habermasian view of re-
flective practice. Appendix (G) contrasts Habermas's and Dewey's approach to re-
232 He is uiieqiuvocal hi his view that 'no emancipatory system can be contemplated outside of the
Frankfurt ScliooFs formulation of critical theory' (Kincheloe, 1991, P. 35).
233 He argues that i t lo become critical constructivist action researchers we must take at least one
step beyond phdnomenology; we must question the power relations, the ideological forces which
shape that, framework' (Kincheloe, 1991, p. 148). He suggests that 'research...must be subjected to
ideological aiialysis (ibid., p. 171) and that in this enterprise 'no aspect of schooling is ideologically
innocent (ibid.. p. 172)..	 -
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fiective practice, arguing that, in many respects, Dewey's approach might be more
empowering than Habermas's as Habermas's agenda is too narrow and his method-
ology - of ideology critique - too limiting and utopian (q.v.). The same is true
for the other forms of research leading to curriculum change which. Habermasian
principles inform - the use of biographical and autobiographical reconstructions
of experience (cf Pinar, 1975), again operating in the psychoanalytically analogous
mode from Habermas. 234 The question to be asked is about the extent to which
individual emancipation can serve social emancipation. It can be argued that these
methods constitute necessary but not sufficient conditions for the development of
empowering curricula.
If qualitative action research and reflective practice are to take place which are
to link to macro-policy making then these concern not the style of research but the
links between researchers and policy makers (Norris, 1990; Anderson and Biddle,
1991). That is another question which Habermasian theory does not explore in
detail (pace Habermas, 1971a).
Though Habermas's work can be seen to support specific types of research,
as before, these areas do not rely on Habermas's work for their justification or
derivation. In the case of principle 4 above - research should be emancipatory -
this can be seen as setting a new agenda, though, by so doing, it meets the problem
which was set out for Habermas's contribution to the sociology of knowledge,
curriculum content and evaluation, viz, that it supports strategic rather than
communicative action, it is perlocutionary rather than illocutionary.
234 For cxaiiiple. Britzinan (1986) argues that 'in the case of student teachers, uncovering biography
can dulpuw'r students through a greater participation in their own process of becoming a teacher'
(p. 452). Gruiidy (1987) cites several examples of empowerment through critical autobiography.
Similarly Greeiie (1986) sees the value of biography and autobiography as essential in recovering
humanity iii a dehumanized and dehumanizing world (p. 440).	 -
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11.8 Summary and Conclusion
One of the overwhelming problems of curriculum theory is that it embraces a
very wide field of vision and that it therefore has an eclectic view of ielevant con-
cepts and issues. Putting some structure into such eclecticism is difficult, indeed
modelling the curriculum may be too simplistic (Barrow, 1984). The discussion
in this chapter has brought structure to the analysis by using the elements of
Skilbeck's (1976a) model of the curriculum. Habermas's work is summarized in
relation to these elements in figures 11.1 to 11.6. Figure 11.1 sets out the organiza-
tion for the remainder of the figures, laying out Habermas's knowledge-constitutive
interests from chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis and then indicating how these can
be used to inform the curriculum elements discussed in this chapter. As has been
shown through this chapter these three interests are touchstones of the analysis
of the curriculum components; the chapter has also established links between the
technical interest and strategic action and between the emancipatory interest and
communicative action. The sequence of figures (11.1 to 11.6) deliberately follows
the sequence of this thesis: figure 11.1 draws on chapters 2 and 3, figure 11.2
draws on chapters 4 to 7 in order, figures 11.3 to 11.6 follow the sequence of chap-
ter 11. This sequence also parallels the development of Habermas's work: figure
11.1 draws on his earliest work (1971a, 19723 1974a), figure 11.2 adds to this his
use of psychoanalysis (1972, 1974a), figures 11.3 to 11.5 apply this work to the
curriculum, figure 11.6 applies his later work on methodology (1988). The tables
follow the sequence in which curriculum elements have been addressed through
this chapter, viz.:
(a) knowledge-constitutive bases of the curriculum (and their views of science,
their foci of enquiry, their views of the role of values in discussion.), taken from
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chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis (fig. 11.1);
(b) contexts of the curriculum debate (epistemological, psychological, socio-
logical and political), drawing together chapter 4 (epistemology), chapter 5 (psy-
chology), chapter 6 and chapter 7 (sociological and political) (fig. 11.2);
(c) curriculum aims, design, development and organization (chapter 11.2, 11.3
and 11.4) (fig. 11.3);
(d) pedagogical aspects of the curriculum (chapter 11.5) (fig. 11.4);
(e) evaluation in the curriculum (chapter 11.6) (fig. 11.5);
(f) methodologies for researching and developing the curriculum (chapter
1L7) (fig. 11.6).
The tables draw together the very many theoretical debates which occupy
curriculum theory and which have been raised in this chapter. Boundaries overlap
and are permeable, the terms used are generalized and capable of interpretations
which might locate them in another column. The categories should be regarded
as emphases rather than as discrete, for to do this latter would be to misrepresent
the complexit,r of the reality they are attempting to model. The tables have to be
seen as setting out the terms for an enquiry into and critique of curricula. They
set an agenda rather than describe an outcome. The tables are deliberately silent
on specific curriculum content, as the argument earlier has suggested that whilst
some examples of curriculum context (eg PSE, literacy, Environmental Education,
Media Education, Political Education, Citizenship Education, Education about
Economic Issues) may have more emancipatory potential than others because of
the issues they treat, nevertheless the curriculum is not of an 'either / or' type,
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Figure 11.1 - Knowledge-constitutive Bases of the Curriculum
KNOWLEDGE-CONSTITUTIVE INTERESTS
____________________ Empirical-analytical Hermeneutic 	 Critical
Knowledge-constitutive 	 Technical	 Practical	 Ideology
Interest	 critique
Interest	 Prediction	 Understanding	 Critique
and control
Purpose / Outcome	 Control	 Consensus	 Emancipation
Scientific	 Natural Science	 Hermeneutic Reconstructive
Basis of
	
Science	 Science
Knowledge________________ ___________ ___________
View of
	
Total (scientism)	 One of
	
Reconstructive
Natural	 many sciences	 sciences
Science
Focus of
	
Work and	 Language and Power and
Enquiry	 instrumental	 interaction	 domination
action	 communicative
action
View of	 Value-free	 Linking of
	 Critique of
the Role	 (separation	 fact and value:	 values:
of Value	 of fact	 understanding	 whose
and value)	 and	 values and
interpretation	 interests are
of facts	 being served
and values
Acceptance	 Judgement	 Critical
judgcineiit
where it either will or will not guarantee emancipation.
The argument has been advanced that whether a curriculum is eniancipatory
depends on how the context and content are approached, taught and learned. In
an elnancipatory curriculum the pedagogy is as important as the cojitent, just as
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Figure 11.2 - Contexts of the Curriculum Debate
CONTEXTS OF THE CURRICULUM
______________ Empirical-analytical Hermeneutic 	 Critical
Epistemological 	 Positivistic	 Hermeneutic	 Critically
Contexts	 and instrumental	 accounts	 reconstructed
accounts	 accounts
__________________	 Objective	 Interpersonal	 Dialectical
Technical knowledge	 Technical and	 Communicative,
	
and rationality	 hermeneutic	 Aesthetic-
knowledge and
	
expressive and
rationality	 emancipatory
knowledge
	
Psychological	 Behaviourist	 Cognitivist	 Constructivist
Contexts	 (eg Skinner)	 (eg Piaget,	 (eg Kelly, Freud,
___________________ ________________________ 	 Gestaltists)	 Piaget)
Political	 Bureaucratic,	 All stakeholders	 Collective,
Contexts -	 hierarchical	 through consensus	 Participatory
	
Curriculum	 and centrally
Control	 administered	 Status achieved	 Shared
in a meritocracy	 responsibility
	
Sociocultural	 Ahistorical	 Historical and	 Historical,
Contexts	 biographical	 sociological
ideological
Social reproduction Social reproduction Social production
and production and transformation
in the psychoanalytic analogy the process of reconstruction and auscultation is
as important as the outcome. In an emancipatory curriculum all the significant
aspects are debatable, contestable and open to scrutiny. The danger of the tab-
ulation in figures 11.1 - 11.6 is that, by its pigeon-holing of the items of debate
it too succumbs to the bureaucratization which, to serve Habermasian interests,
it should resist. Hence the figures should not only be subject to critique by cur-
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Figure 11.3 - Curriculum Design, Development and Organization
CURRICULUM DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT & ORGANIZATION
_____________ Empirical-analytical Hermeneutic 	 Critical
Aims of the	 Reproductive	 Productive and Reconstructive,
Curriculum	 Reproductive	 revolutionary,
ernancipatory
Subject based	 Integrated	 Flexible and
authentic
Knowledge-centred	 Person-centred Person and society
centred
Product	 Process	 Praxis
Transmission	 Interpretation	 Change
Separation of	 Integration of	 Integration of
subject and	 subject and	 subject and
________________	 object	 object	 object
Objectives for	 Behavioural	 Expressive	 Problem-solving
Curriculum	 objectives	 objectives	 objectives
Design__________________ _____________ _______________
View of
	
Prespecified	 Hermeneutically	 Personally and
Curriculum	 packages and kits	 generated	 collectively
Content	 (teacher-proof)	 understandings	 developed
riculum planners but could be used to identify touchstones or key emphases of
the curriculum. For example, using the tables to analyze curricula might indi-
cate that they were more 'hermeneutic' than 'emancipatory', more deterministic
than interactive, more strategic than communicative, more per1ocionary than
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Figure 11.4 - Pedagogical Aspects of the Curriculum
VIEWS OF PEDAGOGY
______________ Empirical-analytical Hermeneutic - Critical
View of	 Determined and	 Phenomenological	 Existential,
Interactions	 behaviourist	 and interpretive	 critical
Formal	 Heterogenous	 Heterogenous
View of	 Emotion-free	 Sentient and	 Repressed
People____________________ imaginative 	 _____________
View of the	 Technician,	 Facilitator	 Catalyst,
Teacher	 expert, instructor,	 Instructor	 therapist
trainer, transmitter 	 transformative
intellectual
View of	 Didactic,	 Engagement,	 Negotiated
Teaching	 controlled	 controlled	 rationally,
open-ended
student-centred
View of	 Obedience,	 Application,	 Autonomous
Learning	 passivity,	 experiential	 action for
conformity,	 individual and
	
________________	 uniformity	 collective good
	
________________	 Acceptance	 Understanding	 Critique
View of	 Strategic,	 Strategic and	 Communicative
Action and	 perlocutionary	 communicative,	 illocutionary
	
Communication	 perlocutionary
in Pedagogy	 and illocutionary ____________
View of
	 Rigid,	 Integrated	 Negotiated
	
Teaching Time
	 differentiated	 and flexible	 and open
and Space
View of
	 Tests of outcomes	 Process and	 Self-
Assessment	 product oriented	 assessments
Standardized	 Descriptive	 Negotiated
illocutionary, more bureaucratized and hierarchical than collegially r-n, more bu-
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Figure 11.5 - Evaluation in the Curriculum
EVALUATIVE CONTEXTS
_______________ Empirical-analytical Hermeneutic 	 Critical
	
View of	 Industrial model	 Connoisseurship	 Stakeholder
Evaluation	 Bureaucratic	 Bureaucratic and Democratic and
Democratic	 autocratic
	
Style of
	 Objectives-driven	 Process-driven Problem-driven
Evaluation
	
Social /
	
Reproductive	 Existential	 Critical
Personal
Effects of
Evaluation
Who	 Outsider	 Participants'	 Self-
	
Evaluates	 evaluation	 self-evaluations	 reflection
	
Style of	 Norm-referenced	 Criterion-	 Criterion-
Evaluation as	 referenced	 developing
Assessment	 -
	
Type of	 Summative	 Formative	 Emancipatory
Evaluation	 and summative and formative
	
Validity	 Truth of	 Sincerity and	 Authenticity
	
Claims in
	
assertion	 comprehensibility 	 and legit-
Evaluation	 of the subject	 imacy of the
__________________ _______________________ __________________	 subject
	
View of	 Strategic,	 - Strategic and Communicative,
Action and	 perlocutionary	 communicative,	 illocutionary
Communication	 perlocutionary
in Evaluation	 and illocutionary
reaucratic than democratic etc.. The key terms of the tables could be used as
criteria for discussion by teachers, learners and curriculum planners. The tables
are a mixture of description, prescription and contention.
The recasting of schools .as communication settings which striv..for the ideal
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Figure 11.6 - Researching and Developing the Curriculum
METHODOLOGY FOR RESEARCHING
AND DEVELOPING THE CURRICULUM -
____________ Empirical-analytical Hermeneutic 	 Critical
Methodology	 Positivistic and	 Phenomenological, Critical and
for	 assessment driven	 deliberative,	 dialogical
Researching	 interactive,	 seif-reflec-
the Curri-	 biographical,	 tion on
culum	 autobiographical 	 domination
and unfree
existence;
Collective
and
participatory;
Ideology
critique and
action research
Model of	 R, D and D	 Social	 Problem-
Curriculum	 interaction	 solving
Development	 Reflecting the	 Understanding	 Transforming
	
status quo	 the status quo	 the status quo
____________	 Top-down	 Involved	 Negotiated
Some Key
	
Tyler (1949)	 Eisner (1985)	 Giroux (1983)
Curriculum	 Taba (1962)	 Reid (1978)	 Freire (1970)
Documents	 Wheeler (1967)
	
Carr and
	
NCC (1987)	 Kemmis (1986)
Aronowitz and
Giroux (1986)
Apple (1993)
Gore (1993)
speech situation becomes a matter for the organization of curricula and pedagog-
ical relationships of participants. It. involves vigilant attention to s.ysternatically
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distorted communication in the school. Hence the form, content and process of
schooling and of the curriculum are all capable of being subjected to Habermasian
ideology critique.
However, the individual and collective freedom of egalitarianisin is complex,
subtle and involves an examination of potentially contradictory issues. For example
Ellsworth (1989) shows that when:
participtiits in our class attempted to put into practice prescriptions offered
in the literature concerning empowerment, student voice, and dialogue, we produced
results that were not only unhelpful, but actually exacerbated the very conditions we
were trying to work against, including Eurocentrism, racism, sexism, classism and
bauking e(lucation (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 298).
This was due to the perceived oppressive need to force critical discourses to be
implemented and thereby to silence diversity 'in the name of 'liberatory' pedagogy'
(p. 299), to disempower some students' voices in the interests of democracy and
empowerment, to support the rationalistic premises of critical pedagogy when it
was seen to perpetuate domination, and to confine critical pedagogy to student
empowerment which left intact 'the authoritarian nature of the teacher / student
relationship' (p. 306). In this respect Ellsworth provokes a significant attack on
empowerment of students as traditionally and simplistically perceived:
Euipowerment' is a key concept in this approach, which treats the symptoms
but leaves the disease unnamed and untouched,.. .in a classroom in which 'empow-
eruient is iiiade dependent on rationalism, those perspectives that would question
the politiral interests (sexism, racism, colonialism, for example) expressed and guar-
anteed by rationalism would be rejected as 'irrational' (biased, partial) (Ellsworth,
1989. p.300).
Commitment to rational discussion is not enough to ensure the eradication of
classism, racism, sexism etc.; other forms of action might be necessary. Similarly
making the teacher more like the student by 'redefining' the teacher as learner of
the students' reality and knowledge (ibid., p. 306) (Habermas's 'fusion of hori-
265
zons') leaves the superiority of the teacher's understanding unproblematicized and
untheorized (p. 307). Further, 'ernancipatory authority' implies that teachers
know better than students about the objectives of study (p. 308), which in many
cases is patently untrue. A white, middle class male may have less .knowledge or
understanding of certain aspects of racism, sexism and classism than a black, work-
ing class woman. Ellworth's paper is unsettling for it moves beyond the slogans of
critical pedagogy to an examination of the multilayered complexity of developing
student voice, participation and empowerment.
This chapter has complemented the preceding chapter by focussing on the
curricular rather than societal implications of a Habermasian account of schooling.
Both chapters have provided support for the suggestion articulated in chapter 9—
that Habermasian tenets, although flawed (as evidenced in the earlier parts of this
thesis), do have a contribution to make to a commentary on curricula. However this
chapter has argued that the significance of that contribution is unclear. Though
Habermas's views can provide a commentary on curriculum matters it is uncertain
whether that conunentary extends our understanding of the issues. His views are
necessarily though trivially true. The issues which derived from Habermas's views
were seen not to rely on them for their substance or justification; they existed
independently of his work, ie correlating these issues with Habermas's work did
not ascribe the power of causality to his work. Where it was clear that Habermas's
views did make an original contribution (eg in a substantive principle of evaluation)
it was argued that the principle was problematical and that it demonstrated an
affinity with strategic rather than communicative action. Indeed this latter point
has been observed throughout these preceding two chapters, that Haberma.s's views
in practice appear to support strategic rather than. communicative aetion. This is
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unsurprising, perhaps, as it was argued in 2.3 that Critical Theory as a whole is
prescriptive, it has a definite agenda of equality, autonomy, collective freedoms and
social democracy. The analysis in these two chapters leads to the view, then, that
Critical Theory is itself ideological and thereby cannot help but support strategic
action.
It is overwhelmingly the case that it cannot be demonstrated that Habermas's
views have an exclusive contribution to make to the spheres outlined in the pre-
ceding two chapters. Indeed it was argued that the work of (a) Young, Bernstein,
Bourdieu and Weber in the field of the sociology of school knowledge, (b) Grundy
and Stenhouse in the field of curriculum modelling, (c) Morrison in the field of
curriculum aims, (d) Aronowitz, Giroux, Freire and Fine in the field of curriculum
content, (e) Zimiles, Palansky, Bloom, Giroux, Freire, Dewey, Young, Vygotsky
and Bernstein in the field of pedagogy, (f) Weiss, House, MacDonald, Lakomski
and Kemmis in the field of curriculum evaluation, (f) Carr and Kemmis, Kinche-
be, Prawat and Dewey in the field of curriculum research and development, may
have more to offer thaii Habermas in these various fields. However, one should not
be too hasty in dismissing his views, for it may be that inappropriate fields have
been chosen or unrealistic expectations held of the power of his work. What might
be his peculiar contribution to the curriculum field? 1-labermas is concerned to set
an agenda for emancipation in which ideology critique, the ideal speech situation
and communicative action are the processes and the outcomes. These focus on
(a) dynamics of situations and (b) suggested areas for communicative action to
work upon (curriculum aims, content, pedagogy, evaluation and research). The
discussion in the preceding two chapters has not focussed on (a) apart from stat-
ing the need for rational enquiry which addresses the procedural principles of the
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ideal speech situation. Here it has been argued that strategic action might be more
empowering than communicative action as strategic action engages lived reality.
Whether this is the case is an empirical matter. With reference to (b) the two
chapters have indicated where and how communicative emancipatory potential
might be realized; again whether this is effected in practice is an empirical matter.
Both (a) and (b) are premissed on the need to investigate the use of language in
context, speech acts and their effects as they are actually transacted and the need
to investigate strategic and communicative action in practice; this study has not
done this so far. The next chapter - the case study - provides an example and
test case of how these might be approached.
Despite the observed shortcomings in Habermas's contributions to the field
of education nevertheless this chapter has demonstrated, to some extent, the re-
quirements of a tenable theory set out in chapter 8 - that it should be fruitful
and fertile in generating research and being applicable in situations which differ
from those which gave rise to the theory. This chapter has shown, however, that
the results of that fruitfulness and fertility were largely unoriginal. There remain
major questions against the contribution that Habermas's work can make to the
study of the curriculum. A 'severe test' of his theories might vindicate the claims
made for them by Habermas. That is the substance of the next chapter.
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Chapter XII
A CASE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL CURRICULUM
12.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a case study which investigates how Habermas's princi-
ples can inform a piece of curriculum analysis. The case study comprises elements
of a 'severe test' of Habermas's theories to ascertain whether they can be demon-
strated to indicate areas of emancipatory potential in curricula which seem far
from emancipatory. The case study focuses on the introduction of the National
Curriculum of England and Wales and on an analysis of its emancipatory potential,
using perspectives established in chapters 10 and 11.
The criteria for rendering the National Curriculum a 'severe tesV are that
it: (a) is a context which is different from Habermas's original; (b) possesses lim-
ited potential for emancipatory action (c) is a bureaucratized curriculum; (d) is
a 'hegemonic academic curriculum' marked by strong classification and framing;
(e) is socially reproductive; (1) is heavily prescriptive; (g) reinforces the 'cultural
capital thesis'; (h) suppresses generalizable interests, emanating from the agenda
of the New Right and sectional political interests; (i) is ideologically loaded and
perlocutionary (strategic), eg with market models derived from the writer Hayek,
a market mentality (competitiveness, consumerism, individualism, acquisitiveness,
choice and diversity, information, privatisation, quality control, freedom from con-
straint); (j) serves the technical and hermeneutic rather than the emancipatory
interest; (k) was introduced by the 'steering media' of law and powem. It is argued
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that, whilst the major elements of the National Curriculum offer limited scope for
emancipation, the cross-curricular issues in general and the themes in particular
contain the scope for significant emancipation. The case study is undertaken in
two stages.
Firstly the National Curriculum is subjected to ideology critique. The con-
text of the National Curriculum and the Education Reform Act of 1988 are set out
(12.2, 12.3), then a Habermasian critique of them is provided (12.4). Secondly the
government documentation of the cross-curricular themes of the National Curricu-
lum is given extended analysis (12.5).
12.2 The Context of the National Curriculum
The National Curriculum is located in the context of a broader political ideol-
ogy of the prime minister of the time when the National Curriculum was introduced
- Margaret Thatcher. This section sets out this broader context of 'Thatcherism',
arguing that Thatcherism suppresses generalizable interests, and then provides a
Habermasian critique of it.
The underpinning for Thatcherite political ideology are the writings of Hayek
(Hayek, 1960; 1973; 1976; 1979) on the value of free market principles and individ-
ual freedoms in the public sphere as the engine of social and technological change
(see also Barry, 1979, p. 4).235 The market is neutral, it makes no moral claims, it
is free from moral principles and prescription. The Secretary of State for Education
in the 1980s, Keith Joseph - a long-time mentor of Thatcher - espoused this view
very clearly in an unusual construction of 'wisdom' : 'The blind, unplanned, unco-
235 Hayek (1976) argues that 'through the pursuit of selfish aims the individual will usually lead himself
to .SaW tin e gvueral interest' (p. 138).
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ordinated wisdom of the market is overwhelmingly superior to the well-researched,
rational, systematic, well-meaning, cooperative, science based, forward-looking,
statistically respectable plans of Governments, bureaucracies and international or-
ganizations' (Joseph, 1976, p. 57). The market allows individual 'tredoms to be
exercised without constraint, indeed Joseph (1976) argued that
market system is the greatest generator of national wealth known to mankind;
coor(liIlatnlg and fulfilling the diverse needs of countless individuals in a way which
no liuiiiaii iiiind could even comprehend, without coercion, without direction, without
bureaiieratic interference. But the niarket order does not only more effectively than
any other system, serve our interests as producers and consumers. It also sustains
our freedoms (Joseph, 1976, p. 62).
Hayek (1976) argues that
it will often be the most effective method to leave the organization and man-
agement of such [public] services to competitive enterprise and rely on appropriate
methods of opportuning the funds raised by compulsion in accordance with some
expressed preference of the users (Hayek, 1976, p. 46).
Indeed, in a Habermasian vein, Hayek (ibid.) appeals to rationality 236
 in his
comment that competition
will iiiake it necessary for people to act rationally in order to maintain them-
selves... .Iit a society in which rational behaviour confers an advantage on the mdi-
vidnal. rational methods will progressively be developed and be spread by imita-
tirni. .. .Coinpetition is as much a method for breeding certain types of mind as any-
thing else: the very cast of thinking of the great entrepreneurs would not exist but
for the environment in which they developed their gifts (Hayek, 1979, pp. 75 - 6).
For Hayek (1979) freedom is interpreted a 'freedom from' (Hoy, 1984, p. 9)237
- 'freedom is an artefact that released man from the trammels of the small group'
(Hayek, 1979, p. 163), freedom from coercion (Hayek, 1960, p. 11) - and 'freedom
for' - freedom 'enables each individual to build for himself a protected domain
236 Joseph (1976) commCnts on the 'declining rationality both in our society's workings and in policy
ivaking and discussion' (p. 20).237 Indeed Hayeks insistence on the need for the absence of constraint echoes the tenets of the ideal
speech situation. That Hayck's views could be pressed so easily into the service of the strategic
action of a right-wing government perhaps undermines its parallel in Habertuas's work; conimu-
uicat.ive artiou may not be a particularly powerful tool. *
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with which nobody else is allowed to interfere and within which lie can use his own
knowledge for his own purposes' (ibid., p. 163) (see also ibid., p. 130).238 Joseph
(1976) argues that the market benefits everybody: 'profit is not what is called
zero-sum. My profit is not your loss. Everyone gains from the extra efficiency
that competitition brings' (p. 61). Ball (1990, p. 37) and Blackstone et al (1992),
however, contest this, arguing that the 'market thrives by-creating winners and
losers' (Blackstone et al, 1992, p. 18).239
Presaging the arguments of the New Right in education (though the New
Right eventually overtook Hayek's principles) Hayek argues: (i) for voucher schemes
in education to enable parents to exercise choice (Hayek, 1979, pp. 46 - 61); (ii)
for greater information to be made available (ibid., p. 60) and for student loans to
be developed (Hayek, 1960, p. 383). He attacks: (i) the advocates of 'permissive
education' (ibid., p. 174); (ii) trade unionism - which he sees as a threat to the
'whole market order' (ibid., p. 144); (iii) socialism - 'nobody with open eyes can
any longer doubt that the danger to personal freedom comes chiefly from the left'
(ibid., p. 129) - which he sees as the 'road to serfdom' (Hayek, 1986) (see also
Hayek, 1960, p. 385) and which Thatcher echoed in her endeavour to 'roll back'
socialism, a view reinforced by one of the architects of Thatcherism, Joseph (1976,
p. 69).
The key terms of a Hayekian market mentality are: competition, consumerism,
individualism, choice, diversity (if choice is to be realistic), individual freedom from
238 It is mtervstmg to note that Hayek moved from Vienna to the UK (from 1931-50) and thence to
the US (1950-62) (Hoy, 1984), leaving Vienna at a time when his freedom was threatened, when
fascism amid Hitler's authoritarianism was rising, a move which paralleled the move of the Frankfurt
School away from Germany in 1933.
239 See also Buwe et al (1992) who argue that 'greater budgetary flexibility in one school will mean
addiUoiial constraints and a reduction in service in another' (p. 29) because the total school
population is fixed. Education, thus. is ot a market but a quasi-market. I3owe et al (1992)
demonstrate that markets are premised on a zero-suni principle (p. 55).
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restraint, privatisation, quality and efficiency (cf Joseph, 1976) (without which
market forces will drive out those dispossessed of these characteristics) and in-
formation (in order that consumers are able to make informed choices): Though
Hayek (1960, 1979) was arguing for limited state intervention in tile operations
of the free market, the Education Reform Act of 1988 and subsequent legislation
in education has witnessed an increasingly interventionist role of the state in an
attempt to further the operation of a free market beyond Hayek's original vision
(cf Joseph, 1976, pp. 70-1). In educational terms the Hayekian principles set out
are interpreted thus (clearly there are overlaps between these elements):
(i) competition, consumerism, individualism, choice, diversity and freedom
from constraint through: open enrolment; the introduction of Local Management
of School; the reduction of the power of Local Education Authorities (see Appendix
H); funding of schools through a per capitum basis; voucher schemes; privatisation
of services through the Assisted Places scheme and the move to have services
put out to competitive tendering; the rise of City Technology Colleges and Grant
Maintained Schools; the undermining of comprehensive education and the call for
a return to a selective system; the strengthening of the links between education,
the economy and industry (eg in the Technical and Vocational Education Initia-
tive funded by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Manpower Services
Commission - thereby sidelining the accepted channels of curriculum reform: the
DES); the advocacy of education for enterprise and entrepreneurship (Jackson,
1982); the moves to make schools more accountable through the orchestration of
the debate about 'standards', the rise of inspections and accountability and the
publication of national tables of examination results of schools; the espousal of
the concepts of 'magnet' schools and 'sink' schools; the rise of parent&l choice; the
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reduction in the powers of teachers and teacher unions through the impositions of
Pay and Coiiditions of Service for teachers; the rise of the statutory National Cur-
riculum; the disdain of 'expert' educational opinion in the proposals for education
(see Appendix i);240
(ii) privatisation through: the Assisted Places Scheme; the rise of payments
for extra-curricular and 'special' additional activities (eg music tuition, educa-
tional visits); the use of competitive tendering (eg for cleaning schools, for the
provision of meals); industrial sponsorships (eg the City Technology Colleges);
grant-maintained ('opted-out') schools.
(iii) quality control through: inspections, accountability and answerability
of governing bodies to parents; the monitoring and development of 'standards'
in schools and the publication of results of children's examinations, assessments
(DES, 1987) and of school inspections; the castigation of 'progressive education'
that had been taking place for a decade since the publication of the Black Papers
on education (Cox and Boyson, 1975, 1977; Cox and Dyson, 1968, 1969); the rise
of managerialism in schools; the imposition of a standard National Curriculum and
its associated assessments; the control of teacher education; the centralization of
control to the Secretary of State.
(iv) information through: the publication of school prospectuses; the publica-
240 Not only were the Central Advisory Councils for Education abolished in 1986, but increased
lay repr(s(Ylltatioll on governing bodies was introduced in the same year. As is evidenced below,
the National Curriculum was brought in after the many thousands of dissenting voices from the
spheres cif education had been 'consulted' but in fact ignored. Further the National Curriculum
was devised with no clear rationale (Bennett, 1990), the arrangements for in-service education
for thii Nat.juiial Curriculum were heavily circumscribed by the Department of Education and, for
cxaiiiph ill TVEI-related In-service Education (TRIST), then Grant-related In-service Education
(GRIST). tln'ii the LEA Training Grants Scheme (LEATGS) and the GEST financing of in-service
educatiun. and there was a move away from higher degree education as ui-service education and
towards a more narrowly instrumental short-crse view of in-service education (Acker, 1991).
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tion of schools' results in public examinations and formal assessments of children
at certain ages.
This vast agenda was premissed on Hayek's notion of the free market. In-
deed Jackson (1982) reports the then Secretary of State for Eduction, Joseph,
as suggesting that 'schools should preach the moral virtues of free enterprise and
pursuit of profit' (Jackson, 1982, p. 8); Joseph, in his own words, argued that
'the child's imagination has to be seized by explaining the role of business in the
modern world... .You can't have freedom without free enterprise, and that is the
case that has to be put into schools' (ibid., p. 8).
The agenda was further informed and swayed by the political ideology of
the New Right. 24 ' Ball (1990) quotes one civil servant in the DES as saying 'He
[Joseph] was heavily got at by the Centre for Policy Studies'. Ball quotes a second
civil servant thus: 'these policies came from the radical right' and a third who
remarked 'it [the proposal for a National Curriculum] wasn't just within the DES,
it was within the DES and the Centre for Policy Studies, No. 10 Policy Unit, and
Cabinet' (Ball, 1990, p. 183). Indeed one of the members of the Centre for Policy
Studies - Letwin - was a member of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit, a Special
Adviser in the DES, and an adviser on privatisation (Letwin, 1988, p. 2).
The policies from the New Right match almost identically the policies voiced
in the Education Reform Act of 1988242 and are based on the principles of the
free market outlined above and Thatcherite policies of 'possessive individualism
241 Josephs (1976) sympathy to the New Right can be seen in his support for the Ceutre for Policy
Studies and his view that government needed to move to the political right to avoid being 'stranded
on the uIul(lle ground' (the title of his book published by the Centre for Policy Studies in 1976).
242 See also the Department for Education's (1992b) paper 'Choice and Diversity' which summarizes
five great themes' (p. 2) of the 1980s - quality, diversity, parental choice, greater school auton-
only. greater accountabihty (pp. 2-5) - and includes in its agenda for the 1990s better testing',
sele:tioii and higher standards' (p. 9).
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and personal initiative' (Ball, ibid., p. 33, see also Bowe et al, 1992, p. 25).
These can he seen in four New Right organizations which gave themselves self-
styled national legitimacy: the Centre for Policy Studies, the National Council for
Educational Standards, the Adam Smith Institute, the Hiligate Group. There was
a common membership of these organizations, (eg Caroline Cox, Marks, Scruton,
Flew, Lawlor, Marenbon, Norcross, Anderson, Naylor, Letwin) and a common
style of publications - short, polemical pamphlets marked by a surety of voice,
frequency of reference to 'policy' and written in sentences whose tone signalled a
'moral panic' (eg '[m]any of Britain's schools are in a state of crisis' (Cox et al,
1986)), echoing the style of the 'Black Papers in Education' of the 1960s and 1970s.
12.2.1 The Centre for Policy Studies
One can see in the publications of this group the themes outlined above and
their premises in the principles of the free market. This can be traced through
a chronology of their publications. Echoing Hayek, Joseph (1976) argued for 'en-
lightened self-interest' (p. 57), the need for privatisation to break down 'producer
capture' of nationalization (p. 22) (a theme echoed by the Adam Smith Institute
(1984) discussed later), the need for competition (p. 60), the need for 'active gov-
ernment to ensure competition' (p. 60), the need for entrepreneurship (p. 61),
and the need to develop market principles (p. 62). Cox and Marks (1982a) edited
a volume which reiterated the themes outlines earlier, viz. 'three central commit-
ments - more information, more diversity and more choice' (p. 6). The editors
argue that:
t1i're 8110111(1 be more freedom aiid more choice in the education systeni....freedorn
is spurious if there are no alternatives from which to choose, and b1ind' if parents
and pupils (10 miot have adequate knowledge with which to make an informed choice
(ibid.. p. 5).
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Hence they advocate 'the establishment within the state system of a number of
schools in our major cities as 'centres of excellence' specializing in particular subject
areas' (ibid., p. 7), presaging City Technology Colleges and 'magnet' schools.
Echoing Hayek (1979), Marks and Cox (1982b) argue for the use: of education
vouchers (p. 9), a view echoed in a later article in the volume by Seldon (1982).
Several authors in the volume support the increase of the accountability of schools
as a way of improving standards, coupling this with parental choice, and Seldon
(1982) argues that 'a school in the market is certain to perform better and cost
less than one without the spur of competition' (p. 107).
Accountability and its relationship to school and teacher improvement is also
linked to (i) the content and quality of initial teacher education and (ii) the rise
in managerialism in education. With regard to (i) Cox and Marks (1982b), echo-
ing their comments in 1979 (Cox and Marks, 1979, p. 6), single out the study of
sociology and the sociology of education as unnecessary, disingenuous and 'vacu-
ous' for student teachers (Cox and Marks, 1982a, p. 8; 1982c), a view which is
reiterated later by Lawlor (1990). Rather, they suggest (Marks and Cox, 1982a,
p. 11; Lawlor, 1990, p. 7) that student teachers should increase their knowledge
of their chosen subject and how it should be taught, itself a feature which was
addressed in the additional time allowances for subject study by the Council for
the Accreditation of Teacher Education. With regard to (ii) Anderson (1982) ar-
gues, with reference to teacher appraisal, that 'to review staff's performance every
few years, reward the good and eject the bad, is simply servicing' (p. 142). This
volume also includes an argument for increasing the attention to the teaching of
Christianity in the school curriculum (Cottrell, 1982), a feature which finds voice
in the subsequent National Curriculum of England and. Wales.
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The reduction of the power of local education authorities (LEAs) and the
need for increased information and choice to be made available to parents was
reiterated by Flew (1984) and Letwin (1988, p. 15). Further, the market principle
of freedom from constraint from LEAs in order to allow greater competition was
suggested by Naylor (1985) where he argued that 'new attitudes to open elites and
healthy competition are urgently needed in our education system' (Naylor, 1985, p.
6), that 'the recent moves towards greater parental freedom of choice and control
have been half-hearted and hesitant. The movement needs quickening' (ibid., p.
6). He suggests that 'there should be an immediate moratorium on any further
comprehensivisation' (ibid., p. 6) and that 'such schools of a specialised character
as still exist (including technical schools) should be supported' (ibid., p. 6).
Naylor takes up the theme of 'magnet' schools set out by Cox and Marks,
(1982a), indicating their peculiar character: (i) they possess a distinctive school
curriculum based on a special theme or method of instruction; (ii) they assist
desegregation; (iii) they involve voluntary choice by students and parents; (iv)
they allow open access (Naylor, 1985, p. 44). Regan (1990) sees the attraction of
City Technology Colleges lying in: (i) their autonomous status; (ii) their potential
for innovation and its effects on LEAs to innovate; (iii) their links with industry,
commerce and the economy; (iv) their accessibility to parents (pp. 38-41); (v) their
potential to raise 'standards' (p. 6); (vi) their ability to act as magnet schools (p.
19).
Letwin (1988) advocates a market principle by fuelling the attack on teachers
and the disdain of 'professionals' in his comment that 'many teachers are not
themselves educated people; they may know something or other, but lack any
sense of. discrimination, intellectual refinement or scepticism' (Letwi.,. 1988, p. 9).
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Echoing Marks and Cox (1982a, 1982b) Letwin, neglecting evidence, asserts that
standards of education are falling and that schools are failing their students.
Furthering the free-market principles set out above Lawlor (1988a) adds to
the advocacy from the Centre for Policy Studies of the reduction o(the powers of
LEAs. She suggests that:
Grant-maintained schools will break the LEA monopoly of state schools. Freed
froni the frustrations of local authority interference, heads and governors will be able
to shape their schools as they think fit... .For parents who want a good education
for their cli jidren, grant-maintained schools will make for better quality and greater
choice within the state system (Lawlor, 1988a, p. 5).
She argues that, by so doing, 'an unnecessary layer of local authority bureau-
cracy will be lifted away so that most decisions can be taken on the spot' (ibid.,
p. 12), a view reiterated in another document by Lawlor (1988c, p. 5). Lawlor
(1988c) emphasizes the need to reduce the power of LEAs in the interests of 'high
standards, diversity and choice' (p. 4) where parental choice is served by an LEA
Information Unit (p. 16). Further, she advocates increased competition (p. 17)
and the introduction of competitive tendering for the inspectorate, careers, psy-
chology and welfare consultancy services and for transport, meals, support services
and resource services.
Lawlor (1988b) was to further the call for a National Curriculum, albeit not
in the breadth which followed the Reform Act, in the interests of protecting and
promoting 'standards' (Lawlor, 1988b, pp. 17-18); this was echoed by Letwin
(1988). Her attention turned to initial teacher education in her publication of
1990. Echoing the need for subject study (p. 7) and the disdain for sociology
(p. 14) and theory in general (pp. 9 - 32) she also advocates the move towards
on-the-job training through an apprenticeship model (pp. 7, 32, 38). That this
has been heeded can be seen in the moves towards school-based teacher education
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in PGCE courses in England and Wales (DFE, 1992a).
Hence the reports by the Centre for Policy Studies resonate with many parts
of the government agenda and Hayekian principles.
12.2.2 The National Council for Educational Standards
This organisation furthered the agenda of freedom of information for parents
so that they could make informed choices and brought forward evidence which, they
suggested, argued for a return to a selective tradition in schooling at secondary
level. Cox and Marks (1979) argue for greater amounts of informatioir to be made
available to the public: 'if choice is to be genuine, the choosers must have access
to relevant knowledge which enables their choice to be well-informed' (p. 30).243
In the interests of a democracy and for diversity to accompany choice they
argue that 'the best way forward would be to encourage as many different educa-
tional initiatives as possible and to enable parents to choose between them' (p. 26).
This would be given impetus by the introduction of education vouchers (ibid., p.
31) and 'alternative methods of financing schools - which encourage diversity and
choice' (ibid., p. 33), presaging City Technology Colleges and Grant Maintained
Schools, ie those schools who had opted out of local authority control (ibid., p.
31). Indeed the title of their publication - Education and Freedom: the Roots of
Diversity - echoes Hayek's market principles outlined above. Greater choice and
diversity involves 'the abolition of the allocation of children by Local Authorities,
according to rigid 'zoning' or 'feeder school' policies' (ibid., p. 29).
243 Cox and Marks (1980) argue thus: 'In a free and democratic society we need to develop the diverse
taleiits of all our children. But before we can do this we need more information - locally so that
choice lilay be better informed, and nationally so that policies may be soundly based' (Cox and
Marks. 1980. p. 8).. .	 -
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Two subsequent reports on 'standards' in state secondary schools make sim-
ilar points to each other and advance the projects of free markets and access to
information, publishing examination results and an analysis of these. Marks, Cox
and Pomian-Srzednicki (1983) suggest that 'diversity in our school system may be
more desirable than homogeneity' (p. 116) and that '[e]xisting specialised schools
of all kinds - grammar, secondary modern, technical or bilateral - should be re-
tained. And new specialist schools should be encouraged' (p. 117). This argument
for a selective system is made clear where the authors write: 'examination results
per pupil are substantially higher for a system of selective schools ... than for a
system of comprehensive schools' (p. 114).
Further, having found gross discrepancies between children's examination per-
formance within and between LEAs (eg pp. 112, 114), the authors argue that
'individual schools and LEAs need to be more accountable to parents and that our
data on examination results should help to increase that accountability' (p. 117).
This, they suggest, will further enable and inform parents' freedom of choice (p.
119) to be exercised.
The findings of the first report were reinforced by their second report (Marks
and Pomian-Srzednecki, 1985). Here data were presented to indicate higher ex-
amination results in selective schools (pp. 14, 196), to show that some LEAs
were profligate with money (p. 106) (eg the Inner London Education Authority
(ILEA)) - an echo of Flew (1984, p. 20) - and to reaffirm the need for diversity
(differentiation):
(Iiffcre1Itiatio11 and diversity in our school system may be more desirable and
conduriv to higher standards than homogeneity .... There is no case whatever for the
abolition of existing specialised schools of any kind grammar, secondary modern,
technical or bilateral. Such schools should be retained and new specialist schools of
various kinds should be encouraged. That is one reason why the recent initiative for
the crt'atiou of new technical schools is so welcome (ibidA p. 107).
	 —
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Hence the reports from the National Council for Educational Standards demon-
strate a clear affinity with the Hayekian principles outlined earlier and the govern-
ment's agenda. One can see that the National Council for Educational Standards
reaffirms the agenda of the Centre for Policy Studies.
12.2.3 The Adam Smith Institute
The Adam Smith Institute (1984) (which cites Anderson, Cox, Flew and
Norcross in its acknowledgements) published Education Policy: The Omega File,
whose tone is redolent of other publications from the New Right, opening with
the words 'Concern about the state education system is growing' (p. 1). Echoing
Joseph (1976) and Hayekian economics (Bowe et al, 1992, p. 32) it advocates the
need for 'producer capture' to be unseated in favour of consumer interests as, at
the time of writing, 'parents are actually denied the information on which to make
their judgement' (p. 2) (in Habermasian terms, parents are denied the opportunity
to participate in the move to an ideal speech situation). 'Producer capture' is
evidenced, the report's authors suggest, in giantism (the move to large institutions
and monopolies), resistance to change, employment laxity, lack of interest in the
product, social engineering, career structures versus consumers. These can be
redressed by the introduction of market models of a service (for example the report
suggests that '[iju a market structure, the entry of new services and the exit of old
ones is an essential feature that keeps innovation on the march' (p. 13)). One can
observe in this document an overt market mentality and vocabulary and references
to industrial models of education. For example, the first page of the report states:
A :oiiiuiercial firm which failed to satisfy its customers would quickly lose them
to its coiiipet.it.ors. But this competitive pressure does not exist in the state sector
yet without this source of consumer pressure it is impossible for a service to he run
in. the jitterests of customers (ibid.,.p.. 1)	 -
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To serve consumer interests the report states that there should be greater
choice between schools, with no fixed catchment areas (p. 12), schools should
retain more independence (p. 5), indeed it suggests that 'LEAs are part of the
problem, not the solution' (p. 12). The role of LEAs should be confined to giving
a block grant to each school and taking responsibility for 'new building works
and major capital expenditure' (p. 7). The report suggests that '[t]he transfer of
responsibility for education from local authorities to parents, and of the funding
decisions to the national government would enable large changes to be made in the
methods of funding and operating state schools' (p. 11). It argues that:
[a]s more schools caine to be run by elected boards and more policy decisions
are devolved clown to each school, however, the role of local bodies would be very
limited. aud it may be best to replace them by ministerial bureaux with the power
to allocate funds (ibid., p. 15).
Further, parents should be given more power and involvement in the running
of schools (p. 5), teachers and schools should be more accountable (p. 5) and there
should be greater diversity in the education system (p. 5). Education voucher
systems should be developed (p. 16). School boards should be established and
should meet annually with parents (this latter being a move which became law
in the 1988 Education Act). Services should be put out to competitive tender
(pp. 7, 26) and premises hired out for community use (p. 8); employers should
be approached to fund the building of new schools (p. 20) (anticipating the City
Technology Colleges programme), coupled with the rise of specialised schools and
'centres of excellence' ('magnet' schools) (p. 23). Anticipating Lawlor (1990) the
report argues for an apprenticeship model of initial teacher education: '[w]ith 'on
the job' training being such a popular concept in other industries, it is difficult to
resist its greater extension to teaching' (p 24). 	 -
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One can see the same features appearing in this report as in the reports from
the previous two organisations mentioned above. It is clear, then, that there is an
identifiable common set of principles which provide a context for the educational
developments of the Thatcherite period.
12.2.4 The Hiligate Group
This group (including Caroline Cox, Marks, Norcross and Scruton in its mem-
bership) published Whose Schools in 1986 (Cox et al, 1986). Its themes echo those
outlined through the publications of the three other groups already mentioned.
It argues that 'there is a need for a national curriculum' (p. 1) and that this
should include very clear religious instruction (p. 2) - echoing Cottrell (1982)
(mentioned earlier). A national curriculum should be cast in traditional subject
form, including English Language and Literature, Mathematics, Science, History
and Foreign Languages (p. 7). Responsibility for the curriculum must be removed
from the LEAs (p. 10). The report reasserts the need for teachers to have clear
subject knowledge (p. 2) and to be bound by very clear terms and contracts of
employment - evidence of a new managerialism in education (p. 8). In initial
teacher education students should be prepared on an apprenticeship model (p. 15).
The report questions the powers of LEAs; asking '[sJhould schools be owned,
as at present, by LEAs?' (p. 7) and arguing that 'schools should be self-governing'
(p. 10), seeking funding from outside agencies where appropriate (p. 15). The
1986 report suggests that an initial major reform of state education 'is to give more
power to the parents' (Cox et al p. 10). It argues that schools:
iiiust be released from the control of local government and financed by direct
grant from central funds .... The state grant to schools will be provided on a per
-	
capita ba.si8. according to tlie.number of. pupils admitted . (ibid.. p. 13).	 -
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Coupling parental choice with diversity the report argues for the extension
of City Technology Colleges (p. 13) and of the concept and practice of 'magnet
schools': '[e]xisting schools of proven merit should also be singled out for special aid
and encouragement. Such schools could serve as 'magnets', on the American model'
(ibid., p. 13). Further, parental choice requires greater freedom of information,
including publishing examination results (p. 14). This latter point is developed
further by the group where they suggest that '[e]xamination results should not in
general depend on course work or on the opinion of individual teachers' (p. 15).
That this latter point found sympathy with Thatcherist policy is evidenced by a
letter from Thatcher's office to a private secretary in the DES:
the iiiethod of assessment places a heavy responsibility on teachers' judgements
and geiieral impressions. She [Thatcher] is also concerned to note the major role
envisagel for the LEAs in implementation of the system (Ball, 1990, p. 191).
These views are echoed in the group's report of 1987 (Hillgate Group, 1987)
where its authors write 'why assume that Local Authority advisers and in-service
training are necessarily blessings?' (p. 30). Indeed the 1987 report comments on
the ILEA as an example of excessive costs and low standards (ibid., p. 26).
Hence, the Hillgate group's documents articulate with the messages from the
previous three groups mentioned above.
12.2.5 A Summary of the Four Right Wing Organizations
The documents from all four groups voice many parts of the agenda for gov-
eminent set out earlier. The four groups are mutually reinforcing and combine to
establish a collective voice that influenced the content of education, itself operating
from Hayekian market principles. These are summarized in figure 12.1.
In 1-labermasian terms sectional interests of one group of the politi.eal spectrum
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Figure 12.1 - Summary Issues from Four Right-Wing Groups
SUMMARY ISSUES FROM THE FOUR GROUPS
Issue	 Competition,	 Privatisation Quality - Information
Consumerism,	 Control
Individualism,
Choice,
Diversity,
Freedom from
Constraint
LMSCPS, ADS, HG _________ ________ __________
Reducedpower of LEAs CPS, NCES, ADI __________ _________ ___________
Open enrolment	 CPS, ADI, HG __________ ________ __________
Voucher schemes	 CPS, AD!	 __________ _________ ___________
Privatisation of services	 CPS, AD!	 CPS, ADI, HG ___________ _____________
CTCs	 CPS, .NCES,
__________________ AD!, HG
	 _________ _______ _________
GM/opted out schools	 CPS, NCES,
___________________ ADI, HG
	 _________ ________ _________
Education/industry links ____________ AD!, HG	 _________ ___________
The 'Standards' debate 	 CPS, NCES, HG	 NCES, AD!.
___________________ ___________ _________ HG 	 _________
Inspections/accountability CPS, NCES,
	 CPS, NCES.
__________________ AD!, HG	 _________ AD!. HG _________
Publication of results of 	 CPS, NCES.	 CPS. NCES. CPS, NCES,
assessment / examinations ADL HG	 HG	 AD!, HG
inspections_______________ _____________ ___________ _____________
'Magnet' and 'sink' schools CPS, ADI. HG ___________ _________ ___________
Parental choice	 CPS, NCES,
___________________ ADI, HG	 _________ ________ _________
National Curriculum	 CPS, HG	 __________ CPS. HG ___________
Control of teacher	 CPS. AD!,
education____________ __________ HG	 ___________
Schoolprospectuses 	 ______________ ____________ __________ CPS, ADI, HG
Rise of managerialism	 CPS, NCES,
in schools	 AIM. HG
Key: CPS = C'ut.re for Policy Studies; NCES = National Council for Educational Standards;
ADI = Adam Smith Iiistitute; HG = Hillgate Group
(the New Right) disproportionately influenced policy - Habermas's systematically
distorted communication and .the violation of the. ideal speech situation (discussed
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later) - rather than promoting a generalizable interest.
12.3 An Ideology Critique of the Thatcherite Agenda
One effect of the Thatcherite agenda is the disempowering of-Those with a
professional voice. in education - teachers, LEAs, educationists and academics -
and the increased control of education by lay professionals (eg the state, governors
of schools and parents) (Ball, 1990). This is an example of Habermasian 'strategic
action'. (Ball (1990) argues that the Education Reform Act 'brings a massively
overdetermined system of education' (p. 214)). The effects of this are not just
to disempower teachers and other educationists, but, by 'blaming' them for the
problems of education, to legitimise opening up the control of education to other
- more 'reasouable' - parties. Ball (1990), for example, writes: 'the concerned
parent is cast as a figure of reason and sanity 2" naturally opposed to and set
over against the wild experimentation and unorthodoxies of the uncaring teachers
(like those of William Tyndale and 'loony left' authorities like ILEA)' (p. 33) (the
abolition of the latter having been advocated by Lawlor, 1988c).
That this drives a wedge between teachers and parents which furthers a corn-
petitive, market, ethic has been articulated by Tomlinson (1991):
Coiirvativc policy during the 1980s has cast parents in the role of consumers.
maziagrs and agents of competition rather than as partners in the education pro-
cess. .. .parvuts have been encouraged to become the 'vigilantes' of education - to
cln(k. and to (:oluplaln rather than cooperate with schools (Tomlilison, 1991, p. 4).
Reduciiig, or circumscribing, the powers of teachers opens the doors to a
strongly interventionist policy in education by the state, separating conception
from execution and furthering the bureaucratisation of education and, in Haber-
244 Cf Buw t al (1992. p. 17) who also show that such a move unrealistically treats thc ideal parent
as tlw average pareut p. 27).
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masian terms, the violation of the ideal speech situation: 'the culpable teacher,
the implicated educational establishment, are excluded from valid participation in
the debates which affect them directly and within which they are spoken of' (Ball,
1990, p. 58). Ball (ibid., p. 197) argues that the rise of managerialism:in education
furthers the separation of conception from execution:
$lIould they [teachers] be regarded as autonomous partners, making key cur-
riculuiu (ICCiSiOUS in the staifroom or classroom, or must they be reduced to agents
of policics which are decided elsewhere? (BalI, 1990, p. 171).
Apple (1993) sees the metaphors of the curriculum as imparting a significant
message in this respect: 'it [the national curriculum] sees people as either stomachs
or furnaces. We use and use up. We do not create. Some one else does that'
(Apple, 1993, p. 238). Such a separation of conception from execution legitimises
the increased power of administrators and the operation of free market principles.
Goldstein (1991), for example, argues that:
thC National Curriculum and National Assessment constitute a powerful in-
frastructure for central control....Along with this structure for control there is the
intention to force as much as possible of a 'free market' economy onto education.
(Goldsteiii. 1991, p. 5).
Ross and Tomlinson (1991) see the sundering of conception and execution
in the establishment of the Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education
(CATE) as a controlling body for teacher edñcation, whose membership is not
democratically elected: 'CATE consists of government nominees and has no mem-
bers appointed by the profession, yet it controls entry to the profession' (Ross and
Tomlinson, 1991, p. 35). This is paralleled in the appointments to the National
Curriculum Council and the Schools Examinations and Assessment Committee.
It was argued earlier that the free market was seen by the New Right groups
as a way of increasing the standards of education, giving rise to 'magnet' schools
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and the rise of 'sink' schools (leading, it is hoped, to the latter's ultimate closure).
However, this has been criticised on two important counts. Firstly because it
will involve parents in complicity in giving unequal educational opportunities to
children (ie a moral question) and,. secondly, because it does not garantee that
poor schools in fact will close (ie an empirical question). With regard to the former,
Brighouse and Tomlinson (1991) argue that:
iiiarket principles require...'winners' and 'losers'. To accept such a state of
affairs ilL the design of provision and management of schools is to accept that some
of our future citizens, through no. fault of their own, are doomed to receive education
in schools known to be failing (Brighouse and Tomlinson, 1991, P. 3).
With regard to the latter, Tomlinson (1991) argues that 'schools ... lost pupils
and became less effective but did not close .... In effect parents were contributing
to lowering standards at some schools by their choices' (Tomlinson, 1991, p. 8).
The reasons for a pupil's 'entitlement' to a National Curriculum may be dif-
ferentiated according to the political interests at work. For the political Left a
common curriculum was seen to serve equality and equality of opportunity - the
furtherance of the comprehensive ideal. For the political Right a common cur-
riculum was seen both as an economic necessity, preparing pupils to take their
place as producers of capital, and to act as a force for social control: 'people must
be educated to know their place' (Ranson, 1984, p. 241). However the National
Curriculum did not apply to all spheres of education, children in schools which
were not publicly maintained were not obliged to follow the National Curriculum.
This is interesting, for the National Curriculum, it will be argued below, is an out-
standing example of a bureaucratized curriculum. Lieberman (1990) argues that
whilst bureaucracies have the effect of raising the standard of the lowest areas of
performance they nevertheless' suppress excellence. One could speciflate that the
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bureaucratized curriculum, required only of public sector schools, acts as a form
of social control and social reproduction.
In the decade before the National Curriculum the call for a comnon curricu-
lum had been a call for outline guidance only, giving control of decision making to
teachers. The National Curriculum, however, in its level of detail in Attainment
Targets and Programmes of Study, gave teachers very little room for professional
decision making, indeed significant decision making did not involve the teaching
profession. Teachers' decision making was confined to organization of the 'delivery'
of the National Curriculum. Teachers could become mere technicians, in Haber-
mas's terms the denial of their interests is evidence of the suppression of general-
izable interests in favour of strategic rather than communicative action. However,
even at the point of the furtherance of the 'technical' interest of government con-
trol of curricula there was more than a glimmer of emancipatory potential in three
ways: (a) the recognition that pedagogy should remain the province of teachers
(DES, 1987) (which, as was argued in chapter 11, is a major means of developing
emancipation); (b) by giving a common entitlement to all children to receive a wide
curriculum; (c) by introducing cross-curricular issues into the National Curriculum
which, as will be argued later in this chapter, have very significant emancipatory
potential. By limiting teachers' decision making it would hardly have been surpris-
ing, therefore, if the National Curriculum had not produced a teaching profession
characterized by alienation and anomie.
The National Curriculum of England and Wales was made law in the Educa-
tion Reform Bill in 1988 (DES, 1988a). That Reform Bill contains several sections
ai.d educational innovations:
• its proposals for a common curriculum for children in state education, coupled
with tile testiiig of those children at ages 7, 11, 14 and 16 (paras. 1 - 16);
• its lifting of restrictions on ceiling numbers which schools are allowed to take
and 'open enrolment' (paras. 17 - 22);
• its delegation of financial control of school budgets to school governing bodies
(paras. 23 - 36);
• its establishment of 'opted out schools' - schools with grant maintained status
who have separated themselves from local authority control (par. 37 - 78);
• its establishment , of city technology colleges - schools whose initial funding
should be from industry with government support (para. 80);
• its establishment of the independence from local authority control of polytech-
nics and institutions of higher education (paras. 82 - 95);
• its establishment of the University Funding Council and the Polytechnics and
Colleges Funding Council (paras. 90 - 94);
• its delegation of financial control of budgets of colleges of further education to
college governing bodies (paras. 96 - 109);.
• its proposal for the demise of the Inner London Education Authority (paras.
114 - 125);
• its provision for the ending of tenure in universities (paras. 131 - 136).
There are several implications which flow from the proposals of the Education
Reform Bill:	 -.
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• its devolution of unprecedented powers to the Secretary of State for education
(some 250 powers at the time) to dictate directly the nature of education -
its content, organization, management and administration (Tomlinson, 1993);
. its breaking of the powers of local authorities to manage schooling (ibid.);
• its support for the independent sector and non-local authority schooling (through
the Assisted Places scheme, through opted-out schools seeking grant main-
tamed status, through its establishment of city technology colleges);
• its radical break with the tradition of devolved responsibility ancL,relative cur-
ricular autonomy of teachers (Acker, 1991; Hargreaves, 1991);
• its reduction of the status of teachers to technicians whose task it is to 'deliver'
the National Curriculum (Simon, 1988);
• its importation of monetarism and market models of organization from in-
dustry into education, with their language of competition, narrow notions of
accountability, a behaviourist mentality, 245 support for perceived excellence in
schools24° at the cost of supporting more deprived schools in other areas (Ball,
1990);
. its suppression of local initiatives and grassroots curriculum development (Tom-
linsoii, 1993);
The effects of the Education Reform Bill, in their disempowering of local
education autl1orities and teachers, at the same time as expanding enormously - as
245 This was to occur through the prescription of the National Curriculum and its associated published
results of assessiiieuts of children, performance indicators, the improvement of utandards' through
a.sscssiiiitt, led curricula (DES, 1987) and the introduction of LMS (cf Bowe et a! (1992): 'LMS
has mll)liratious for the curriculum, management is closely related to the market' (p. 4).
246 To b a liivecl through open enrolment and opting out' of local authority coutrL
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never before the powers of the Secretary of State, were to establish a centralist,
interventionist, dirigiste regime from a conservative political party (Coffield and
Edwards, 1989).247 This party not oniy did not represent the majority of voters,
but drove policies in to the field of education that had received whole'sale rejection
and condemnation - the suppression of generalizable interests to which Habermas
alludes (Habermas, 1976a).
Society is marked by cultural diversity; flexibility and adaptability of the
workforce are seeii to be the keynotes of the economy. The imposition of a uni-
form and largely academic curriculum (ci Hargreaves' (1989) views oEthe National
Curriculum as a 'hegemonic academic curriculum'), which, from the arguments in
the sociology of knowledge outlined in chapter ten (cf the discussion of Bourdieu)
advantages those sectors of society possessed of a particular cultural capital and
habitus in its stress on the acquisition of knowledge, skills and understandings in
a narrow academic sphere and is socially reproductive rather than ernancipatory.
Indeed Bowe et al (1992) argue that LMS leads to schools attempting to attract
'additional cultural capital into the school' (p. 53). Bourdieu argues that such
a curriculum affords the middle classes the opportunity to secure advantage and
privilege at the expense of the subordinate classes, ie is a device for social and
cultural reproduction (see Appendix A).
Ball (1990) suggests that '[i]n terms of curriculum policy the key question that
is addressed here is not which curriculum prevailed but rather whose curriculum
prevailed' (BaIl, 1990, p. 160). The effects of this decision-making are outlined by
Apple (1993) where he sees that the 'official knowledge' of a national curriculum
247 Cf Da1is (1990) comment that education was 'to be made more disciplined (greater state interven-
tioii and monitoring and more centralized control') (p. 19) with a clear shift of operation by the
DES frt,in one artieulated in terms of influence to one articulated in ternis of intervention and the
uced ir ltgisiation (ibid., p. 146).	 -
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'embodies conflict over what some regard as elite conceptions that empower some
groups whilst disempowering others' (Apple, 1993, p. 222) (see Appendix A).
Apple argues that the operation of free market principles will have the effect,
regardless of its intentions, of educational segregation, with the New Right pre-
ferring 'to decenter ... power altogether and redistribute it according to market
forces and thus tacitly disempower those who already have less power while using
a rhetoric of empowering the 'consumer' ' (ibid., p. 230). This echoes Bernstein's
(1990) view that 'the explicit commitment to greater choice by parents ... is not a
celebration of participatory democracy, but a thin cover for the old stratification of
schools and curricula' (Bernstein, 1990, p. 87). Those possessed of economic and
cultural capital will profit from market forces whilst those dispossessed of them
will lose.248 Indeed Apple (ibid.) suggests that ' 'freedom' and 'choice' in the new
educational market will be for those who can afford them. 'Diversity' in schooling
will simply be a more polite word for the condition of educational apartheid' (p.
236) ,249
 ie the suppression of generalizable interests.
12.4 A Habermasian Critique of the National Curriculum
This critique will use Habermas's concepts of the ideal speech situation, the
suppression of generalizable interests, strategic..and communicative action, the colo-
nization of the lifeworid and systematically distorted communication. Simon (1988)
demonstrates how the proposals for the National Curriculum were drawn up in the
face of massive hostility from all sectors of education - the traditional partners
248 Apple (1993) argues that the process of covert stratification is furthered the publication of 'league
tables of ,t'liools exammation results; under the guise of providing 'objective' data about schools
the agenda of the decision makers of the curriculum is not questioned (Apple, 1993. p. 231).
249 Barry. 1979. :oininentating on Hayek, argues that 'Lc]onservative governments have been as persis-
tent as their rivals in assiduously protecting favoured groups from the fih1 effect of market forces,
while at. the same time proclaiming the virtues of free enterprise (Barry. 1979, j 52).
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and parties in education, 25° ie a warranted consensus, was systematically distorted
into the silencing of opposition. Hence the participatory democracy of the ideal
speech situation (Habermas, 1987a, p. 292) was not applied, nor was the 'warranted
consensus' alluded to earlier applied; as demonstrated in the previoii section, con-
sensus politics was replaced with minority political will. In Habermasian terms
communicative action was overridden by strategic action, general interests were
suppressed, the education system distorted communicative action for a politically
vocal and powerful minority. Simon (1988) indicates how consultation on the
proposals in the Education Reform Bill was a sham, being telescoped into an unre-
alistically short time scale and then ignored.251
 He also indicates that the claimed
dissatisfaction with the current provision for education was largely a media myth.
As an exercise in decision making the consultation process and the Education Re-
form Bill itself was a singularly outstanding example of strategic action replacing
communicative action. The force of the better argument was quite simply ignored,
a clear example of systematically distorted communication which violated central
principles of the ideal speech situation (fig. 6.2 q.v.).
Tile suppression of generalizable interests and the advance of strategic action
is an instance of Habermasian systematically distorted communication whereby the
politico-economic system distorts the socio-edmcational system; it is an example of
how the steering media of power, the law, and the economy can enter the lifeworid
of those involved in education and colonize it. The evidence of strategic action
through systematically distorted communication rather than communicative action
250 For vxaiiipl' local authorities and local education authorities, churches, teachers, parents, edu-
catiouists. politicians across the political spectrum, the Trades Union Congress. a plethora of
professional associations and organizations representing all walks of life and educational interests,
and the iiivdia.
251 See also.Bowc et al. (1992), pp. 7,101-2.-.
in the establishing of the Reform Bill and the National Curriculum is strong, viz.:
the government's neglect of hostile comments;
• the government's intervention to advance a partisan political ideology (informed
powerfully by the New Right);
• the reduction of powers of teachers and LEAs, enabling central policy to be
put into schools without overt practical opposition;
• the control of the introduction of the National Curriculum by statute;
• the control of teacher education.
These measures violate the conditions of the ideal speech situation (cf fig.
6.2 q.v.) .252 Strategic action is evidenced in the government's intervention - by
statute - to advance the market principles into education, outlined earlier. Indeed
one of the stated intentions of the National Curriculum was to enhance Britain's
competitive edge in international markets (Ball, 1990). A subtler form of Haber-
masian strategic action can be evidenced in the Reform Act and the introduction
of the National Curriculum, where the call for more information to be made avail-
able to parents, eg in examination results and school prospectuses, can be seen as
serving Habermas's hermeneutic interest; however, when one sees that this action
in fact served the perlocutionary - strategic - purposes of a government wishing
to advance market principles into schools, coupled with the reduction of teachers'
and LEAs' powers, the hermeneutic interest is incorporated into the wider strategic
action of government.
252 Ewert. (1991) argues that 'the instrumental spiral that leads to increasing control over social and
ccoiioiiur life creates two problems: (a) increasing dependency on the State and titus a demand for
its services and (1)) the need for the State to claim a rational consensus iii order to justify increasing
adiniiiistrat.ive roiitroi' (Ewert, 1991. p. 367).	 .	 .-.	 -.
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Market principles are a clear example of Habermas's suppression of generaliz-
able interests and the advance of his technical interest in control; there are winners
and losers in a competitive market. Indeed it was outlined at the start of this
chapter that a market mentality emphasises selfish, strategic, individual (echoed
by Joseph, 1976), acquisitive action. The advocacy of voucher schemes, of compet-
itive tendering, of a return to selective schools (emanating from the New Right),
of 'magnet' and 'sink' schools, all are premised on the notions of 'winners' and
'losers'; clearly generalizable interests cannot be served in such a zero-sum model
of society (Thurow, 1977, 1980), despite Joseph's (1976) assertion to the contrary.
The intrusion of market principles into education is a clear example of Haber-
mas's views of the colonization of the lifeworid by steering media (in this case the
steering media of the market economy and the force of law), where systems (polit-
ical and economic) combine to impinge on the lifeworid and agency of participants
(cf Layder, 1994, p. 197). A dear example of this is the reduction of power coupled
with increased workload of teachers in implementing the National Curriculum.
One can see also in the rise in managerialism and bureaucracy in schools
evidence of the rationalization and colonization of the lifeworld by the steering
medium of bureaucracy (and its associated concepts of differentials of power - a
violation of the principles of the ideal speech situation which mention equal oppor-
tunities and powers) (fig. 6.2 q.v.). The effects of managerialism are to further
Habermass technical interest in controlling schools by government and, in turn,
senior managers in schools controlling other staff in schools. A clear example of
the former can be seen in the introduction of vastly greater numbers of inspections
of schools. Here inspectors are not required to reach a 'warranted consensus' on
reports, there is not freedom for -teachers to: enter a discourse, check question-
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able claims, evaluate explanations, modify a given conceptual framework, allow
commands or prohibitions to enter discourse, assess justifications, alter norms, se-
lect and employ speech acts, reach consensus 253 - all elements of the ideal speech
situation (fig. 6.2 q.v.).254
A curriculum which advantaged and disadvantaged middle and working classes
respectively (see the discussion in chapter 10 of the reproductive effects of an aca-
demic curriculum), was an instance of the suppression of generalizable interests.
Because the ernancipatory potential of the National Curriculum was confined to a
particular sector of society it did not embody the generalizable interests which the
universalizability principle of emancipation should address.
In Habermasian terms the National Curriculum is an example of systemati-
cally distorted communication and indicates how the dialectic between action and
structural perspectives could be negated; the action perspectives of many of those
involved in education were eroded by the decision making of the representatives
of the systems perspectives - the politicians and their supporting bureaucracies
(Lawtomi, 1984). The treatment of society as an amalgam of hypercomplex so-
cial systems (Habermas, 1984, 1987a) was simplified enormously by the political
will of a single party in political power which simply rode over contestation and
opposition (ci Bowe et al, 1992). As Simon (1988) has argued above, a series of
unfounded generalizations about an alleged parlous state of education which hap-
pened to capture the crest of a political wave enabled a wide-ranging and partisan
political ideology to surface, the effects of which were as socially divisive as they
were socially reproductive.
253 Cf Bowriug-Carr (1993).
254 This fl1rt.11ers the separation of conception and executIon in the bureaucratic organization of
educat itit.
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This section has indicated how Habermas's principles are exemplified - in-
stanced - iii a critique of the National Curriculum. However, exemplification of
his principles alone does not necessarily imply that they add to a critique of the Na-
tional Curriculum, a critique of the National Curriculum might exemplify a variety
of different principles and perspectives without necessarily enriching the analysis.
Coincidental exemplification cannot replace justification. The same issue as was
observed in chapter 11 might apply here too - that the critique of the National
Curriculum does not rely on Habermas's principles for meaning. For example the
politics of a sham consultation process, of the use of law and political power, of
the advance of market principles into education, of the bureaucratization of edu-
cation, and of the curriculum as an agent of the reproduction of social inequality
(discussed in this section) does not rely on Habermas's principles for justification.
Habermas's views, then, might be trivially rather than necessarily apposite here;
whether they add to the critique is a moot point.
12.4.1 The National Curriculum as a Bureaucratized Curriculum
In many respects the organizational arrangements and the content of the Na-
tional Curriculum represent a fully worked out example of a bureaucratized cur-
riculum, a major instance of the technical interest, the colonization ofthe lifeworid
and the neglect of communicative action. Habermas (1984, p. 429) characterises
a bureaucracy thus:
• official business is conducted on a continuous basis;
• it is conducted in accordance with stipulated rules;
• impersonal criteria delimit workers' type of work;
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. there are official zones or authority to carry out work;
. there are clear definitions of zones of legitimate power;
. there is a hierarchy of power;
• workers do not own the resources needed for their work;
• there are no property rights on offices held;
• official business is conducted through written documents.
This echoes clearly not only the authoritarianism (or 'authoritarian populism'
(Dale, 1989) of a conservative government) (cf Giroux, 1989) but, in Habermasian
terms, the replacement of communicative action with strategic action and deci-
sionism. The National Curriculum was brought in with the legitimacy and power
of the 'steering medium' (Habermas, 1987a) of the law. Not only did it stratify
powers of decision making differentially to different participants, whereby the Sec-
retary of State made the decisions on a wide array of matters and curricula (xcept
some aspects of pedagogy), but it prescribed - or circumscribed the powers of
teachers so that they became 'deliverers' of the National Curriculum.
The powers of the Secretary of State were laid out in written documentation
that was to be subject to ongoing reformulation by the appointees of the Secretary
of State (in the membership of the National Curriculum Council and the Schools
Examinations and Assessment Council). Members of the subject working groups
were not elected but appointed by the Secretary of State. Indeed the Secretary of
State intervened in the subject matter as well as the appointment of the curriculum
working groups (Elliott, 1991).
•0
The 'impersonal criteria' suggested by Habermas above are indicated in the
National Curriculum not only by the blanket application of the curriculum but in
the 'objective' testing that accompanied it, whereby the move to norm-referenced
use of what were purported to be criterion-referenced tests markedan.appeal to the
scientific (or scientistic) respectability of quantitative analysis, itself the working
out of a narrowly conservative political ideology (Morrison, 1990a). The publica-
tion of 'league tables' of results that were designed to enable comparison of schools
to be made, furthering the competitiveness envisaged in the government's princi-
ples for improvement, neglected a central tenet of education - that it concerns
interpersonal relationships as well as the simple accumulation of knowledge.
The 'official business' was carried out not oniy through the overwhelming
amount of written directives, statutory orders and circulars which accompanied
the National Curriculum, but through the emphasis which was placed on written
plans and policies, written reports, and written assessments by children in pen-and-
paper tests. A post hoc analysis of the curriculum model implicit in the National
Curriculum reveals it to be Tylerian (see chapter 11), itself a curriculum model
which, as was argued in chapter 11, reinforces Habermas's technical interest rather
than the emancipatory interest. The technical interest in control is evidenced in the
National Curriculum through the Secretary of State's control of its scope, content
and availability. Education becomes an instrumentally rather than an intrinsically
worthwhile activity (Elliott, 1991) •255
Moreover, the actual content of the curriculum and its accompanying assess-
ment has been bureaucratized. This has been done at one level by the ascription of
25& Elliott. ironically, adds that the National Curriculum proposals do not even fulfil a full instrumen-
talisni. in t.lia.t they neglect knowledge utilization at the expense of knowledge aeuisition.
301
differential status to different areas of the curriculum - into core, foundation and
cross-curriculum issues with decreasing status respectively. One can observe the
haste with which the content of the core subjects was decided - the status of the
subject was reflected in the degree of concentration and time scales for production
of aspects of the National Curriculum and the sequence of their appearance. The
interim reports of the groups working on the core areas had to be furnished within
three months of their initial meetings (Simon, 1988, p. 111). The contents of the
core subjects - English, Mathematics and Science - were the first to appear,
emphasizing a concern with the traditional 'basics' of education, with the lower
status subjects appearing later. One can observe in this the perpetuation of the
differential status afforded to the ostensibly cognitive over the affective aspects of
the curriculum.
The framing of the National Curriculum indicates a sympathy with a sub-
ject based classical humanist ideology, 258
 which, it has been argued, is socially
reproductive rather than ernancipatory. 257
 Indeed the National Curriculum ex-
hibits Bernstein's strong classification and framing, themselves indicating a strong
sympathy with the status quo of traditionalism in society, his 'collection code' (dis-
cussed in chapter 10). The integrative potential of the curriculum, an indicator of
weakened social control (chapterlO), is confine4 to the low status cross-curricular
issues. 258 The curriculum is set out in traditionalist subject terms, 259 where teach-
ers and pupils are cast more as passive recipients of decisions than as creators of
those decisions.
256 This is discussed in Lawton, 1973; Skilbeck, 1976b.
257 For exaiiipk Bernstein, 1971; Young, 1971; Bourdieu, 1976.
258 The National Curriculum Council (1990a) suggests that cross-curricular themes can 'permeate'
other cuiriciiluut subjects.
259 The National Curriculum specifies mathematics, English. science, technology, geography, history,
art. pltyshal education, music, a modern foreign language, religious education. 	 .
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An analysis of key verbs in the 'attainment targets' of the National Curricu-
lurn, for example, shows the low incidence of higher order verbs - 'interrogate',
'evaluate', 'judge', 'critique', 'produce', 'explore', 'propose' 'make' (Bloom, 1956);
higher order activities such as 'evaluate', 'assess justifications', ref1ect on', 'dis-
cuss', 'search for truth', 'check questionable claims', 'evaluate explanations', using
'the force of the better argument alone' resonate with the phrases used to typify
the ideal speech situation in figure 6.2 (q.v.).
The DES document on Mathematics (DES, 1991a) emphasizes 'select', 'iden-
tify', 'follow', 'coordinate', 'respond', 'demonstrate', 'understand', 'find', 'manipu-
late', 'use', 'recognise', 'handle', 'organize' in its ten levels. Higher order verbs -
'interpret', 'examine critically', 'justify', 'explore' - are heavily weighted to the
upper levels (6 - 10).
The DES document on Science (DES, 1991b) emphasizes 'use', 'manipulate',
'choose', 'recognize', 'name', 'know', 'understand', 'describe', 'know how', 'know
that', 'explain', 'be able to' in all of its levels. Higher order verbs - 'interpret',
'evaluate', 'justify' - are underrepresented and only appear in levels 8 - 10.
The DES document on History (DES, 1991c) emphasizes 'identify, 'describe',
'recognize', 'explain', 'show an awareness', 'show an understanding' at all levels.
High order verbs and situation - 'complex historical situations', 'interpretations
may differ', 'comment on the usefulness of a source', 'explain the problematic
nature of' - are confined to the higher levels (5 - 10).
The DES document on Geography (DES, 1991d) emphasizes 'use', 'follow',
'identify', 'state', 'name', 'describe', 'compare', 'give evidence of' in all of its lev-
els. Higher order verbs - 'interpret',. 'synthesise', 'evaluate', 'evaluae alternative
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explanations', 'examine critically' - are confined to levels 7 - 10.
The DES document on English (DES, 199Db) emphasizes 'respond', 'listen',
'recognize', 'use', 'convey', 'show', 'describe', 'demonstrate', 'select', 'assemble' in
all of its levels. Higher order verbs - 'take an active part in', 'evalute', 'combine
information independently', 'organize complex...subject matter', 'assess' - are
confined to levels 8 - 10.
The confinement of higher order verbs to later levels of the National Curricu-
lum echoes Bernstein's (1971) comments that
aity collection code involves an hierarchical organization of knowledge, such
that the ultimate mystery of the subject is revealed very late in the educational
life. By the ultimate mystery of the subject, I mean its potential for creating new
reahti(s. It is also the case.. .that the ultimate mystery of the subject is not coherence,
but mroherence; not order, but disorder .... this mystery, under collection codes,
is revealed very late in the educational life - and then only to a select few who
have shown the signs of successful socialization .... For the many, socialization into
knowledge is socialization into order, the edsting order, into the experience that the
worlds educational knowledge is impermeable (Bernstein, 1971, p. 57).
The language and framing of the National Curriculum, however, is cast in such
a way that it renders it almost immune to challenge, resistant to communicative
action. The NCC casts its prescriptions in a form which suggests that it has
anticipated and met social and educational needs and problems, eg 'much of the
future is uncertain; what is beyond dispute is that in the next century these
together with flexibility and adaptability, will be at a premium' (NCC, 1990a, p.
3), 'inter-departmental planning can lead to ... the reduction of wasted time' (ibid.,
p. 1) respectively. It discusses the need for policies, aims and management (ibid.),
to respect the 'professional responsibility of teachers' (ibid., p. 8) coupled with
the provision of in-service support, to make the curriculum responsive to parents,
and for schools to develop plans for the whole curriculum. Hahermas's notion that
language is inescapably empowering., has much force here; the language of these
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documents empowers its writers by defusing objection and critique by dint of their
wide embrace and eminently appealing phraseology.
Further, the curriculum is framed widely to include: ten subjects, Religious
Education, 'additional subjects', 'extra-curricular activities', 'teaching methods',
'cross-curricular elements' (dimensions, skills, themes) and Personal and Social
Education (NCC, 1990a). A wide view of pedagogy is mentioned in the core and
foundation subjects, eg the references to problem-solving in Science and Mathe-
matics and collaborative methods in cross-curricular themes (discussed later) such
as to incorporate a variety of interests and pedagogical preferences.: It refers to
equal opportunities, to special educational needs, to every child's entitlement to
education, to the need for careful assessment, monitoring, differentiation and pro-
gression (NCC, 1990a). It is a catch-all set of documents, enabling the government
to argue that it is meeting a variety of demands from a wide audience. It would
be difficult to argue against the inclusion of any of these items in the curriculum.
However, given the emphases, differential status, extent of inclusion of items in the
document, the effects of the documents - perlocutionarily - are to reinforce the
status quo. A subtle process of incorporation and accommodation to the dominant
ideology can be observed260
 and which a Habermasian ideology critique can expose.
One can observe the further bureaucratization of the curriculum in its artic-
ulation of subjects into ten levels of progression, each level building on the former.
Not only does this establish a hierarchy of increasing importance of each level but
it sets the 'stipulated rules' of progression in learning, making the massive assump-
tion that the order in which the curriculum is laid out reflects the psychological
pathways of learning for all children - confusing logical and psychological aspects
260 The doiiiivaiit class gives a little in order to retain a lot' (Cormack, 1992, p. 153.
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of learning (Hirst, 1967) . 281 The construction of a curriculum packaged into sub-
jects and levels within subjects embodies the commodification of curricula which
Apple (1983) criticizes for its materialist conception of education, its reduction of
teachers and learners to consumers in a market mentality, and its ueglect of the
realities of children's learning.
12.5 Conclusion
This case study so far has demonstrated how Habermasian principles can in-
form a commentary on the National Curriculum and its implementation. However,
it has been suggested that such informing does not necessarily enrich the analysis;
whilst Habermas's work provides a very convenient set of labels to analyse the in-
troduction of the National Curriculum, whether the absence of those labels would
weaken the overall analysis has been questioned. The labels are a form of concep-
tual shorthand. In this spirit the National Curriculum suppressed generalizable
interests, it did not abide by the principles of the ideal speech situation, it neglected
embodiment of all of Habermas's knowledge-constitutive interests, it neglected the
action theoretical perspectives of social theory, it exemplified the negative aspects
of bureaucratization as the colonization of the lifeworid, it did not manage to break
free of the instrumentalism which characterized Weber's analysis of the rational-
ization of society into bureaucracies, it displayed a narrow functionalism in the
serving of a minority political will and an existing economic order, it systemati-
cally distorted communication in its implementation by strategic action and the
silencing of debate. It displayed very fully the technical interest in control, for the
1988 Education Act increased the powers of the Secretary of State for Education
261 Tliat. this twlies the complex and recursive nature of learning has been attested by Morrison (1990a),
Mooii (1991) and Doll (1993).
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to control the curriculum, assessment and teachers, operating from an industrial
model (including standardisation, uniformity, measurement, outcome foci). More-
over, by eroding the powers of LEAs, together with the rhetoric of parental choice,
the 1988 Education Act gave the Secretary of State for Education a direct line
into schools, with no strong middle party - the LEAs, the representatives of local
democracy - to challenge this. It appears that its emancipatory potential - as
serving generalizable interests - was highly circumscribed. In what respects, in
which of its elements, then, could the National Curriculum be said to be emanci-
patory? The case is made here that it is in the 'cross-curriculum issues' that the
emancipatory potential of the National Curriculum can be realized. -
12.6 The Cross-currIcular Issues of the National Curriculum
During 1989 and 1990 the NCC issued a series of eight Curriculum Guid-
ance documents, principally to cover the cross-curriculum areas of the National
Curriculum:
. A Framework for the Primary Curriculum (NCC, 1989a);
• A Curriculum for All (NCC, 1989b);
• The Whole curriculum (NCC, 1990a);	 -
• Education for Economic and Industrial Understanding (NCC, 1990b);
• Health Education (NCC, 1990c);
• Careers Education and Guidance (NCC, 1990d);
• Environmental Education (NCC, 1990e);
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• Education for Citizenship (NCC, 1990f).
The titles alone cover the themes outlined in chapter 11 as including the
contents of emancipatory curricula. At the same time they can be seen to ex-
emplify the intrusion of Habermas's steering medium of the economy into school
curricula - eg in Education for Economic and Industrial Understanding and Ca-
reers Education. Their management accords with Habermasian principles of ideal
speech (fig. 6.2 q.v.) in their references to collegiality in the use of phrases such
as 'the principle of sharing responsibility' (NCC, 1990a, p. 3), 'co-operation and
teamwork' (ibid., p. 11) and 'teachers need to share expertise and experience,
discuss progress, resolve problems and initiate further development' (ibid., p. 11),
'the school community' working together (ibid., p. 10). Indeed cross-curricularity
can be seen as a form of co-operation which inherently addresses Habermasian
principles of participatory democracy, equality, empowerment and communicative
action. It will not work without these principles.
The contents of the cross-curricular issues are potentially emancipatory in that
they require reference to social issues - politics, citizenship, equal opportunities,
power, education for economic and industrial understanding, personal and social
education, environmental education - and to the society out of school (ie the ref-
erents focus on the wider community - which accords with the principles outlined
in 11.3). In Habermasian terms the cross-curricular themes address the objective,
social and subjective worlds of the lifeworld (Habermas, 1987a, chapter 6), thereby
furthering their integration. Further, the pedagogical principles advocated by the
NCC for their study accord with pedagogical principles derived from Habermas in
chapter 11 which advocated: cooperative and collaborative work; discussion based
work; autonomous, experiential and. flexible learning;, negotiated lrning; coin-
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munity related learning; problem-solving activities; increased pupil talk; the role
of teachers as transformative intellectuals. The Curriculum Guidance documents
state very clearly that the cross-curricular themes should be taught and learnt in
ways which possess the following characteristics:
• a reliance on practical activities and students' decision making;
• active learning and exploratory activities (illocutionary activities);
• learning by first hand experience and participatory approaches;
• the use of problem-solving approaches;
• the flexible use of a wide range of teaching methods and resources;
• the matching of content with pedagogy;
• the development of collaborative team work - teams of students as well as
teams of adults;
• the development of students' abilities to take responsibility for their own learn-
ing and control of time (ie autonomous learning);
• the development of small-scale projects within and outside the school;
• the establishment of links between the school and the wider community, defined
widely to include industry, different types of environment, community groups,
the infrastructures of communities;.
• the development of partnerships between the school and the community (echo-
ing Habermas's ideal speech situation in its call for the 'recognition of the
legitin1acy of each subject to participate. in the dialogue as an autonomous and
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equal partner' (fig. 6.2 q.v.).
Further, Habermas's views have been seen to inform an understanding of
the significance of the status of areas of school knowledge (chap..ter 10). This is
problematical for the cross-curricular issues as they are accorded low status in
three main ways:
(a) they do not have the de jure status which is accorded to the core or
foundation subjects, indeed whilst 'Orders [would] prescribe attainment targets
and programmes of study for each of the core and other foundation subjects' (DES,
1989, para. 29) the DES merely indicated that 'there will be scope for the teaching
of other subjects, and of cross-curricular issues' (ibid., para. 29). Hence raising
their status could be achieved in part by making them a legal requirement of the
school curriculum.
(b) The NCC (1990a) envisaged that the cross-curricular issues would become
part of a programme of personal and social education, itself a low status area of
the curriculum, being taught by non-specialists, not being formally examined, be-
ing under-developed in terms of content and pedagogy, receiving scant timetabling
in school curricula and being viewed by many students as non-essential. Echo-
ing the issues earlier in the sociology of knowledge Morrison (1987) argues that
the relegation of politically sensitive issues to a low status was quite deliberate
because the themes could not be ignored but had to be reinterpreted or incorpo-
rated because of their politically deleterious or challenging effects on the political
status quo. By including them on a National Curriculum lip-service was being
done to their importance, but it was so heavily circumscribed as to be ineffectual
and thus unable to challenge the ideological status quo. Echoing H.abermas, one
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wonders what the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects or purposes - politi-
cally - would have been of elevating them to 'core' or 'foundation' subjects in
the prescribed National Curriculum, for example: they would become 'danger-
ous knowledge' (Giroux, 1989), ie that knowledge which challenges the ideological
status quo; their contents and organization would break down traditional subject
barriers and loyalties (which, according to Bernstein (1990), would be immensely
challenging to society and social hierarchies); their pedagogy would upset tradi-
tional teaching styles; they would constitute a threat to the power of the New
Right to influence educational policy (cf Quicke, 1988). Instead the challenge was
diluted, the cross-curricular issues became potentially marginalised.
(c) The cross-curricular issues do not feature in the formal examination sys-
tern - they do not contribute to 'credentials'. From the discussion in chapter
10 it is clear that their status could be raised by awarding credentials for stu-
dents' achievements in these areas - credentials which were part of the formal
examination system to match academic qualifications.
Hence if cross-curricular themes are to achieve their considerable ernancipa-
tory potential (discussed below) then they would need to be accorded much higher
status, a central feature which emerged in chapter 10. This could be addressed
by (i) making them a legal requirement; (ii) making them identifiable elements in
the curriculum either through separate timetabling (ie possessing strong classifi-
cation), eg through a modular approach, or through permeation of other subjects
which was made visible to students (though this latter might risk losing their vis-
ibility, being 'buried' in other subjects); (iii) having them taught by specialists;
(iv) by according them greater time allowances in the curriculum; (v) by making
them part of the compulsory formal examination; (vi) by removing them from the
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PSE curriculum; (vii) by placing a named senior manager or promoted teacher in
charge of their implementation, ie giving them an identity which is attached to a
senior position in the institution; (viii)by ensuring that they are developed through
teams of teachers (together with the necessary in-service support). -
The cross curriculum elements have been ordered into three components by
the NCC (1990a):
• cross-curricular dimensions;
• cross-curricular skills;
• cross-curricular themes.
This study will focus on the dimensions and skills only briefly - to set the
scene for the themes, where it will be shown how a Habermasian analysis is par-
ticularly pertinent.
12.6.1 Cross-curricular Dimensions
Whilst the dimensions (Education for a Multicultural Society, Equal Oppor-
tunities, and Special Educational Needs) clearly have the potential for empower-
ment outlined above262 - equal opportunities to realize individual and collective
existential futures - the question has to be raised whether outlining only the di-
mensions is enough to effect any real changes or any real empowerment. Simply
recognizing and injecting these components into the core and foundation subjects
and cross-curricular themes is no guarantee of empowerment if they are accorded
low status. They need to become touchstones of curriculum decision making.263
262 
•Ec1 i o)p(,rt1111itiCS is about helping all children to fulfil their potential' (NCC, 1990a, p. 2).263 It is otah1e. that whilst Special Educational Needs are given separate attention h the publication
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The notion of equal opportunities in the National Curriculum is taken to be
the equal opportunity to study the National Curriculum, which, if we take the
arguments of Bourdieu (1976), Bernstein (1971) and Apple (1993) adduced ear-
lier, would be socially reproductive in its effects, being in many wäyi an academic
and traditional curriculum. Bowe et al (1992) comment on the 'mismatch of pur-
poses' between the academic / cognitive National Curriculum and issues of equal
oppqrt unities in schools (p. 91). Hence, whilst cross-curricular dimensions have
great potential for the realization of the ideal speech situation, attempts need to
be made to ensure that they receive their full attention, that they do not become
marginalised. Fully implemented they could constitute a major challenge to ac-
cepted societal norms; it is no accident perhaps that they receive less status than
less system-upsetting and more socially reproductive forms of curricula.
12.6.2 Cross-curricular Skills
The cross-curricular skills identified by the NCC (communication, numer-
acy, study, problem-solving, personal and social, information technology) have
considerable emancipatory potential in that they accord with the Habermasian
pedagogical principles outlined earlier. Indeed the references to 'communication',
'problem-solving' and 'social' skills go to the heart of Habermas's conditions for
ideal speech. The list of skills is an identical copy of the list provided by Her
of a separate Curriculum Guidance booklet (NCC, 1989b) the same particular attention is not
given to Education for a Multicultural Society or Equal Opportunities. The issues of 'silencing'
and iiamiug. mentioned earlier, are important here; by naming a particular group in more detail
than ut,l1(rs oiie is isolating them as a special case (Shapiro, 1984) and (lelegituntzrng the rights of
other groups to be represented equally. However, the case of special educational needs is interesting
as it appears that here Habernias's principles of rationality may be inappropriate. Dc La Bat Smit
(1994) argues that a more serious objection is the general one that Haberinas's theory presupposes
an nniiinse capacity for rationality among people in society. It could be argued that Habermas's
theory militates agaill8t the educationally and mentally disadvantaged in society, who may not have
the degrec' of articulacy or education or natural ability necessary to engage in radical argumentation'
(Dc La Bat. Siiiit. 1994, p. 213)	 —
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Majesty's Inspectorate (HMI) (DES, 1985b) and, in that document, is full of the
emancipatory potential of the ideal speech situation: 'to weigh and interpret evi-
dence', 'to ask pertinent questions', 'to propose alternative hypotheses', 'to apply
knowledge and concepts to the solution of reai-life problems', 'to make informed
choices', 'to imagine life as it may appear to other people', 'to adjust to different
social contexts', 'to consider others' views', 'to contribute, cooperate and take the
lead as appropriate within groups', 'to accept responsibility' (ibid., pp. 39 - 40).
The pedagogical principles for the learning of the skills, too, have a Habermasian
flavour: 'to discuss and explore ideas among themselves.. .in groups', 'to talk at
some length', 'opportunities for pupils to put questions', 'personal and social skills
need to be practised in a variety of situations', 'schools need to provide many
opportunities for social interaction' (ibid., pp. 40 - 1).
That said, there is silence on the need for developing critique and critical
skills; taking the guidance of HMI (DES, 1985b) for the central Habermasian skill
- communication - one finds that it is defined very generally and in low-order
terms: 'the ability to listen, speak, read and write effectively', 'the ability to use
and interpret non-verbal and graphical means of communication' (ibid., p. 39).
The NCC (1990a), however, does not provide the same level of detail as HMI.
It only lists the skill headings in summary form and does not devote any space
to analysis of these at all. As with the cross-curricular dimensions, though there
is considerable affinity between Habermasian principles and the cross-curricular
skills, simply outlining - 'naming' - these skills and then, additionally, accord-
ing them low status, does not guarantee that they will be addressed fully in the
curriculum. Like the cross-curricular dimensions, implemented fully the skills out-
lined could constitute a major source of empowerment.
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12.6.3 Cross-curricular Themes
The anxieties raised about the limiting effects of the low status afforded to
cross-curricular dimensions and skills applies similarly to cross-curricular themes:
• economic and industrial understanding;
. health education;
• careers education and guidance;
. environmental education;
. education for citizenship.
At first blush the five themes possess the emancipatory potential alluded to
in chapter 11.5, they pose a threat to the established order which the power of
knowledge and information about the steering mechanisms of that society (Haber-
mas, 1987a) can bring. They touch children's everyday realities (cf Bernstein's
(1971) comments earlier) and the steering media of society. If ignorance - cul-
tural illiteracy (according to Freire earlier) - is disempowering then not only is
any knowledge dangerous and threatening to the status quo, but particularly so if
Marxian analysis of the centrality of the economic base of society is correct, for the
cross-curricular themes concern knowledge of the economic motors of society and
their effects on the democratic process, of how political and economic decisions
affect the quality of life - environmentally, personally and interpersonally, and
the powers which an understanding of citizenship can bring.
If these cross-curricular themes possess 'dangerous knowledge' which can chal-
lenge the legitimacy and value of social, ideological and. cultural hegemony, then,
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for their full potential to be realized, they have to be accorded high status in
the curriculum as outlined earlier. The balance between the emancipatory and
constraining effects of the content prescription and pedagogy will be discussed for
each of the themes below. Before evaluating each theme in partiul an analysis
will be undertaken to identify the extent to which the Habermasian principles of
pedagogy and status are addressed in the modes of delivery of the cross-curricular
themes prescribed by the National Curriculum Council.
12.6.4 Pedagogy, Status and the Cross-curricular Themes
The principles of pedagogy for the cross-curricular themes outlined in 12.6
resonate clearly with the Habermasian principles for pedagogy outlined in the
previous chapter and clearly develop the objective, social and subjective worlds of
the lifeworld to which Habermas alludes (Habermas, 1987a, chapter 6). Though
the Curriculum Guidance documents accord a place to formal and didactic methods
it is quite clear in the documents that the types of experiences being advocated
for students should be active and collaborative rather than passive. The National
Curriculum Council provides some suggestions for how schools might address these
features. It suggests five approaches to 'delivery' which schools might adopt (cf
Curriculum Guidance (3)):
(i) permeating the whole curriculum;
(ii) whole curriculum planning leading to blocks of activities;
(iii) separately tirnetabled themes;
(jv) taught through separately timetabled PSE;
(v) long block timetabling
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The permeation approach can elevate the status of the themes by attaching
them to existing high status subjects and by requiring all staff to take cognizance of
them in their curriculum planning. On the other hand permeation can result in loss
of visibility in the curriculum, thereby lowering their status; all teachers may not
possess the subject expertise to handle the themes or the willingness to abandon
their subject loyalty (ci Bernstein, 1971, discussed in chapter 10). Attaching the
themes to an existing timetable which typically deals in short blocks of time might
prevent some of the active teaching approaches from taking place as these require
longer blocks of time.
Using the approach of whole curriculum planning leading to blocks of activi-
ties addresses the range of practical experiential learning situations advocated for
the cross-curricular themes (it is no accident that the title of this approach uses
the word 'activities'). In doing so it ensures that a very clear set of focuses is
established for the activities, enabling large and small scale projects to be devel-
oped which can link to the wider community and which develop collaborative team
work. According blocks of time to the themes may also be a means of enhancing
their status, as is the corollary of whole curriculum planning - the need for wide
involvement and ownership (though, as with the permeation approach, this latter
point does not guarantee the elevation of their status).
Of all five approaches set out in the Curriculum Guidance documents planning
by separately timetab led themes can accord considerable significance and status to
the cross-curricular themes. This is finely balanced, however; it can elevate the
status of the themes, alternatively it can marginalise them because this approach
separates theni from other curricular areas. This approach might also enable the
experiential and community based pedagogical principles outlined ealier to be ad-
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dressed, though how realistic this is in an overcrowded curriculum is questionable.
Locating the themes in separately timetabled PSE sessions sets cross-curricular
themes in an area of the curriculum with which they are sympathetic. - Personal
and Social Education. This enables direct involvement of students' own experi-
ences to be developed and an interrogation of values and beliefs to be undertaken.
However, locating them in PSE programmes might be the most problematical as-
pect of their delivery as PSE is often viewed by teachers and students as a low
status area of the curriculum. Further, locating cross-curricular themes in PSE
time is no guarantee that the practical, experiential and project based approaches
advocated will be able to be addressed.
What is emerging so far is a picture of the cross-curricular themes which sug-
gests that by confining them regularly to short blocks of timetabled time risks los-
ing the experiential, community-focussed and project-based aspects of the themes.
Long block timetabling avoids these difficulties. This method of delivering the cross-
curricular themes has very many attractions as it enables the practical, experiential
aspects of the themes to be addressed fully. Freeing large blocks of time enables
community-focused projects to be developed in a fully-fledged way (eg the example
of a project on 'shops' for primary children hi the document Education for Eco-
nomic and Industrial Understanding and work placements in secondary schools).
Clearly this approach can elevate the status of the cross-curricular themes, making
them very visible in the curriculum; in the long term, however, this might reduce
their status, for giving short term, discontinuous high status to the themes in this
approach might afford them a 'special' but marginalized place in the curriculum.
Having outlined the issues of pedagogy and status in the cr.ss-curricular
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themes the case study moves on to an examination of the contents of each of
the cross-curricular themes to indicate their emancipatory potential and to per-
form an ideology critique of them. This will involve a measure of analysis and
prescription for each theme, analysing its emancipatory potential. aiid suggesting
what is needed for that emancipatory potential to be realized.
12.6.5 An Analysis of Each Cross-curricular Theme
12.6.5.1 Education for Economic and Industrial Understanding
There is a recognition by the NCC that this theme 'involves controversial
issues such as government economic policy and the impact of economic activity on
the environment' (NCC, 1990b, p. 4), ie the Habermasian steering medium of the
economy. However in the same paragraph the message is given unequivocally that
young minds should be educated to enable pupils to be embryonic capitalists in a
free market, materialist economy:
Education for economic and industrial understanding aims to help pupils make
decisions such as how to organise their finances and how to spend their money... .It
prepares pupils for their future roles and producers, consumers and citizens in a
democracy. Pupils need to understand enterprise and wealth creation and develop
entrepreneurial skills (ibid, p. 4).
This echoes the market principles established earlier as an important context
of the National Curriculum as a whole. Indeed the tone of the NCC carries all
the optimism of a wealthy populace whose only contribution to the economy is
through work:
They will face choices about how they contribute to the economy through their
work. They will decide how to organise their finances and which goods and services
to spend iiioney on (NCC, 1990b, p. 1).
Through 'silencing' - the absence of reference (cf chapter 11) - it thus
renders unproblematic the reality of unemployment amongst individuals and whole
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communities which the demands of capital - corporate and international - exact
in their drive for surplus value. It links the notion of citizenship very firmly with
the economy, as though one cannot be a true citizen if one in not producing or
consuming -products: '[i]t prepares them for future economic roles: As producers,
consumers and citizens in a democracy' (ibid., p. 1). In doing so it links democracy
with the economy, a potentially narrow view of the complexity of democracy.
Further, whilst it acknowledges the need for an understanding of an industri-
alised and highly technological society this document regards as unchallengeable
and legitimate the view that that society is premissed on competitiveness (ibid.
p. 1), ie strategic action rather than communicative action and the suppression
of generalizable interests, indeed it sees the solution to such competitiveness in
increased rather than decreased competitiveness, ie that one abides by the same
'rules of the game' and becomes better at playing the game, where pupils 'meet
this challenge' by understanding wealth creation and developing entrepreneurial
skills (ibid. p 1) rather than by challenging the legitimacy of the game at all, ie
there is an absence of ideology critique in the document. It commits the natural-
istic and ideological fallacy of trying to derive an ought from an is - just because
one can observe this occurring in society gives little justification for its desirability.
One wonders if the hard-nosed, challenging, combative tone of the NCC document
would have found such an insistent voice if equal opportunity for a more caring,
compassionate, collaborative style were to have been afforded, ie if strategic ac-
tion had given way to communicative action and the operation of the ideal speech
situation.
The title of this document and the tone throughout is also met in the other
Curriculum. Guidance documents from the National Curriculum Condil - that
320
they deal with understanding rather than critique, perhaps not surprising given
that they are documents of guidance only. In Habermasian terms they deal with
hermeneutic rather than critical knowledge-constitutive interests. The effects of
this are to delegitimizealternatives to and to legitimize.the status ZLO, ie to risk
incorporation by the dominant ideology, ie the suppression of generalizable inter-
ests. Equal opportunities becomes redefined as equal opportunity to play the same
game regardless of the desirability of the game or its rules:
All pupils, regardless of culture, gender, or social background, should have equal
access to a curriculum which promotes economic and industrial understanding (NCC,
1990b. p• 6).
No space here is given to the consideration that not everyone might wish to -
or be able to - play the same game, though the latter is advocated in Curriculum
Guidance 7 (NCC, 1989b) and Curriculum Guidance 9 (NCC, 1992). Economic
and Industrial understanding is seen, therefore, to be a passionless activity, where
choice is rationalized out of existence. It emphasizes the 'decisionism' of the tech-
nical interest outlined in chapter 3.5.
Perhaps it is not idle to note that whilst art, dance and drama - those aspects
of the curriculum which could redeem the dehumanizing of economic and industrial
education through an appeal to aesthetic rationality, an important alternative to
technical rationality which is supported by Habermas (1984, 1987a) - all have
their part to play in the early Key Stages (eg ibid., pp. 14, 15, 23, 24), these are
either absent in the later Key Stages or are redefined so as to serve advertising,
marketing and persuasion to buy (eg pp. 33 and 42), as though they cease to
be intrinsically important activities as children become locked into industrial and
economic understanding. They become part of strategic action. In both cases the
aesthetic side of economic and industrial understanding -- in Habeasian terms
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a counter to rationalization - is seen itself to be a service industry, furthering
the technical and hermeneutic interest, and not worthwhile in its own right. It be-
comes a servant of strategic rather than communicative action. One is reminded of
Read's (1958) coimnents on essentialist versus- contextualist art; esseutialist art is
art for itself, contextualist art fulfils an instrumental function. In the Curriculum
Guidance document here art is contextualist. If one considers the issues raised in
the sociology of knowledge earlier where it was seen that affective, artistic areas
of the curriculum were accorded little status, then the dropping or redefining of
the arts as a service industry in education for economic and industrial understand-
ing can be seen as an attempt to raise the status of education for economic and
industrial understanding.
Further, people are seen as resources to be managed efficiently or to be ma-
nipulated - technically, strategically - as consumers. The NCC document is
unequivocal on this:
Industry involves the effective management of people and other resources, and
industrial organisations have different ways of maximising efficiency, output and job
satisfaction (ibid. p. 41).
Habermas's technical interest is well served in this document, method is all,
efficiency of the mechanism is all, and method ignores questions of aims, values
and goals, one simply accepts them as given. Debate and dialogue (communicative
action) are replaced by decisionism. The NCC document sets clear boundaries on
what is relevant to economic and industrial understanding (business, commerce,
finance and consumer affairs) (ibid., p. 3) and defines 'controversial issues' in
this field as 'the impact of economic activity on the environment', thereby ruling
out as irrelevant any discussion of poverty, of class oppression, of exploitative
relationships, of unequal power, of the daily experience of this unequaLpower, of the
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casualties of capitalism, ie in Habermas's terms providing unequal opportunities to
employ speech acts. Even though the document calls for a 'balanced presentation
of opposing views' and for pupils to be 'encouraged to explore values and beliefs,
both their ownandthose of others' (ibid., p. 3) its silence on whaLtthose might
be is, as was Thomas More's, 'not silence at all but most eloquent denial' (Bolt,
1960, p. 92), ie the suppression of generalizable interests and the application of
systematically distorted communication. It sees the rewards of wealth accruing to
those individuals and communities possessed of 'business enterprise' (ibid., p. 4),
it assumes that industry and industrial relations are fixed - 'the organization of
industry and industrial relations' (ibid., p. 4) (italics mine), thereby replacing
illocutionary communication with perlocutionary force.
The document defines the key concepts of economic and industrial under-
standing as production, distribution supply and demand (NCC, 199Db, p. 4),
and develops in a clear 'spiral curriculum' (Bruner, 1960) of economic concepts,
business enterprise, industry and the world of work, consumer affairs, government
and society (see Appendix J), thus thereby relegating any other agenda of key
concepts - eg exploitation, greed, materiaiism, need, poverty, exploitation and
pauperisation. It is not totally silent on these issues, 264 but, importantly, leaves
their consideration and the consideration of alternative economic systems until
pupils have reached Key Stage four (ibid., p. 40) - a very late stage (for children
in their middle teenage). This echoes Bernstein's (1971) implications discussed
earlier that for those pupils who do not reach the higher levels of the National
Curriculum the heart or the 'mysteries' of the subject are never met so that the
problematic issues are not fully explored or, therefore, challenged. They are so-
264 Eg Ecliicatioii for Economic and Industrial Understanding involves controversial issues' (NCC,
1990h. p. 3).. .
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cialized - perlocutionarily, strategically - into an existing order.
One has to question the ideological interests at work in devising and ordering
the NCC prescriptions in the way outlined. The government is seen to have a
legitimate regulative role to perform (ibid., pp. 34 and 43), theiby not only
reinforcing a bureaucratic hierarchy of power (the steering medium of the state) but
delegitimating alternative sources of power. System driven imperatives override
individual or collective agency which is consigned to the roles of producers and
consumers (ibid., pp. 33 and 42). In Habermasian terms the steering medium of the
economy colonizes the lifeworld of individuals, the 'system' distorts communication
by supplying a fixed rather than open agenda of curricular issues.
However, the document has a certain antinomial quality. On the one hand
what can be observed in it is the reaching into the heart of schools and very young
children the steering media of society - money, law, economics, ie wider referents
in society. The lifeworid of citizens, their agency, is redefined to meet the needs of
capital. Indeed 'enterprise' is defined in terms which feed into wealth generation:
Education for enterprise means two things. First, it means developing the qual-
ities iieedcd to be an 'enterprising' person, such as the ability to tackle problems, take
initiatives, persevere, be flexible, and work in teams. Secondly, and more specifically,
it uleans taking part in small-scale and community enterprise projects designed to
develop these qualities (ibid., p. 6).
On the other hand one would hesitate to say that children ought not to be
introduced to these issues. The question is one of adequacy; the document avoids
critique in the Key Stages, it needs to widen its view of profit and loss to include
human terms and humanity, it needs to question legitimacy, interests and ideology.
Pupils will 11ave to question why this has occurred - ie critically examining the
perlocutionary effects of the document. This will involve a critique of the instru-
mental and decisionistic tone of. the document.. A .Babermasian aua.lisis suggests
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the need to take far more seriously and in a more developed way its own call for
'rational argument' on the issues in the document (ibid., p. 5), for considerations
of 'respect for alternative economic viewpoints and a willingness to reflect criti-
cally on their [pupils'] Own economic views and values' and 'humanights' (ibid.,
p. 5), ie to reflect on and evaluate the role of the economic steering medium in
the lifeworld of pupils, and the ways in which communicative action - opening
up issues to debate - have been limited by strategic action in the delineation of
the agenda of the document. The call for rational debate and critical reflection
resonates clearly with those principles of the ideal speech situation which require:
freedom to: enter a discourse, check claims, evaluate explanations, modiiy frame-
works, reflect on the nature of knowledge, assess justifications, reflect on the nature
of political will (fig. 6.2 q.v.).
A Habermasian analysis suggests the need to counter the view of understand-
ing as acquiring knowledge of fixed and reified economics (cf Habermas's critique
of the law-like nature of positivism) with a view of human agency and human-
ity, with an acknowledgement that education does not simply - instrumentally,
strategically - provide an economically desirable service, but that it is the bearer
of dangerous knowledge, of critique, of the restoration of humanity in an age where
technology scientistically threatens to commodify human conduct. Emancipation
and empowerment - communicative action - upset rather than service the sta-
tus quo. In these terms the content of Education for Economic and Industrial
Understanding (EIU) remains underdeveloped.
Not only does the content of EIU neglect critique but this is evidenced in
pedagogy - that element identified in chapters 10 and 11 as being important
in promoting empowerment. Though the document implies activeexperiential
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learning (p. 4) - a pedagogical principle of procedure outlined in chapter 11 -
the pedagogical principles neglect critique. Figure 12.2 presents the key verbs used
to describe the pedagogical aims of EIU at different key stages (KS).
Figure 12.2 - Key Verbs in the EIU Document
Key Stage Key Verbs
KS1	 Discuss; talk about; survey; visit
KS2	 Discuss; understand; investigate; explore; visit;
interview; examine; describe
KS3	 Discuss; understand; survey; investigate; visit; compare;
___________ role-play; analyse; know that; recognise; collect data
KS4	 Discuss; understand; collect; know; prepare; use;
- debate; investigate; identify
These terms neglect the higher order skills outlined earlier in the elements
of the ideal speech situation (fig. 6.2) (cf Bloom, 1956) in verbs like 'evaluate',
'critique', 'analyse', 'synthesis', 'judge', 'suggest why', 'interrogate', 'explore', 'pro-
pose' and reflect a technical and hermeneutic interest rather than an interest in
critique, deliberation and evaluation. Indeed the only reference to evaluation shows
it to be an evaluation of the achievement of given objectives rather than of the
objectives themselves: 'Pupils were encouraged to reflect on and evaluate their
own work in relation to the objectives for each part of the project' (ibid., p. 38).
Hence the pedagogical principles, whilst embodying key requirements of empower-
ing curricula, fall short of full empowerment, they neglect critique and judgement.
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12.6.5.2 Health Education
The NCC document (NCC, 1990c) casts health education into nine compo-
nents:
. substance use and misuse;
• sex education;
• family life education;
• safety;
• health-related exercise;
• food and nutrition;
• personal hygiene;
• environmental aspects of health education;
• psychological aspects of health education.
As before the question to be put here is not against the content with which it
deals - it would be difficult to argue against the inclusion of the content specified
- but rather the way in which the content is approached, the inclusion or exclusion
of content and the hidden curriculum of such decision making.
A reading of the list of topics within health education might indicate that a
wide range of issues and areas is to be covered; indeed that is the case. However
the document addresses the topics in such a way as to cast health education as
largely an individual's responsibility, suggesting that this responsibility is merely
an exercise of choice,.. neglecting the requirements of the. ideal speejh situation
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that a common interest and a 'cooperative search for truth' are important (fig.
6.2). For example the document indicates that 'today, non-infectious diseases,
fatal accidents and unhealthy patterns of behaviour are the key factors' (ibid.,
-	 p. 2), thereby minimizing environmental causes and avoiding heal.th problems
overseas in developing and third world countries. Problematical issues are alluded
to: 'an understanding of environmental aspects of health education, including
social, physical and economic factors which contribute to health and illness' (p.
5); 'know that within any environment there are people with different attitudes,
values and beliefs and that these influence people's relationships with each other
and with the environment' (p. 15); 'understand how legislation and political, social,
economic and cultural decisions affect health' (p. 20). However they are defined in
the early Key Stages as being a matter almost of individuals' responsibility which
is subject to their own preference, for example:
know that within any environment there are people with different attitudes,
values aiid beliefs and that these influence people's relationships with each other and
with the environment (ibid., p. 15).
As with the document Education for Economic and Industrial Understanding
it is only in Key Stage four that reference is made to the politics of health care:
'understand how legislation and political, social, economic and cultural decisions
affect health' (ibid., p. 20). Even here the responsibility for health, as in the
previous Key Stages is overwhelmingly seen to be personal or at best a community
concern - 'the overlapping interests of individual, group and community health'
(ibid., p. 3). There is a 'silencing' (cf chapter 11) on the large scale political
decision making to improve health care and provision. 265 The solubility of health
problems is seen to be an individual rather than a political, social, cultural or
265 In this context it is notable, for example, that commercial sponsorship by tobacco companies is
not a(l(Iressed ijor are questions of the ambivalent relationship between governments who enjoy tax
revemnu' fromit tobacco and yet who proscribe tobacco as an addictive, killing drug...,..
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economic issue: 'the emphasis in most health education curricula is on encouraging
individual responsibility, awareness and informed decision-making' (ibid., p. 7).
Such a circumscription of concerns diverts attention away from structural poverty
and its relateiiess '
 to health - that many citizens cannot afford to exercise choice
in their life styles - and that this is as much a politico-economic problem as it
is a health problem. Though this is touched upon at Key Stage 3 (pupils should
'recognise that there are some socio-economic factors which make cleanliness more
difficult for some people' (p. 17)) there is a naivety about the document which
celebrates agency over structure, whereas Habermas argues for lifeworld, agency
and system to be integrated: 'know that there is a wide variety of foods to choose
from and that choice is based on needs and / or culture' (ibid., p. 13). That,
plainly, is only an option for a fraction of the world's population.
The NCC document adopts a nationalistic, insular view of health at home as it
impinges on children and overlooks massively the international politics of health.
Its assumption of the low incidence of infectious diseases overlooks third world
poverty and the politics of international capitalism which allows this to continue,
ie communication free from domination of the ideal speech situation is overlooked.
Whilst health education is seen to invoi;e more than physiological concerns -
extending to 'psychological aspects of health education' it is portrayed as relatively
unproblematic. Hence the NCC document simplistically states that 'those who are
happy with their image are able to take increasing control of their lives, including
decisions relating to healthy lifestyles' (ibid., p. 9), overlooking the reality that
for many the col1trol of their image is out of their reach, ie Habermas's speech act
claim of veracity is being.. violated.	 -	 -
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The NCC document is almost completely silent on the politics of health,
thereby leaving the politics unchallenged; this has the effect of legitimizing the
status quo, ie in Habermasian terms acting strategically rather than communica-
tively. This political silencing reaches further, for not only is the family unit (and,
if the drawings in the document carry hidden messages, the white, nuclear fam-
ily) celebrated as having the central role as an institution (p. 4) but alternative,
less institutional groupings receive no comment. The document reinforces, both
through its text and its drawings the heterosexism and homophobia of a govern-
ment which - strategically - outlawed homosexuality and its manifestations;
sexual relationships are only to be heterosexual and only to be fostered in the
context of supporting family life (ibid., p. 4).
The 'naming' of the family unit (cf chapter 11) disregards the lived experiences
of many people of the miseries of family life (or its breakdown) and the happinesses
of alternative groupings, whilst the 'silencing' of non-heterosexual relationships
devalues and disconfirms these groups in society. For many this 'loss of meaning'
leads to 'loss of freedom', a feature exposed by Habermas's analysis of Weber.
The issue is intensely political; Worsley (1977) summarizes a wealth of re-
search to support the view that nuclear families underpin a capitalist economic
system because of their characteristics of independence, privacy, consumerism, the
exploitation of women, the facility for primary social relationships - enabling
bureaucratic relationships to be fostered in the bureaucracies of work, ie Haber-
mas's 'scientization' of relationships and the intrusion of an objective, rationalized,
steering medium - bureaucracy - into the lifeworld of its participants. Indeed
Worsley argues that in many respects the value of the family unit is a convenient
myth - an ideology	 which is functionally convenient for the reqiirements of
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capital, ie which suppresses generalizable interests.
Both examples illustrate the distortion of communicative action by the strate-
gic action of the steering medium (the National Curriculum Cquncil entering the
lifeworlds of participants and serve to reinforce the status quo which oppresses the
powerless and already oppressed and does little to further the equal opportunities
policy declared as a cross-curricular dimension. In this respect the document has
perlocutionary rather than illocutionary effects.
In terms of pedagogy health education is seen to be more a niatter of Un-
derstanding than of critique, Habermas's hermeneutic rather than emancipatory
interest. As with the previous document, the political sensitivity of the issues,
where it is addressed, is given only scant attention and then only at the later Key
Stages, ie the issues are not able to be explored communicatively, thereby violating
the speech act validity requirements of truth, appropriacy and comprehensibility.
There is an assumption that children should not exercise their critical faculties
until they reach teenage, and that sensitive issues cannot be made accessible to
childreii at Key Stages one or two. This runs counter to the evidence (summarized
by Dixon, 1977) that race and gender stereotypes are present in pre-school children;
the NCC health education document only introçluces the question of labelling and
stereotyping at Key Stage three (ie for secondary school pupils).
If Haberniasian empowerment and emancipation are sought, then, as with
the discussion of the previous document, this will require an amplification of the
pedagogical sphere of health education to move beyond hermeneutic understanding
of controversial issues to ideology critique and critical interrogation from the early
Key Stages onwards of the sensitive issues of . the document,. thegitimacy of
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the views propounded in the document, and the politics of the issues involved.
What characterizes the health education document is its silence on the problematic
underpinnings of its views. It devotes most of its pages to laying out content to
be delivered rather than probing beneath the content to unpack thQ arguments,
values and ideologies which are contained in it.
The document does mention the active, experiential pedagogies suggested as
necesary for communicative action in chapter 11:
The participation of pupils is essential in order to encourage pupils to learn
froiii others and to help them use appropriate language in ways that are understood
by others. . . .[M]uch of the teaching in health education will be based on the active
involvement of pupils. Teaching methods particularly suited to this kind of approach
iiichtde games. simulations, case studies, role plays, problem-solving exercises, ques-
tiounaires. surveys, open-ended questions and sentences and group work of various
kinds (NCC. 1990c, p. 7).
However this remains underdeveloped in the document. Further, figure 12.3
indicates that, as with the document on EIU, the key verbs of this document use the
lower order verbs of the technical and hermeneutic rather than the emancipatory,
critical interest and higher order verbs of the ideal speech situation.
There is very little to suggest that pedagogical issues are sensitive, problematic
and value laden. The potential for rational, critical enquiry is minimised. If the
causes of the sensitive issues were addressed and interrogated, questioning the
legitimacy of decision making - macro- as well as micro-sociologically, if rational
enquiry - communicative action and ideology critique - were undertaken into
the background to health related issues (eg poverty, affluence, exploitation, health
care and nutrition, and the political and economic systems which undergirded
the decisions) then their full emancipatory potential might be realized. What we
are presented with here is another commission of the naturalistic fallacy where
an understanding of what is replaces a critical discussion .of what.-..ought to be
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Figure 12.3 - Key Verbs in the Health Education Document
Key Stage Key Verbs 	 -
KS1	 Explore; construct; talk about; know that; understand;
acquire
KS2	 Devise; draw; exemplify; consider; perform; know that;
understand; acquire; recognise
KS3	 Discuss; describe; share; assess; identify; recognise;
be aware of; understand; know that
KS4	 Discuss; clarify; devise; investigate; explore;
understand; be aware of, know that; accept
happening in health-related enquiry.
12.6.5.3 Careers Education and Guidance
This document (NCC, 1990d) argues that children will profit from an early
contact with careers education which includes:
• careers education;
• access to information;
• experience of work;
• access to individual guidance;
• recording achievement and planning for the future (NeC, 1990d, p. 5).
In this context careers education and guidance addresses Haberrnas's steering
medium of the economy and the need to investigate market principles, personal
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and social development, 'stereotyped attitudes to education, training and career
opportunities' (ibid., p. 2) through the study of five strands:
• self (knowing oneself better);
• roles (being aware of education, training and career opportunities);
• work and career (making choices about continuing education and training, and
about career paths);
• transition (managing transitions to new roles and situations).
In this process the document cites the concept of partnership, developed
through liaison between education and a heterogeneity of organizations and in-
terested parties (pp. 9 - 1O),26ê and suggests that 'careers education and guidance
has particularly close links with economic and industrial understanding and edu-
cation for citizenship' (p. 11). Indeed the document advocates the 'application of
industrial processes in the classroom' (p. 5), an ideological practice which resonates
with the market context of education outlined earlier in this chapter.
In these links and partnerships the effect of this document is to suggest not
only infinite possibility, eg. 'future career possibilities' (p. 34) and 'future career
opportunities' (p. 41), but also that the education system will prepare for this
infinite possibility from the year a child enters school and thereafter be able to
serve all of a child's career needs and interests, eg 'careers education and guidance
should help pupils to know themselves better, be aware of training and career op-
portunities, make choices about their own continuing education and training, and
266 For exaiiiple. the careers service, Compacts, employers, the Foundation for Education Business
Partiierships. governors, parents, Schools Industry Liaison Officers, School Curriculum Industry
Partuvrships. Mini-Enterprise in Schools Project, staff from FE and HE institutions, Training and
Enterprise Councils, youth and community workers.
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about career paths' (p. 2). Clearly this is an example of strategic action and it
neglects the lived experiences of individuals and communities where structural un-
employment is an everyday feature, where the 'local employment patterns' (p. 30)
are non-existent or fragile and temporary, where poor pay and conditions combine
to render the concepts of a career and work not only worthless or unrealistic but
undesirable, unfulfilling and undignifying, ie where, in Habermasian terms, there
are iot equal opportunities to employ speech acts.
There is a cosiness about the document which suggests that if one abides by
the advice given in it - if one 'plays the game' - then employment is certain,
that 'future work opportunities' (p. 42) are guaranteed. Indeed the language of
the document is replete with references to 'opportunities' (pp. 1, 2, 22, 23, 26,
30, 33, 40, 41, 42), 'enjoyment', 'interest' and 'satisfaction' (pp. 2, 13, 19, 24,
37, 38), 'work satisfaction' (p. 24) and 'career choices' (pp. 2, 4, 5, 26, 33, 37).
The message is unequivocal: understand and abide by the rules of the game, do
not challenge the 'system' and prosperity will follow; the 'system' is there to help,
the system can be supportive, even if it 'colonizes the lifeworid'. That this has
an ideological - concealing - function is evidenced in the lived experiences of
unemployment by millions.
The bureaucracies of education and its partners are seen to fulfil an enabling
rather than a constraining role. This document is written in the language of oppor-
tunity and personal investment of the human capital theorists and the imperatives
of capital which appeared unmoved by the dehumanization and exploitation of
workers on an international scale in its thirst for surplus value, ie Habermas's sup-
pression of generalizable interests which underlies strategic action. The examples
of careers which the document portrays are of fulfiffing. roles (eg p,.-.24), of 'ad-
335
mired adults' as role models (p. 29) and of the possibilities of work both at home
and overseas (p. 40); the document is marked by the theme of 'possibility', which
is unrealistic in an employment context which is market-driven (ie strategic ac-
tion), in which selection and competition for jobs occurs (a curious ititerpretation
of the 'equal opportunities' of the cross-curriculum dimension!), and in which 'op-
portunity' is defined as the opportunity to take part in a system whose legitimacy
remains unchallenged, ie the suppression of generalizable interests in systematically
distorted communication through the concealment of interests.
The effects of casting the document in this tone are twofold. Firstly it diverts
attention away from the desirability of the 'system' for which children are being
prepared (p. 12) - a 'cooling out' process in which the steering media of work,
career and the economy impact on the lifeworid of participants from their entry
into school at 5 years. The whole process of preparation for participation in a
steering medium has been bureaucratized - systematized, rationaiized - for the
period of the child's time in school. Secondly it minimizes the problematic areas
of the world of work, redefining the problem of work as the failure of an individual
to match up to the system's requirements rather than vice versa267 and thereby
violating the speech act validity requirement of truth.
As with the previous two documents the study of controversial issues is sup-
pressed until the Key Stages three and four, thereby violating the speech act
validity requirements of appropriacy and comprehensibility, and then it is given
low priority by being swamped by a multiplicity of system-affirming areas of study
(pp. 27 - 43). In these sixteen pages of text in the document there are only some
207 This is a relicarsal of the cultural and individual pathology model of education of the 1960s (Horton,
1966: Jackson and Marsden, 1966; Dreebeuç 1968). - 	 -
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two dozen lines in all which mention contentious issues, eg: 'to consider controver-
sial issues related to work' (p. 31); 'identify problems and opportunities of work
overseas' ( p. 40); 'appreciate conflicts in adult work life' (p. 31); 'consult sources
of specialized knowledge about hazardsand conflicts at work' (p. 36).'identify the
satisfactions and dissatisfactions of specific roles' (p. 38). Understanding replaces
critique, hermeneutic interest replaces emancipatory interest, empowerment only
follows if one abides by, rather than challenges, the system.
The effects of this document are to delegitimize alternatives to the capitalist
system, ie demonstrating perlocutionary rather than ifiocutionary force, to neglect
the lived experiences of unemployment, ie to leave uncontested the intrusion of the
system into the lifeworid, to render education instrumental (strategic action), ser-
vicing a system the consideration of whose worth is neglected, to prepare children
from their entry into school at five years for the future world of work and thereby
to reinforce the status quo. It is interesting in this context to note the conservative
nature of the example of a career line which stops at marriage (p. 29).
In terms of pedagogy the declared purposes have all the rhetoric of partici-
patory activity of the ideal speech situation, eg 'work visits, work simulations (eg
design-and-make exercises, mini-enterprises, business games); work shadowing; ap-
plication of industrial processes in the classroom; project work arising from real-life
problems set by industry and community contacts' (p. 5). However figure 12.4 in-
dicates that the verbs used in describing the pedagogy, whilst indicating some
possibilities for critique, eg 'begin to challenge adult role stereotypes' (p. 15) and
'consider controversial issues' (p. 31), nevertheless use the language of Habermas's
technical and hermeneutic rather than the emancipatory, critical in.terest.
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Figure 12.4 - Key Verbs in the Careers Education Document
Key Stage Key Verbs	 -
KS1	 Describe; form impressions; examine; plan; acquire;
notice; use; identify; recognise; talk about;
_____________ investigate
KS2	 Understand; explore; become aware of; classify;
review; compare; respond to; devise; visit;
____________ discuss; identify; use; contrast; anticipate
KS3	 Understand; make decisions; solve problems;
strengthen knowledge of; explore; compare; review;
participate in; identify; survey; prepare for;
consider; visit; research
KS4	 Understand; prepare for; use; talk about;
role-play; simulate; consult; compile; review;
examine; share; identify; explore
This document nevertheless carries some emancipatory potential. If the 'chinks
in the armour' (Giroux, 1983) of the system are exposed, if the system is not simply
accepted and understood but interrogated, chJlenged and critiqued, if questions
of interests, legitimacy, power, agency and determinism are addressed - subjected
to rational investigation of the degree of generalizable interests which inhere in the
values investigated, ie coupling Habermas's ideology critique and communicative
action - then careers education and guidance may be empowering.
As with the previous two documents, this document provides a necessary
introductory platform for enquiry by -indicating fields of study, knowledge and
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skills, but it needs to go further; it needs to introduce critique and contestation
early on if it is to interrogate the systematically distorted communication in the
constructions of careers education and guidance placed in the document and to
examine the illocutionary and perlocutionary purposes and effects f abiding by
the document as it stands. The language of 'possibility' and 'opportunity' to 'know
thyself' (NCC, 1990d) in careers education and guidance needs to take seriously
the structural constraints, bureaucracies and contexts which affect those possi-
bilities and opportunities. Knowing thyself, rationally reconstructing the blocks
which prevent individuals from being empowered, echoes Habermas's early work
on ideological distortions and his later work on the need for communicative action
through rational enquiry; this can be immensely challenging to the status quo. Uti-
lizing Habermas's concepts exposes the significant omissions from the document
and suggests how these omissions might be addressed.
12.6.5.4 Environmental Education
Though much of this document is devoted to worked examples of environ-
mental education about, for and through the physical environment (NCC, 1990e,
p. 7) it nevertheless squarely reflects the contentious nature of environmental ed-
ucation, it recognizes that 'environmental education is the subject of considerable
debate and that there is no clear consensus about many of the issues' (ibid., p.
1), clearly inviting those elements of the ideal speech situation which emphasize
a 'common interest' and a rational consensus. The document requires pupils to
study a range of sensitive issues which raise questions of interests, legitimacy and
ideology critique, for example:
. the impact of.human activities upon the environment;
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• environmental issues such as the greenhouse effect, acid rain, air pollution;
• local, national and international legislative controls to protect and manage the
environment; how policies and decisions are made about the environment;
• the environmental interdependence of individuals, groups, communities and
nations;
• the conflicts which arise about environmental issues;
• the importance of effective action to protect and manage the environment,
(NCC, 1990e, p. 4).
This is undertaken for each of a range of environmental topics (p. 10): climate
(pp. 26 - 7, 30 - 1); soils, rocks and minerals (pp. 20 - 1); water (pp. 30 - 1); energy
(pp. 30 - 2); plants and animals (pp. 20 - 5); people and communities (pp. 26 -
9); buildings, industrialization and waste (pp. 17, 36 - 7). Indeed the document
suggests that environmental education aims to 'encourage pupils to examine and
interpret the environment from a variety of perspectives - physical, geographi-
cal, biological, sociological, economic, political, technological, historical, aesthetic,
ethical and spiritual' (ibid., p. 3). It suggests the need for a respect for evidence
and rational argument (p. 6), clearly a sympathy with Habermas's concern for a
rational consensus, and encourages individuals, schools and communities to raise
awareness of personal, participatory responsibility for the environment (pp. 1 - 6):
'never has there been a greater need for young people to be aware of the necessity
to look after the environment. They are its custodians' (p. 1); 'each individual
can...contribute to the protection of the environment' (p. 3); 'working coopera-
tively with others, eg participating in group activities for the environment, taking
individual and group responsibility for the environment' (p. 6).	 --
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Whilst this document is perhaps laudable it nevertheless stops short of ide-.
ology critique of the power of groups, governments and decision makers to exploit
the environment, ie to practise strategic rather than communicative action, on
the moral resolution of conflicts and the nature of the warrantEd rational consen-
sus about environmental decisions. 268 The document, like that on EJU considered
above, gives weight to people as producers and consumers (p. 1), reiterating the
market principles which were questioned at the start of this chapter for their sup-
pression of generalizable interests, and some of the examples it gives269 illustrate
a market mentality. One wonders, therefore, whether, even though the rhetoric of
the document involves Habermasian principles of rational enquiry, responsibility
and questions of legitimacy and interests, the moral arguments have received the
due weight that they perhaps deserve if the aims are to be realized. Justifications
are seen pragmatically - strategically - (eg p. 29 and p. 34) rather than ethi-
cally and communicatively, and questions of differential powers in decision making
are understated. Influence over decision makers is not considered problematic,
ie how individuals and groups can affect the participants in steering media (eg
those in economic and political office) is neglected. Though there is much illocu-
tionary potential in the document it offers little advice on how to overcome the
perlocutionary decisions of those in power.
In terms of pedagogy this document possesses much potential for communica-
tive action as it requires pupils to recognise 'all the points of view' (NCC, 1990e,
For iiistaiiee. in the example of emissions from British power stations affecting Scandinavia (pp.
30 - 31) t.hc ixarest that the document comes to suggesting censure of the practice is to mention
the need for euvironmenta1 interdependence' (p 30). In the passing mention it gives to rainforest
destrurtioii it. neglects to consider the possible causes of rahuforest destruction - eg materialist
consumerism in the developed world, the developed world exploiting the third world - and the
lcgitiiiiuey (if the enterprise.
269 For eXallIl)lO p. 39 on.cattle- rearing for . profit.	 -
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p. 1), it suggests that environmental education 'introduces pupils to political pro-
cesses and encourages them to take on social responsibility' (ibid., p. 12). In the
verbs it uses this document possesses many elements of empowerment though it
stops short of critique (figure 12.5).
Figure 12.5 - Key Verbs in the Environmental Education Document
Key Stage Key Verbs
KS1	 Look at; express views on; compare; explore
KS2	 Express views, argue, retrieve; interpret; evaluate;
___________ identify; investigate; formed reasoned opinions
KS3 Investigate; analyse; take responsibility for;
argue; retrieve; interpret; evaluate; identify;
form reasoned opinions
KS4	 Draw up proposals; argue; retrieve; interpret;
evaluate; identify; form reasoned opinions
One can see evidence in these of the higher order thinking of the ideal speech
situation though it is interesting to note the same verbs appearing at three different
stages, indicating perhaps a lack of progression.
Hence, as with the problematic areas of the previous documents, the prob-
lematic questions of environmental education are mentioned - indeed they are
seen to lie at the heart of environmental education - but they are cast in the
language of unrealistic possibility. The case studies presented are either of local
small scale projects or are paper exercises in analysis of more global issues. If
participatory democracy and decision making for environmental res.onsibi1ity is
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sought then the channels of that participation and its problematic areas need to
receive greater attention, ie participants should be made aware of how they can
influence communicative action for everyone's interests - the promotion of gen-
eralizable interests. Without this the effects of the document are jo emphasize
hermeneutic knowledge rather than critique. This document, probably more than
most of the others considered here, centralizes the problematic areas of the topic
under discussion, its highlighting of an ecological crisis adds to the legitimation,
economic and motivational crises outlined by Habermas (1976a).27°
12.6.5.5 Education for Citizenship
The rhetoric of this document (NCC, 1990f) celebrates participatory democ-
racy, positive action, responsibilities, rights and rational entitlement (p. 1), all
central features of emancipatory education 271 dealing centrally with Habermas's
steering media of law and power and addressing the notion of citizenship as a
major means of breaking strategic action of ifiegitimate power and a technicist
mentality (cf chapter 11). Indeed the title Education for Citizenship echoes the
frequent references to 'citizenship' and 'civic courage' found in the work of Giroux.
As with the previous documents discussed above, one would not wish much of
the material to be excluded; rather the question, as before, is how the material
is approached, discussed, treated, and whether the material goes far enough to
empower pupils to realize their existential futures free from ideological distortion
- systematically distorted communication. This document sets out an agenda of
issues for citizenship education whose effects may reinforce the status quo and rule
out of the analysis any developed questioning or critique of legitimacy, interests,
270 In this respect it addresses a niajor weakness of Gixoux's work noted in Appendix E - his neglect
of th tcological crisis in the world and his celebration of an anthropocentric view of the universe.
271	 .Cf Aruiiowitz and Giroux, 1986; Giroux, 1989. - 	 -	 -
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powers or degrees of freedom. There are two main ways in which this occurs:
Firstly, the document, in its aims of citizenship education, minimises critique
in favour of understanding and delimits participatory action:
Schools must lay the foundations for positive, participative citizenship in two
iniportaiit. ways:
(i) by helping pupils to acquire and understand essential information;
(ii) by providing them with opportunities and incentives to participate in all
aspects of school life (NCC, 1990f, p. 1).
Thus pupils are only required to receive hermeneutically certain prescribed
information, not to challenge or critique it. Moreover, there is an arrogance in
the certainty of what is 'the essential information' which not only defines essential
information but which rules out alternative constructions of essential information,
the effects of which are therefore perlocutionary. By its prescription of essential in-
formation the document risks incorporation into the dominant ideology (discussed
later), the effect of which is to buttress up the status quo. Further, active participa-
tion is confined to school life rather than moving outside of school, it is contained
in an environment that can leave the outside world untouched, thereby neglecting
that element of Haberniasian pedagogy which argues for community links.
Secondly, when one examines the content of the citizenship curriculum one
finds that its scope embraces:
(i) the nature of community involvement (p. 5), which, even though it includes
economic and political communities, only emphasises roles and the operation of
these communities, ie they are 'givens' not interrogated or critiqued, the potential
for ideology critique is neglected;
(ii) roles and relationships in a pluralist society (p; 6), which,-even though
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they einphasise equality, justice, multiculturalism and multiethnicity, nevertheless
neglect to detail the problematic areas of these considerations, eg the lack of op-
portunity for some to employ speech acts, ie they are generalized, exhortatory and
administered through the operation of laws whose content or iegitimacy are not
interrogated; hermeneutic understanding takes precedence over critique;
(iii) duties, responsibilities and rights of being a citizen (pp. 6 - 7), which,
in contrast, for example, to the document on Careers Education discussed earlier,
include reference to equal opportunities, political rights and the protection of the
rights of the weak and disadvantaged, ie those with limited powers to employ
speech acts, and recognize the need for a balance between individual freedoms and
social constraints (the agency and structure tension) but which neglect critique
of the legitimacy of structural inequality, poverty, oppression and exploitation, ie
which fail to engage ideology critique and the search for a warranted consensus;
(iv) the family, (p. 7) which neglects to render the family as problematic272
and, in its 'naming' of the family and 'silencing' of other forms of partnerships,
operates a heterosexism which violates the NCC's declared policy of equal opportu-
nities and legitimates what, for many, is a problematic and illegitimate institution,
ie generalizable interests are suppressed, the outcomes of this - perlocutionarily
are socially and culturally reproductive rather than transformative;
(v) democracy in action (pp. 7 - 8) which, even though it includes a corn-
parison of different political systems, is silent on the legitimacy or questioning of
political systems and mechanisms of the state, the effects of which are to confine
participatory democratic behaviour to local institutions with major political deci-
sion making being seen as the legitimate responsibility of a representative dernoc-
272 Sec the eounueiits earlier on the health education document.....
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racy without questioning the differential powers which it is representing and the
interests at work in this. Ideology critique and communicative action to interrogate
systems are neglected;
(vi) the citizen and the law (p. 8), which, although including questions of
freedoms and rights, neglects to question, for example, how the law may oper-
ate against the interests of the poor, the disempowered and the oppressed, the
relationship between the law and political interests in the creation of laws, and
tensions in the law, ie which neglects unequal opportunities to employ speech acts.
Further, it is only at Key Stage four that students are introduced to how laws are
made and changed (p. 19), reinforcing the issue raised by Bernstein earlier that
not introducing pupils to the heart of a subject until very late (ie until they have
been 'schooled' into acceptance of legitimacy) has the effect that many pupils are
socialized - perlocutionarily and strategically - into an existing order;
(vii) work, employment and leisure (pp. 8 - 9), which, although including
reference to union activity and governmental responsibility for employment and
unemployment, like the documents discussed earlier, carry an implicit message of
infinite possibility and the benefits of wealth creation in materialist and leisure
activities for those who abide by the 'rules of the capitalist game', ie which ne-
glect ideology critique and a critique of the effects of the intrusion of the steering
medium of employment into the lifeworld of participants (eg the reasons why some
participants may not have equal rights to employ speech acts);
(viii) public services (p. 8) which, although it includes the issue of provision of
public services, neglects to question the legitimacy of public, private and voluntary
services and the iegitimacy of the funding of, availability of,. and opportunity to
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access what many see as a fundamental human right.
Whilst the document recognizes that 'education for citizenship involves con-
troversial issues upon which there is no clear consensus' (ibid., p. 14) nevertheless
its emphasis on understanding a received body of knowledge negléds a critical
rational and moral / ethical enquiry that Habermas's ideal speech situation re-
quires. Citizenship education has become redefined as community responsibility
to an existing order rather than as critical participatory democracy. A Haber-
masian critique suggests that the capability of all the 'systems' mentioned above
to systematically distort communication through the suppression of generalizable
interests needs to receive greater attention.
The content as described above brims over with emancipatory potential pro-
vided that this content is interrogated rather than simply accepted. How one might
gain access to power, how one exercises and develops one's 'voice', how one exposes,
acts on, and reduces non-generalizable vested interests needs to receive greater
coverage if a fully fledged emancipation is to be wrought. As with the preceding
document, without participants being made aware of how they can generate and
become involved in communicative action with those in power the effects of this
document are to reinforce hermeneutic rather than critical knowledge. Further,
the suppression of other areas of 'citizenship' ontent needs to be questioned, for
example Peace Studies, Political Education, Media Education.273
In terms of pedagogical principles, though there is some indication of interro-
gation and critique and frequent references to 'activities', the verbs used in the doc-
ument focus on understanding and exploration rather than critique (figure 12.6).
This replicates the analysis of the previous four cross-curricular themes.
273 These arc area.s which are arraigned by the Hillgate group (Cox it et al, 1986, pp.- 4 - 5).
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Figure 12.6 - Key Verbs in the Education for Citizenship Document
Key Stage Key Verbs
KS1	 Think about; cooperate; agree; discuss; listen to;
___________ explore; talk about;_decide;_plan
KS2	 Plan; review; evaluate; investigate; survey;
__________ study; organise; identify
KS3	 Choose; investigate; discuss; collect examples;
____________ identify
KS4	 Plan; organise; investigate; participate in;
observe; debate; discuss; find out about
12.7 Conclusions
This case study has argued that it is in cross-curriculum issues in general
and themes in particular that much of the emancipatory potential of the National
Curriculum content can lie. Using a Habermasian perspective on these it has been
suggested that it is in the cross-curricular issues that the controversial nature of
values, legitimacy and interests resides, and as such they possess greater trans-
formative potential than the subjects of the core and foundation subjects of the
National Curriculum. Their content was seen to articulate with the wider society
and steering media, ie to have referents beyond the confines of the school rather
than to shut down external referents in school curricula (ie to refer to students'
communities and objective, social and subjective worlds).
In the field of pedagogy, though active, practical and experiential approaches
were celebrated (linking them to Habermasian pedagogical principles- for emanci-
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patory curricula set out in chapter 11) nevertheless they understated the inter-
rogative and critical pedagogies which chapter 11 suggested were necessary for
emancipatory curricula. The cross-curricular themes possessed the potential for
communicative action in that they were seen to 'have in commom th. capacity to
promote discussion of values and beliefs, extend knowledge and understanding, en-
courage practical activities and decision making and further the inter-relationship
of the individual and the community' (NeC, 1990f, p. 3). However in these the
emphasis needed to shift beyond instrumental and cognitive passiveness (resisting
challenge to issues) to interrogation and ideology critique.
The cross-curricular themes are heavy on Habermas's technical and hermeneu-
tic interest but very light on the emancipatory, critical interest. What we are wit-
ness to here is that emancipatory curricula - curricula that can develop student
voice - are being both suppressed and reinterpreted to reduce their emancipatory
potential, a clear ideological process of incorporation. They have considerable
einancipatory potential, but in the construction of these emancipatory themes this
potential is being under-represented in the documents.
The five cross-curricular themes place an emphasis on education as an instru-
mental activity in the service of the economy, reinforcing strategic action and the
suppression of generalizable interests of the market mentality which the early part
of this chapter suggested was a principle on which the National Curriculum and
the 1988 Education Reform Act, which brought it into being, were premissed. It
has been suggested here that were they to be supplemented by another agenda of
cross-curricular themes - eg empowerment, enjoyment, the experience of success,
awareness, compassion, self-determination, freedom, creativity, the development
of aesthetic and imaginative forms-of expression. which reflected . the more intrinsic
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worthwhileness of education 274 - and were they to develop a Habermasian critical
pedagogy then emancipation and empowerment would become less bounded, less
circumscribed, less predictable, more dangerous and system-upsetting. The cross-
curricular themes have potential for learners to appropriate, contextualize and
situate discussion in their own circumstances, but this not only needs to be done
from an earlier age than that given in the NCC's Curriculum Guidance documents
but needs to render more problematical the issues in the cross-curricular themes
than the documents suggest. The content and pedagogy of the cross-curricular
themes needed to develop critique in students. The cross-curricular themes, then,
provide a foundation for empowerment which needs a fuller and more developed
critical superstructure.
A fully-rounded picture of content and pedagogy - its rendering as prob-
lematical the issues which it treats - enables communicative action as rational
discourse and rational interrogation of issues to be pursued. Rational interrogation
exposes th degree to which generalizable interests are embodied in content and
promote action oriented to mutual understanding in the pedagogical processes of
rational interrogation.
Though the National Curriculum embodies strong classification and framing
and can stifle empowerment, there is still room for emancipation to occur. If it
can occur here then it is likely to have greater potential to occur in curricula which
are ideologically more suited to Habermasian principles. This can be seen in an
update of th politics of the curriculum in Appendix K.
In presenting the case study material this chapter has attempted to make good
the empty rhetoric for which Bowers (1991) criticized Giroux; it has attempted to
274 Thb r(rog11izes. of course, that the two are by no means mutually exclusive. 	 -
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provide a concrete example as well as to provide a 'severe test' of Habermas's
theory. The chapter has shown how Habermas's views can stand up to a 'severe'
test by: (a) being applied in a context which is different from that which gave rise
to the theory; (b) clarifying where and why the emancipatory potential of curric-
ula might be limited; (c) outlining the meaning and implications of a bureaucra-
tized curriculum and suggesting how the negative effects of a highly prescriptive
and bureaucratized curriculum can be addressed; (d) exposing the dangers of a
'hegemonic academic curriculum' which suppresses challenge and the higher order
thinking required of an emancipatory curriculum and indicating how these might
be addressed; (e) indicating how 'generalizable interests' are blocked and yet might
be deeloped in the curriculum; (f) undertaking an ideology critique of the political
and sectional interests at work in the curriculum; (g) indicating how an analysis of
knowledge-constitutive interests and communicative action might be undertaken
in the curriculum and how this might be used to expose emancipatory potential
within a constraining curriculum. That said, the implications of the conclusions to
sections 12.4 and 12.5 suggest that Habermas's views, by dint of being exemplified
in, rather than enriching, the analysis of the National Curriculum, might stand up
to a 'severe' test but only minimally.
This chapter has indicated that Habermasian principles can inform a commen-
tary on the education and suggest an agenda for reform in the National Curriculum
by its exposure of interests, flaws, omissions and ways in which these can be made
good by adoption of central tenets of Habermasian theory. The abifity of Haber-
mas's theories to suggest an agenda for action furnishes reasons for accepting his
views, viz. that they have practical applicability. Whether this is borne out em-
pirically is, of course, another question. Habermas's theories ultimately stand or
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fall on empirical testing. The contribution of Habermas in this chapter is perhaps
more significant than that demonstrated in chapters 10 and 11. This chapter has
also demonstrated the requirement of a theory set out in chapter 8 - that it should
be fruitful and fertile..
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Chapter XIII
CONCLUSIONS, DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
13.1 Introduction
This chapter draws together the strands of the arguments developed through
the thesis, sets parameters to the applicability of the argument and suggests impli-
cations for the work of Habermas and for education. It is thus bothtetrospective
and prospective. It falls into five sections:
• a summary of key factors of the argument through those chapters of the thesis
which dealt with the field of education (13.2);
• an identification of the nature of a 'severe test' of Habermas's theories in the
light of the sections of the thesis which dealt with the field of education (13.3);
• a discussion of the significance of Habermas's theories for the field of education
and an analysis and prescription of implications of Habermas's work for the
field of education (13.4);
• a critique of the thesis (13.5);
• implications for future research (13.6).
The chapter thus provides a synthesis of theory and practice and an applica-
tion of this synthesis in the field of education.
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13.2 Reviewing Habermas's Theories
The thesis traced a developing argument in its exposition and critique of
Habermas's work - that its elements, singly and severally, were problematical,
containing weaknesses and limitations. It was suggested that Haberthas had suc-
ceeded in creating a coherent and self-supporting theory of communicative action
but that there was confusion about (i) its nature and status qua theory, (ii) the
terms of and criteria for its verification and testing, and (iii) its potential to serve
the requirements of a Critical Theory. The status of the theory was seen to be
undermined by sub-elemental flaws and a global relativism; the thesis has indi-
cated that although Habermas had created a 'grand' theory it was still desirable
to explore the potential of this to be verified empirically because (a) in its appeal
to reconstructive science it was a variant of an empirical theory, and (b) because a
major criterion for success of a Critical Theory is its power to bring about equal-
ity in practice, ie it is a prescriptive not a descriptive theory. Clarification was
provided of the terms and nature of the verification of Habermas's theory.
It was argued that there was a non-positivistic alternative to or equivalent
of the 'severe test' of Popperian science, viz, the analysis of the potential for
conimunicative action to occur in practice even in circumstances which in many
respects would forbid emancipation. This 'severe test' moved beyond an evaluation
of the internal coherence of the theory to a new substantive field, for it was argued
that, in order for a theory to stand empirical scrutiny and to avoid circularity
(ie to move beyond simple corroboration and induction), it was necessary to test
the theory under different circumstances and with different data from those which
gave rise to the theory. The substantive field of education was taken as meeting
these requirements. It was recognized that this. was anew field for 1e testing of
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Habermas's theory.
The test of Habermas's theory was undertaken in two ways. Firstly the field
of education was selected to meet the requirements of fruitfulness and fertility of a
test. This was undertaken in chapters 10 -12. Chapters 10 and 11 suggested that,
though Habermas's theories could inform an understanding of the relationship
between curricula and society and of curricula as practised in schools respectively,
the issues that derived from Habermas's work did not do so exclusively, ie they
did not rely on Habermas's work to give them meaning. 275
 Coupled with the
argument in chapters 10 and 11 that strategic action was seen to b potentially
more empowering than communicative action it was suggested that Habermas's
contribution to an analysis of education was slight.
Secondly the case study was taken as an example of several elements of a
'severe test' of Habermas's theories. The case study indicated prescriptions for
practice, ie how the limited potential that it possessed for transformative action
could be developed and maximised in the pursuit of emancipation, social and ide-
ological critique and equality. Habermas's theories were seen to have the heuristic
value suggested for them here in setting an agenda for action. In this respect his
theories were seen to be tenable in a 'severe test' in chapter 12.
The demonstration of the utility of Habermas's theory lay in its potential to
underpin and effect transformative practice. Chapters 10 -11 however questioned
the necessity of using Habermas's theories to underpin and effect transformative
practice. Transformative practice was not necessarily predicated on ideology cri-
tique and communicative action.
Cf Laiulaiis (1990) comment that '[a] theory is ... not necessarily 'tested' by all its known positive
instances (Laudan. 1990, p. 64).
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The iiotion of 'effecting practice' was separated into two elements - ap-
proaches to empirical investigation and the empirical investigation itself. It was
argued that a Haberrnasian approach (a) could identify an ideologically critical
approach to situations and practices, (b) could clarify the nature Sand terms of
substantive transformative practice, (c) could underpin and outline the develop-
ment of emancipatory movements, programs and projects, and (d) could outline
areas for empirical investigation. Chapters 10 and 11 set the ground for (a), (b),
(c) and chapter 12 provided a specific example of how (d) could be approached.
In this sense Habermas's work was seen to have heuristic value both in the field
of methodology and substance within the field of education. His theories were
demonstrated to be supportable in these chapters.
The second element of 'effecting practice' - the empirical testing of the extent
to which Habermas's work can effect practice in reality rather than in principle or
outline - still awaits empirical research. That is another thesis. However, it was
argued that Habermas's work, by dint of its abstruse language, utopian idealism,
emphasis on rationality and inability to suggest agendas which are not derivable
from other sources, did not hold much promise in this respect. Indeed the argument
was advanced that strategic action might be more empowering than communicative
action and that to ignore this might render Habermas's advocacy of communicative
action in reality disempowering. Language might provide a justificatory basis for
a social theory but this would not be sufficient to bring empowerment. Premises
do not guarantee effects. Language does not reign supreme in everyday life: 'if we
devise some simple theory about the workings of a complex structure, it is bound
to be inadequate' (Butler, 1983, p. 145).
The combination of flawed elements of his- theory and its inabilitrbo articulate
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many exclusively original insights into education severely undermined his contri-
bution to education. That might be to give his theories the status as 'tools' as
with other 'grand theories' - eg Marx and Freud - where the specific elements
and terms in their work are flawed but they have survived in everyday parlance.
13.3 Towards an Empirical Test of Habermas's Theories
The nature of social enquiry derives from Habermas's criteria for the ideal
speech situation and communicative action - his norms of truth, sincerity, com-
prehensibility, authenticity, rightness and legitimacy. Social enquiry will need to
clarify its substantive contents and methodological proced ures. Chapter 8 indicated
criteria for testing his theories, that they must: demonstrate internal consistency;
identify the type of evidence required; be empirically testable in their power to em-
power; be tested in new contexts; demonstrate fruitfulness and fertility; withstand
a 'severe test'. Whether Habermas's theories are tested by using quantitative ap-
proaches in the style of the experimental empirical testing of the natural sciences
or in a qualitative enquiry in the style of anthropology and ethnography has to be
decided on the grounds of feasibility, acceptability and appropriacy.
In an experimental approach, for example, the researcher would have to isolate
and control the discrete independent variables which affect the dependent variable
- empowerment - operationalised into its component elements. The independent
variables would include that range of factors which exert an effect on empowerment
and a measurement of their effects, for example:
• the degree of authoritarianism in society;
• the degree of choice of members of society over their life styles;
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. the separate interests at work in society;
• the degree of suppression of separate and generalizable interests in society;
• the spheres in which the suppression of generalizable interests operates;
• the spheres of operation of steering media;
the degree of control by steering media in these spheres of operation.
The list of variables will necessarily be infinite as their identification will be
a function of the numbers of individuals, groups, cultures, and societies involved.
The task therefore becomes unmanageable. It poses insuperable problems of con-
tent validity. Moreover not only is there is an overwhelming problem of construct
validity in this proposal as the terms are inoperationalizable, being open to inter-
pretation and disagreement, but an attempt to operationalize them for the pur-
poses of experimental research will give a spurious numerical value to that which
is unmeasurable. Further, given the complexity of the variables not only will it
be impossible to isolate and control significant variables but this, even if it were
possible, would be indefensible on ethical grounds. The experimental paradigm
is inappropriate and unworkable for testing Habermas's theories. 276 Habermas's
theory is not susceptible to the 'proof' of experimental research. 	 --
An alternative to the experimental approach regards context not as a con-
taminating factor but as the heart of the matter (Morrison, 1993). In a qualitative
research style ethnographic data could be assembled which would (a) chart the
operation of communicative action (or its lack) in specific situations and circum-
stances, (b) he able to clarify the nature of barriers to emancipation, (c) indicate
276 This is an interesting irony, for it echoes Hayek's early views on the impossibility of knowing, let
alone predictiug. the variables at work in thee structure of society (Butler. 1983, .pp.. 144-5).
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where emancipatory potential lay and how it might be developed. Indeed this
was the intention of the case study in this thesis. Not only would this address
the requirements of a theory - that it informs manageable research enterprises
- but it would make transparent the operation of ideology and the-potential for
and spheres of communicative action. Given that Critical Theory is premissed on
emancipation (ie that it is 'situated activity') it is more fitting that it be tested
in the real lived experiences of societies and groups rather than in the antiseptic
world of the laboratory. Indeed the process of rational reconstruction requires this.
From the preceding chapters it is possible to suggest the elements of an em-
pirical test which flow from Habermas's theories. These elements, investigated
qualitatively, comprise four stages (derived from Habermas, 1972, p. 230):
(i) a description and interpretation of the existing situation;
(ii) a penetration of the reasons which brought the existing situation to the
form that it takes and an evaluation of their legitimacy and acceptability;
(iii) setting an agenda for altering the situation (if that is appropriate);
(iv) an evaluation of the achievement of the agenda in practice._
This clearly maps on to the criteria for communicative action and the ideal
speech situation outlined by Habermas (cf fig. 6.2): stage (i) addresses his notion
of the comprehensibility of a speech situation; stage (ii) addresses his notions of
the sincerity, legitimacy, authenticity and acceptability of a speech situation; stage
(iii) addresses his notion of the truth of a speech act (truth here being defined
in Haberniasian terms as that which is premissed on the ideal speech situation);
stage (iv) uses the criteria of the previous three stages to evaluate .4he extent to
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which emancipation has been achieved - the extent to which the Conditions of
ideal speech and communicative action have been realized in practice.277
Stage (i): A description and interpretation of the existing situo,Ltion.
This can be seen as a hermeneutic exercise which not only identifies the current
practices which obtain in the situation or circumstances under investigation but
attempts to make sense of them. In effect this part of the methodology involves the
identification of areas and ways in which the naming and / or silencing of specific
features of a situation are present.
Stage (ii): A penetration of the reasons which brought the existing situation
to the form that it takes.
In this stage social enquiry will look for causes and purposes of the situation
and an evaluation of their legitimacy. Principally this will involve:
• an identification of whose interests are protected and neglected in the situation,
what those interests are, how they came to be protected and neglected, how they
continue to be protected and neglected, and what might occur if they continue
to be protected and neglected (ie to clarify and evaluate the suppression of
generalizable interests, its spheres of operation, its past, present -and future);
• an identification of the alignments of powerful interests with decision makers;
. an identification of the nature and spheres of operation of that power;
. an evaluation of the legitimacy and acceptability of the power differentials ob-
277 Fairciougli (1989) indicates a similar approach in teaching children about language - an essential
Haberiiiasiaii feature. He suggests a four-stage cycle: reflection in practice; systematizing expe-
rience: explaiiation: developing practice. He argues that 'such an exercise is designed to lead...to
children [p]roduciiig...emancipatory discourse ? (Fairciough, 1989. p. 243).	 -
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served and identified as causes and as purposes of particular projects, programs
and situations;
• an evaluation of the means by which powerful interests have been..served in the
past and may continue to be served in the future. This will involve firstly an
evaluation of the acceptability and legitimacy of the suppression of debate on,
contestation about and resistance to specific programs, projects and situations.
Secondly it will involve an evaluation of the mechanisms which operate to sus-
tain the powerful in power (eg through the process of negative bureaucratiza-
tion - that bureaucratization which restricts the operation of communicative
action rather than promotes it).
This stage of the process not only requires rational interrogation of causes
and contexts of and backgrounds to existing situations but requires the analysis to
be undertaken widely and deeply if content validity is to be preserved. A research
exercise which deals only at the intersubjective and interactional levels, whilst it
would have the attraction of microsociological enquiry, would neglect the wider
sociocultural, economic, political, historical, systemic and structural forces and
constraints which brought about the existing situation (an analysis of the operation
of the steering media of society), ie it would neglect the macrosociological contexts
of actions. A full analysis, then would require attention to micro and macro forces
which were operating on a situation. This is premissed on the view that there
is such a thing as 'reality' and that it is multi-layered and can be interpreted at
several levels.
278 Pollard (1985) rovides a very striking example of this where he shows how teachers' instructions
can be interpreted at micro- and macrosociological levels, how day-to-day instructions resonate with
tile vahies of the wider capitalist society achievement, individualism, hierarchy and self-reliance
(Pollard. 1985. P. 110).
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Stage (iii): An agenda for altering the situation.
Having identified areas where ideology critique, the movement towards social
justice and rational reconstruction might take place there are several elements
which can feature on an agenda for action:
• identifying areas in which emancipation can begin, where it can reach and how
it can he managed;
• raising a debate about policies, projects, programs, situations and practices,
ie raising a debate about matters which are contestable and which presently
operate againt the interests of some individuals and groups;
• indicating how 'things might be done differently' (R. Simon 1988);
• exposing the suppression of generalizable interests and setting an agenda for
its reduction (in terms of content and process);
• identifying 'levers of change', ie small alterations which can bring about larger
scale or larger order changes;
• identifying those areas over which the disempowered can exert some power or
agency and over which they can involve themselves in democratic. processes;
• identifying the means, processes and content of change by which the nega-
tive effects of steering media and bureaucratization (or indeed any structural,
systemic factors) can be turned into enabling, emancipating and empowering
mechanisms;
• identifying targets and criteria to evaluate the successful achievement of these
(eg in terms of time scales, content and sequence of changes)..-
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Stage (iv): An evaluation of the achievement of that agenda in practice.
This evaluates the value of changes in practice, praxis, attitude, belief and
behaviour (individual and group) and the systems and mechanisms which support
those; this is the touchstone of a Critical Theory - transformative and transformed
practice. It is inadequate simply to 'feel' empowered (Ellsworth, 1989); this might
be a delusion of the falsely or partially conscious.
It is possible to identify how a 'severe test' of Habermas's theories might be
undertaken. Popper (1969) characterizes the essence of a 'severe test' thus:
A serious empirical test always consists in the attempt to find a refutation, a
counter exaiiiple. ...we always look in the most probable kinds of places for the most
probable kinds of counter examples - most probable in the sense that we should
expect to find them in the light of our background knowledge (Popper, 1969, p. 240).
A 'severe test', then, will require the theory to be tested in circumstances
where it is most likely to fail. For a 'severe test' of Habermas's theory the case
study suggests that this would have to include the following:
• the identification of areas where ernancipatory potential and communicative
action are very limited;
• the identification of powerful reasons, power structures, the sources of the power
(steering media), the locus of decision making and factors which perpetuate this
limitation (ie where the suppression of generalizable interests is not only very
powerful but which appears to offer limited or no scope for alteration);
• an identification of the significant nature and extent of the suppression of gen-
eralizable interests in given contexts;
• an identification of major areas where communicative action is-winimal and
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strategic action has a significant stronghold (ie where technical and hermeneutic
interests significantly outweigh the ernancipatory interest);
• an identification of areas where bureaucratization has become disempowering;
• an identification of areas where the violation of the ideal speech situation is
known by those in power but which they choose not to reform.
Having identified a situation where empowerment, emancipation and commu-
nicative action are minimal (ie stage (i) of description and interpretation outlined
earlier) and having identified where there is very limited potential for altering that
situation because it is buttressed by powerful forces (stage (ii) of identifying causes
and evaluating their legitimacy outlined earlier), a 'severe test' will identify where,
notwithstanding, emancipation is possible and will set an agenda for practical ac-
tion (stage (iii) of setting an agenda outlined earlier). Finally, criteria for the
achievement of the elements of the agenda (stage (iv) of evaluation of the actual
achievement in practice of the agenda) together complete the 'severe test' of the
theory. The test, then, moves from description, analysis, interrogation to practice;
it combines formulation with application.
If, under these four conditions, Habermas's theories are foundto be unsub-
stantiated or disproved then this would constitute a significant weakening or refu-
tation of his theories. If, on the other hand, his theories stand up to examination
in these contexts then credence can be put in them.
13.4 The Significance of Habermas's Theories for Education
Chapters 10 - 12 demonstrated that Habermas's theories could be used to
inform a commentary on the sociology of school knowledge, ideologritique, cur-
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riculum building and curriculum analysis, even though, it was argued, the signifi-
cance of his contribution was at best equivocal in chapters 10 and 11. That said, it
was suggested that his contribution to the study of interactions and their dynamics
was useful.
The argument that Habermas's work can be justified on the ground that it
brings an added dimension to a commentary on education is weak, for it is one
which could be applied to any additional dimensions - good or bad - which
could be used to illuminate education. It echoes the dictum 'everything has mean-
ing; nothing has value'. The possibility for simple accretion of dimensions is no
recommendation for their adoption; there is a moral argument to be won for their
adoption. The particular contribution of Habermas's work has to be stated and
evaluated. In this respect several justifications can be adduced for the inclusion of
Habermasian principles in a commentary on education:
• they enlarge individuals' and groups' potentials for emancipatory action to-
wards empowerment, ie for praxis;279
• they are consciousness-raising, they offer interesting and empowering ways of
analysing and approaching education;
• they indicate the nature of that empowerment and the means by which that
might be reached (eg through communicative action);
• they set a substantive and methodological agenda for action;
• they are 'performatory' and practical, ie they affect action and behaviour;
279 Fairclongli (1989) argues that 'empowerment has a substantial 'shock' potential, and it can help
people to overconic their sense of impotence by showing them that existing orders of discourse are
tiot iiuiiiutablc (Fairclough, 1989, p. 244). -
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• they argue for participation in collective decision making;
• they elevate the significance of language;
• they advance the processes and substance of democracy;
• they focus on people interacting, ie they focus on the dynamics of situations
and specific contexts;
• they expose the operation of power to questions of legitimation;
• they argue for issues to be brought out into the open, for motives and interests
to be made public and for public discussion to be held where relevant;
• they are non-dorninatory and do not prescribe outcomes of a rational consensus,
ie agendas are open;28°
• they 'start where people are' rather than where they ought to be;
• they strive for a rational consensus in participants' own terms;
• they indicate that the democracy of the lifeworld is served by communicative
action within a system - capitalism - which is premised on strategic action;
• they argue for the need to develop communicative competence;
• they are rooted not only in an analysis of society but in the very structures of
discourse (eg his appeal to reconstructive science), ie the normative foundations
of his theories are evident in daily practice;
Dc LL' Bat Sixiit (1994) argues that Habermas's tenets 'do nor predeflue the set of issues which
can b' 1tgitiiiiatcly raised in the conversation. The agenda of moral conversation or discourse is
radu ally upell. being defined by the agents themselves rather than by the theorist' (De La Bat
Siiiit. 1994. p. 203).
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• they advance social justice and equality;
• they enable participants to have ideals and to be idealistic;
• they indicate a way of reducing the negative effects .of bureaucratization and
strengthening the positive effects of bureaucratization (eg through communica-
tive action based on communicative rationality);
• they offer a process for developing empowerment in everyday situations (the
use of the ideal speech situation).
The justification of Habermas's work for education, therefore, lies not only
in its potential contribution to specific areas of education (discussed below) but
because the implications of his work for education purport to be more than a
matter of simple subjective preference and, rather, a matter whose roots lie in the
moral imperative of an unavoidable characteristic of everyday communication.
Chapters 10 - 12 have addressed the curriculum-specific implications of Haber-
mas's work; here the implications for implementing these curricula will be dis-
cussed, covering the fields of management and staff development.
13.4.1 Implications for Management
In this field a set of principles of procedure, substantive and methodological,
can be identified which follow from Habermasian tenets:
• the need for information sharing, consultation and open channels of coinmuni-
cation with leaders as enablers rather than directors;
• the need for debate about and critical interrogation of educational issues and
policy making and the decisions which flow from4hese;
	 -
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• the interrogation of interests at work in decision making and their legitimacy
as a preliminary to the taking of decisions which serve and embody equality
and democracy;
• the identification of the nature and extent of bureaucratic processes in the insti-
tution and an identification and evaluation of their enabling and constraining
potential;
• the need for debate and decision making to embody the tenets of the ideal
speech situation;
• the replacement of technical and instrumental rationality with an emancipatory
movement, strategic action with communicative action;
• the need for collegial and collective rather than autocratic decision making;
There is a powerful implication from Habermas's work - that if issues in edu-
cation are essentially contestable and contested 281 then a debate about these issues
should take place which operates from the principles of the ideal speech situation,
ie that the debate should be rational, where interests are exposed are debated,
where the positional power of advocates should be replaced by the unforced force
of the argument alone with equal rights of participants to be hearcj- Given that
the contours of much of the education system are determined by politics and the
politics of the party in political power, Habermas's exhortation to a debate which
is marked by equal rights of participation and the force of the argument is a call for
open consultation on decision making, a stakeholder approach to decision making
(either in a representative or participatory democracy), a requirement that issues
and participants in a debate about these issues should be examined for their truth,
' Cf Hartiiet.ts and Naish's (1976) view of education as an. 'essentially contested cencept'.
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authenticity, comprehensibility, legitimacy, sincerity, correctness, evidence, ratio-
nality, implicit values and interests. Not only are the conditions of the ideal speech
situation to be striven for and embodied in debate but there should be a will that
these should be addressed.
If the conditions of ideal speech are to be observed then this will require
appropriate infrastructures and systems to be put into place at the appropriate
levels. For example this means that channels of information-flow are open, two-way,
their existence disseminated and that encouragement and the ability to use them
is both activated and developed. The views of stakeholders in decision making and
decision receiving should not only be canvassed but should be built into decisions
- those affected by the decisions should have a right of consultation about and
voting on those decisions.
The opening of two-way channels of information-flow, accompanied by col-
lective decision making (either representatively or participatorily) marks a move
away from an autocratic style of decision making and the management of educa-
tional systems to a collegial, collective style of management in a division of labour.
This breaks down the stultifying effects of bureaucratization. The openness of
communication channels, the extent of the free flow of information_and genuine
consultation which results in decision making which represents the involvement of
participants and the shared ownership of those decisions is an elemental feature of
organizational health and a beneficial organizational climate. 282 Miles (1975) sug-
gests several elements of organizational health which clearly lie within the ambit of
Habermasian principles of the ideal speech situation (ci figure 6.2 sic): clear goals;
282 Cf Ha1iiu (1966). Miles (1975), Stenhouse (1975), Nicholls (1983), Fullan, (1991), Hoy et a! (1991),
Daliji (1993).	 -	 -'
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adequate communications; optimum equalization of power between leaders, senior
managers and teachers; optimum use of resources; cohesiveness; high morale; inno-
vativeness; autonomy; adaptiveness to change; adequate procedures for resolving
problems which are internal to the institution.
In terms of organizational leadership the operation of communicative action
is prernissed on a collegial rather than autocratic management structure. If a
bureaucratic organization is required because of the need for a division of labour
this need not preclude an open style of consultation and decision making. Rather,
if the deadening effect of bureaucratization as embracing instrumental rationality
is to be resisted then openness becomes a requisite rather than an option.
13.4.2 Implications for Staff Development
It is accepted here that whilst only a limited number of teachers will probably
have encountered the work of Habermas, nevertheless the implications of his work
are significant. If schools are to develop the curricular and managerial implications
which are exposed by a Habermasian interpretation of the curriculum then there
will be a need for a substantial staff development exercise - differentiated for
different staff, tasks and roles - to include: decision making about emancipatory
curriculum content and emancipatory pedagogy. The potential for interrogation of
critical conteiit by teachers and students alike is a prime concern here (ci chapters
11 and 12).
A staff development exercise would need to be mounted to make teachers and
educators aware of the channels of participation in political processes, curriculum
content, pedagogy and evaluation in order that they possessed the power and
capability to act as transformative intellectuals. In this role there i.-.1early room
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for addressing quite specifically the work of Habermas (which might be undertaken
in higher degree and in-service courses which teachers attend).283
Further, a staff development exercise would be necessary to extend the po-
tential for communicative action in classrooms - opportunities for discourse and
autonomous action. This would involve the identification of increased opportuni-
ties for language development in a variety of forms: debate, discussion, questioning,
problematisiug, critique, the justification and defence of arguments, formal and in-
formal communication, communication in a variety of registers and for a variety
of purposes and audiences. To effect this would require action to be- -taken which
would develop responsible student autonomy and the equalization of powers in the
pedagogical situation. 284 A staff development exercise would conform to the four
stage model of development outlined earlier in this chapter which derived from
Habermas (1972):
Stage (1): description and interpretation of the situation in defined fields in
order to identify where innovation and change were needs to develop communicative
action, for example:
• curriculum. aims, content, resourcing, pedagogy, assessment, evaluation, rela-
tionship to the wider society;	 -	 -
• the loci and zones of power for different types of decision making in the insti-
tution, their legitimacy, the ways in which power operates and is revealed in
the institution;
A very clai instance of the value of this direct approach to addressing Haberni as can be seen in
the work of Bowman (1993) where she devises and interrogates a programme of Personal and Social
Education in a comprehensive school.
284 Clear exauipks of this are the High Scope Curriculum for early years education (Hohivann et al,
1979) aitcl the iliove towards flexible learning and student centred leariiiiig in sixth forms (Training
Agency. 1990).
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• rationales and premises which underpin the existing ethos of the institution,
its administration and organization;
• the bureaucratic elements of the institution;
• roles and relationships in the institution;
• the areas of agreement and conflict or disagreement in the institution;
• the nature of collaboration and teamwork in the institution;
Stage (ii): analysis of the causes of and background to these fields and
situations, for example:
• the operation of power and decision making;
• the nature of the bureaucratic processes in the institution their facilitating
and inhibiting potentials (ie the extent to which they serve communicative or
strategic action);
• the operation, nature and extent of democratic procedures in the institution;
• the curricular (formal and hidden), managerial, organizational, interpersonal
practices in the institution;	 -
• the management of discussion, debate and conflict;
Stage (iii): setting an agenda to develop communicative action in terms
of content, management, resource support and success criteria (the elements of a
school development plan (Hargreaves and Hopkins, 1991)), identifying:
• the operation of bureaucratic processes inenabling• styles;
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• the equalising of power in institutions;
the furthering of democratic principles and processes in the institution;
• spheres of change (eg curricular, managerial, administrative, organizational,
interpersonal - who and what has to change);
• the degree of involvement, ownership of and concern for the change, (eg the
development of collaborative and teamwork aspects of the change in terms of
content and process);
. the leadership of and tasks involved in the change;
• the management of dissensus;
• the areas in which the change can be trialled, where its sub-elements can be
tried (ie the notion of divisibility), who might be involved;
• starting points, short term, medium term and long term aims.
Stage (iv): an evaluation of the achievement of the agenda - the criteria
for which have been identified in stage (iii).
The substantive points in stages (i) to (iv) derive from a synthesis of issues
outlined in chapters 10 - 12 and factors in change theory. 285
 This also conforms
to the spiral of action research (Hopkins, 1985) and reflective practice (Appendix
G) which has been adopted by several writers in the field of a critical educational
theory286 as an appropriate methodology for embracing the form and content of
285 These derive from the work of Bennis, Benne and Chin (1961); Havelock (1973); Steuhouse (1975);
Hoyle (1976): Miles (1975); Daliii (1978); Dalin and Rust (1983); Davis (1983); Nicholls (1983); Hu-
bermau uid Miles (1984); Hall and Hord (1987); Morrison (1989d); Hargreaves (1989); Lieberman
(1990): Fiillau (1991) Hargrcaves and Hopkins (1991); Dalin (1993).
286 For exaiiiple Carr and Kemmis (1986); Grundy. (1987); Young (1989); Kincheloe-(-].991).
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the development of personal and collective empowerment and the development of
ernancipatory curricula.
13.5 A Critique of the Thesis
This section is organised into two parts - (a) those issues which relate specif-
ically to Habermas's work (13.5.1 - 13.5.3) and (b) those issues which relate to the
chapters of the thesis which address the field of education (13.5.4 - 13.5.7).
13.5.1 The Limits on the Analysis of Habermas
Though care has been taken to ensure that Habermas's work has been fairly
represented within the parameters set nevertheless one has to acknowledge that
this cannot do justice to the close and encyclopaedic way in which Habermas argues
through his sources. What has been taken from his works are the key issues of
his own developing theories rather than the analysis which he provides of others'
writings. There are dangers in this approach: problems of selectivity and criteria
for judging Habermas's work. These two areas are discussed below.
13.5.2 The Problem of Selectivity
The potential threat to the validity of the argument in the thesis in adopting
a selective reading of Habermas was recognised from chapter one. For example
the criticism was put that Habermas does little more than offer a set of slogans
which support a particular viewpoint or value system. Now, if one simply selects
in supporting points and excludes the fine grain of his argument then, of course,
one is left with little more than slogans, ie it is the writer of the thesis who is
guilty of 'sloganizing' rather then Habermas. Whilst this might be inevitable in
attempting to digest and reduce the thousands . of pages of Habern's work the
374
selective reading of Habermas can be justified if:
(i) the argument fairly represents the key issues which Habermas is discussing;
(ii) it can be shown that the criticism of 'sloganizin'is a faii. criticism of
Habermas's work;
With regard to (i) chapters 1 - 8 deliberately provided a panoramic yet syn-
optic view which was developed through his works, ie fidelity to his key points
was shown through their repeated mention and development over more than two
decades of his work. This was documented through the references and arguments
provided.
With regard to (ii) it can be seen through these two decades of his work and
within each of his major texts that he repeatedly uses the same form of words, terms,
concepts, ideas and theories, ie that his work is characterised by the repetition of
key terms. This was documented through the references provided. In one sense
the charge of 'sloganizing' might be unfair as it does not do justice to the careful
argument which led to these, ie that his terms are less slogans than summary
epithets which are used symbolically or as shorthand for a cluster of supporting
issues and arguments. However the critiques raised through the first eight chapters
demonstrated one of the essential properties of a slogan - that it is used un-self-
critically. One of the main features of the several critiques was that Habermas
did not apply to his own work the scrutiny and interrogation which he applied to
others. Further, it was demonstrated that there were significant flaws in his works;
the suggestion that his terms be used asslogans therefore might be to Habermas's
advantage as a slogan conceals contradictions and problematical issues. The arrival
at the charge of 'sloganism', then, was justified through the analysis provided.
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13.5.3 Criteria for Judging Habermas's Work
Several criteria to evaluate Habermas's work have been indicated through-
out the thesis. These can be organized into internal and external• criteria. For
Habermas to meet internal criteria his work must demonstrate internal coherence,
consistency, completeness; his success in these terms has been partial - the the-
sis has argued that, though his theory is complete, its elements are so internally
consistent in substance and methodology that it is impenetrable and hermetically
sealed. To meet external criteria his work must demonstrate not only the potential
to explain comprehensively the phenomena that it purports to explain, but that,
given the peculiar character of Critical Theory, it must be able to effect practice,
to transform lived experiences. On both of these criteria doubts were expressed
about the efficacy of his theory.
13.5.4 The Analysis of the Curriculum
In turning to the field of the curriculum this section of the thesis was justified
as a testing ground for Habermas's work. Though such a justification was provided
in the thesis however this raises problematical issues which have to be addressed:
(a) the generalised use of terminology; (b) the limitations of the case study. These
two areas are discussed below.
13.5.5 The Use of Terminology
This thesis has used terminology as though it were unproblematical, eg democ-
racy, social justice, empowerment, emancipation, resistance, mediation, freedom,
responsibility, authentication, high status knowledge etc. For example the concept
of democracy is used here as if-situations where there were conflicts ofalues simply
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did not occur, where collisions of interests and ideologies were avoidable through
communicative action; the thesis mentions representative and participatory democ-
racies without indicating the several and very real problems which inhere in these
interpretations. Similarly the term social justice is equated with equality of ac-
cess and equality of outcome and that these serve the common good, it neglects
the very powerful arguments which have been advanced for inequality, ie the in-
terpretation here is ideologically loaded. The term empowerment operates from
a relatively undifferentiated and open-ended view rather than a zero-sum model;
though this is justified in the thesis nevertheless it is only one interpretation. The
clarification of high and low status knowledge might require further justification
than that provided by Young, Bernstein and Hargreaves. One could perform such
an analysis of very many terms used in this thesis.
One can provide a twofold justification for the lack of interpretation of key
terms in this thesis:
• the literature which has been used here assumes an understanding of the ways
in which the terms are used;
It was stated in the thesis that one of the problematical areas of the work
of Habermas and of educationists in this field (eg- Giroux) is their assumption not
only of a shared interpretation of key terms but a shared consensus to exclude
other interpretations of key terms. 287 This is evidenced by the lack of explanation
of key terms and by the suggestion in the thesis that the writers and readers in
these fields were members of a cabal of cognoscenti whose immersion in the issues
was such as to obviate the necessity for explanation and interpretations of key
287 Tins is scarc'ly surprising, perhaps, as rival translations of Habermas's work have not yet ap-
pcare(l. Ow' could speculate that future translations (as, for example. of Freud) might cause
further (hLrifieatiou to become necessary.
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terms. 288 To do justice to the key writers in the fields one acts as they do,viz. by
accepting the putative if unspoken interpretation of key terms, and neglecting the
uncovering of the problematical aspects of these terms. This is evidence of the
degree to which these terms carry strong ideological connotations for writers in
these fields. This is a justification which is marked by contradiction, for it supports
an intellectual elitism against which Critical Theory inveighs in its appeal to all
elements of society. In this thesis the writer is as guilty of unspoken consensus
as those writers whose work is critiqued in it. The appeal to the shorthand of
assuming a given interpretation is open to question.
• the issues which are raised do not require an extended analysis of different
interpretations of specific words;
Even if one were to accept that key terms were capable of several interpre-
tations it might be immaterial to the argument of Habermas or indeed of critical
educationists to unpack all of these interpretations, for the thrust of their message
would be tile same regardless of the minutiae of interpretation. This is especially
so if the principles of the ideal speech situation were adopted as the touchstone
for debate. (This is not to justify a neglect of interpretation. For example much
of Giroux's writing is a polemical advocacy of participatory rather than represen-
tative democracy, regardless of how, in fact, this could possibly operate in large
societies with necessary bureaucracies and a multiple division of labour; clearly it
would be advantageous to have a more fully worked out analysis of these key in-
terpretations). This last point is significant, for it was argued in the early chapters
that some of the strength of Critical Theorists was their exhortatory appeal; an
288 This edios Berusteiu's (1971) view that those who have been schooled over a matter of several
years are able to see a subject from the inside.
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exhortation in practice seldom benefits from a convoluted examination of all its
nuances, indeed the nature of an exhortation perhaps denies this.
Whilst this justification for generality has been offered it shou1d not rule out
an analytical examination of writers in this field. This thesis has attempted to
provide definitions of key terms where they appear in the text (eg empowerment,
emancipation, praxis, social justice) even though it leaves underdeveloped dis-
cussions of significant large ideas (eg democracy, freedom, responsibility), clearly
another thesis might focus on further interpretations of these ideas.
13.5.6 The Limitations of the Case Study
The parameters of the case study were carefully defined and justified in chap-
ter 12. However it might be argued that the details of the National Curriculum
and its elements were presented selectively - its denial of emancipatory potential,
its coverage of the technical and hermeneutic interests, its use as an example of
a bureaucratised curriculum, its socially reproductive rather than transformative
potential, the differential status it accords to different areas of content, organi-
zation and pedagogy, its demonstration of strategic rather than communicative
action, its instrumentalism, its limited potential for developing communicative
competence. Further, the Gramscian principle of conservative schooling for radi-
cal politics (Entwistle, 1980) was understated (only being addressed in the notion
of 'entitlement' to the National Curriculum). 'What is being suggested here is that
the interpretation of the National Curriculum is driven by ideology, that it was
only one reading of the situation; in that respect that is true - the commentary
was deliberately Habermasian and took pains to stay within that perspective or
paradigim Further, the case study. took care to provide evidence fm an array
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of sources, putting the case for and against the specific details of the National
Curriculuni through argument rather than polemic. In this respect, although the
argument was paradigmatic, nevertheless it was faithful to the 'facts' of the case.
Where prescription was offered it was from a Habermasian perspective.
A further issue is that insufficient justice was done to the literature on the core
and foundation subjects and the cross-curricular issues, only the cross-curricular
themes were the subject of extended analysis, ie that if a wider selection of litera-
ture about the National Curriculum and cross-curricular issues had been taken then
a different interpretation might have ensued. In one respect this is true; the case
study took oniy the Curriculum Guidance documents of the National Curriculum
Council even though it justified this decision as an instance of documentation from
the government in power. It might be argued that these are ideologically loaded
and therefore are an easy target for ideology critique. So they are. However it
was suggested that this was the very reason why they were chosen for extended
focus, the selectivity of focus was deliberate in order to present a 'severe test' of
Habermas's theories. Clearly a more developed analysis of content and pedagogy
of the cross-curricular themes, drawing on a wider pooi of literature and practice,
might have provided an attenuation of the critique. That literature and practice
was not available for the period of the Natioiial Curriculum under study.
3.5.7 Conclusion to the Critique
Though this section has accepted that there are limitations to the analysis
which has been performed in this thesis an attempt to justify these has been
made. It has been argued above that in some cases the justification is sufficient.
In other cases the justification has been accepted as-limited and sugstions have
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been made for further research beyond the bounds of this thesis (eg the analysis
of key terms, certain aspects of the case study, the empirical testing of the thesis).
What has been argued is that the thesis has set the grounds for empirical testing.
That Habernias's views should have practical. application in bringing collective
empowerment and emancipation is a significant summary message of this thesis.
13.6 Implications for Future Research
The issue of developing personal and collective empowerment suggests an
important avenue for further empirical research. This thesis has suggested that
empowerment might take place through a reconsideration and implementation of
aims, emancipatory models of the curriculum, content, pedagogy, evaluation, cur-
riculum development and research (principally action research). Whether address-
ing these in the ways outlined above (chapter 11) in fact develops empowerment
is an empirical question. This thesis has attempted to set out the field or focus
of future empirical research, ie to prepare for an empirical investigation. Further,
empirical research could usefully investigate teachers' constructions of empower-
ment, how and where they see it developing in schools - in terms of possibilities
and actualities - and the extent to which they feel empowered or disempowered
by the developments in the National Curriculum of England and Wales (chapter
12) or in other aspects of the curriculum. The foci, loci and degrees of empow-
erment could be matched with those outlined in chapters 10 - 12; this could be
analysed from Habermasian perspectives to investigate how applicable his themes
were in practice. Indeed one could undertake an investigation into the foci, ways
and extent to which 'knowledgeable teachers' - those aware of Habermas's work
- actually found his work empowering.
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This thesis was critical of the originality of the contribution that Habermas's
principles offered to an analysis of the curriculum. This suggests that an empiri-
cal investigation might be necessary to discover exactly and exclusively what his
theories offer educationists in practice. It was argued in chapter 11 that the educa-
tional outcomes of Habermas's theories were often served better by other writers.
That being so there is a case to be investigated for defining the fields (empirically
and conceptually) in which Habermas's theories might be most applicable. For
example, chapter 11 indicated the shortcomings in applying Habermas's theories
to an accepted model of the curriculum (Skilbeck's model). Whilst this might
suggest problems with Habermas's analysis one could speculate that the problem
lay with the use of Skilbeck's model, and that alternative conceptions of the cur-
riculum might be more condusive to Habermasian analysis. For example, a more
communicative framework of curriculum discourse, and the interpersonal, psycho-
logical, personal, emotional and social aspects of curriculum discourse (including
the formal and hidden curriculum, the curriculum as planned and the curriculum as
transacted) might be a richer furrow to plough with Habermasian principles than
those chosen in this thesis. That is an empirical question. Given that shortcom-
ings were found in sociological, philosophical and 'traditional' curriculum-theoretic
analyses of Habermas's work, there is a need to clarify the curriculum territories
in which his work might be most applicable 28° If one accepts Habermas's argu-
ment for communicative and aesthetic-expressive rationality then his work may be
applicable in the development of these forms of rationality. That is an empirical
question.
280 For example Young (1992) suggests that Habermas's work is particularly useful in an analysis of
classrooiim talk. Lakoinski (1987) sees Habermas's work as making a significant contribution to
uiaimagmneut theory. 	 -
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The empirical field of Habermas's work is not confined to empowerment alone
or to the fields of curriculum theory set out above, but spreads much wider to
include, for example:
• the development of ideology critique in teachers and students;
• the paths to the emancipatory interest in schools;
• the realization of communicative action and the ideal speech situation in schools;
• the recoupling of lifeworid and system in schools.
All of these features have been discussed in the preceding chapters and set a
wide agenda for empirical investigation (see also chapter 13.3).
The introduction of Habermasian principles into education is a call to move
in the opposite direction from that which teachers are being driven down by forces
out of their control, for Habermasian principles resist negative bureaucracies and
disempowerment. The struggle for empowerment is not easy or straightforward.
However, as indicated earlier, even the most forbidding circumstances contain pos-
sibilities for emancipation. Clinging to that possibility offers a hope for the real-
ization of a just, free and egalitarian society.
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Appendix A
The Cultural Capital Thesis
The cultural capital thesis derives from the work of Bourdieu. It states that
whilst schools formally offer equality of opportunity to all pupils to take up high
status knowledge, there are differential outcomes to this process, dependent on the
backgrounds of children (Bourdieu, 1976, 1977; Bernstein 1977). Some children will
have the background cultural and linguistic capital and 'habitus' - the necessary
'dispositions' and positive attitudes to school, motivations to learning, parental
support for education, social advantage, ease in dealing with authority figures,
high culture - so that when they meet school knowledge they can engage it
comfortably and take advantage of it (cf Wells, 1986; Tizard et al, 1988). For
other children school knowledge represents an alien culture and methodology such
that they cannot engage it as easily and hence are disadvantaged. For them the
'hegemonic academic curriculum' produces a culture shock.
With reference to the National Curriculum, whilst formal equality of oppor-
tunity is enshrined in the National Curriculum's view of 'entitlement' it produces
unequal outcomes as children do not start the educational race from the same
starting line. Schools are not ideologically innocent (Giroux, 1989, p. 134), the
knowledge that they treat confirms a dominant controlling culture and disconfirms
subordinate cultures:
Those students who represent cultural forms that might rely on 'restricted'
linguistic codes, working class or oppositional modes of dress..., who downplay the
ethos of individualism, who espouse a form of solidarity, or who reject those forms of
acadeiiiie knowledge that embody particular versions of history, social science, and
S11CC(!SS at. odds with their own cultural experiences and norms, often find themselves
excllL(lc!d froni the reward systems of schools as well as the larger society. What is
iniportant. to remember here is that the dominant school culture functions net only to
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legitiiiiate the interests and values of dominant groups, it also functions to marginalize
and discoiifirin knowledge forms and experiences that are extremely important to
subordinate and oppressed groups (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1986 p. 47).
The cultural capital thesis identifies the limitations of the liberal view that
school knowledge, albeit ostensibly open to all, will reduce inequality. In Haber-
masian terms the effects of the cultural capital thesis are to highlight the per-
locutionary effects of a high status academic curriculum even if its purposes (and
access to it) are illocutionary.
Bourdieu's argument is supported by the implications of the research of Halsey,
Heath and Ridge (1980) a decade ago. In this they demonstrated that, though
the grammar schools offered the opportunity to working class children to gain an
academic curriculum, because this curriculum was already on offer to the middle
classes the effect was to raise educational advantage proportionately across the
social spectrum. A middle class child would still remain more privileged than the
working class child even though the working class child had had access to a priv-
ileging curriculum. Both strata of society raised their level of advantage but this
did not upset the relative, superordinate position of the middle classes. The few
working class children who did succeed in breaking out of their class confines were
enough to convince the remainder that the system was equitable but not enough to
upset significantly the social stratification of society. The same argument applies
here; a curriculum which in principle is on offer to all strata of society will have
the effect of reproducing the status quo, also adopting the 'cooling out' mechanism
of social reproduction in enabling a small proportion of working class pupils to
achieve highly but not in sufficient numbers to upset the status quo.
Halsey (1992) charts the .existence of the cultural capital thesis in higher ed-
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ucation, whilst Bowe et al (1992) argue that market competition and open enrol-
ments into schools will see schools competing to attract 'students bearing cultural
capital' as they 'look like good long-term investments' (Bowe et al, (1992) p. 53).
Apple reiterates the cultural capital thesis in his view that:
the granting of sole legitimacy to such a system of [academic] culture through
its incorporation within the official centralized curriculum, then, creates a situation
in winch the markers of taste become the markers of people. The school becomes a
class school (Apple, 1993, p. 223).
However, one cannot assume too tight a fit between school and society. This
forms the basis of Aronowitz's and Giroux's critique of theories of cultural repro-
duction (Aronowitz and Giroux, 19856 chapter 5). They critique Bourdieu's views
on a variety of fronts (ibid., pp. 83 - 87), arguing that he:
• operates from a mechanistic view of power and domination;
• regards human agency as too overdetermined;
. is too accepting of the logic of domination;
• neglects the notions of resistance and contestation;
• assumes that working class capital is merely a pale reflection of dominant cul-
tural capital;
• collapses the notions of culture and class;
• accords homogeneity to classes;
• neglects the mediating effects of race, gender and class on culture;
• neglects to link domination with economic forces.
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Despite these reservations the work of Halsey and Bourdieu indicates that the
cultural capital thesis is an empirical reality.
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Appendix B
Skilbeck's Curriculum Development Model
Source: Skilbeck (1976a)
Situational Analysis
Goal Formation
I Programme Building
I Interpretation and Implementation I
Monitoring, Feedback
Assessment, Reconstruction
Skilbeck argues that the elements can be addressed in any sequence and that
they enable outside-school and within-school factors to be represented in the cur-
riculurn.
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Appendix C
Freire's Méthodo Paulo Freire
--C.
Freire has been practising his Méthodo Paulo Freire for over aquarter of a
century and it has received international acclaim in raising standards of literacy
and political consciousness amongst disadvantaged groups in society, principally in
Brazil. Freire teaches literacy so that the Brazilian disempowered can understand
and critique the ideological forces which maintain their oppression and legitimize
the status quo, ie to develop an insight into cultural hegemony. He argues that dia-
logue cannot exist unless it involves critical thinking (Freire, 1972). Taylor (1993)
indicates how Freire's work establishes a link between individual and collective
emancipation, outlining a five point rationale of Freire's Método Paulo Freire to
increase literacy:
(i) The individual deprived of Dialogue is oppressed;
(ii) Dialogue is the Process and Practice of liberation;
(iii) The individual engaged in Dialogue is liberated;
(iv) Dialogue, by definition, requires more than one person;
	 -
(v) More than one person can be called a society (Taylor, 1993, p. 59).
Freire's method requires learners to move from naming (what is the problem?)
to reflection (why is this the case?) and onwards to action (what can be done about
it?).29° His students generate key words which are then used as the basis for phonic
290 Snkyth (1989(1) echoes this in his suggestions for description, information, confrontation and recon-
struct iou uiitliued earlier, and Haherinas's (1972) work suggests a similar sequence in the process
of rational r('coustructiou.	 .
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word-attack skills; the key words reflect the learners' own situations - for example,
'slum', 'rain', 'plough', 'hoe', 'land', 'food', 'wealth', 'brick' (Taylor, 1993, P. 75).
Reading thereby is meaningful. These words derive from the everyday experiences
and life of the Brazilian groups with whom his method is used, principally peasant
groups, they are 'strong on reality'.
Freire's work, however, has been seen as problematical (Taylor, 1993). Taylor
sums up a range of criticisms of Freire:
(i) he fails to define the oppressed and the oppressors;
(ii) his 'generative words' appear to be remarkably similar despite being gen-
erated in different parts of Brazil, indicating the possibility of strong teacher di-
rection or even manipulation. Teachers, therefore, are operating instrumentally,
inflexibly and mechanistically;
(iii) his generative words are all nouns, no prepositions, verbs or adjectives -
'naming the word does not and cannot mean inventing, creating the world' (Taylor,
1993, p. 80), ie Freire's method is contradictory as it does not allow praxis, his
nouns overlook the significance of relationships;
(iv) he sees the literate person as one who can read, neglecting the importance
of writing: 'If I can read I can follow what you want to say to me. But if I can
write, you can read what I want to say to you... .Reading is the currency of Banking
Education, Writing is the currency of Dialogue. The former creates imitation, the
latter innovation' (Taylor, 1993, p. 146). 'Reading enables the student to conform
to the world, writing to transform it' (ibid., p. 129);
(v) Freire, in celebrating the-culture of the book, is guilty of 'cultra1 invasion'
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and assimilationist practices. He removes one form of indoctrination oniy to replace
it with another;
(vi) his pictorial examples do not indicate dialogue and partnership but strong
teacher direction and control
	
the teacher is active and the student-sit passively
facing the teacher.
Hence, though Freire's work does have palpable worth in raising critical con-
sciousness, the extent to which this is derived or prescribed, cultural representation
or cultural imperialism, is a moot point.
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Appendix D
Smyth's (1987a, 1989a) Questions in Critical Pedagogy
Smyth (1987a, 1989a) suggests that it is possible to generate a critical con-
sciousness through content and pedagogy by interrogating curriculum content, fol-
lowing a line of questioning which focuses on understanding, a questioning of le-
gitimacy and the setting of an agenda for action. He outlines a series of questions
in this respect:
• What do my practices say about my assumptions, values and beliefs about
teaching?
• Where did these ideas come from?
• How did I come to appropriate them?
• Why do I continue to endorse them now in my work?
• What social practices are expressed in these ideas?
• What is it that causes me to maintain my theories?
• What views of power do they embody?
• Whose interests seem to be served by my practices?
• What power relationships are involved?
• How do these ideas influence my relationships with my students?
• What is it that acts to constrain my views of what is possible in_aching?
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. In the light of what I have discovered, how might I work differently?
Smyth (1989a) regards teaching as the antithesis of an apolitical, ahistorical,
atheoretical activity. These questions, he argues, cast education and teaching as a
political activity. Clearly these questions resonate with the process of rational re-
construction which Habermas (1972, p. 230) outlined in his references to Freudian
psychoanalysis: describing, interpreting, giving reasons for the current state of
the patient's neurosis in terms of repression, analysing the legitimacy of repressive
forces and setting an agenda for altering the situation.
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Appendix E
Gore's and Bowers' Critique of Giroux's Critical Pedagogy
Giroux's work, though of international standing, is not to be accepted uncrit-
ically. One can discern in the work of Giroux the same weakness as that which was
demonstrated in the work of Habermas (chapter 8), viz, that his work is exhor-
tatory and replete with repeated slogans to the detriment of specific detail. Gore
(1993) criticizes Giroux's work as offering only outline features of aritical peda-
gogy, she argues that Giroux 'provides no sense of his own attempts to implement
the critical pedagogy he espouses' (Gore (1993, p. 38). Indeed she suggests that
Giroux's work is less about critical pedagogy and more about a 'critical educational
theory' (ibid., p. 42). She contrasts this with the work of Freire, which indicates
specific pedagogical practices for specific contexts (ibid., p. 17).
Gore's critique of Giroux and McLaren (a writer in a similar vein to Giroux)
is significant, writing that:
ther' arc few references in their writings to their own teaching or to 'testing out'
their tlieorivs of critical pedagogy. To what extent has their political and theoretical
project 1eit shifted by their location in a small, predominantly white, middle / upper
class iiuiv'rsity? (ibid., p. 112).	 -
Further, she takes issue with the crude bi-polarity of Giroux's conception of
human groups (ibid., p. 95), either empowered or powerless, either silenced or
legitimated, paralleling the Marxian conception of a two class society (see also
Bowers, 1991). What is missing from the work of Giroux is any detailed guidance
on how to manage disagreement (how to operate the ideal speech situation), how
to move to communicative- action. Giroux has generated a set of h4ghly charged
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clichés which are met repeatedly in his works, for example: emancipation, domi-
nation, civic courage, pedagogy of empowerment, resistance, interrogate, discourse
of possibility.
Bowers (1991) argues that Giroux must contextualise his terms so that it is
actually possible to see what can take place in classrooms for emancipation to
occur. Not only has Giroux 'turned the metaphor of emancipation into an empty
abstraction' (ibid., p. 244) but Giroux (and McLaren) 'transform the problem of
emancipation, which is seldom the exercise in binary thinking that they represent it
to be, into a banal and empty rhetoric' (ibid., p.. 244). In Habermasian terms their
language needs to become more dialogical, more located in given and examined
lifeworlds, more contextualised. For Bowers (1991), Giroux's work is ultimately
too anthropocentric in an age characterised by ecological crisis and talk of bio-
diversity. It is too individualistic for an era in which ecology and interdependence
have to include all forms of life on the planet. Participatory democracy and the
appeal to collective political reforms, therefore, must consider a much wider view
of interdependence than Giroux adopts.
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Appendix F
MacDonald's Debates with Evaluation Sponsors
MacDonald's five year arguments with the sponsors of the National Develop-
ment program in Computer Assisted Learning exposed six main issues in demo-
cratic evaluation (Simons, 1987, pp. 47 - 8) which show how communicative action
ultimately succeeded over strategic action:
(i) there were arguments about the model of evaluation - an assessment of
the achievement of objectives or a portrayal - an argument which the evaluators
had to will if they were to keep their independence and autonomy;
(ii) there were disagreements about the purpose and powers of the evaluators
- the sponsors wanting the evaluation to make recommendations about which
projects should be terminated and which supported, with the evaluation team
disclaiming this as part of their task; the sponsors would have to read the reports
and make up their own minds, the evaluators were simply to act as brokers of
information;
(iii) there were arguments about the secrecy of the report, the sponsors want-
ing secret information (ie information beyond that contained in the report that
would be received by a wide audience), and the evaluators rejecting this;
(iv) there were disagreements about the form of reporting and its consequences
(the sponsors wanting summaries and the evaluators rejecting this on the grounds
that it would do violence to the complexity and idiography of the situations being
evaluated);
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(v) there were disagreements about whom should be evaluated - the sponsors
not wishing to be evaluated and the evaluators arguing that they were part of the
whole field of the evaluation and therefore had to be evaluated;
(vi) there were disagreements about the control of the eva1uator— the spon-
sors arguing that the evaluators were being paid to perform a service (to do as
they were told) and the evaluators arguing that payments only bought a service,
not i privileged exemption from focus, that evaluation was democratic and could
not be bought but only sponsored.
MacDonald was arguing for an evaluation to be disinteresteda genuinely
democratic process, avoiding serving the powers of the sponsors. That it took five
years for the evaluators' agenda to be accepted is an indication of the potency of
strategic action and the patience needed to break it by communicative action.
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Appendix G
Dewey, Habermas and Reflective Practice
This appendix extracts a little material from the main thesis (eg parts of
chapter 5, 6, and 13 to bring them to bear on a new area of reflective practice).
The difficulty with the notion of 'reflective practice' is that, as it has become
popularised in the last decade, so it has become increasingly diverse. At present
it is difficult to distinguish what is and what is not reflective practice as the term
has become a conceptual and methodological umbrella. C1onceptually it has come
to embrace action research (Stenhouse, 1975; Carr and Kemmis 1986; Grundy,
1987), professional development (Van Manen, 1977; Prawat, 1991), the linking of
theory and practice (Schön, 1983; 1987; Morrison and Ridley, 1988; Pollard and
Tann, 1993), how we think (Dewey, 1933, 1938), teacher empowerment (Carr and
Kemmis, 1986; Prawat, 1991; Kincheloe, 1991), pedagogy and language (Young,
1989, 1990, 1992), social and political emancipation (Habermas, 1972, 1974; Carr
and Kemmis, 1986; Smyth, 1991) and any action which improves the quality of
teaching and learning (Ashton et al, 1980; Moyles, 1988).
Methodologically it has come to embrae small scale, local, institutional in-
terpersonal and intrapersonal initiatives, problem-solving approaches, the action-
research cycle (Stenhouse, 1975, 1983; Kemmis and McTaggart, 1981; Hopkins,
1985;), deliberative approaches to the curriculum and teaching (Reid, 1978; Schön,
1983, 1987), any form of enquiry into the theoretical bases of practice or the trans-
lation of theory into practice which requires teacher commitment and an openness
to change (Dewey, 1933,.J938; Smyth, 1991; Kincheloe .1991; Pollath and Tann,
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1993). It is a term that has suffered from its own popularity such that any at-
tempt by teachers to improve the quality of teaching and learning becomes labelled
reflective practice. The distinctive features of reflective practice have been lost.1
Nor is the term confined to classroom practice. It has been applied to a
consideration of aims, planning, content, organization, resources, assessment, eva!-
uation, development and innovation, in short to the whole gamut of the curriculum
(Morrison and Ridley, 1988; Pollard and Tann, 1993). It has been seen to be a
pre-requisite of teachers' professionalism (Schön, 1987; Calderhead, 1988), requir-
ing abilities to plan, implement and evaluate which, in turn require empirical,
analytical and evaluative competencies (Pollard and Tann, 1993). Indeed it has
become included as part of a political project for societal emancipation (Smyth,
1987, 1989a, 1989b, 1991).
This appendix attempts to disentangle the several strands of reflective practice
in three ways. Firstly it will 'go back to first principles' and re-examine Dewey's
(1933) seminal work on reflective practice. Secondly it will update the analy-
sis by comparing Dewey's work with Habermas's know ledge-constitutive interests
(Habermas, 1972, 1974) and his concept of the ideal speech situation (Habermas,
1979a). It will define three types of reflective practice and indicate their location in
Habermas's schemata of know ledge-constitutive interests, the ideal speech situation
and collective emancipation in communicative action (Habermas, 1984, 1987a). In
doing so it will suggest that reflective practice is 'interested', ie that it serves a
political agenda. Finally it will be argued that there are several similarities be-
tween Dewey and Habermas, that the differences between the two stem from their
starting points and purposes - Dewey was concerned to expose 'how we think'
(sic) whilst Habermas has a clear political agenda - and that, whilstjiabermas's
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work has exhortatory appeal Dewey's work is, in practice, more likely to achieve
the aims of reflective practice (even of Habermas's reflective practice) because it
concerns situated activity and realistic proposals.
Dewey and Reflective Practice
Dewey (1933) provides a very-full account of reflective practice, arguing that
reflective thinking, in distinction from other operations to which we apply the
name of thought, involves (1) a state of doubt, hesitation, perplexity. mental difficulty,
ill whi(:h thinking originates, and (2) an act of searching, hunting, inquiring, to find
uiatcri.tl that will resolve the doubt, settle and dispose of the perplexity' (Dewey,
1933. 1) 12).
Thinking, he avers, 'begins in what may fairly enough be called a forked-road
situation, a situation that is ambiguous' (p. 14).
Dewey roots his notion of reflective thinking in a problem-based approach
which strives for resolution, for horneostasis, consensus: 'the aim and outcome
of thinking.. .is the transformation of a dubious and perplexing situation into a
settled, or determinate one' (p. 95). The problems are real rather than contrived or
imagined ('thinking arises out of a directly experienced situation' (p. 99) wherein
'the moment lie [the reflective practitioner] begins to reflect, he [sic] begins of
necessity to observe in order to take stock of conditions' (p. 102)) and the solutions
are to be practicable:
Data (facts) and ideas (suggestions, possible solutions) thus form the two indis-
pensal)le amid correlative factors of all reflective activity. The two factors are carried
oil by nieans respectively of observation.. .and inference. The latter...rclates. there-
fore. to what is possible, rather than to what is actual .... W]hat is inferred demands
a choubh test: first, the process of forming the idea or supposed solution is checked by
coimstant cross reference to the conditions observed to be actually present; secondly,
time idea after it is formed is tested by acting upon it (Dewey, 1933, p. 104).
Dewey is explicit on practicability, then, arguing that 'proving is testing'
(p. 96) and that 'what is important is that every, inference be a test,d inference'
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(p. 97). He argues that reflective practitioners have to exercise their judgement
in choosing between alternative solutions, and that this judgernent needs to weigh
the evidence, the warrants of the elements (p. 119). Reflective practice, for Dewey,
has five phases 2 or aspects which can be addressed in any sequence (p. 115):
(1) saqgestions, in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution: (2) an
ifltCl1C(;tUa1i'/atiOI1 of the difficulty or perplexity that has been felt (directly experi-
eflCC(l) into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
(3) the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis, to initiate
and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material; (4) the
mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition (reasoning, in
the sense in which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and (5) testing
the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action (Dewey, 1933, p. 107).
The involvement of the reflective practitioner, in Dewey's view, is not only
an intellectual, cerebral activity, but an activity which involves the whole person,
requiring the emotional involvement of the practitioner. For example he writes
that 'active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form
of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclu-
sions to which it tends, constitute reflective thought' (ibid., p. 9). He argues
that there are three constitutive attitudes required for effective reflective practice:
open-mindedness ('freedom from prejudice, partisanship, and such other habits as
close the mind and make it unwilling to consider the problems and entertain new
ideas' (p. 30)); whole-heartedness ('absorbed interest' (p. 33)); responsibility ('to
carry something through to completion' (p. 33)). These, he argues 'are them-
selves personal qualities, traits of character' (p. 33). Indeed he argues that at the
forked road situation the decision to 'face the situations' (p. 102) fully, frontally,
rather than to 'abandon the suspense of judgement and intellectual search' (p. 16)
requires a degree of personal commitment.
In summary, then, one can suggest key features of Dewey's notion&of reflective
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practice:
it is problem based, rooted in 'real' problems;
. it is situated activity, context bound;
.. it seeks a resolution to ambiguous situations, it seeks settlement;
• it involves an open-ended and open-minded search for solution;
• it explores possibilities and requires the exercise of judgement in deciding which
of those possibilities is worth pursuing..or accepting;
• it requires problems to be empirically operationalizable and soluble;
• it projects forward anticipated solutions to problems which are then to be tested
in practice;
. it requires the personal commitment of the practitioner.
Habermas and Reflective Practice
Habermas's early work (1972) suggests that knowledge and reflective practice
are iiot neutral but that they serve a range of interests and power structures in
society. His critical theory, like that of the Frankfurt School in general, is explicitly
normative, prescribing a view that society ought to be based on equality, freedom,
democracy, autonomy, collective empowerment and 'generalizable interests'. 3 It
will be argued that reflective practice can serve this view of society, discussed in
terms of the intentions, operations and effects of reflective practice.
Habermas justifies his normative theory by the principles of the ideal speech
situation (1976, 1979) (see chapter 6.8 of this thesis); Hence the proces&of reflective
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practice is to render understanding and practices comprehensible, true, 1egitimate
and sincere and to bring about equality, freedom, justice, generalizable interests,
autonomy, emancipation and empowerment.
In seeking a rational warrant for claims and practices Habermas's view res-
onates with Dewey where Dewey writes that:
[rjefiection. . .commences when we begin to inquire into the reliability, the worth
of aiiy particular indication .... Reflection thus implies that something is believed
in (or disbelieved in), not on its own direct account, but through something else
whicli stands as witness, evidence, proof, voucher, warrant; that is, as ground of belief
(Dewey. 1933. p. 11).
Habermas's communicative action (Habermas, 1979a, 1984) requires a ratio-
nal warrant for claims and is illocutionary, it strives for a rational and warranted
consensus on practices, it is an open-ended inquiry into situations and circum-
stances - a clear sympathy with reflective practice. Strategic action, on the other
hand, is perlocutionary and instrumental in reaching prescribed and deliberate
ends; it defines a closed, technical form of reflection. 'Whilst communicative action
- domination-free communication - is emancipatory, strategic action reproduces
existing power differentials in society. Hence using Haberma.s's principles to un-
derpin a conceptualisation of reflective practice suggests that reflective practice
can link to a wider political agenda of teacher empowerment.
Habermas roots his analysis of reflective practice in Freudian psychoanalysis
(Habermas, 1974a, pp. 25 - 32), using this as an analogy for the development of
societal health, in particular the value he accords to the power of self-reflection
as a tool of emancipation - 'depth hermeneutics' (Habermas, 1972, p. 218),
knowledge of oneself which has become inaccessible to oneself through repression
(ibid., p. 217). Habermas's use of Freudian psychoanalysis suggests that a pa-
tient will engage in self-reflection and. that such. reflection. has emancitory power
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(Habermas, 1972, P. 197) as it exposes the repressive forces which have induced
false consciousness and hence the neurosis (p. 208). Habermas sets great store by
reflection; for him 'self-reflection is at once intuition and emancipation, compre-
hension and liberation from dogmatic dependence' (p. 208).
In the process of self-reflection the neurotic is facilitated by the analyst to
perceive the latent, , repressed experiences which have given rise to the present
neurotic condition, just as a social group suffering from ideological distortion will
have to see through the sources of that distortion. The analyst is cast in a ther-
apeutic mode - a 'reflective participant (Habermas,. 1988, p. 93).-..This might
be perfectly acceptable in psychoanalytic theory but it creates many problems in
macro-sociological theory - eg the notion that society can be changed by a pro-
cess akin to psychoanalysis writ large. Patients, through self-reflection, wifi be
involved in identifying the factors which have distorted their psyche and hence
their functioning as fully-fledged individuals in control of their own lives. This
involves:
(a) a hermeneutic element - where the patient comes to reconstruct (Haber-
mas, 1972, p. 230), understand and interpret previous experiences;
(b) a positivistic element - where the analyst helps the patient totomprehend
the significance of experiences by making nomothetic constructions of them;
(c) a critical element - where the patient reflects on the factors which have
led to the distortion and repression (ibid. P. 231) in the psyche and which are
subject to critical scrutiny in an attempt to dissolve their capacity to distort.
This process of reflexive analysis with the assistance of the analyst brings
about self-awareness in patients, an understanding of the-constraining-elements on
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their lives, and the disempowering of those factors to exert any further pressure to
distort (cf Habermas, 1962). The progress, then, is from neurosis to emancipation.
The self-aware individual, having clarified the causes of the oppression or repres-
sion, bringing them back to consciousness and reflecting on them,.-achieves the
state of being able to break free of her / his oppressive ties: 'through ... psycho-
analysis, as interpreted in terms of communication theory, the two procedures of
reconstruction and of self-critique can. ..be brought together within the framework
of one and the same theory' (Habermas, 1987b, p. 300). This is the process of ra-
tional reconstruction - the partner to self-reflection (cf Habermas, 1987b, p. 300).
Habermas asserts that there is a symbiosis of self-understanding and liberation,
the movement is from unfreedom to freedom.
The strengths of this analysis are twofold. Firstly it accords responsibility
for the condition and its solution to the patient - it 'demands moral responsibil-
ity for the content of the illness' (Habermas, 1972 p. 235) - a fitting model for
an analogy of society premised on participatory democracy (see also Lukes, 1982,
p. 137), however illusory this may be in reality. Indeed Habermas writes that
'truth must converge with authenticity - in other words, the patient himself is
the final authority' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 29). Secondly Habermas (1974a) (and
Freud) acknowledge that it is society, institutions and pressures which can cause
the repression in the individual's psyche (ibid. p. 29). The role of psychoanalysis
in Habernias, though largely of analogical value, also identifies the significance of
systematically distorted communication (Habermas, 1970a), where external struc-
tural - system wide - societal constraints and repressions reach right into the
individual psyche.
As an analogy .for the projected progress of societies from ideological oppres-
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sion to self-control the importation of Freudian analysis has considerable exhorta-
tory and symbolic significance. Just as ideology distorts the realization of the 'real'
interests (Geuss, 1981) of social groups, bringing to their awareness the power of
ideological oppression, so rational reconstruction sets the scene for the restoration
of the health of that society which, in Habermas's terms, is founded on the prin-
ciples of social justice - democracy, equality, and the generalizability of interests.
In Habermas's view the progress towards societal emancipation involves self un-
derstanding writ large. A four-stage process for this to occur can be derived from
Habermas (1972, p. 23O):
(i) a description and interpretation of the existing situation;
(ii) a penetration of the reasons which brought the existing situation to the
form that it takes and an evaluation of their legitimacy and acceptability;
(iii) setting an agenda for altering the situation (if that is appropriate);
(iv) an evaluation of the achievement of the agenda in practice.
This clearly resonates with Dewey's (1933) five-phase approach to reflective
practice outlined earlier and maps on to the criteria for communicative action
and the ideal speech situation outlined. by.Habermas (1976a; 1979a;4984). Stage
(i) addresses his notion of the comprehensibility of a speech situation; stage (ii)
addresses his notions of the sincerity, legitimacy, authenticity and acceptability of a
speech situation; stage (iii) addresses his notion of the truth of a speech act; stage
(iv) uses the criteria of the previous three stages to evaluate the extent to which
emancipation has been achieved - the extent to which the conditions of ideal
speech and communicative action have been realized in practice (see also chapter
13 of this thesis).
Stage (1): A description and interpretation of the existing situation.
This can he seen as a hermeneutic exercise which not only identifies the current
practices which obtain in the situation or circumstances under investigation but
attempts to make sense of them.
Stage (ii): A penetration of the reasons which brought the existing situation
to the form that it takes.
In this stage social enquiry will look for causes and purposes of the situation
and an evaluation of their legitimacy (see chapter 13 of this thesisj This stage
of the process not only requires rational interrogation of causes and contexts of
and backgrounds to existing situations but requires the analysis to be undertaken
widely and deeply if content validity is to be preserved. Reflective practice which
deals only at the intersubjective and interactional levels, whilst it has the attraction
of microsociological enquiry, neglects the wider sociocultural, economic, political,
historical, systemic and structural forces and constraints which have brought about
the existing situation (an analysis of the operation of Habermas's steering media
of society) (Habermas, 1984, 1987a). A full analysis, then would require attention
to micro and macro forces which were operating on a situation. This is premissed
on the view that rea1ity' is multi-layered .nd can be interpreted at several levels
(Pollard, 1985, p. 110).
Stage (iii): An agenda for altering the situation.
Having identified areas where ideology critique, the movement towards so-
cia! justice and rational reconstruction might take place an agenda for action is
prepared (see chapter_13 of this thesis).......
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Stage (iv): An evaluation of the achievement of that agenda in practice.
This evaluates the value of changes in practice, praxis, attitude, belief and
behaviour (individual and group) and the systems and mechanisms which support
those; this is the touchstone of a critical theory - transformative and-transformed
practice. Habermas (1974a) summarizes the retrospective and prospective ele-
ments of reflective practice where he writes that:
th niediation of theory and praxis can only be clarified if to begin with we
distinguish three functions.. .the formation and extension of critical theorems which
can stand up to scientific discourse; the organization of processes of enlightenment,
in which such theorems are applied and can be tested in a unique manner by the
initiation of processes of reflection carried on within certain groups toward which
these 1rs have been directed; and the selection of appropriate strateies, the
solution of tactical questions, and the conduct of the political struggle (Habermas,
1974a. p. 32).
Having outlined the views of Dewey and Habermas on reflective practice the
remainder of this appendix will set out Habermas's threefold schema of knowledge-
constitutive interests and indicate their similarities and differences with Dewey's
analysis of reflective practice. Finally, the conclusion will make some evaluative
comments on the merits of the two approaches to reflective practice.
Three Types of Reflective Practice
This section derives a schema of three types of reflective practicfrom Haber-
mas's knowledge-constitutive interests and his ideal speech situation. It argues
that Habermas's technical knowledge-constitutive interest is an example of strate-
gic action in intent and that this leads to technical reflective practice; that his
hermeneutic interest is an example of strategic action in its effects and that this
leads to hermeneutic reflective practice; that his emancipatory interest is commu-
nicative 111 its intents, processes and effects and is premissed on the ideal speech
situation, but whether it is actually operable. is. questionable.
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Technical Reflective Practice
Haberinas (1972, P. 47, 56) argues that the 'technical' knowledge-constitutive
interest, characteristic of the empirical-analytic sciences, has a fundamental inter-
est in predicting and controlling the environment (however defined) through the
establishing of efficient and effective rules of procedure (see chapter 4.3.2 of this
thesis). This resonates with Dewey's (1933) view that thinking is teleological, it
'makes possible action with a conscious aim' (p. 17), it 'makes possible system-
atic preparations and inventions' (p. 18) and these 'two values mentioned are of
a practical sort; they give increased power. of. control (p. 21). Thia. has a clear
affinity to the positivism of the natural sciences which, in turn, has a clear affinity
to behaviourism.
The intentions of 'technical reflective practice' are to render more efficient the
existing situation rather than to transform it. In this type of reflective practice
teachers seek to improve their technical skifis in teaching, essentially a practical
activity which develops their 'craft of the classroom'. It comprises reflection-in-
action (Schön, 1987) and 'reflection-on-action' but without the necessity for any
theoretical underpinning. It asks what can be done to improve teaching and learn-
ing rather than what are the principles behind it. It concerns reflecting on practice
from the basis of practice - 'technical skills of day-to-day practice' (Schön, 1987,
p. 9). Such an approach can be seen in the Curriculum in Action (Ashton et al
(1980) approach to reflective practice which asks six questions:
. What did the pupils actually do?
• What were they learning?
• How worthwhile was .it? -
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. What did I do?
. What did I learn?
. What do I intend to do now?
It can be seen in these questions, designed for self-evaluation, that the in-
tention is to improve practice through the application of improved practical tech-
niques, replacing one set of routines with another (cf Dewey's (1933, p. 17) distinc-
tion between routine and reflective action), a pragmatic and instrumental rather
than principled justification which often concerns itself with low-level details of
practice. It is an example of Habermas's 'strategic action' (Habermas, 1979, 1984).
It is atheoretical and is evidenced in the competencies model of the professional
preparation of teachers (cf Moyles's (1988) questions for teacher self-evaluation).
Though, in its effects, it may improve everyday practice this view of reflec-
tive practice has all the dangers of a competencies model, eg its behaviourism,
its trivialisation of teaching, its narrowing of teachers' behaviours, its reduction of
teaching to the performance of trained behaviours. Moreover the technical interest
in prediction and control is a very suspect model for reflective education, which is
marked by openness rather than closure, activity rather than- passivity, developed
interpersonal relations rather than a freezing of relationships: 't]echnica1 rational-
ity rests on an objectivist view of the relation of the knowing practitioner to the
reality he knows... .professional knowledge rests on a foundation of facts' (Schön,
1987, p. 36). The effects of this approach to reflective practice are to sustain the
existmg classroom order and practices and to render them more efficient rather
than to understand or to transform them. It assumes that the existing order is
legitimate and does not question that legitimacy. Moreover, this view-Df reflective
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practice is essentially isolationist and monological, it can be undertaken by an in-
dividual teacher without impinging on, or being informed by, other teachers. This
is a model which sits uncomfortably with a collegial view of practice.
Hermeneutic Reflective Practice
Habermas (1972, pp. 50 -1) argues that the hermeneutic knowledge-constitutive
interest (see chapter 4.3.3 of this thesis), characteristic of the historical-hermeneutic
sciences, has a fundamental interest in clarifying, understanding and interpreting
meanings, intentions, actions and communications- of 'speaking an&acting sub-
jects' (Hahermas, 1974a, p. 8) and has a strong affinity to Weber's concept of
Verstehen. It strives for consensus and a 'fusion of horizons' between participants
(a term which Habermas borrows from Gadamer (1975)). In this model the re-
flective practitioner wifi seek to make sense of situations, to understand them, by
engaging the theoretical underpinnings of the practices. Unlike the previous model
this concerns reflecting on practice from the basis of theory. This is by far the most
widely used view of reflective practice (eg Schön, 1983, 1987; Morrison and Rid-
ley, 1988; Van Manen 1977; Pollard and Tann, 1993). It shifts reflective practice
from technical craft knowledge to artistry, an applied science (SchSn, 1987, p. 9):
'artistry is an exercise of intelligence... .There rn are an art of problem framing, an art
of implementation, and an art of improvisation - all necessary to mediate the use
in practice of applied science and technique' (ibid., p. 13).
Here the reflective practitioner becomes a connoisseur (Eisner, 1985) by seek-
ing the theoretical underpinnings of practice, subjecting them to 'criticism' and
'disclosing' them to others (Eisner, 1985). Eisner argues that 'if connoisseurship
is the art of experience, criticism• is the art of disclosure' (Eisner, A'985, p. 92).
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Connoisseurship, he argues, js private whereas criticism is public (p. 93). This
resonates with Dewey's view that 'the end of criticism is the re-education of the
perception' (Dewey, 1934, p. 324). Indeed Dewey (1933) inveighs against the
person who is not 'sufficiently critical about the ideas that occur to. him' (Dewey,
1933, p. 16).
There are four main strengths to this approach. Firstly, in its appeal to
understanding this approach values theory and the explicit link between theory
and practice. Secondly, building on Eisner's notion of disclosure, it replaces the
monological practice of the technical interest with a dialogical process, building
collegiality and underlining the importance of collective practice as a pathway to
teacher empowerment. It requires practitioners to engage in debate and discussion
with each other and requires that debate to be informed. It recognises that reflec-
tive practice must focus on interpersonal factors, must be made public and must be
disseminated. This resonates with Habermas's (1976a, 1979a, 1984, 1987a, 1987b)
concept of the ideal speech situation which includes features such as 'only the un-
forced force of the better argument comes into play' (Habermas, 1987b, p. 130),
the 'unconstrained, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech' (Habermas,
1984, p. 110), freedom to: modify a given conceptual framework; check question-
able claims; reflect on the nature of knowledge; assess justifications; alter norms;
evaluate explanations; participate in a discussion as an equal. Thirdly, it respects
teachers' professional, informed judgement, it requires practice to be principled
and thoughtful. Fourthly, it replaces the passivity of the technical model with
an active constructive approach to teaching, echoing Schön's (1987) suggestion
that '[u]nderlying this view...is a constructionist view of the reality with which the
practitioner deals -- a view that leads us to see the practitioner a-.eonstructing
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situations of his practice, not only in the exercise of professional artistry but also
in all other modes of professional competence' (p. 36).
This model, however, is not without its drawbacks. For example, the emphasis
placed oii understanding - making sense of - situations does not guarantee to
improve practice; that is a contingent rather than an analytical claim. 6 Further, if,
as is claimed (eg Carr and Kemmis, 1986; Kincheloe, 1991; Smyth, 1991) reflective
practice should lead to teacher empowerment, it is by no means certain that simply
understanding a situation (however many theoretical lenses are used) will lead to
empowerment. Indeed it might increase the sense of frustration in tachers who
can see what needs to be done but are powerless to effect this. 7 In its effects a
hermeneutic understanding might be reproductive rather than transformative of
the status quo; it is partially rather than fully empowering.
In pinning so much on an understanding of the situation and a theoretical un-
derpinning of practice there is an optimism in this approach that theory will effect
practice. However the recourse to rationalisation of practice does not necessarily
lead to its improvement. Moreover it is not clear which theories will be addressed,
which will be 'understood' or applied. This is an important point, not only be-
cause theories might conflict (eg behaviourism and constructivism) ibut because
the espousal of a theory neglects the debate about values - the justifications for
adopting one theory or set of theories over another. A hermeneutic model offers
little insights into how ideological disagreements might be resolved. In this respect
Dewey has more to offer than Haberinas, for Dewey's (1933) commitment to the
exercise of judgement and the practicability of putative solutions takes the issue
beyond mere understanding to action and requires the reflective practitioner to
weigh different theories and judge their-relative merits before embarking on action
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(p. 120).
Emancipatory Reflective Practice
Habermas (1974, P. 22) argues that the emancipatory knowledge-constitutive
interest has a fundamental interest in bringing about a society (a) that is based
on freedom, equality and democracy, (b) in which illegitimate repressive forces
have, been dissolved and (c) which promotes individual and social empowerment,
in short an emancipated society - 'individual autonomy within a just society'
(Massclielein, 1991, p. 97) (see chapter 4.3.4 of this thesis). In this model the
practitioner will seek to become empowered - emancipated - thfough reflec-
tive practice. Reflective practice, then, has an educational agenda of improving
classroom practice and a political agenda of affording teachers a high degree of
autonomy, informed professional judgement decision-making and existential self-
realization in education - individually and collectively - ie it has a particular
substantive agenda. It couples education and society very firmly (Carr and Kern-
mis, 1986; Grundy, 1987; Smyth, 1989b, 1991; Kincheloe, 1991; Prawat, 1991). It
moves beyond craft knowledge and artistry to empowerment and emancipation.
The claim of the power of critical theory to interrogate and transform the
status quo (Gage, 1989, p. 140) in education is immense though no't, of course,
exclusive. Dewey, for example (1933) argues that
[t]lw function of reflective thought is, therefore, to transform a situation in
which tln're is experienced obscurity, doubt, conflict, disturbance of some sort, into a
situatioii that is clear, coherent, settled, harmonious (Dewey, 1933, p. 100).
The emancipatory reflective interest has all the attractions of the hermeneutic
interest outlined earlier but, additionally and significantly, it has a political agenda.
Unlike the hermeneutic interest which is undiscriminating in the theeretical fields
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to be chosen, Habermas's emancipatory interest is specific in defining the theories
with which it is concerned - ideology critique, the notion of the ideal speech
situation and the theory of communicative action.
However, as with the hermeneutic interest, the putative power of critical the-
ory (and Habermas's version of it in particular) to effect change and empowerment
is not guaranteed. Ottmann (1982) argues that that there is a 'singular
tirnation of the power of reflection' in Habermas's work (Ottman, 1982, p. 86).
Though Haberinas's views entail subjects examining the causes and legitimacy of
their circumstances he may be overemphasizing their abilities to alter the situation.
He singularly neglects the practicalities of achieving agendas for empowerment. In
this respect Dewey's is a far more promising set of proposals, being rooted in
action.
Nevertheless Habermas's principle of ideal speech is a powerful call to begin
the process of emancipation by taking account of people's current circumstances, to
have them set their agenda rather than to have it imposed. It begins where people
are. In that respect it embodies the collegiality and dialogical practices noted in
the hermeneutic interest. In its call for the involvement of teachers in realizing their
own futures themselves, emancipatory reflective practice is a means ofjovercoming
the motivation crisis to which Habermas (176a) alludes. Emancipatory reflective
practice motivates practitioners to create their own freedoms.
Conclusion
One can see that in many respects there are important similarities and differ-
ences between Dewey and Habermas in their interpretation and prescriptions for
reflective practice. These can be summarised thus (Table 1):
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Table 1: Habermas and Dewey Compared
and Deweys Concerns in Reflective Practice
Habermas's Concerns	 Dewey's Concerns
Political Agenda	 Psychological Agenda
Problem ba.scd, deriving from real 	 Problem based, deriving from real
situations and the suppression of	 situations, situated activity
generalizahie interests';	 which is context-bound
Prescribes resolutions to problems 	 Seeks resolution to ambiguous
through coimnunicative action, the 	 situtations through judgeinent
ideal. eech situation and an appeal	 and the practicability of proposed
to freedom, equality, rational 	 solutions; seeks a
argument, autonomy, justice and 	 rational consensus;
enh1)ower111ent 	 _____________________________________________________________
Prescribes the operation of the 	 Involves open-ended and open-minded
ideal speech situation in seeking	 search;
solutions:
Requires ideology critique;	 Requires the exercise of judgement;
Requires rational reconstruction of 	 Requires problems to be
systematically distorted communication empirically operationalizable;
which has led to the repression and
the suppression of generalizuble
interests:
Assumes that rational reconstruction	 Requires problems to be empirically
and the ideal speech situation will	 soluble;
dissolveproblems;	 ______________________________________________
Auti:ipates real solutions;	 Anticipates real solutions;
Requires personal commitment of 	 Requires personal commitment of
practitioiiers.	 practitioners.
Hahermas appears to be much more narrowly prescriptive in his analysis than
does Dewey. Indeed for Habermas reflective practice only springs from repression
and the suppression of generalizable interests - a narrow view of reflective prac-
tice which is rooted in pathology, when something has gone wrong. Additionally
Habermas puts exclusive store by a series of exhortations to the ideal speech situ-
ation, the process of rational reconstruction and ideology critique to bring about
an ernancipatory reflective interest. Whether he is correct in so doing, however
optimistic a view of human nature this espouses, is ultimately an empirical mat-
ter; that is where Dewey's work has an advantage for he requires solutions to be
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practicable. Though Dewey does not concern himself with an agenda of political
emancipation in his 1933 publication (though clearly he does so in his Democracy
in Education (1916)) it does not follow that his prescriptions for reflective prac-
tice are any less einancipatory. Indeed it could be argued that Dewey's notions of
reflective practice, resonating much more with Habermas's strategic action rather
than communicative action, could be much more certain to bring about teachers'
empowerment than the ethereal rationalisation of Habermas (cf the critiques of
Habermas by Bernstein, 1976; Keat, 1981; Lukes, 1982; Boudon, 1989). Hence
though Habermas may have an additional agenda to Dewey it is by no means
certain that his narrow prescriptions for the achievement of that agda will be
successful. On the other hand Dewey's prescriptions are much more eclectic, much
more 'down-to-earth', much less dogmatically prescriptive and begin with the agen-
das of teachers rather than the agendas of critical theorists. Whether he is correct
to do so is another matter; Habermas's prescriptions give a high profile to central
tenets of freedom, justice, democracy, autonomy and equality. In an age where
threats to these are evidenced daily throughout the world it may be that Haber-
mas's elevation of these principles is both timely and welcome. Reflective practice
is neither educationally nor politically innocent.
Notes
[1] Pollard's and Tann's (1993) introduction to reflective teaching, rooted in
the work of Dewey (1933), provides a six-fold definition of reflective teaching (pp.
9 - 10) which captures the wide range of meanings and components of reflective
practice but, nevertheless, does not enable the practitioner to distinguish that
which makes reflective practice different from other forms of enquiry.._
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[2] Dewey notes that 'it has been suggested that reflective thinking involves
a look into the future, a forecast, an anticipation, or a prediction, and that this
should be listed as a sixth aspect, or phase' (Dewey, 1933, p. 117) but he dismisses
this on the grounds that this is evident in all 'intellectual suggestion.., ie it is not
peculiar to reflection.
[3]This appendix will not dwell on Habermas's justifications for his views or
the several critiques of his views. These are discussed fully in the thesis.
[4]Habermas (1974a) accords considerable power to self-reflection as a tool of
critique as it can provide 'emancipation from unrecognized dependencies - that
is, knowledge coincides with the fulfilment of the interest in liberation through
knowledge' (Habermas, 1974a, p. 9).
[5]Smyth (1 989b) parallels this in his model of critical reflective action which
has a sequence of four stages: description, information, confrontation and recon-
struction (pp. 5 - 7).
[6]This is akin to Habermas's (1970b, 1988) critique of Gadamer's emphasis
on hermeneutics, viz, that Gadamer is too accepting of history and tradition,
overlooks the role of ideology in concealing the operation of illegitimate power, is
neglectful of critique and, thereby, neglectftil of setting an agenda for democracy,
freedom, equality and the furtherance of 'generalizable interests'.
[7]This resonates with Lukes's (1977), Keat's (1981), Fay's (1987) and Boudon's
(1989) criticisms of Habermas's ideal speech situation, that he neglects the day-to-
day realities of oppression, power and constraint that cannot be resolved by the
force of argument or the ability to understand others' perspectives alone.
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Appendix H
The Pressure for the Reduction of LEA Powers
There was a concern amongst right wing pressure groups (outlined in chapter
12) for the number of perceived 'left-of-centre' LEAs, particularly the former Inner
London Education Authority. The power of LEAs stood in the way of centralised
control of education and the opening up of education to market forces, a central
tenet of the conservative government anxious to secure a fourth term in office
(Simon, 1988).
The breaking of the power of the LEAs was introduced in the name of allowing
parents greater variety and choice in their children's education by providing: (i)
I-
more types of schools (eg City Technology College, grant-maintained schools); (ii)
more information about schools (through school prospectuses and the publication
of schools' examination and assessment results); (iii) the opportunity to 'opt out'
of local authority control (grant-maintained schools) accompanied by a massive
publicity campaign and the massive diversion of funds into sponsoring them.
Further, the introduction of Local Management of Schools, combined with the
devolution of monies for in-service work, effectively deprived the LEAs of power
over budgetary control of schools. With regard to in-service money the government
required money to be spent on its own agenda - principally servicing the National
Curriculum and management development, ie the LEAs had little control over the
in-service money which had not been devolved to schools.
This breaking of LEA power was part of an overall conservative policy of
reducing local authority power generally, evidenced in rate capping. _Dismantling
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local authority powers enabled an authoritarian centralist regime to drive in its
policies directly into schools, power-coercively, (Havelock, 1973), without a mid-
dle tier of realistic opposition from democratically elected representatives of local
communities (Coffield and Edwards, 1989).
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Appendix I
The Neglect of Professional Opinion in Education
The history of the conservative government of the 1980s and 1990s is one of
sidelining professional opinion. For example the Schools Council (a curriculum
development agency with teacher representatives on its governing committee) and
the Central Advisory Councils for Education were abolished in 1984 and 1986
respectively and increased lay representation on governing bodies was introduced
in the latter year.
The National Curriculum was brought in after the many thousands of dissent-
ing voices from the spheres of education had been 'consulted' but in fact ignored
(Simon, 1988). Further the National Curriculum was devised with no clear ratio-
nale (Bennett, 1990) and in the face of clear hostility to its testing arrangements
from teachers and educationists (Goldstein, 1991).
Whilst the arguments of the Adam Smith Institute (1984) against listening to
teachers were that they would be seeking to serve their own self-interests ('producer
capture') the events of the mid-1990s displace this view (eg the eventual reduction
of the National Curriculum, the failure of the policy of 'opting out' in many parts
of the country, the two-year struggle over the amount and nature of testing which
led to the teachers' boycott in 1993 and 1994, the dismissal of the Secretary of
State for, amongst other matters, his neglect of professional opinion).
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Appendix J
A Spiral of Objectives in the EIU Document
This is derived from an an analysis of Education for Economic and Industrial
Understanding (National Curriculum Council (1990)).
A SPIRAL OF OBJECTIVES IN THE EIU DOCUMENT
	
KS1 KS2
	 KS3	 KS4
Objective	 1	 1	 1	 1
Number:	 2	 3	 13, 14, 19, 20	 13, 14. 19. 20
4	 4	 4
___________ 4
	 5	 14	 14
_____ 5 6	 3	 3
________ 6	 7	 10,11	 9.11,12
_____ 7 8
	 8	 8
__________ 8
	 9, 10	 10, 11
	
9. 11. 12
________ 9 11,12
	 5	 5.10
________	 2,	 2,7	 2,7
___________ - 10	 10, 11	 9. 11, 12
_______ - 12	 5	 5.10
___________ - 13
	 16	 17
___________ - 14
	 6, 16, 18	 6. 17. 19
____ - __ 9	 7
________ - ____	 12	 9.11.12
__________	 _____	 15	 13. 15
__________ - _____
	 17	 18
16
One cati see that each Key Stage (KS) adds new concepts as well as develops
those from the previous Key Stage.
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Appendix K
An Update on the Politics of the Curriculum
At the time of completing this thesis six events have occurred which provide
an interesting update to the application of Habermas's advocacy of communicative
action:
(a) in 1993 and 1994, in the face of an increasingly authoritarian and dirigiste
government, teachers in the United Kingdom collectively and successfully refused
to carry out the government's bureaucratic requirements for the testing of pupils
and the provision of data for making public the results of what were seen as
illegitimate tests and the serving of an inappropriate - market-driven - view
of education. This action was begun in the field of the English curriculum, an
interesting reference to Habermas's power of language, and swelled to include the
whole curriculum. It provides a striking example of the power of a participatory
democracy which operated from the principles of the ideal speech situation. This
contributed in no small part to the dismissal of the Secretary of State for Education
in July, 1994.
(b) in response to concerted objections from teachers to the lesser weightings
given to their assessments in comparison to nationally set assessments, in 1993 and
1994 teacher assessments were given equal weighting with national assessments.
(c) in 1993 the Secretary of State for Education, in an attempt to defuse
the growing power and militancy of teachers in their opposition to the National
Curriculum, commissioned a report into the National Curriculum. He accepted its
findings on the same day as the first report was published; the suggestions were
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for a slimming down of the National Curriculum's level of prescription and the
reduction of testing, albeit to standard written tests. One can see in the documents
the erosion of the significance of pedagogy. In the first two versions of the National
Curriculum they were included separately in the curriculum prescriptions (eg in
the Mathematics curriculum (DES, 1991a)); in the third version they have been
subsumed in other, content-framed versions of the National Curriculum, a Pyrrhic
victory, perhaps, for teachers and emancipatory curricula.
(d) in 1993 the Secretary of State for Education not only refused to listen to
parents' groups but described them as 'neanderthal'. This was seen. te contribute
to his dismissal from office in 1994 - a failure to act communicatively had sorry
effects for him.
(e) in 1994 it became clear that the contents of the National Curriculum would
continue to be contentious (eg the History curriculum was seen to celebrate a white,
insular and supremacist culture), ie strategic action continued to be threatened by
communicative action.
(f) in 1994 it became clear that the rate of growth of City Technology Col-
leges and Grant Maintained Schools (ie those that 'opted out' of local authority
control) was much slower than desired by the government, an indication of the
communicative power of collective participatory action by local authorities and
parents.
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